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Abstract
On 14 January 1963, French President General Charles de Gaulle shook the 
Western world. During a press conference, he announced that France was not only 
vetoing the British application to join the European Economic Community, but that it 
was also rejecting US President John F. Kennedy’s proposal to integrate the French 
nuclear force defrappe into the Multilateral Force. In the aftermath of the Algerian War, 
De Gaulle’s spectacular double non was meant to signal the shift to a more ambitious 
diplomatic agenda, which centred on the twin aims of recapturing France’s Great Power 
status, and striving to overcome the Cold War bipolar order. In the next five years, 
France placed itself at the forefront of international affairs through a series of bold 
initiatives that affected all areas of the world. Yet, by the summer 1968, the General’s 
grand design was effectively in ruins, following a series of domestic and international 
setbacks.
Despite the fact that there is vast literature on the subject, there are still important 
divisions when it comes to assessing the exact intentions of the French President. Was he 
primarily pursuing revisionist goals, or was he in fact more interested by traditional Great 
Power interests? Was De Gaulle anti-American? This dissertation aims to present a more 
nuanced picture of French foreign policy between 1963 and 1968. It will attempt, thanks 
to its multi-archival and multi-national research, to place Paris’ actions in a more 
international context. It will further argue that the General’s grand design is best 
understood by underlining the role of linkages, which is to say by systematically studying 
the interactions between the various policy spheres, rather than considering them in 
isolation.
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Introduction
On Monday 7 March 1966, French President General Charles de Gaulle sent a letter to 
his American counterpart Lyndon Baines Johnson. The tone of the message was generally 
cordial, even including a tribute to the role played by the United States [US] in the defence of the 
Western world. The content, though, was not so courteous. While remaining a member of the 
Atlantic Alliance, established by the Washington Treaty in April 1949, De Gaulle solemnly and 
unilaterally announced that France intended to withdraw from the integrated military structure of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO]1. This was a crucial moment for France and the 
Atlantic organisation. While it was the culmination of the policy of independence initiated by the 
General since his return to power in 1958, it was also a clear attempt to dispute the whole 
architecture of Atlantic relations, which helped generate “the most traumatic moment in NATO’s 
history”2. Interestingly, in this same letter to Johnson, De Gaulle justified his bold initiative by 
referring to the changes that had taken place, or were taking place, since 1949 in Europe, Asia 
and elsewhere3.
There is no doubt that the Cold War had undergone an important transformation within a 
generation. At the time of its inception, in the late 1940s, the multi-dimensional confrontation -  
covering ideology, culture, economic development and nuclear weapons to name a few -  
between the world’s two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, had helped create 
a rigid bipolar order. As a consequence, Europe and Germany had been divided into two hostile 
and monolithic camps, separated by the Iron Curtain and protected by new military alliances, 
NATO in the West and the Warsaw Pact in the East. In the respective blocs, Washington and 
Moscow possessed an overwhelming share of power and authority, leaving the European 
countries devastated by World War Two very limited influence over their fate.
1 De Gaulle, Charles, Lettres, Notes et Carnets: Tome X fLNC: XI. (Paris: Plon, 1987), pp.261-262
2 Ellison, James, “Defeating the General: Anglo-American Relations, Europe and the NATO Crisis of 1966”, Cold 
War History, Vol.6/1 (2006), p.85
,3 De Gaulle, LNC: X. p.261
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Yet, in the early 1960s, as the Cold War entered a less acute phase, the nature of the 
confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union, as well as the international order itself, 
seemed to be evolving. For a start, Europe was progressively losing its central role in the 
superpower rivalry. By 1963, following the building of the Berlin Wall two years before and the 
end of the Berlin crisis, a relatively stable system had emerged on the old continent based on 
three pillars: a general respect for the status quo in Central Europe, especially Berlin, the non­
nuclear status of West Germany, and the continuing American military presence on German soil. 
It was not that the Cold War was over or that a final settlement had been reached, but the threat 
of a major war had receded significantly4. Concomitantly, the Third World was fast becoming 
the main stage of the competition between Washington and Moscow. The process of 
decolonisation had led to the creation of a large number of independent states in Asia and Africa, 
thereby complicating the international system. The emergence of this vast grey zone between 
East and West certainly attracted the superpowers and gave them an opportunity to expand their 
influence throughout the world, but it also increased the risks of conflict. Nowhere was this 
clearer than during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, when the world moved to the 
threshold of nuclear holocaust. It was a crucial turning point, and a sobering reminder for the US 
and the Soviet Union that despite their hostility, they shared common interests, starting with the 
need to prevent their mutual destruction. The limited superpower detente or the relaxation of 
tension in the aftermath of the Cuban episode was effectively an attempt to guarantee more 
predictability in East-West relations.
Regional conflicts and national forces in the developing world still had the potential to 
cause big power collision, but they mostly convinced Moscow and Washington to pursue a more 
regularised cooperation and crisis-defusing dialogue. Yet, if the international order in the 1960s 
was still structured around the US-Soviet competition, there were growing signs that the scales
4 Trachtenberg, Marc, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement. 1945-1963. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999), pp.398-399
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of power were tipping away from both superpower5. The Cold War system was becoming more 
diffuse. The Big Two were no longer as predominant as they once had been and they now had to 
deal with far less docile allies. It seemed as if they were facing a bigger threat within than 
outside their respective blocs.
In the East, the People’s Republic of China [PRC] was the most visible, but not 
exclusive, example of this trend. Following its success in the civil war in October 1949, the 
Chinese Communist Party had initially decided to align itself on the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, 
within less than a decade, Beijing began to actively challenge Moscow’s leadership of the world 
communist movement. Profound differences over the concept of peaceful coexistence, and the 
best strategy to adopt towards the US, caused serious friction, and by 1960, relations between 
China and the Soviet Union had reached breaking point. The Sino-Soviet split effectively 
signalled the end of the communist world as a monolithic entity. Moreover, the Cuban Missile 
Crisis further strengthened the aspirations of small states for greater autonomy. As Mastny 
explains, both the US and the Soviet Union had to pay a price for what they had allowed to 
happen. Their allies were alarmed about how close they had been to getting embroiled in a war 
not of their making, but rooted in a confrontation between two superpowers over which they had 
no control6.
If the Cold War was in a state of flux in the early 1960s, the same applied to the Western 
world. At the outset, the Atlantic Community established after World War Two depended 
entirely on America’s leadership, the US’ overwhelming superiority in all domains, and its 
ability to carry a disproportionate share of the burden. NATO and the American troops provided 
security for Western Europe, and the nuclear umbrella played the role of ultimate defence against 
a Soviet invasion. Similarly, Washington’s supremacy meant that it could shape the post-war 
economic and financial order. The Marshall Plan gave a much-needed boost to European and
V** iCoy^o'Yy
5 Dumbrell, John, President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet communism. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2004), p.26
6 Mastny, Vojtech, “Detente, the Superpowers and their Allies, 1962-64”, in Loth, Wilfried (ed.), Europe. Cold War 
and Coexistence. 1963-1965. (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p.215
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kick-started trade, while the Bretton Woods conference in July 1944 created a new international 
monetary system based on a fixed dollar-gold parity for official reserve transactions. Considering 
how the US possessed half of the world’s gold reserves, it was only natural that the dollar was at 
the centre of this new mechanism. Western Europe, devastated by the recent conflict, was largely 
confined to a subordinate role.
However, important changes in the 1950s, starting with the dramatic European economic 
recovery, put pressure on the foundations of the Western bloc and strained relations between 
partners on both sides of the Atlantic7. The creation of the European Economic Community 
[EEC] in 1957 -  a customs union including six states, France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg -  and the subsequent efforts to improve political cooperation, 
symbolised the resurgence and growing ambition of the old continent. The US viewed this 
development with both satisfaction and apprehension. On the one hand, it welcomed regional 
integration as a way of strengthening the European economies and increasing their unity. On the 
other hand, it feared that the EEC might raise protectionist barriers, shut out US exports, and 
undermine the cohesion of the Western Alliance8.
The Western European economic revival also had implications for the international 
monetary system. By the late 1950s, the in-built flaws of the Bretton Woods system were 
becoming very apparent, especially the so-called Triffin dilemma, after Yale economist Robert 
Triffin. The world was dependent on US deficits for growth of reserves, but an increase in 
dollars in circulation carried the risk of fostering inflation and undermining the international 
faith in the dollar. Yet, if US deficits were eliminated, the world would be deprived of its major 
source of reserve growth, with detrimental effects on world trade and economic activity. 
Additionally, American gold stocks began to decline steadily, and its balance of payments 
consistently showed a deficit. US international accounts were being drained by a variety of 
factors, including its overseas military commitments tied to the Cold War, its support for free
7 See Giauque, Jeffrey, Grand Designs and Visions of Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the Reorganization of 
Western Europe. 1955-1963. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002)
8 Zeiler, Thomas, American trade and power in the 1960’s, (New York: Columbia University Press, c l 992), p.27
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trade, and the European economic recovery that was pushing American companies to invest 
offshore. Many Europeans complained about these deficits, and worried that they would force 
Washington to end dollar convertibility. In such a case, the billions of dollars in foreign 
government treasuries would drastically decline in value. At the same time, European officials 
could not push the US too far. The easiest way for the US to end its balance of payments deficits 
was to eliminate or significantly decrease its defence commitments to Europe9.
Furthermore, the erosion of the credibility of the nuclear deterrent posed a serious 
dilemma. Once the Soviet Union developed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles [ICBM] in 1957, 
the American territory was no longer invulnerable to Soviet nuclear attacks. Would the US 
government then sacrifice New York to defend Hamburg? This was the heart of the problem, and 
to overcome Washington decided to switch NATO’s nuclear strategy from massive retaliation to
fkt*
flexible response. The idea was to reduce the Alliance’s dependence on nuclear weapons and 
develop a variety of responses to any Soviet invasion, which included a build-up of the member- 
states’ conventional capabilities. Yet, for the Europeans, this appeared as a sign that the US was 
decoupling itself from the defence of Western Europe10.
By 1962, as Mahan points out, mistrust and tension had infected the Atlantic Alliance11. 
It was in reaction to these complex problems that US President John F. Kennedy decided to put 
forward his Grand Design in a speech in Philadelphia on 4 July 1962, in which he stressed the 
importance of the two pillar Atlantic partnership, the US and Western Europe, ‘developing 
coordinated policies in all economic, political and diplomatic areas’. This was essentially a
9 For more on the international monetary system, see Solomon, Robert, The International Monetary System. 1945- 
1976: An Insider’s View. (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977), pp.26-33; Kunz, Diane, “The American 
Economic Consequences of 1968”, in Fink, Carole, Gassert, Philippe, and Junker, Detlef (ed.), 1968: The World 
Transformed, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.85-88; Gavin, Francis, Gold, Dollars, and Power: 
The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958-1971, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2004), pp. 17-31; for the link between monetary and security issues, see Zimmermann, Hubert, Money and Security: 
troops, monetary policy, and West Germany’s relations with the United States and Britain, 1950-1971, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001)
10 For more on the nuclear dilemma, see Bozo, Frederic, Deux Strategies pour l’Europe: De Gaulle, les Etats-Unis et 
1’Alliance Atlantique. 1958-1969. (Paris: Plon, 1996); Haftendom, Helga, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A 
Crisis of Credibility, 1966-1967. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Pagedas, Constantine, Anglo-American Strategic 
Relations and the French Problem, 1960-1963: A Troubled Partnership, (London: Frank Cass, 2000)
11 Mahan, Erin, Kennedy, De Gaulle, and Western Europe. (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 122
11
proposal for interdependence under US guidance, which centred around three key initiatives12. 
Firstly, Washington supported the British application to join the EEC, which had been on the 
table since July 196113. Secondly, Kennedy pushed for a new more ambitious round of talks of 
the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade [GATT] -  dubbed the Kennedy Round -  to 
prevent the Atlantic Community from dissolving into separate trade systems. Thanks to the 
Trade Expansion Act [TEA] passed by Congress, he was granted extensive authorities for the 
five year period ending on 30 June 1967. The two more noticeable powers allowed the President 
to negotiate a reciprocated and across the board 50% reduction in tariffs on both sides of the 
Atlantic, as well as to completely eliminate tariffs when the US and the EEC combined for at 
least 80% of world exports. This was the so-called “dominant supplier” provision, which would 
only be meaningful if Britain joined the European Community14. Finally, the US sought to create 
a Multilateral Force [MLF]. First proposed in December 1960 at the Atlantic Council by US 
Secretary of State, Christian Herter, the MLF project was an attempt to establish an integrated 
nuclear force for NATO. The aim was to try to restore European confidence in the American 
nuclear umbrella, and concede some limited European role in matters of nuclear strategy15.
Kennedy, however, was not the sole Western statesman with a grand design. After 
coming back to power in May 1958, De Gaulle immediately set out to implement his vision for 
the future of the Atlantic Alliance, which rested on two key ideas. On the one hand, he sought to 
restore French independence, especially in the military field. Generally opposed to the principle 
of integration, the General specifically disapproved of NATO’s organisation. He considered that 
France was not being given its rightful place, and that it was effectively subordinated to the 
Anglo-Saxon powers. As he made clear in his September 1958 memorandum to US President
12 Bange, Oliver, The EEC crisis of 1963: Kennedy, Macmillan, de Gaulle and Adenauer in conflict, (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press in association with Institute of Contemporary British History, 1999), p.42
13 For more on the British application and negotiations with the EEC, see Ludlow, N. Piers, Dealing with Britain: 
The Six and the First UK Application to the EEC. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)
14 For more on the Kennedy Round, see Zeiler, American Trade: Preeg, Ernest, Traders and Diplomats: an analysis 
of the Kennedy Round of negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. (Washington: Brookings 
Institution, 1970); Evans, John Walker, The Kennedy Round in American trade policy: the twilight of the GATT?. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971)
15 Barbier, Colette, “La Force Multilaterale”, Relations Internationales, Vol.69 (Printemps 1992), p.3
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Dwight Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, “France cannot consider that 
NATO, in its current form, satisfies the conditions of the security of the Free World and, 
especially, its own security”16. Instead, he called for a reform of the Atlantic Alliance through 
the establishment of a tripartite directorate. When Eisenhower and Macmillan failed to follow up 
on his suggestion, the General began to progressively disengage French troops from NATO’s 
integrated military structure17.
On the other hand, Paris accepted the Rome Treaty and fully invested itself into the 
development of the EEC. Of course, this was partly motivated by self-interest, and in particular 
guaranteeing the establishment of the Common Agricultural Policy [CAP] as a compensation for 
the creation of a common industrial market. Yet, France was also genuinely keen to develop a 
Western European political entity. The latter would remain allied with the US, but ultimately 
become more independent, and would be limited to the Six members of the EEC -  in other 
words, there was no desire to let Britain join the European Community. To this end, French 
leaders initiated a rapprochement with West Germany, and proposed the Fouchet Plan for an 
intergovernmental political union between the Six18. During his first four years in power, though, 
De Gaulle faced a series of significant obstacles that prevented him from fully pursuing his 
grand design. Domestically, he realised that France first needed to strengthen its economy and its 
army, which meant especially completing the development of a nuclear arsenal, before it could 
aspire to an independent foreign policy. Externally, the brutal Algerian conflict and the tense 
East-West relations further limited France’s diplomatic margin of manoeuvre.
All was to change, however, in 196219. Thanks to his success in the referendum of 28 
October, which modified the constitution and ensured that the president would be elected by 
universal suffrage, and the victory of the Gaullist party Union pour la Nouvelle Republique
16 Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres Frangais [MAEF]: Secretariat General [SG], Entretiens et Messages [EM], 
Vol.5: Memorandum for Eisenhower and Macmillan, 17.09.58
17 Evidence seems to suggest that De Gaulle expected Eisenhower and Macmillan to reject his memorandum, see 
Peyrefitte, Alain, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.l, (Paris: Editions de Fallois: Fayard, 1994), p.352; De Gaulle, Charles, 
Memoires d’espoir: tome 1. (Paris : Plon, 1970), p.215
18 For the Plan Fouchet see Giauque, Grand Designs: Soutou, Georges-Henri, “Le general de Gaulle, le plan 
Fouchet et 1’Europe”, Commentaire, Vol. 13/52 (Winter 1990-1991)
19 See Burin des Roziers, Etienne, Retour aux Sources: 1962.1’annee decisive. (Paris: Plon, 1986)
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[UNR] in the parliamentary elections of 18-25 November, the General had significantly 
strengthened his domestic position. He could now look ahead to three years free from electoral 
constraints. At the same time, key changes on the international sphere seemed to open up new 
opportunities for France. The Evian Accords in March finally ended the Algerian war, and 
removed a major thorn in the French side. Having turned the page of colonisation, Paris could 
now look towards expanding its action throughout the Third World. Furthermore, the Cuban 
Missile Crisis was again decisive. While De Gaulle gave his unconditional support to 
Washington during the crisis, the lessons he drew were to have a lasting impact on French 
strategy. In his view, the Cuban episode convinced him that neither the US nor the Soviet Union 
wanted to fight a war. It was clear that Moscow would not dare to attack Europe, which meant 
that there was a chance in the future that it would be interested in peace and improving relations 
with Paris. Additionally, the crisis confirmed to the General that the US would not be willing to 
risk a nuclear conflict to defend Europe. This was the best justification for his policy of
30independence and the need to develop a nuclear arsenal, or force defrappe .
Thus,, by the end of 1962, the situation was ripe for a change of course in French 
diplomacy. On the one hand, France had the means to pursue a more independent policy, and it 
now faced a more favourable international environment. In the space of four years, the economy 
had grown remarkably, and the government had managed to repay its debts and stabilise its 
currency21. Despite the failure of the Fouchet Plan in April, the Franco-German rapprochement 
at least had made great strides forward. As both sides discussed the option of signing a 
reconciliation treaty, the creation of a Paris-Bonn axis, as the basis of a more independent 
Western Europe, was now a distinct possibility. At the same time, the Nassau Accords of 
December 1962, which highlighted the British dependence on the US in military matters and the 
strength of the ‘special relationship’, essentially gave De Gaulle a pretext to veto London’s
20 Vaisse, Maurice, “’Une hirondelle ne fait pas le printemps’: La France et la crise de Cuba”, in Vaisse, Maurice 
(ed.), L’Europe et la Crise de Cuba. (Paris: A. Colin, 1993), pp. 104-105
21 Vaisse, Maurice, La grandeur: politique etrangere du General de Gaulle 1958-1969. (Paris: Fayard, 1998), pp.42- 
43
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O')application to the EEC . On the other hand, there was an urgent need for decisive action. 
Kennedy’s Grand Design threatened to establish a large Atlantic Community, which would 
subsume the General’s goal of developing a more independent Western Europe.
This dissertation is a study of the underlying motivations of French foreign policy 
between 1963 and 1968. This was a significant period when Paris pursued in all spheres a very 
ambitious and independent diplomatic agenda, placing it at the forefront of international affairs. 
It was also a time when it increasingly resorted to unilateral and forceful actions, angering its 
allies in the process. If France played such a prominent and controversial role, it was in no small 
measure due to its intriguing and charismatic leader, General de Gaulle. Already a prestigious 
figure thanks to his wartime past, the French President further distinguished himself by his bold 
initiatives and his distinctive style. As a master tactician, he relied on an impeccable sense of 
timing, along with his eloquence and carefully prepared speeches, to give a maximum impact to 
his decisions. His semi-annual press conferences, which hosted the press corps and other 
notables, were a perfect example of this. According to John Newhouse, they resembled a piece 
of theatre, an event, a happening -  a ritual with all the panoply and pomp of a royal ceremony, 
which few performed as well as De Gaulle23.
Moreover, the General cultivated secrecy and surprise with great skill, in order to add 
more weight to his policies. This reflected in part his natural separateness and remoteness. Even 
his closest advisers declared that it was impossible to achieve familiarity or intimacy with him24. 
It also stemmed from his conception of authority and leadership. For De Gaulle, the chief was 
necessarily distant, because authority depended on status, and status required distance. There 
could be no prestige without mystery, as one could not worship what one knew too well25. Thus, 
the French President never hesitated to resort to deliberate ambiguity. What he meant by a 
‘European Europe’, a ‘Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals’, or the neutralisation of Vietnam,
22 Ibid, p.219
23 Newhouse, John, De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons. (New York: Viking Press, 1970), p.237
24 Jackson, Julian, Charles de Gaulle. (London: Haus, 2003), pp.55-57
25 De Gaulle, Charles, Le Fil de l’Epee. (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1944), p.44, 66
15
was never clearly spelt out. He constantly kept his allies in the dark and second guessing about 
his ultimate intentions, much to their frustration. The key point, as Logevall points out, is that 
vagueness and a certain blurring of categories generally suited De Gaulle’s purposes26.
However, this same elusiveness certainly has not facilitated the task of historians. The 
vast number of memoirs, biographies, and scholarly works focusing on the General -  in excess 
of three thousand items -  are a testimony to the enduring fascination with Gaullism, but also to 
the fact that there are still very sharp differences when it comes to analysing the fundamental 
goals of its foreign policy. Considering the size of the literature, it makes little sense to provide a 
complete and exhaustive historiographical review. Instead, the discussion will be restricted to a 
certain number of central and controversial debates, which are particularly relevant for this 
dissertation.
The first, and most important one, focusses on whether or not De Gaulle possessed a 
grand design, and if so what was he trying to achieve with it. Thus, a certain number of former 
officials and scholars have rejected, or tried to downplay, the fact that the French President had 
any sort of plan, or broader vision for his diplomacy. Pierre Salinger, Kennedy’s former 
spokesman, claimed that the General was mainly interested in restoring France’s pride and 
convincing its population that they were now independent. In a similar vain, former Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger believed that his aim was essentially pedagogical, that is to say he wanted 
to teach his people to adopt a more independent attitude27. More recently, in the field of 
European integration, Andrew Moravcsik suggested that Paris was driven by the desire to secure 
commercial interests for its agriculture and industry, rather than by any attempt to accomplish 
grand political and ideological goals28.
26 Logevall, Fredrik, Choosing war: the lost chance for peace and the escalation o f war in Vietnam, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999), p. 104
27 Salinger, Pierre, in De Gaulle ou l'eternel defi: 56 temoignages. (Paris: Seuil, 1988), Lacouture, Jean and Mehl, 
Roland (ed.), p.144, 152; Quoted by Durandin, Catherine, La France contre l’Amerique, (Paris: Presses 
universitaires de France, 1994), p.l 13
28 Moravcsik, Andrew, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), p.177
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Alternatively, another school has argued that the French President did have a design, but 
one that was essentially negative, and which sought to achieve narrow, selfish, or even 
irresponsible objectives for his country. For example, former Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
pointed out that De Gaulle’s diplomatic agenda aimed at establishing a continental system led by 
France29. Similarly, Newhouse believed that although the General was the sole figure who could 
lay a strong claim to leadership in Europe, he generally deployed his strength only to advance 
some largely irrelevant claims to greatness. This included a very dangerous attack against the 
principle of integration in both the EEC and NATO30. Eric Roussel largely followed this line in 
his recent very detailed biography of De Gaulle. In his view, the General’s grand design from 
1963 onwards was centred on three main pillars: restoring French grandeur, building Europe
- j  i
around France, and countering as much as possible America’s hegemonic power .
A final group of scholars have defended the French President’s foreign policy as a 
genuine attempt to overcome the Cold War order and change the international status quo. De 
Gaulle viewed the Cold War as a dangerous system, where all states were permanently 
threatened by two contradictory, but equally dangerous trends, that is to say either a superpower 
war or a superpower joint hegemony. According to Maurice Vaisse, he believed that a multipolar 
world would be more balanced and stable than the existing bipolar system32. He was driven, in 
the words of Stanley Hoffman, by a sort of “global revisionism”. Not only did he want, in the 
view of Edward Kolodziej, to recapture France’s lost grandeur, but he also tried to undo 
superpower rule and fashion a world order based on the multiplicity of nation-states and 
responsive to their individual needs33.
Moreover, De Gaulle’s attitude towards America has equally generated much debate 
within the literature. On the one hand, many American officials in the Kennedy administration
29 Rusk, Dean, As I Saw It: A Secretary of State’s Memoirs. (London: Tauris, 1990), p.240
30 Newhouse, De Gaulle, p.248
31 Roussel, Eric, Charles de Gaulle. (Paris: Gallimard, 2002), p.738
32 Vaisse, La grandeur, p.51
33 Hoffman, Stanley, Essais sur la France: Declin ou Renouveau?, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1974), p.321; Kolodziej, 
Edward, French international policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou: the politics of grandeur. (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1974), p.56
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felt that the General not fully rational, and that his policy was “largely animated by anti-US 
prejudice”. He was the ultimate free rider, a “highly egocentric” leader, “with touches of 
megalomania”, and who welcomed confrontation with the US as a way to regain France’s 
identity as a great power34. For Richard Kuisel, the French President was even anti-American in 
the sense that he challenged US leadership and harboured strong antipathy for its society35. On 
the other hand, some authors and former French officials have rejected the idea that De Gaulle 
was obsessed with Washington. In their view, there were disagreements and opposition, but 
nothing that could be construed as systematic hostility. The tension was more the result of 
conflicting national goals, and if anything, the General was more anti-hegemonic than anti- 
American36. Finally, there is also a divide when it comes to assessing the goals of France’s Third 
World policy. Former French Foreign Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, defended Gaullist 
policy as a grand charitable mission, which aimed to train and foster the progress of the Third 
World states. Authors such as Anthony Hartley or Philip Cemy, however, have focused more on 
the imperatives of Great Power status, and how these pushed France towards pursuing self- 
interested goals, such as economic and industrial benefits37.
Amidst this vast and polarised literature, this dissertation will try to contribute to the field 
in the following ways. It will argue that while De Gaulle was not anti-American in the sense of a 
systematic hostility, the growing tension between France and the US did push him to become 
more and more obsessed with his powerful ally, to the extent that it pervaded other aspects of his 
policy. It will further claim that the General had a grand design, which centred on two key and 
interrelated aims, that is to say restoring French independence and overcoming the Cold War
34 Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, p.393; Gaddis, John Lewis, The Cold War: A New History. (New York: 
Penguin Press, 2005), p. 140
35 Kuisel, Richard, Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanisation. (Berkeley, Cal: University of California 
Press, 1993), p. 145
36 See Alphand, Herve in Lacouture, Jean, De Gaulle: vol. 3. (Paris: Le Seuil, 1986), p.344; Costigliola, Frank, 
France and the United States: the cold alliance since World War II. (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992), p. 136; 
Vaisse, La grandeur, p.39
37 See Couve de Murville, Maurice, Une politique etrangere. 1958-1969. (Paris: Plon, 1971); Cemy, Philip, The 
politics of grandeur: ideological aspects of de Gaulle's foreign policy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1980); Hartley, Anthony, Gaullism: The Rise and Fall of a political movement. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1972)
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order. Yet, his vision was more complex and less coherent than previous authors have suggested. 
On the one hand, in regards to Europe, the French President was attempting, as George-Henri 
Soutou pointed out, to completely transform the Continent’s security system, rather than look for 
a way to reinforce transatlantic ties as suggested by Frederic Bozo38. On the other hand, it was 
essentially a Euro-centric model, in which the Third World was little more than an area of 
competition for Great Powers keen to spread their spheres of influence. Similarly, there is a need 
for a more nuanced assessment of why the Gaullist project failed, which goes beyond blaming 
either French weaknesses, or blaming the rigidity of the international system39. Instead, the 
emphasis will be placed on the inability of Paris to deal with the complex challenge of 
interdependence.
Furthermore, this thesis will also distinguish itself by its methodology and sources. 
Despite the fact that De Gaulle’s private papers remain closed, this work tried to overcome that 
obstacle by relying on very extensive multi-archival and multinational research in French, 
American and British government documents, as well as private papers and interviews. This 
means it was able to benefit from the large amount of materials on the 1960s that were 
declassified in the last few years in France, including for example the files on the Vietnam War 
or on the withdrawal from NATO at the Quai d’Orsay, or the boxes on monetary policy at the 
Archives Nationales. Most recently the private papers of Michel Debre during his time as 
Minister of Finances in 1966-1968 have been made available to scholars, and provide a wealth of 
useful information. The evidence from the US and Britain helped to compensate some omissions 
from the French archives, noticeably by giving a better sense of how the Quai d’Orsay reacted to 
De Gaulle’s actions, and were very helpful in placing French foreign policy in its larger 
international context.
38 Soutou, Georges-Henri, “La decision frangaise de quitter le commandement integre de l ’OTAN (1966)”, in 
Harder, Hans-Joachim (ed.), Von Truman bis Harmel: Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Spannungsfeld von 
NATO und europaischer Integration, (Miinchen: R. Oldenbourg, 2000), p. 188; Bozo, Deux Strategies, p. 16
39 See Wolton, Thierry, La France sous influence: Paris-Moscou, 30 ans de relations secretes, (Paris: Grasset, 1997), 
p. 443; Charbonnel, Jean, L’ Aventure de la Fidelite, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1976), p. 126
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The main contribution of this dissertation, however, is the method it uses to conceptualise 
the General’s grand design. It will seek to explain French policy by underlining the role of 
linkages. Of course, previous authors have occasionally pointed out the connections between 
certain of De Gaulle’s initiatives, especially the close ties between the withdrawal from NATO 
and his rapprochement with the Eastern Bloc40. Yet, this is the first time that any scholarly work 
has engaged in such a systematic analysis of the links between the various policy spheres. It 
emphasises not only the interactions between France’s Westpolitik, Ostpolitik and its policy 
towards the Third World, but also the way in which decisions towards NATO impacted other 
spheres, such as the European Community level or even the monetary negotiations. By adopting 
this methodology, and by not looking at the various policy strands in isolation, it is possible to 
reach a better and more dynamic understanding of the De Gaulle’s grand strategy.
Finally, the topic of French foreign policy between 1963 and 1968 is a very broad one, 
and it is thus essential to set out the limits of the subject, in order to keep it manageable. This 
dissertation is not meant to be an exhaustive work. It is concerned with France’s attempts to 
overcome and transform the Cold War order, which explains why Africa only features briefly. It 
mostly focusses on the international, rather than domestic scene. This is not to say that domestic 
factors had no influence whatsoever on De Gaulle’s strategy, quite the opposite. As Kolodziej 
claims, part of the appeal of pursuing grandeur was that it was a way to harness the energies of 
Frenchmen, distracting them from petty personal concerns and mutual animosities41. Yet, it 
would be misleading to suggest that domestic goals were the main motivation behind the 
General’s foreign policy.
Moreover, while it also covers economic, monetary and military affairs, this thesis is 
essentially looking at policy from a diplomatic and political standpoint. As such, it clearly places 
De Gaulle at the heart of the decision-making process. Naturally, the French President was never 
omnipotent nor omniscient. He could not possibly be in control of all aspects of policy at the
40 For example Bozo, Deux Strategies, p. 163
41 Kolodziej, French international policy, p.28
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same time. He also, obviously, relied on advice from a variety of sources, including 
ambassadors, his diplomatic advisers, Etienne Burin des Roziers, Secretary General of the 
Elysee between 1962 and 1967, and of course Maurice Couve de Murville, who held the position 
of Foreign Minister between 1958 and 1968. Nonetheless, De Gaulle still played a predominant 
role when it came to devising France’s grand strategy. His distrust of the Quai d’Orsay, and its 
tendency to compromise, meant that he often kept it in the dark when it came to key decisions -  
for example the recognition of China or the withdrawal from NATO42. Similarly, the Council of 
Ministers was a very formal affair, and rarely led to any decision-making. According to Jean 
Charbonnel, a junior Minister between January 1966 and March 1967, there were only four 
instances of round-the-table debates during his time in government43. Instead, decisions were 
generally taken in small committees, especially during Inner Councils44. It is therefore justifiable 
for a study of French foreign policy in this period to focus primarily on De Gaulle.
This study is divided into two broad chronological sections. The first part, covering the 
period between 1963 and 1965, is organised thematically and geographically. Considering how 
De Gaulle followed multiple paths in his quest to restore France’s Great Power status, this 
arrangement makes it easier to examine the separate strands of his policy, and the specific goals 
he pursued in each of them. It is also a useful way to detail the various challenges that Paris 
faced. Thus, the opening chapter will focus on France’s policy towards the Western world. It will 
explain why the General moved away from his ambition to build an independent Western 
Europe, centred on the Franco-Germany axis, and shifted towards a more critical stance towards 
the American hegemony. It will also emphasise the close interactions between events in NATO, 
the EEC, the international monetary negotiations, and the Kennedy Round. Chapter two will 
concentrate on the relations between France and the Communist world. More specifically, it will 
analyse why De Gaulle reversed his opposition to East-West detente, and how the
42 Hartley, Gaullism, pp. 196-197
43 Interview with Jean Charbonnel, Paris, 15.09.04
44 See Vaisse, La grandeur, pp.284-314 for a more in-depth look at the decision-making process; See also The 
National Archives [TNA]: Foreign Office [FO] 371/177865: Paris to FO, 13.05.64
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rapprochement progressively took place between France and the countries of the Eastern bloc. 
The third chapter will highlight the policy towards the developing states. It will discuss to what 
extent De Gaulle actually had a coherent policy towards the Third World, and whether there was 
a gap between the rhetoric and reality. It will also try to show how France’s Third World policy 
fitted in its overall strategy, and how that evolved through time.
The second part, which includes the period following the General’s re-election as 
President in December 1965 up to August 1968, is organised in chronological fashion. Such a 
procedure has the advantage of not only bringing together the broad threads of the first three 
chapters, but it also helps to give a more convincing explanation of the rise and fall of the 
Gaullist grand design. De Gaulle’s bold and spectacular initiatives in 1966, including the 
withdrawal from NATO, his trip to the Soviet Union, and his Phnom Penh speech, are at the 
heart of chapter four. This was without doubt the high point of his attempt to transform the 
international order, and the clearest expression of his ultimate grand design. Chapters five and 
six will detail the major challenges faced by Paris throughout 1967. In particular, the decisive 
problem was how to deal with the question of interdependence. If France needed to maintain the 
unity of the Six over monetary matters, it was also pursuing policies towards the EEC and 
NATO that were inimical to the interests of its European Community partners. Finally, the fall of 
De Gaulle’s ambitious diplomatic agenda during the first eight months of 1968 will dominate 
chapter seven. His grand design, it will be argued, was dead months before he left office in April 
1969.
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Part I: The Quest for Great Power Status. 1963-1965
Chapter I; All (not so) Quiet on the Western Front
I. Introduction
January 1963 was, without doubt, an extremely traumatic and significant month for the 
Western world. Not only did the French President, General Charles de Gaulle, veto British entry 
into the EEC during his press conference on 14 January, but he also rejected American President 
John F. Kennedy’s proposal to integrate the French nuclear force de frappe into the MLF. By 
doing( so he effectively destroyed Kennedy’s Grand Design for a partnership between Western 
Europe and the US. With that move, he also prevented the establishment of a vast Atlantic zone 
of free trade. The Kennedy Round as such was not in ruins, but De Gaulle had managed to limit 
its scale and make the ‘dominant supplier’ provision meaningless1. Additionally, the treaty 
signed a few days later between Paris and Bonn caused panic in Washington that West Germany 
was about to follow in France’s footsteps. Though this hysteria died down quickly, the events of 
January were to leave lasting scars at all levels of the Atlantic Community.
January 1963 was equally a significant turning point for French foreign policy as a 
whole, and especially its Westpolitik. Certainly, De Gaulle felt that he had to act decisively to 
face the challenge posed by Kennedy’s plan, and as both his domestic and international position 
had been strengthened in late 1962 -  thanks to the victories in the referendum and the legislative 
elections, and the imminent Treaty with West Germany -  he believed that he could now resort to 
more dramatic methods. More importantly, with the perspective of having to face no major 
elections for the next three years, the General wanted his press conference and the Treaty to 
signal a shift in France’s policy towards the Western bloc, with his three main goals of 
promoting France’s quest for Great Power status, resisting American hegemony, and helping to 
develop a more independent Western Europe through the Franco-German axis.
1 Jouve, Edmond, Le General de Gaulle et la Construction de PEurope (1940-1966) Tome I. (Paris: Librairie 
generate de droit et de jurisprudence, R. Pichon et R. Durand-Auzias, 1967), p.614
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French Prime Minister George Pompidou summed up well this new direction a few days 
before the conference. “If Britain entered the EEC, nothing could stop the American firms from 
invading the continent. [...] We are the only ones defending Europe against the American 
invasion. [...] We have decolonised the French empire. We now have to shake off the Anglo- 
Saxon colonisation”2.
II. .Tanuarv-Mav 1963: Le Double Non and its consequences
Through his press conference, De Gaulle believed he was defending Western Europe and 
preventing the consolidation of American hegemony. Because of London’s close relationship 
with Washington, allowing it to join the EEC would threaten the Community’s fragile 
equilibrium, and undermine its cohesion and distinctive European nature. The end-result could 
only be the emergence of a “colossal Atlantic Community under US direction and leadership ... 
[that would] quickly absorb the European Communities”3. In the same way, accepting the MLF 
appeared dangerous to the French President because it opened the way to complete US 
dominance in nuclear matters, at a time when the Cuban missile crisis highlighted how the 
defence of Western Europe “is no longer a top priority [of the US]”4.
Apart from resisting the Anglo-Saxon “challenge”, taking the lead in opposing their 
initiatives strengthened France’s claim to Great Power status. By not integrating the force de 
frappe into the MLF, De Gaulle ensured that France would not lose control of its independent 
nuclear deterrent, which was for him a vital criterion of Great Power status. Such an independent 
arsenal was both a right for Great Powers and an “equaliser” versus more powerful states, or 
what De Gaulle called la dissuasion du plus faible au plus fort. Similarly, rejecting British entry 
into the EEC guaranteed that France remained the sole power in the EEC with an independent 
nuclear force, and thus safeguarded its position as the leading power in Western Europe.
2 Peyrefitte, Alain, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.2. (Paris: Editions de Fallois: Fayard, 1997), 07.01.63, p. 16
3 De Gaulle, Charles, Discours et Messages : Tome IV, [DM: IV1. (Paris: Plon, 1970), p.69
4 Ibid, p.72
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However, De Gaulle’s press conference was not simply an exercise of obstruction and 
self-promotion. It also outlined an alternative organisation for the Western World around the 
idea of “independence and alliance”5. The ongoing Soviet menace certainly justified an alliance 
between Western Europe and the US, but equally he argued “alliances do not have absolute 
virtues”6. Western Europe needed to develop as an independent political entity, separate from the 
Americans, in charge of its own fate and ready to defend itself. Instead of Kennedy’s “Great 
Partnership”, De Gaulle envisaged Western Europe as tied to the US by a minimal alliance -  the 
promise to mutually defend each other in case of war -  but centred on the blossoming Franco- 
German axis.
The Franco-German treaty signed on 22 January laid the foundations for increased 
collaboration in all fields between both states; in particular, De Gaulle attached great importance 
to defence because “without organised military cooperation, political cooperation would lose its 
purpose”7. Both the French President and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer perceived 
the treaty as key, albeit for different reasons. If De Gaulle saw it as vital for his European 
strategic project, Adenauer considered it as the crowning achievement of the Franco-German 
reconciliation before he left power, and as a way of restraining De Gaulle’s tendency of 
undermining NATO8. Nevertheless, the General’s attachment to the Treaty was also an 
emotional one, and not solely a strategic calculation. As he confessed a few weeks later: “When I 
went to Germany [in September 1962], I was expecting to be well received. However, in front of 
the warmth of the welcome, in front of the popular enthusiasm, I saw the profound feelings of 
the German people towards the French people. And that is not misleading. That is why we have 
to solidly anchor West Germany to Europe and to the West”9. In other words, De Gaulle hoped 
that the Franco-German reconciliation could usher a new era in the relations between both states.
5 Ibid, p.72
6 Ibid, p.71
7 Maillard, Pierre, De Gaulle et le Probleme Allemand: Les lecons d’un grand dessein, (Paris: Guibert, 2001), p. 187; 
MAEF: Cabinet du Ministre [CM], Couve de Murville [CD], Vol.375: De Gaulle-Adenauer meeting 2, 21.01.63
8 Soutou, Georges-Henri, L’Alliance Incertaine: Les rapports politico-strategiques franco-allemands 1954-1996. 
(Paris: Fayard, 1996), p.253
9 Jouve, De Gaulle II. 12.02.63, p.290
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If they managed to develop a common policy, they could create a model around which the other 
EEC partners could gravitate, and foster the development of a more independent Western 
Europe.
Taken together, the press conference and the Franco-German treaty were meant to signal 
the “rebirth” of France as a Great Power, but they mostly triggered a major crisis within the 
Western world. If France was certainly not alone in feeling that the negotiations with Britain 
were getting bogged down, it was De Gaulle’s unilateral method of action -  possibly even more 
so than the content -  that truly shocked the other Five EEC members10. At the same time, the 
Franco-German treaty threw the US government into a state of panic. Kennedy considered the 
Franco-German Treaty as a “very unfriendly act”, while interpreting French actions as an 
attempt to kick the US out of Europe and break up NATO11. The American administration also 
feared the monetary power of the Franco-German bloc. Possessing more dollars in reserves than 
other countries, France and West Germany could potentially expose the US’ monetary 
weaknesses by running down the American gold supply, and thus shaking confidence in the 
dollar12.
Despite the initial shock, the Five refused to cave in to the French demands, and
pressured Paris into accepting a new EEC meeting in Brussels on 28 January13. The Five were
further egged on by Washington. Believing that their allies could force France to change its mind
if they remained united, American officials did not hesitate to pressure the Five; US Secretary of
State Dean Rusk even ominously warned West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder that
“if this negotiation [EEC] should fail, there would result a most serious injury to Western
cohesion in the cooperation across the Atlantic”14. This vigourous resistance surprised the
French government and created divisions on how to respond, a development that emerged during
10 Maijolin, Robert, Architect of European Unity: Memoirs. 1911-1986. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989), 
p.338
1 Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS]: 1961-1963, Vol.XIII: Document 60, 23.01.63 and Document 169, 
25.01.63
12 Gavin, Gold. Dollars, and Power, p.94
13 For more details on the Five’s reactions and attempts to pressure France, see Bange, EEC crisis
14 Jauvert, Vincent, L'Amerique contre De Gaulle: histoire secrete (1961-1969). (Paris: Seuil, 2000), pp.103-105; 
FRUS: 1961-1963, Vol.XIII: Document 62, 28.01.63
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the Council of Ministers on 24 January. While French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de 
Murville was worried by his country’s isolation and advocated delaying tactics, De Gaulle 
preferred the option of a brutal crisis15. In the end, the President’s line prevailed and France 
stuck to its guns during the Brussels meeting. In the absence of a consensus over enlargement, 
the EEC had no choice but to end negotiations with London on 29 January. The Five’s anger and 
frustration with France at that moment was seldom to be matched again16.
By vetoing Britain’s candidacy to join the EEC and by signing the Franco-German 
Treaty soon after, De Gaulle dealt a serious blow to Kennedy’s goal of a “Great Partnership” 
between the US and Western Europe, and caused major drama within the Atlantic Alliance. Yet, 
the consequences of these twin blows, at least in the short and medium-term, were limited. 
Despite strong domestic support for his policies, the French President had no intention, at that 
moment, of launching a full-frontal challenge in all spheres against the US17. That is not to say 
that he was not worried by America. As he confessed to his Minister for Information, Alain 
Peyrefitte, on 27 February, “US imperialism, no field can escape it. It takes all forms, but the 
most insidious one is the dollar [...] Luckily we prevented the British from coming into the EEC. 
If not, American investments in Britain would have multiplied. It would have been the 
bridgehead of the American invasion of capital in Europe”. He added to Peyrefitte on 30 April 
“the Americans are engaged in a process of dominance of all the political, financial, economic 
and military circuits. [...] That is why we must create the irreversible. The irreversible, for 
currencies, would be the gold standard”18. De Gaulle, however, did not really publicise those 
concerns.
In the same way, French policy towards NATO and the MLF after January remained 
largely non-confrontational. De Gaulle argued to Adenauer that a future reform of NATO could
15 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: v o l.l, p.369
16 Ludlow, N. Piers, The European Community and the Crises o f the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist challenge. 
(London: Routledge, 2006), p.l 1; See also Bange, EEC crisis, pp.229-230
17 Vai'sse, La grandeur, p.351, in January 1963 47% of French people approved De Gaulle’s policy towards the US, 
17% disapproved, and 36% had no opinion; Institut Frangais d’Opinion Publique, Les Frangais et De Gaulle, (Paris: 
Plon, 1971), p.277, in February-March 1963 44% approved France’s initiative to end negotiations with Britain, 21% 
disapproved, and 35% had no opinion.
18 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.2, pp.74-75
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be possible if European cooperation developed enough, but “for the moment there is no 
alternative to US omnipotence”19. Thus France minimised both its involvement in NATO’s 
affairs and its obstructive policies. Couve indicated that France could not accept the MLF 
proposal, but would still take an interest in how it developed20. Nonetheless, this aloof behaviour 
did not translate into any major improvement of French relations with the organisation. Couve 
did not object to the MLF because he felt that it had little support amongst NATO members, and 
thus was unlikely to ever become a reality21. Additionally, while not openly challenging NATO, 
France pursued its policy of reclaiming national control over its armed forces, and made plans to 
withdraw from the integrated military command22. Finally, while reminding allies that France 
wanted to contribute significantly to the defence of Western Europe and develop its nuclear 
deterrent, De Gaulle’s official speeches continued to question America’s commitment to defend 
its Atlantic allies23.
Fundamentally, though, the French government backed down from a clash with its allies 
because its aims were more defensive than is generally believed. Having repealed Kennedy’s 
“Great Partnership”, the key focus was now on consolidating its claim to Great Power status and 
defending French interests. In particular, agriculture was of paramount importance as De Gaulle 
explained in his 14 January press conference. “We cannot conceive of a Common Market where 
agriculture would not receive its rightful place and we feel that amongst the Six, we are the 
country that needs this the most” 24. True, the French simultaneously pursued more ambitious 
and revisionist goals through the Franco-German axis, which was meant to provide the basis of a 
more independent Western Europe. However, this remained a long-term objective for De Gaulle, 
especially as long as Europe still lacked a clear political will25. Couve thus summed up French 
thinking nicely when he indicated that the priority for the Six was to complete the tasks they had
19 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.375: De Gaulle-Adenauer meeting 1, 22.01.63
20 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.375: Couve-Merchant meeting, 25.02.63
21 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.375: Couve-Rusk meeting, 07.04.63
22 De Gaulle, Charles, LNC: IX. (Paris: Plon, 1986), De Gaulle to Maillard, 21.03.63, p.324
23 De Gaulle, DM: IV. Televised Speech, 19.04.63, p.96
24 Ibid, p.67
25 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.2, 30.01.63, pp. 19-20
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set themselves, and that first meant establishing the CAP, while the Franco-German Treaty 
would prepare the stage for future political developments within Europe . Yet, in order to get 
the EEC running again, France needed to be conciliatory enough to overcome the crisis, but not 
so much as to undermine its vital interests.
After the Brussels split, the French adopted a mixed strategy. On the one hand, officials 
went to great lengths to reassure Allies, explaining that the door of the Common Market was not 
closed to Britain, and that France did not want an autarkic, inward-looking Western Europe27. To 
appease their partners, the French also made a certain number of compromises to show their 
good-will, such as by going ahead with tariff cuts and external tariff alignments planned for 1 
July, or claiming that they were approaching the forthcoming Kennedy Round in a positive 
spirit28. On the other hand, France’s restraint and conciliatory behaviour was not incompatible 
with relying on confrontational tactics when need be. De Gaulle openly confronted the Dutch, 
complaining about their obstructionist behaviour towards the Common Market since the Brussels 
split, and accusing them of displaying a total loss of interest in the latter’s establishment29. 
Moreover, the Five helped the French. Noting that De Gaulle opposed further integration 
between the US and Western Europe, it made little sense for them to further endanger the EEC; 
instead, they attempted to revive the Community while maintaining a close bond with Britain. 
West Germany, under criticism for the supposed exclusive nature of the Franco-Germany treaty, 
took a leading role in this process. During the 2 April meeting of the Council of Foreign 
Ministers of the Six, Schroeder presented his ‘synchronisation’ plan -  a broad programme of 
work for the future development of the Community -  to restore political momentum to the 
EEC30.
26 Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques [FNSP]: Fonds Couve de Murville [CM] Carton 1: Speech to 
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27 MAEF: Amerique, Etats-Unis 1952-1963, Vol.358: Alphand interview with ABC, 30.01.63
28 Ludlow, European Community, p.23
29 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.375: De Gaulle-Luns meeting, 16.03.63
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France had thus adopted a cautious attitude expecting that, with time, the hostile attitude 
of its partners would lessen and that the Six could move on. The 2 April meeting highlighted the 
relative success of this strategy. Jean-Marc Boegner, French permanent representative to the 
EEC, concluded that the improvement in atmosphere had been progressive, due both to the 
Five’s unwillingness to paralyse the Common Market, and France’s reassurances that it was 
committed to developing the Common Market and an outward-looking EEC. The crisis was not 
over, but getting back to work seemed to be on everyone’s agenda31. Similarly, the agreement on 
9 May for the Community’s future agenda represented a victory for France. The Council decided 
to define the basic elements of the CAP before any negotiation on agriculture within the 
Kennedy Round, prevailing over the German-Dutch thesis, which wanted greater simultaneous 
progress on both fronts. Moreover, the Council unambiguously emphasised the need to reach an 
agreement on the next three sets of CAP regulations -  beef, rice and dairy products -  by 31 
December 1963, rather than the preferred German deadline of 1 July 1964. Finally, regarding the 
industrial component of the Kennedy Round, the Council agreed on a strategy, which fitted well 
with the three aims the French were hoping to achieve with tariff negotiations: lessening 
obstacles to international trade, removing disparities between tariffs, and equilibrium in 
reciprocated concessions32.
If France’s priority in this period was consolidating the CAP, it nonetheless saw distinct 
advantages in cooperating on the Kennedy Round. The latter forced the EEC states, very divided 
after the split of January 1963, to work towards a common effort in order to conciliate their often 
diverging interests, while the Five’s strong attachment to the success of the negotiations -  
especially Bonn -  gave France a valuable lever for other questions33. Moreover, the French also 
managed to win over their partners on the EEC strategy towards the Kennedy Round, in 
particular on tariff disparities. For example, during a talk with US officials, Belgian Foreign
31 Documents Diplomatiques Frangais [DDF]: 1963, Tome I: Boegner to Couve, Telegram number 566-578,
03.04.63
32 DDF: 1963, Tome I: Boegner to Couve, Telegram number 768-794,10.05.63
33 Boegner, Jean-Marc, Le Marche Commun de Six a Neuf. (Paris: Armand Colin, 1974), p.129
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Minister Paul-Henri Spaak “confessed that he was personally impressed by the arguments put 
forward by France that our equilinear approach did not in itself represent an entirely satisfactory 
or equitable solution for the high tariffs problem”34.
Indeed, the French appealed to legitimate concerns of the EEC members. If the 
Community seemed to accept the procedural implications of linear tariff reductions, “they would 
not trust them to produce the kind of reciprocity they had sought in past negotiations and still 
continued to seek”; instead the EEC suggested ecretement, a formula for automatic and unequal 
cuts35. The Community certainly felt vulnerable to the US export policy, but not to the extent of 
threatening to scupper the Kennedy Round. France’s partners generally supported Kennedy’s 
trade aims, and in any case the American government was desperate to keep the negotiations on 
track. If the Kennedy Round failed, and it did not obtain a bigger trade surplus to make up for its 
balance of payments deficit, the US feared that it would have to cut its economic and military 
expenditures -  i.e. probably reduce the number of American soldiers serving abroad36. In those 
conditions, after intense discussions during 16-21 May ministerial meeting in Geneva, all the 
parties involved achieved a breakthrough. The talks over agriculture remained in a dead-end, but 
thanks to postponement and ambiguity, the Ministers agreed “in those cases where there are 
significant disparities in tariff levels, the tariff reductions will be based upon special rules of 
general and automatic application”37. The battle over disparities was not over, but at least the 
negotiations in this rule-making stage could move forward before the planned official opening of 
the Kennedy Round in May 1964.
On a superficial level, it seemed as if the Atlantic Alliance had successfully overcome the 
challenge posed by De Gaulle in January; both the EEC and the Kennedy Round, for example, 
had taken important steps forward in their May meetings. Unfortunately, this was largely 
misleading. These agreements had not resolved some of the key differences, especially the clash
34 National Archives Record Administration [NARA]: Record Group [RG] 59, Central Foreign Policy Files [CFPF], 
1963, Box 3911: Brussels to State Department, Telegram number 1704, 12.05.63
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37 Evans, Kennedy Round, p. 192
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between Paris and Bonn over the future direction of the Community. Moreover, as Spaak points 
out, the 14 January press conference was a turning point for the EEC. The veto left a strong 
legacy of mistrust that would plague the Community for years to come, and a desire for revenge 
persisted among France’s partners38. Finally, there was the little matter of the major American 
offensive to improve relations with Western Europe and to nip the Franco-German Treaty in the 
bud.
To counter De Gaulle, the Kennedy administration espoused a carrot-and-stick approach. 
They sought to restore US-European trust by pushing for closer integration, while privately 
encouraging the Five to unite and stand up against De Gaulle. They also refrained from starting 
an open battle with the French President, fearing that it would give credence to the General’s 
attacks against the US, and adversely affect the unity of the Atlantic Alliance . Moreover, the 
US leaders relied on the MLF as a means to promote closer integration. Walter Dowling, 
American Ambassador in Bonn, emphasised that it could be the answer to De Gaulle’s 
allegations that the US was abandoning Europe40. At the same time, the US also resorted to 
threats and blackmail. Kennedy hinted to Adenauer that continuing European hostility might 
convince the American people and Congress to return to isolationism, while his government 
made it clear to West Germany that if they ratified the Franco-German treaty in its present form, 
they would be putting their relations with the US at risk41.
Washington’s strategy proved successful, especially in Bonn. Karl Carstens, West 
German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, confessed to Roland de Margerie, French 
Ambassador in Bonn, “the situation in the US is serious, it deserves all our attention. It is 
essential we restore the trust that is shaken there ...”42. Additionally, the US had strong 
supporters within the West German government. Schroeder and Ludwig Erhard, the Minister of 
Finance who was due to replace Adenauer as chancellor in October, were determined to
38 Spaak, Paul-Henri, Combats Inacheves: vol.2, (Paris: Fayard, 1969), p.406
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40 FRUS: 1961-1963, Vol.XIII: Document 173, 12.02.63
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neutralise the Franco-German treaty43. In any case, by early February, the idea of adding a 
preamble to the Franco-German treaty had emerged, with the intention of making clear that the 
latter would not affect Bonn’s loyalty to NATO, the Atlantic Alliance and the EEC44. Very 
quickly, the whole German political class rallied around this proposal. On 16 May, the 
Bundestag ratified the Treaty with the preamble. Publicly, France raised no objections, but this 
was not the case privately. De Gaulle was angry because he felt the preamble was emptying the 
Franco-German treaty of its content45.
III. .Tune-December 1963: A Fragile Status-Quo
By mid-1963, the Western bloc had recovered from the shock of De Gaulle’s double non. 
The following year was free of such drama, as all governments sought to avoid serious clashes. 
Yet, the challenge posed by the General in January 1963 -  the future of relations between 
Western Europe and the United States in the political, economic and military spheres -  had not 
been decisively settled and would resurface. This was even more likely because the events of the 
first half of 1963 left lasting scars amongst all parties. The US regretted Western Europe’s lack 
of cooperation in trade negotiations and refusal to carry more of the security burden of the 
Alliance, the Five could not forgive De Gaulle for his veto of Britain, West Germany felt trapped 
amidst the Franco-American rivalry for its favours, and France resented the preamble added to 
the Franco-German treaty.
The preamble and the initial mechanism of Franco-German cooperation certainly 
disappointed De Gaulle, as he told Margerie and later Peyrefitte on the eve of the Bonn summit 
of 4-5 July46. It is easy, however, to overstate the preamble’s immediate impact. Even if it did 
push France to follow a slightly more independent course, it was not quite the complete turning
43 Bange, EEC crisis, pp.229-230
44 The preamble’s exact origin is uncertain. Some suggested it was inspired by Jean Monnet, others claimed it came 
from the American State Department, and others traced it to Eugen Gerstenmaier, a German Christian Democrat 
deputy.
45 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.2, 24.04.63, p.228
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point that Maillard suggests. Soutou is closer to the mark when he argues that the failures of the 
Franco-German Treaty did not become as quickly apparent to the French leaders as is generally 
believed47. The preamble, in fact, had only limited consequences on French grand strategy, and 
De Gaulle continued to hope he could develop Franco-German cooperation, despite existing 
obstacles.
Indeed, French foreign policy displayed a great deal of continuity during the second half 
of 1963. When France acted independently, it did so in domains for which it had been the case 
beforehand -  nuclear and military questions. Thus, it announced the withdrawal of its Atlantic 
fleet from NATO on 21 June, and refused to be bound by the Partial Test Ban Treaty [PTBT], 
signed by Britain, the US and the Soviet Union on 5 August. Additionally, France blocked in the 
autumn all attempts to adopt flexible response as the new nuclear strategy of the Atlantic 
Alliance48. These actions were all driven by a desire to safeguard France’s autonomy of action, a 
vital component in its quest for Great Power Status. For French leaders, a national community 
needed to be in charge of its own defence to keep control of its destiny, whilst they perceived the 
nuclear arsenal as the core element of their policy of independence49. Moreover, De Gaulle 
firmly believed that flexible response, and the concept of a nuclear break, posed a real threat to 
Western Europe’s security in case of a Soviet attack, because there was no guarantee that the US 
would defend its allies. The force defrappe, therefore, could serve to defend the French territory 
in case of a Soviet invasion, and could force the US -  the only truly plausible defenders of 
Western Europe -  to react before it was too late50. This clear difference in strategy between the 
US and Western Europe did not invalidate their alliance, but it certainly made “integration” in 
NATO Unjustifiable51.
47 Maillard, Probleme Allemand. pp. 194-197; Soutou, L’Alliance Incertaine. p.255
48 See Haftendorn, NATO, pp.39-41
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Withdrawing its Atlantic Fleet, not signing the PTBT, and the stubborn opposition to 
flexible response, were all calculated to portray France as an independent player to reckon with 
on the international scene. By taking spectacular initiatives, France was both strengthening its 
claim to be a Great Power, and providing a model for other countries to follow. As Couve 
claimed, France could speak in Europe with great authority, and by its example show that 
solidarity was different than conformity52. However, for all its opposition to NATO and 
integration, France still avoided a major “conflict” with the organisation. For a start, the EEC 
remained the priority, and French leaders felt that the situation within NATO was not yet ripe for 
reform53. Couve hinted this to Kennedy in October 1963, as well as France’s discontent with the 
organisation. He pointed “NATO, as it is now, corresponds less and less to realities. Western 
Europe needs a bigger share of responsibilities”, but he also added that it was preferable to 
“leave the situation as it is and not talk about it” 54. France, under no illusions regarding a 
possible reform of NATO, was thus happy to bide its time and stick to its aloof attitude.
Equally Paris, despite the General’s criticism of dollar imperialism, kept a low profile 
during the debates over the international monetary system. Part of this was the result of serious 
divisions within the French government over the strategy to pursue. On the one hand Couve and 
Jacques Rueff, the influential economic adviser to De Gaulle, argued against the Bretton Woods 
system. Couve wanted an increase in the price of gold, while Rueff pushed the General to 
convert France’s dollar reserves into gold, so to indicate his displeasure with American abuses of 
the reserve-currency system. On the other hand Pompidou, and Finance Minister Valery Giscard 
d’Estaing, were more favourable to the US, believing it was in the French national interest to 
stabilise the international monetary situation55. In the short-term, Giscard prevailed over Rueff 
and, along with Pompidou, they convinced the President that the time was not right to denounce
52 FNSP: CM Carton 1: Speech to VAssemblee Nationale, 29.10.63
53 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.2. 27.11.63, p.49
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the international monetary system56. Giscard was thus able to present a moderate line at the 
annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund [IMF]. Though he underlined the flaws in the 
mechanism of the international monetary system, he also declared his country’s readiness to help 
improve the system, including the possibility of increasing liquidity should developments in
cn
world trade make this necessary . General goodwill at the meeting enabled the Ministers and 
Governors of the Group of Ten [G10] -  a select group of IMF states including the US, Canada, 
Germany, Japan, Italy, France, Great Britain, Switzerland, Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium 
-  to agree that their deputies should “undertake a thorough examination of the outlook for the 
functioning of the international monetary system and of its probable future needs for liquidity”58.
France’s less confrontational Westpolitik in this period was essentially shaped by the 
dynamics of the Paris-Washington-Bonn triangle. Admittedly, French leaders were disappointed 
by the fact that their German partners had ran to the US for pardon, after the signing of the 
Franco-German treaty59. De Gaulle thus sent a clear warning to Bonn when he chose to withdraw 
the Atlantic fleet from NATO without prior consultation, and four days before Kennedy’s 
triumphant visit to West Berlin60. Yet, as long as there was hope for Franco-German 
cooperation, it was in Paris’ interest to avoid open competition with Washington for Bonn’s 
loyalty. Thus, Couve publicly denied that the preamble was either a surprise or a major blow to 
French ambitions61. Privately, De Gaulle reassured Adenauer that he had never intended to make 
a policy against the US, and later dismissed as a “bad joke” -  during a talk with Erhard -  the 
idea that Bonn had to choose between Paris and Washington62. At the same time, Couve 
explained to US officials that there was no contradiction in Bonn maintaining good relations
f\Xwith both Paris and Washington . France also played down its conflict with the US, whilst not
56 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.2. 18-19.09.63, p.78
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ignoring the existing problems. For example De Gaulle, during his press conference of 29 July 
1963, was quick to point out that if changes in France’s political, economic and military situation 
had affected Franco-American relations, they certainly did not undermine the alliance between
i  . 64the two countries .
That is not to say there was a real improvement in relations, and both the US and France 
remained suspicious of the other’s intentions towards West Germany. Moreover, if De Gaulle 
dismissed the competition as a “bad joke”, in reality he still entertained the hope that Bonn 
would eventually side with Paris rather than Washington, as he confided to Peyrefitte: “It is 
important for West Germany to understand that its destiny is Europe, and Europe is mainly its 
union with France”65. There was no question, however, of France forcing West Germany to 
make such a choice in the short-run, especially because of the influence of other external factors. 
For a start, as explored in chapter three, Franco-American differences partially shifted from 
European to Asian questions, a region that was of far less interest to West Germany. More 
importantly, the change of leadership in both Bonn and Washington -  Erhard succeeding 
Adenauer as chancellor, and Lyndon Johnson replacing Kennedy after his assassination -  
naturally created uncertainty in regards to their future policy. If De Gaulle did not think much of 
the new American President, he believed that Erhard’s pro-American inclination was not 
necessarily irreversible66.
Furthermore the EEC, rather than Bonn’s ties with Washington, remained the main focus 
of France’s Westpolitik in the second half of 1963. Indeed, for Couve, the Six needed to achieve 
their economic union before they could focus on military and political cooperation and trade
f \7relations with the rest of the world . This meant moving forward on the vital CAP, and making 
sure the Six respect the deadline of 31 December 1963 for agricultural settlements. 
Unfortunately, this also implied overcoming German resistance to the CAP, which escalated in
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the weeks after the 9 May agreement . De Gaulle, convinced that Bonn’s policy was not helping 
the EEC, was determined to express his disappointment during the upcoming Franco-German 
summit in July; the Franco-German entente would be clearly meaningless unless both countries 
could overcome their differences at the Community level69.
At the summit, France followed a mixed strategy of confronting and pressuring Bonn 
about the CAP, while simultaneously displaying signs of empathy and understanding. De Gaulle 
upped the stakes when he accused Bonn of not really wanting to complete the Common Market. 
Couve, on the other hand, agreed with the West Germans that they could not accept exaggerated 
sacrifices. Yet, he also reminded his interlocutors that completing the CAP was vital for any 
common trade policy, and was a prerequisite for the Kennedy Round talks70. Both De Gaulle and 
Couve’s approach ultimately shared the same aim, but neither approach was particularly 
successful. Bonn did not trust its partner and doubted its commitment to succeed on the Kennedy 
Round front. The July meeting really achieved little as the German government stuck to its 
positions: it still complained about the inherent flaws of the CAP and its impact on its trade with 
the outside world, and wanted the EEC foremost to agree on a common position for the 
upcoming Kennedy Round. France’s response to this deadlock was swift and threatening. In his 
press conference of 29 July 1963, De Gaulle made it crystal clear that France considered an 
agreement on the CAP as vital for its agricultural interests and the upcoming tariff negotiations 
with the US. Alternatively, any failure to respect the self-imposed deadlines might cause the 
Common Market to completely disappear. The General also reminded his EEC partners that 
success in the economic field could significantly increase the chances of developing a common 
European policy, a vital aim when the Anglo-Saxon powers were negotiating with the Soviet 
Union over issues that involved the fate of Western Europe71.
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In the final months of 1963, French leaders stuck to the line according to which the 
Common Market could only survive if the Six respected their deadlines. De Gaulle .even dropped 
hints that France could easily live without the Common Market72. However, this was more of an 
example of brinkmanship and a way of pressuring the Five, rather than a genuine threat. Paris 
sometimes feigned indifference towards the Common Market, but remained strongly committed 
to its completion. Therefore, the French President showed flexibility in his attempt to win over 
the Germans. He accepted the possibility of agreeing to a temporary solution for cereal prices, so 
long as Germany agreed to reach an agreement for the other three settlements by the end-of-year 
deadline73. Even in the final days of December, France still worked hard towards a solution. 
Meeting Manfred Klaiber, West German Ambassador in Paris, on 21 December, De Gaulle again 
hinted that France could live without the Common Market. More importantly, he confronted the 
West Germans and questioned their commitment to the EEC. He mentioned that France had 
compromised on the Kennedy Round, and added that doing the same for the European 
Community would not amount to capitulation for Bonn74. All this confirmed that France was far 
from indifferent to the fate of the Common Market.
In the end Sicco Mansholt, the European Commissioner responsible for agriculture, 
helped break the deadlock when he presented his plan on 5 November. In his bold attempt to 
solve both the Community’s internal and external problems, Mansholt put forward three main 
proposals: a common cereal prices by 1 July 1964, the basis of the EEC’s agricultural offer in the 
Kennedy Round, and a Community position on disparities in industrial tariffs for the Kennedy 
Round -  the double ecart15. This was sufficient to push Bonn to step back and compromise on 
the three outstanding CAP regulations. Not only was West Germany isolated on the latter issue, 
but also its government realised that the Mansholt Plan, and especially the proposal on cereal
72 MAEF: SG, EM, Vol. 19: De Gaulle-Bohlen meeting, 05.11.63
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prices, presented a graver threat76. On 23 December, the Six finally reached a package agreement 
for the CAP and the Kennedy Round; the issue of cereal prices was left for later discussions.
1963 thus seemed to end on a high note, and the French were especially pleased. Boegner 
seemed convinced that “the December 23 deal has erased the immediate consequences of the 
crisis caused by the breaking off of negotiations with England”, while De Gaulle approvingly
inspoke to Adenauer of “the success of our Europe in Brussels” . Yet, this was misleading 
because many of the divisive questions, including a common price for cereals and the financial 
settlement for the CAP, had not been sorted. Moreover, France’s future Western policy would 
largely depend on the developments of the Paris-Bonn-Washington triangle. In other words, it 
would depend on how long Paris could tolerate Bonn’s complete loyalty to Washington.
IV. .Tanuarv-.Tulv 1964: Crisis in the Making
During the first half of 1964, the Western world had seemingly overcome the drama of 
the previous year, as all states appeared to cooperate for the good of the Alliance. The changes of 
government in the US, Britain, West Germany and Italy, combined with the willingness of most 
states to limit the general crisis, had helped to cancel out the effects of lingering disputes and 
divisive topics. France, for its part, was focussing less on Europe, and giving more priority to 
gestures that announced future policy axes, rather than resorting to spectacular diplomatic 
initiatives78. However, this peace was fragile, especially as a major Franco-German crisis was 
brewing beneath the surface.
The 23 December agreement was an important achievement for the EEC, even if it 
neither solved all outstanding questions for the Community nor really altered France’s strategy, 
as shown by De Gaulle’s press conference of 31 January. The French President made it clear that 
his priority remained the CAP, and he again warned his EEC partners that failure to complete
76 Ludlow, European Community, p.35
77 Ibid, p.37
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this would lead his country to “reclaim its freedom”. However, if the Six accomplished their 
economic goals, they could then focus on other pressing matters, such as negotiations with 
external states -  especially the US -  and the vital question of developing their political 
cooperation, as long as the latter was not drowned within a wider Atlantic framework and did not
7Qinvolve supranational integration . French leaders essentially supported the principle of a 
political union, but were cautious on the subject since the failure of the Fouchet Plan two years 
earlier.
In any case, as long as Western Europe lacked a common will to become an independent 
political power, they believed that this was not a question for the immediate future80. France’s 
partners, with the noticeable exception of West Germany, shared this assessment, albeit for 
different reasons. For example Giuseppe Saragat, the Italian Foreign Minister, explained to his 
American counterpart Rusk that the December agreement was an important step towards a CAP, 
but it did not mark progress towards political union; there could be no united Europe without
O 1
Britain . Yet, this relative stalemate did not impede the cautious optimism that prevailed within 
the EEC at the time. In a meeting with the same Rusk, the European Commissioners pointed out 
that the Community’s ability to overcome successive crises in 1963 had created a momentum,’ 
which would allow it to move rapidly in 1964. Existing tensions could prevent progress on the 
political front, but the Commission seemed confident that the EEC would further its economic 
unity, and expected success in the Kennedy Round negotiations82.
The trade talks actually progressed smoothly during the first half of 1964. The great 
debate over disparities was finally shelved when all parties agreed to disagree on the subject83. 
Moreover, the mood was relaxed at the formal opening of the Kennedy Round on 4 May, thanks 
to a tacit desire to avoid major confrontations. The participants were thus able to agree 
unanimously on two points: adopting 50% as a working hypothesis for linear cut, and setting 16
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November as the date to table exception lists -the list of items not being offered a 50% cut84. 
This general goodwill also extended to France. Certainly, De Gaulle feared that a Western
oc
Europe without a common tariff would invite an invasion of US products . It convinced French 
officials that it was essential for the Six to maintain their cohesion, in order to ensure success in 
the Kennedy Round negotiations86. This is not to say, though, that Paris wanted the EEC to 
become an autarkic community. As Emile Noel, the European Commission’s Executive 
Secretary, confirmed to American officials, the French negotiators were showing no intentions of 
torpedoing the trade negotiations, although he felt this could change if future CAP talks did not 
succeed87.
Similarly, during their monthly meetings between October 1963 and June 1964, the G10 
deputies managed to discuss changes in the international monetary system without major 
disputes. The participants aired their views and criticisms frankly, but the atmosphere remained 
conciliatory. Giscard criticised the existing system for its lack of ‘automatic machinery’ to bring 
about a prompt return to balance of payments equilibrium for reserve currency states, the 
American deputies argued that the US balance of payments was improving, and the views of 
other deputies ranged between those of the US and France. The end result was a compromise 
report presented by the deputies to their Ministers in mid-June88. The report, published in 
August, essentially defended the international monetary system, and argued that the current 
stocks in gold and reserve currencies could cover liquidity needs. However, it also pointed out 
that the future growth in world trade and world payments would increase demand for liquidities, 
which could be either covered by expanding credit facilities or by establishing new reserve 
instruments; Rinaldo Ossola, of Bank of Italy, was thus asked to lead a group to examine those
84 Ibid, pp.81-83
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different options89. Despite the fact that French criticisms of the international monetary system 
were softened in this report thanks to Anglo-Saxon pressures, De Gaulle nonetheless found the 
compromise acceptable during an Inner Council meeting on 9 June90.
The French President’s apparent unwillingness to start a conflict in the monetary sphere 
certainly gave Giscard more leeway in the negotiations. Unlike some of his colleagues within the 
government, the Minister of Finances seemed ready to work with American authorities, and did 
not intend to end the use of dollar as a reserve currency. What he wanted, instead, was to give 
the French franc a place in a broadened monetary scheme that used additional currencies as 
reserves. As such, Giscard proposed the establishment of a Collective Reserve Unit [CRU], that 
is to say artificial units representing a certain amount of gold, which would have been distributed 
according to the reserves of all states. The CRU would be used outside the IMF -  where the US 
exercised great influence -  and would address French concerns about curbing global inflation, 
while meeting the demands for expanded international liquidity91. Giscard realised, however, 
that his margin of manoeuvre was curtailed by the fact that some of De Gaulle’s advisers,
q >y
especially Couve, were pushing for a tougher stand against the dollar .
Paris cooperated with its partners in the economic, monetary and commercial fields, but 
it also balanced this stance with more independent actions that aimed to promote its claim to 
Great Power status. Indeed, French leaders hoped Western Europe would eventually take 
increasing control of its fate, and force the US to transform its “leadership” into a more equal 
“partnership”. They were convinced that this evolution was inevitable in the long-run, even if 
they acknowledged that there was no such will to act in common in the present93. In the 
meantime, the French government was happy to lead the way for other states and defy its 
powerful American ally, especially since it felt more empowered now that the force de frappe
89 Esteva, Pierre, in De Gaulle en son siecle: vol.3 fPGESS IIP. Institut Charles de Gaulle (ed.), (Paris: La 
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was finally operational94. Thus, Paris surprised most of its allies when it unilaterally announced, 
on 27 January, its decision to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing. This move, as 
described in chapter three, was very closely connected to the situation in South-East Asia, but it 
was also for the General a great opportunity to irritate the Americans and emphasise his 
country’s margin of manoeuvre95. As Couve remarked to Schroeder, Great Powers did not 
always consult their allies: witness the US during the Cuban Missile Crisis96. Similarly, during a 
televised speech, De Gaulle explained to his compatriots that without a nuclear deterrent, they 
would be forced to rely on a “foreign protectorate”, or a veiled attack against the presence of 
American troops on French soil97.
Defence was the central pillar of France’s independent ambitions, and this emerged 
clearly in its policy towards NATO. On 4 March, De Gaulle decided that French naval ships
QO
would no longer be under the organisation’s command . For Jean de la Grandville, head of the 
Quai’s Service des Pactes, this was a further sign -  as he confided to British officials -  that the 
General’s attitude was hardening and that he was preparing France for a complete break with 
NATO99. It was also clear that the French President was the driving force behind this policy, and 
neither Couve nor the French navy were able to soften his instructions regarding the role of 
French ships within the Atlantic organisation100. However, the General’s growing animosity 
towards NATO largely remained concealed in this period, and did not lead to an open 
confrontation. For example, during the mid-May Ministerial meeting in The Hague, Couve 
underlined the split between France and its allies when it came to possible reforms of NATO. 
While France wanted more military freedom, other members were pushing for more integration. 
Yet, he concluded it would be vain to open a debate about the future of the Atlantic Alliance,
94 Bozo, Deux Strategies, pp. 124-125
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considering the irreconcilable gap between the various parties101. As Spaak later surmised, 
Couve avoided all controversial questions during this meeting, because maintaining mystery 
about France’s intentions would better serve its long-term goals towards NATO102.
Fundamentally, though, Paris’ policy towards NATO was tied to the fortunes of the 
Franco-German axis; as long as an effective partnership with Bonn still seemed feasible, France 
would not engage in a full-frontal attack against the Atlantic organisation. However, tension had 
been brewing between both countries ever since they had signed the Treaty in January 1963. 
Within its first year, the preamble, France’s withdrawal of its Atlantic fleet from NATO, and 
tough negotiations over the EEC and the Kennedy Round, had certainly dampened the 
enthusiasm of both governments for the Treaty, not to mention public opinion103. Moreover, the 
trend persisted in the first half of 1964 thanks to France’s unilateral recognition of Communist 
China and the Argoud affair. The latter incident involved the French secret services kidnapping a 
member of the Organisation de VArmee Secrete [OAS] -  involved in murder attempts on De 
Gaulle but roaming free in West Germany -  without informing the authorities.
These episodes did not cause a major Franco-German crisis on their own, but their 
accumulated impact exacerbated doubts held by supporters of the Treaty concerning its 
usefulness. In West Germany, any hope that the Treaty could act as a restraint on French foreign 
policy appeared more and more illusory. As the Secretary to the Chancellery, Ludger Westrick, 
complained to Margerie, Paris’s decision to recognise the PRC, without consulting Bonn, only 
made life more difficult for the German “Gaullists” who pushed for closer cooperation with 
France104. De Gaulle suggested similar concerns when he spoke of “trying to give a new basis to 
our relations with Germany” during a speech on 31 December 1963; while the Treaty had
101 MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.21: Couve to Seydoux, Telegram number 3714-3729, 14.05.64
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worked well in terms of procedures and regular meetings, French officials were convinced it 
could have worked better if Bonn had not constantly looked towards Washington105.
This was clearly the heart of the problem for the French. In all fields, the American 
influence presented an insurmountable obstacle to their hopes of closer cooperation with their 
neighbour. This was true for the field of defence where projects to develop and build common 
weapons, such as tanks, and to establish common strategic and tactical concepts faltered quickly. 
Undoubtedly, the significant arms deal signed in August 1963 -  without informing nor 
consulting the French -  by Kai'-Uwe von Hassel, the German Defence Minister, and his 
American counterpart Robert McNamara, played a significant part in undermining Franco- 
German military cooperation106. Similarly, if De Gaulle questioned America’s commitment to 
defend Western Europe in case of a Soviet aggression, Erhard had a total and loyal belief in the 
US nuclear umbrella107. Essentially, though, the crucial factor proved to be the shift in foreign 
policy introduced by Erhard once he became chancellor. Taking a more independent stance 
towards De Gaulle, the new chancellor quickly moved to repair relations with the US, and 
increasingly based his political fortunes on the assumed steadfastness of the American 
commitment in Europe. As such, he promised several times to his American partners that his 
government accepted full offset for American troops stationed in Germany, despite the concerns 
of many of his officials108. Erhard had clearly chosen Washington over Paris, and a crisis 
appeared pretty inevitable.
The trigger for the crisis was not paradoxically over Europe, but over Vietnam, which 
largely seemed a marginal interest for Bonn109. Yet, on 12 June, a few days after Schroeder had 
mentioned to Couve Bonn’s lack of interest in the situation in Indochina, Erhard offered US
105 De Gaulle, DM: IV. p.153; DDF: 1964, Tome I: Note number 4 of Direction Europe-Centrale, 06.02.64
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President Johnson his full support for the war effort in Vietnam110. According to Klaiber, De 
Gaulle considered Erhard’s statement as a “slap in the face” and yet another proof that Bonn had 
failed to stand up to the US on each and every issue111. If Bonn could not show independence 
from Washington on a question as marginal to German interests as Vietnam, what were the 
chances that it would cooperate closely with France to develop a more independent Western 
Europe? Disappointed by West Germany’s excessive friendliness towards the US, and the fact 
that “they [Germans] do not want it [Franco-German treaty] to be a treaty of friendship and 
cooperation”, De Gaulle was determined to confront the German chancellor during the 
forthcoming Franco-German summit of 3-4 July in Bonn112.
De Gaulle’s first meeting with Erhard set the tone for the following discussions. He 
began by announcing “he had no illusions concerning the results of this meeting with West 
Germany”, and presented Bonn with a clear choice. “Either you [Bonn] follow a policy 
subordinated to the US or you adopt a policy that is European and independent of the US, but not 
hostile to them”113. Erhard and his colleagues, however, rejected the General’s challenge by 
pledging total loyalty to Washington. The French leaders spared no efforts to convey their 
irritation to their German counterparts, and displayed none of the diplomatic restraint, which had 
come to be usually associated with these summits. Equally, they abandoned their restraint 
towards the US, typified by Couve’s very clear description of French strategy towards NATO: 
“withdraw from the integration system and restore national command of our troops”. Likewise, 
Couve showed no flexibility on the project of a European political union, despite the fact it was a 
subject close to Erhard’s heart114.
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Unsurprisingly, the talks ended with no concrete results, as expected by De Gaulle115. If 
he still believed that Bonn would eventually follow France’s independent stand in the long-run, 
he could see no such prospect as long as Erhard remained chancellor. The French government 
had hoped that the January 1963 treaty would help foster a common European policy, which 
could serve as a model for other EEC states and provide the basis of an independent and 
politically strong Western Europe. Yet, the preamble had confirmed that Bonn had not adopted 
the treaty in the same spirit and, instead of working towards a united Europe, it had chosen to 
always side with Washington, even over Vietnam. The consequences were very clear for Couve. 
Without a common European policy, there was no chance of reforming Western Bloc, and no 
more reason for France to accept integration into NATO and general subservience to 
Washington116.
V. Julv-December 1964: Towards a New Strategy
The July 1964 Franco-German summit was a turning point for France’s Westpolitik. De 
Gaulle bitterly acknowledged, “West Germany is an American protectorate in political, military 
and economic terms. There is thus no way of developing a common Franco-German policy”117. 
Without this basis, there was no hope either of creating a more independent Western Europe and 
reforming the Atlantic partnership, even though this remained a long-term goal for France. In the 
short-run, the shortcomings of the treaty freed Paris from the restraint it had displayed earlier so 
to appease Bonn, and pushed it to harden its stance and adopt more independent policies to 
promote its claim to Great Power status. The treaty had clearly lost its special place at the heart 
of French strategy; at the same time, French leaders still believed that cooperation with West 
Germany could serve some interests, especially over the EEC.
The summer months led to no improvement in relations between Paris and Bonn; if 
anything, the situation escalated after De Gaulle’s press conference of 23 July 1964. After
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referring to the “minor successes” of the Franco-German treaty, the master of the Elysee then
110
listed the numerous areas for which both states had failed to agree on a common policy . The 
German government, however, refused to give in to France’s independent behaviour and rejected 
its criticisms. In response to the General’s press conference, Schroeder made it clear that Bonn 
had not signed the treaty to “adopt France’s policy”119. Relations between both partners had 
reached a sort of stalemate, as they blamed each other for the current tensions. Whereas Erhard 
denied that there had ever been a Franco-German consultation over Indochina, the French replied 
that there had been such talks in June, and that the Germans had chosen the American, rather 
than French line, on the subject120.
Germany’s apparent subservience to Washington also led France to adopt a new attitude 
towards the US. As De Gaulle told Herve Alphand, his Ambassador in Washington, “... the 
Americans have to realise they are not the dictators of Western Europe. It is clear for France, but 
others will surely follow, even if they do not seem to for the moment”121. In the meantime, 
France increasingly sought to mark its independence vis-a-vis the US, first and foremost within 
NATO. Just a few days after the July Franco-German summit, De Gaulle privately confided to 
Peyrefitte “the Americans have to leave. [...] Not a single American uniform must remain”122. 
Additionally, France’s more confrontational stance towards the Atlantic organisation became 
more public. During a meeting with Manlio Brosio, the new Secretary-General of NATO, De 
Gaulle forcefully rejected integration as no longer appropriate, and hinted that it would no longer 
apply to his country by 1969 -  the date when member states could theoretically denounce the 
April 1949 North Atlantic Treaty123. For Charles Bohlen, US Ambassador in Paris, this was 
more brutal and specific than previous De Gaulle statements on NATO, and a way for the French
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President to send a message to his allies, because he was aware that Brosio would repeat the 
content of their talk124.
The shortcomings of the treaty with Germany had undoubtedly a very significant impact 
on French foreign policy, but it was actually only after the complex crisis of October-November 
that France changed the strategy of its Westpolitik. This new round of tension erupted in the 
autumn when the fate of various negotiations and projects, normally quite independent from one 
another, suddenly became closely intertwined. This included the MLF, which began receiving 
more active support from the US administration in the spring 1964, and especially from its more 
“Europeanist” elements like George Ball, the Under-Secretary of State for European Affairs. For 
Ball, the MLF presented multiple advantages. Not only would it give West Germany a legitimate 
role in the Alliance’s defence, albeit “on a leash”, but it would also provide “an Atlantic solution 
to the problem of the nuclear defence of the West, and weaken French and British determination 
to hold on to their national nuclear establishments”125. Erhard enthusiastically supported this 
project, and after his meeting on 12 June with Johnson, both men pledged to reach an agreement 
on the MLF by the end of the year. During an interview on 6 October, Erhard went a step further 
when he publicly mentioned the possibility of a German-US bilateral agreement over the 
MLF126.
In parallel, the West German government was also working hard on a plan to re-start 
talks on European political union, which was eventually completed on 4 November. The plan 
outlined progress through several stages, and involved some supranational elements with the 
establishment of a consultative commission to help governments push forward the process127. 
Bonn’s willingness to achieve political union stood in stark contrast with its obstructive policies 
towards the CAP. Despite the European Commission’s repeated pressure, with the backing of
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France and the Netherlands, West Germany continuously refused to agree a common price for 
cereals during meetings in spring and summer 1964; a situation complicated by the fact the 
Community needed to urgently establish a opening stance for the Kennedy Round discussions of 
agricultural trade128. Already bitter because of the failure of the treaty and further disappointed 
by Bonn’s opposition to the CAP and its excessive befriending of Washington, France responded 
forcefully.
On 21 October, reverting to the brinkmanship tactics of the previous year, Peyrefitte 
issued a clear warning to France’s partners in the official communique after the Council of 
Ministers: “The President and the French government stressed that France would cease to 
participate in the EEC if the agricultural market were not organised as it had been agreed that it 
would be organised”; he also added “France maintains in this regards the position it has always 
taken. There is no possibility of negotiating usefully with the US as long as the EEC - including 
agriculture - is not completely organised and this will not be the case as long as the Common 
Market for agriculture is not organised”129. To achieve its goals for the CAP, France was clearly 
ready to resort to all kinds of threats and linkages.
Along with the CAP, Paris launched a major offensive against the MLF. Initially 
unconcerned by the latter because they never thought it would materialise, French officials 
stepped up their opposition to the nuclear force once it became a real possibility, and in 
particular after Erhard’s interview in October130. Additionally, once De Gaulle came back in 
mid-October from his month-long trip in Latin America, his collaborators immediately informed 
him of the latest changes in the MLF negotiations. Describing the force as an American tool to 
“block French diplomacy”, they pushed the President to place this affair on the political level: 
failure to do so would mean France gave the “impression it accepted the indefinite postponement 
of a political Europe in line with its views, and the supremacy of the US in Western Europe”131.
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Convinced by this argument, De Gaulle and his colleagues immediately went about undermining 
the MLF by specifically targeting their German partners. In a meeting with Carstens, Couve tied 
the fate of the plan for European political union to the CAP and the MLF: there could be no 
European union without an agreement on aims and policy, but the discussions on the nuclear 
force confirmed this was not the case. Moreover, how could the Six agree on a political 
organisation if they could not agree on the bases of the Common Market132? Pompidou went 
even further when he claimed, in early November 1964, that the MLF would not be compatible 
with the Franco-German treaty133. Olivier Wormser, head of the Quai’s Direction Economique, 
was right when he pointed out to American officials that the atmosphere reminded him very 
much of January 1963134.
Yet, France’s forceful policies were to a certain extent a defensive reaction, and were not 
solely for selfish reasons. They reflected a growing mistrust of the US, as well as an 
understanding of the events of October-November as part of a wider Franco-American struggle 
over the future of the Western world. Wormser, for example, felt the Americans were clearly 
undermining the CAP, by insisting to the Germans that they did not consider the common price 
of cereals to be of any use for the Kennedy Round135. Couve could thus sum up those
136agricultural questions as an “open and resolute conflict between France and the US” .In  the 
same way, Paris was convinced that the MLF, like the Kennedy Round, was an American 
weapon aiming to divide Europe137. Additionally, it feared that the MLF would allow West 
Germany to indirectly possess nuclear weapons138. This was vital because French plans for 
cooperation with West Germany had always centred on Bonn’ subordination, which depended 
greatly on the fact that France was the sole country to possess nuclear weapons amongst the Six.
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In the end, though, the October-November crisis disappeared as quickly as it had 
emerged. Combined pressure from the EEC and the US, along with hard negotiations, eventually 
convinced West Germany to accept a common price for cereals139. The Kennedy Round also 
moved forward: on 16 November, sixteen countries including the US, Japan, Czechoslovakia, 
the Six and the seven members of the European Free Trade Association submitted their 
exceptions list to an otherwise across the board cut in industrial tariffs140. As for the MLF, 
American interest in the project petered out quickly from late November onwards. Considering 
the numerous obstacles, such as British reluctance, French opposition, divisions within Erhard’s 
Christian Democratic Union [CDU] party, and lukewarm support in Congress, the American 
Ambassador in Bonn George McGhee recommended that the US should let the MLF “sink out of 
sight”141. The MLF was not completely dead yet, but the key issue for the Johnson 
administration was now how to back away from it without offending or humiliating Bonn.
Yet, the consequences of this crisis were far-reaching. Despite the optimism resulting 
from the agreement on a common price for cereals, the Community had in fact been weakened 
by this new episode of brinkmanship. On the French side, German resistance made the 
government even more determined to reach a quick agreement on the financial settlement of the 
CAP, the final step needed for its implementation. On the other hand, the Five and the 
Commission expected future compensation from France in exchange for the agreement on cereal 
prices. In particular, the Erhard government felt it had made great concessions on cereal prices, 
and expected progress in other domains, noticeably its plan for political union142. Disappointed 
by Paris’ opposition to the MLF, Bonn was less likely to make new concessions on the CAP. In 
such circumstances, the margin for compromise in future EEC discussions could only be very 
limited.
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Furthermore, the events in the autumn had a serious impact on Paris’ attitude towards 
both Bonn and Washington. There is no doubt that De Gaulle felt very bitter against the 
Germans and was disappointed by their consistent subservience to the US143. As for Franco- 
American relations, they were already poor, but the French leaders believed they were facing a 
different situation: with the MLF, the American government seemed to be trying to create a sort 
of German-American axis, which would forever prevent the emergence of a more independence 
Western Europe144. The consequences for France’s Westpolitik -  as well as for its policy towards 
the Soviet Union as we will see in the next chapter -  were fundamental. Instead of simply 
defending its independence against its powerful ally, France was now determined to actively 
attack US leadership within the Western world, starting with NATO. Thus, De Gaulle clearly 
accelerated the timing for withdrawal, and he now privately hinted at a move as early as 1967, 
instead of 1969145. As he unambiguously explained to Peyrefitte, “between us and the 
Americans, behind the courteous conversations, it is a struggle. We are the only ones 
resisting”146.
VI. Januarv-.Tune 1965: Challenging America
On 31 December, De Gaulle announced to his compatriots his determination to protect 
France’s independence and reject “all systems which ... would hold us under the hegemony that 
we know”147. True to his word, the French President in 1965 increasingly condemned America’s 
political, economic and military leadership in the Western world, at a time when the Johnson 
administration was dramatically escalating its involvement in Vietnam. Despite its spectacular
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nature, public opinion largely supported this new direction for French foreign policy, as well as 
De Gaulle’s attitude towards the US148.
In the monetary field, the fragile compromise of mid-1964 broke down because of 
interrelated political and economic differences between France and its Anglo-Saxon partners. 
Both parties disagreed over the need for liquidity, Britain and the US looked for ways to create 
liquidity while France wanted to establish a rational objective system of sound international 
finance, and France was preoccupied with the dangers of European inflation resulting from the 
American balance of payments deficit. Politically, France wanted to magnify its own role in 
monetary affairs but distrusted international organisations, while the US wanted to improve the 
IMF mechanisms149. By the time of the annual IMF meeting in September in Tokyo, the 
controversy had become more pronounced. Criticising the gold exchange standard for its 
inflationist tendencies, and for its lack of corrective mechanism for the deficits of the reserve 
currency states, Giscard suggested instead an international monetary system organised in 
concentric circles, with gold at the centre of the system of international payments150. However, 
Douglas Dillon, US Secretary of the Treasury, firmly rebuffed Giscard’s criticisms, and argued 
that a national increase in the contributions to IMF would take care of the problem of liquidity 
for the next few years. The battle lines were now clearly drawn with France keen to see gold 
replace the dollar as the cornerstone of the monetary system, and the Anglo-Saxon powers 
defending the existing organisation151.
The developments in the following months only served to reinforce Paris’ objections. 
With dollar and sterling facing growing problems in late 1964, the French government had 
further evidence to support its views on the lack of discipline of the main debtor countries.
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Moreover, the discussions within the Ossola group, regarding the creation of new reserve 
instruments, had quickly demonstrated a lack of support for Giscard’s CRU proposal152. With the 
failure of Giscard’s plan, the time was thus ripe for a presidential initiative and a more forceful 
stance in monetary matters, especially as France now possessed the means to do so. Its economy 
was growing faster than those of its main Western competitors, and its dollar reserves had 
increased by $5 billion between 1959 and 1963 . It was in this context that De Gaulle gave his
press conference on 4 February 1965.
Taking advantage of this very public platform, the French President denounced the gold 
exchange standard in an eloquent and scathing manner. Not only was it no longer fitted to the 
current situation -  if the US possessed most of the world’s gold reserves after World War Two, 
by 1965, the Six’s total gold reserves were nearly equal to those of the Americans -  but the 
dollar’s special status gave the US unfair privileges. It could run a balance-of-payments deficits 
for free and export its inflation abroad, while all other states were forced to rigourously maintain 
equilibrium154. For the General, the only alternative solution was to establish a system where 
international exchanges would be tied to gold, “a monetary basis that is not controversial and 
bears the sign of no country in particular”155.
As David Calleo rightly argues, the gold standard appealed to De Gaulle because it was a 
metaphor for the requirements of a healthy international order, that is to say a multipolar world 
system based on interdependence without hegemony, and where everyone obeyed the same 
rules156. Yet, at the same time, the master of the Elysee also realised that with this dramatic and 
political denunciation of the dollar and Washington’s monetary predominance, he was defending 
French prestige and placing his country at the forefront of international affairs. This is not to say 
that he did not genuinely seek a reform of the existing international monetary system, but his
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priority was to accommodate French ambition for greater responsibility in world affairs; there 
was no need to start a prolonged monetary war because the General was convinced that the 
flawed gold exchange standard would not survive in the long-run157. In the meantime, the French 
government was just happy to lead the way for other states by publicly and progressively 
converting most of its dollars reserves into gold, and by refusing to vote for the American 
request for a 25% increase in national contributions to the IMF.
Moreover, France in this period was clearly distancing itself from NATO, although the 
General and his close collaborators kept their cards close to their chest when it came to the 
timing of their move and their ultimate intentions. Maintaining a certain amount of mystery, with 
both French and foreign officials, was an integral part of De Gaulle’s strategy because it 
dramatised and added weight to the eventual action. Thus, for example, in a meeting with Brosio 
on 27 February, the French President told his interlocutor that it was his firm intention to 
withdraw from the NATO organisation by 1969, but then cryptically added that he would not 
attack the organisation between now and 1969 “as long as matters remained substantially as they 
are”158. Similarly, in case they were asked about the intentions of the French government 
towards NATO, Couve simply advised the relevant ambassadors to reply that Paris was hoping 
for a complete reshaping of the organisation by 1969159. To a certain extent, De Gaulle was also 
considering various scenarios, including a project for a possible bilateral Franco-American 
Treaty that would follow NATO, or even, as he hinted to Alphand, a series of bilateral accords to 
replace the Atlantic Alliance altogether. Bozo, though, is probably correct when he argues that 
the latter idea was more of a trial balloon than a serious option160. De Gaulle was privately less 
hesitant, however, when it came to timing, as he confirmed to Alphand that France would make
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an announcement concerning NATO in early 1966 -  or after the December 1965 Presidential 
election161.
There is no doubt De Gaulle wanted to speed up preparations for the eventual 
withdrawal. In March, he instructed Couve to have a study made on the following theme: “the 
political, legal and practical implications of a reconsideration of the decisions taken, which have 
the effect of inserting France into the military integrated structure of NATO”. According to 
worried Quai officials, this was the first time they had been asked to write such a comprehensive
1 69paper in conjunction with the military authorities . Additionally, American interventions in
Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic hardened De Gaulle’s attitude, and further encouraged
him to act quickly towards NATO. Not only did he fear the consequences of US actions for
world stability, but also he worried that America had now reached a level of power whereby it
16^could do whatever it wanted . It was no great surprise that after a meeting with De Gaulle in 
early May, Bohlen commented that he “had never heard him before state so flatly that all foreign 
military installations would have to leave French soil”164.
If France in this period mostly focussed on opposing American hegemony, it also ended 
up at the centre of a major crisis within the EEC when it chose to boycott the Community 
institutions and recalled its permanent representative, after the failure to agree over the CAP’s 
financial settlement -  the so-called “empty chair” policy. Unsurprisingly, this dramatic incident 
has generated fierce scholarly debates on its origins and Paris’ motivations in pursuing such a 
policy. Was the “empty chair” part of a wider, coordinated French attack against the principle of 
integration at both the European and Atlantic levels, or was it as, Loth argues, a narrow 
campaign to defend French agricultural interests165? Was it an opportunistic political move by 
the French government, or was it premeditated and mostly driven by economic
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considerations166? While not taking anything away from the past literature on the subject, there is 
room for a different approach, which seeks to fit the “empty chair” within the wider context of 
France’s Westpolitik. The crisis did not come about because of a pre-planned French attack on 
integration, but it was largely the result of the interaction between three normally independent 
disputes: the battle for CAP, the divisions surrounding the future development of the EEC, and 
the growing gap -  especially since January 1963 -  between France’s vision of transatlantic 
relations and that of its partners.
Indeed, the breakdown of trust between France and the Five, symbolised by the lack of 
progress in European political union talks, played a significant part in the crisis. The prospects 
for closer political cooperation had initially improved in early 1965, especially since the new 
Labour government in Britain did not appear particularly interested in the European Community 
at that time167. Additionally, during their talks in Rambouillet, both De Gaulle and Erhard had 
seemed to agree on a meeting of the Six heads of state168. However, any hope from this meeting 
rested on a crucial misunderstanding: the French government supported in principle the idea of a 
meeting, but would only agree to a procedure if it felt there was a genuine desire to establish a 
common policy169. Essentially, the French president still doubted these talks could succeed as 
long as the Six continued to disagree on all essential issues, including defence170. He believed his 
partners were mostly driven by cynical motivations, such as Erhard with his forthcoming 
elections, and regretted that France was alone in its criticisms of American actions in Vietnam or 
the Dominican Republic171. Furthermore, there was also the fact that the French government no 
longer considered developing an independent Western Europe as its immediate priority, and so it
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preferred to do nothing rather than start a process that would lead to nothing172. Thus on 27 
March, Couve rejected the Italian proposal for a meeting of the EEC Foreign Ministers to discuss 
plans for a political union.
France’s rejection angered the Five, especially the Bonn government which had expected 
compensation from Paris after its sacrifices on cereal prices in December 1964. Erhard just could 
not understand De Gaulle’s change of mind since the Rambouillet meeting173. For the West 
German government, already uncomfortable with some of the EEC’s development, this was yet 
another proof that France was only interested in imposing its own priorities on the Community. 
Already frustrated by France’s poor relations with the US and its rapprochement with the Soviet 
Union, Bonn decided in early May that it was time to challenge Paris over the CAP’s financial 
settlement, with the aim of forcing it to accept progress on other EEC matters that were of 
interest to the Five174. At the same time, the Dutch and Italians also had grievances with the 
French, and perceived the financial settlement as a last opportunity to exert pressure. The 
atmosphere was thus very tense as the EEC approached the 30 June deadline for the financial 
settlement negotiations. “Never before had the Community encountered a situation in which so 
many national delegations had decided independently that the outcome of a particular 
negotiation was a vital issue of national interest and something on which compromise and 
concession might undermine the very bases of the integration process”175.
However, the crisis went beyond the disputes between member states, as it also involved 
the European Commission led by Walter Hallstein and centred on the key question of 
integration. It has to be remembered that the Commission’s relationship with the French 
government had never been smooth: if they sometimes allied when it came to completing the 
CAP, De Gaulle always feared that Hallstein and his colleagues wanted to make France “suffer
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17 f%over the agricultural Common Market and push Europe in the direction of a federation” . The 
General was not far off the mark. With the Commission’s mandate to make proposals for the 
financial settlement covering the period between July 1965 and 1970, Mansholt and Hallstein 
believed they had a last chance to exploit the leverage stemming from De Gaulle’s desire to 
complete the CAP. Breaking with tradition, they prepared their proposals in secret, before 
presenting them on 24 March first to the European Parliament rather than the Council of 
Ministers, a procedure considered unacceptable by Couve177. Yet, the truly controversial aspect 
of the plan was the suggested increase of both the budgetary powers of the European Parliament 
and the Commission’s funds178. De Gaulle immediately grasped the implications: Accepting that 
the Commission controls the financial administration of agricultural matters risked making the 
whole of the EEC supranational, and giving the responsibility of massive funds to an 
organisation without responsibility179.
In the two months following the Commission’s proposals, the situation got worse for 
Paris as all its partners, except Belgium, sought to take advantage of the confusion to postpone 
difficult decisions and to block an agreement on the financial settlement180. This is not to say that 
the Five wholeheartedly supported Hallstein’s plan, but they undoubtedly saw it as an 
opportunity, especially the Dutch, to make the French pay for the January 1963 veto181. Taken 
together, the Commission’s challenge over integration and the Five’s obstruction led the French 
government to believe that they were facing a new and radical threat to the CAP. Before that, 
neither De Gaulle nor French officials thought that the Rome Treaty provision to implement 
majority voting by 1 January 1966 would really be accepted or substantially affect EEC 
decision-making182. There now appeared to be a real possibility that this institutional procedure
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could be used to outvote France and undermine all its previous hard-earned successes in the 
agricultural sphere.
Paris’ reaction to this threat was a mixture of anxiety and anger. On the one hand, until 
the expiration of the 30 June deadline, French officials did their very best to make sure that the 
negotiations would succeed183. In particular, they tried to work closely in cooperation with their 
German partners to find a way out of the deadlock. On the other hand, the sense that their 
national interest was at stake pushed the French leaders to be less flexible and to consider more 
dramatic solutions. In late May, Couve first suggested to De Gaulle the possibility of a 
generalised boycott if the Six failed to accept the financial settlement, a move which would offer 
the added bonus of blocking the adoption of majority rule in January 1966184. After negotiations 
broke down in Brussels on 30 June, De Gaulle did not hesitate: the next day, after the Council of 
Ministers, the French government officially announced its decision to withdraw its 
representatives from Brussels and abstain from any future meeting until a solution was found.
VII. Julv-December 1965: Preparing the Future
Coming on the tails of its very public attacks on the dollar and its progressive 
disengagement from NATO, France’s decision to boycott the EEC naturally seemed ominous to 
its allies. Vet, despite the appearances, Paris was not about to destroy the Atlantic Community, 
and this came across clearly in its management of these various spheres during the second half of 
1965. De Gaulle preferred not to fight “several wars” at once, and he gave priority to the turmoil 
within the European Community. This crisis represented a more immediate problem because of 
the Treaty of Rome’s provision to introduce majority voting on a grand scale from 1 January 
1966 onwards. Additionally, De Gaulle wanted France to be in a position of strength before 
pushing forward with its challenge against US leadership, and withdrawing from NATO. Finally, 
with the first round of the French Presidential elections scheduled for 5 December, it also made
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sense to focus more on Europeans matters, which were of greater interest to the electorate than 
say the policy towards NATO185. While De Gaulle only announced on 4 November that he was 
candidate, the upcoming elections had a significant influence on his foreign policy in this period. 
In particular, he postponed all crucial decisions to the following year, or until he received a new 
mandate; his main goal in the second half of 1965 was to prepare for the future.
If the outbreak of the EEC crisis changed priorities, it does not mean the French 
government ignored other matters altogether. For example, it still converted regularly its dollars 
into gold, while Giscard reminded American officials that his government would continue to 
underline the need for a reform of the international monetary system186. Yet, it is true that French 
leaders adopted a more cautious stance, at a time when it was actually the American government 
that seemed to take the initiative in the monetary field. Responding to De Gaulle’s challenge 
against the dollar, Henry Fowler, the new US Secretary of Treasury, dramatically stated in a 
speech on 10 July that his government now embraced reform, which hardly convinced Giscard 
who told De Gaulle that Fowler “takes on the theme of international monetary reform as his, but 
without giving it any practical contents”187. Moreover, the Ossola report, completed in May and 
published in August 1965, had also revealed four main points of contention -  mainly between 
France and the US -  regarding the creation of reserve assets on which a range of views existed: 
the link between gold and the new asset, the width of the membership for the management and 
distribution of the asset, the role of the IMF in the reserve creation, and rules for decision­
making concerning the creation of reserve assets188.
On the back of this report, the Americans suggested the creation of a new asset called 
Special Drawing Rights [SDR], which aimed to alleviate the burden on the dollar while still 
guaranteeing adequate international liquidity. The SDR would be international money, not credit
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as the French wanted, and allocated according to a ration based on dollar and gold holdings189. 
Nevertheless, despite the mistrust between Paris and Washington, both parties still cooperated 
with their G10 partners in their quest to improve the international monetary system. At the 1965 
IMF annual meeting in Washington in September, the Ministers and Governors of the G10 
countries instructed their Deputies to “determine and report to the Ministers what basis of 
agreement can be reached on improvements needed in the international monetary system, 
including arrangements for future creation of reserve assets, as and when needed, so as to permit 
adequate provision for the needs of the world economy”190.
Similarly, the American government took the initiative within the Atlantic Alliance on 
the thorny matter of nuclear strategy. Robert McNamara, US Secretary of Defence, sought in 
spring 1965 to give a less radical formulation to flexible response, with the intention of re­
establishing the strategic consensus by taking into account European reservations and isolating 
France. McNamara’s approach proved successful, even if his original idea of a select committee 
with four of five representatives eventually underwent some changes. On 27 November, ten 
Ministers of Defence of the Atlantic Alliance -  representing Belgium, Canada, the US, Turkey, 
Britain, Denmark, West Germany, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands -  formally established a 
special committee in charge of nuclear consultation, which was meant in principle to be ad 
hoc191. Very quickly, De Gaulle confirmed that France would not take part in this committee, 
largely because it provided no substantial improvement to the Alliance strategy and had the
j n yadditional disadvantage of tying France down when it came to the use of its force defrappe . 
However, there was little Paris could do to stop McNamara’s proposal going forward. During the 
NATO Ministerial meeting on 14-16 December, Couve was effectively isolated as his allies were
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not only determined to see the Alliance “moving on again”, but also growing increasingly used 
to the idea of a NATO without France193.
Indeed, during the second half of 1965, De Gaulle’s policy towards NATO was 
essentially concerned with preparing the disengagement, whilst misleading his allies as to the 
exact timing of his move. As a mole of the French Foreign Ministry confirmed to American 
officials, De Gaulle, because of his advanced age, was in a hurry to act; privately, he had 
requested the Quai to send him in mid-December the dossiers on the “US occupation of France”, 
which he had asked for originally back in February194. During their talks with foreign officials, 
though, the French President and his collaborators took a very different line. They essentially 
took a reassuring line by claiming that the NATO treaty was valid until 1969, and that there was 
no rush to modify it195. Publicly, De Gaulle adopted the same tactic of criticising NATO, whilst 
remaining vague in regards to timing. During his 9 September press conference, electoral 
concerns undoubtedly pushed De Gaulle to defend French independence in even more forceful 
terms than usual. Besides referring to France’s rapid expansion, the General condemned the 
“subordination that is integration”; but he nonetheless stuck to the line that integration “would 
end by 1969 at the latest”196. The final months of 1965 saw no substantial chances to this 
strategy, except the fact that America’s increasing involvement in Vietnam only strengthened De 
Gaulle’s desire to rapidly disengage from NATO. In his view, the US had become unreasonable 
and too powerful, and with the risks of war between China and the US increasing in Asia, he felt 
that France’s membership in NATO might force it to take part in a war it had not chosen197.
Any future policy towards NATO, however, would depend on what happened within the 
European Community. Failure to agree on the CAP’s financial settlement had initially triggered 
the “empty chair”, but the motivations of the French government went beyond agricultural
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matters. As De Gaulle stated on 7 July, “we have to take advantage of this crisis to deal with 
political problems in the background. It is not acceptable that on 1 January 66, our economy 
could be submitted to a majority rule, which could impose on us the will of our partners ... As 
for the Commission, it proved partial ... and needs to be completely replaced”198. In addition to 
the CAP, Paris now demanded a revision of the Treaty of Rome, as De Gaulle made very clear 
during his press conference of 9 September. Going to great lengths to appear as the defender of 
French independence to the voters, he also used the latter speech to explain his reading of the 
turmoil that rocked the EEC. Not only did he place full responsibility on his partners and on the 
Commission, but the General also warned that this crisis could last for a very long time199.
Yet, below the surface, the tension within the EEC was not quite as bad as it appeared. 
For a start, the French boycott was not complete and their chair did not remain empty for all 
meetings. Crucially Maurice Ulrich, Boegner’s deputy, stayed behind in Brussels to make sure
^ A A
that his government remained well informed of any development . Moreover, De Gaulle’s 
threats and warnings were mostly part of his strategy of brinkmanship. As he confided to 
Peyrefitte, “last time, you gave the impression it would all work out in the end. You must not use 
that tone! You have, instead, to worry everyone. It is the best way to defeat our opponents. If 
they are not afraid, they will figure that it will all be fine ... In reality we will win, won’t we? 
We will not win immediately because we want a total victory”201. Equally, Couve very early on 
reassured Bohlen that the crisis would probably last a few months, but he was confident that they 
would find a solution202. The simple fact is that while France was ready to wait, it could not 
afford to delay the EEC crisis indefinitely because of its planned move against NATO. Indeed, 
De Gaulle was even ready to show some flexibility if need be. Speaking to Peyrefitte a few days
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after the press conference, he implied that France could settle for a formal agreement instead of a 
revision of the Rome Treaty .
Until the Presidential elections, the French leaders mostly adopted a carrot-and-stick 
policy towards their partners. During a meeting with Baron Adolph Bentinck, the Dutch 
Ambassador in Paris, De Gaulle stuck to a hard-line strategy. He explicitly accused the Five of 
causing the split, by both ignoring past promises and accepting the Commission’s proposals. 
This implied that the ball was in the Five’s court when it came to renewing talks, but any 
discussion could not take place in the Brussels framework. Additionally, De Gaulle reminded 
Bentinck that the supranational question took priority, because the absence of agreement on 
voting procedures could undermine at any time any agreement on the financial settlement. 
Considering how important the matter was, France could only accept written engagements204. He 
was still happy thus to use the idea of a revision of the Rome Treaty as a negotiating card. The 
General revealingly ended the meeting by mentioning that France did not object to a meeting of 
the EEC’s Foreign Ministers, as long as it was not in Brussels.
Couve’s speech to YAssemblee Nationale a few days after shared the same approach. He 
paid lip service to the motto of independence, referring to France as the only defender of French 
interests, and again demanded guarantees to prevent the reoccurrence of the crisis that the EEC 
was experiencing. At the same time, he also sent signals to Bonn by underlining how the latter 
had fought against the principle of majority rule during the talks on a common price for cereals. 
Lastly, Couve also waved the promise of progress on political union if the six managed to solve 
the current crisis205. Yet, these diplomatic games could only last so long. Both sides had strong 
incentives to eventually end the crisis: there was no doubt that the EEC had been a very 
beneficial entity for France, while the Five needed to get their Paris back in the frame if they 
wanted to push forward the Kennedy Round, which had been effectively at a standstill since the
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OC\f\start of the “empty chair” . Since late October, De Gaulle had already made up his mind that 
France should restart talks with its allies in January207.
VIII. Conclusion
Despite initial difficulties, De Gaulle eventually won the Presidential elections on 19 
December with 55% of the popular vote. Four days later, Couve indicated to Giovanni Fomari, 
Italian Ambassador in Paris, that France was ready to meet the Five for talks in Luxemburg on 
17-18 January208. The crisis was not officially over, but this was an important step towards 
settling it, and De Gaulle could now contemplate his move against NATO. As he reflected at the 
end of his first term, “This septennat, it was primarily une liquidation. La liquidation of the 
Algerian affair, which was painful and terrible in many ways. [...] And also the liquidation of 
the subordination to the Americans. [...] Independence, it is done, at least virtually, there are 
only a few formalities left. We will no longer be integrated”209.
Between 1963 and 1965, France had been successful at underlining its independence and 
showing that it could still matter in international affairs. This was true not only in the political 
and military sphere, by its determination to act against Alliance solidarity whenever it felt it was 
in its national interest, but also in the international monetary sphere through its challenges 
against the privileges of the dollar. France felt that its sound balance of payments gave it the 
right to demand more influence. However, the balance sheet appeared more mixed when it came 
to its desire to reform the Western bloc. It had not managed to develop Western Europe as a 
political counterweight to the US, especially after the failure of the Franco-German axis. In 
addition, the complete lack of agreement between the Six concerning the political role of 
Western Europe also affected seemingly less controversial issues, such as the economic 
development of the EEC.
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The challenges for France in 1966 were thus clear. Could it convince its partners that it 
was a credible Great Power and that they should follow its independent policy vis-a-vis the US? 
Would public opinion, for the moment largely supportive of De Gaulle’s foreign policy, be 
prepared to accept the costs of an even more ambitious agenda210? Chapter four will begin to 
answer these questions. Beforehand, however, it is necessary to understand the evolution of 
French attitudes towards the non-Westem world, starting with the communist bloc.
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CHAPTER II: The Long Road to Moscow
I. Introduction
In a meeting in mid-November 1965 with West Germany’s Foreign Minister Gerhard 
Schroeder, French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville reflected on the development of 
detente in Europe. In his view, the transformations in Europe had happened progressively, rather 
than suddenly. The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 had proved a first turning point as it 
showed that neither Russia nor the US wanted a nuclear ’war, while the dismissal of Soviet leader 
Nikita Khrushchev in October 1964 had further crystallized the change in Moscow’s attitude1. In 
line with the changes in the East-West situation, by late 1965 detente with the communist bloc 
had become the main strategic priority of French foreign policy.
This was in stark contrast to the period between 1958 and 1962, when Franco-Soviet 
relations were poor and France consistently adopted a firm line in its dealings with Moscow over 
the Berlin crisis and the German question. Not surprisingly, there have been divisions within the 
literature regarding when and why this shift took place, or in other words when Franco-Soviet 
relations switched from confrontation to cooperation. On the one hand, Gomart traces the 
beginnings of the rapprochement back to summer 1963, and Lacouture claims that it was the 
French recognition of Communist China in January 1964 which started the long process of 
normalising relations between France and the Eastern Bloc2. On the other hand, Newhouse and 
Soutou date the turning point to late 19643. The latter, however ^ provide a more persuasive case 
because, as Vaisse points out, Franco-Soviet relations were still dominated by confrontation and 
controversy for most of 1963 and 19644. What helped to change this situation was a combination
1 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.381: Couve-Schroeder meeting, 12.11.65
2 Gomart, Thomas, Double Detente: Les relations Franco-Sovietiques de 1958 a 1964. (Paris: Publications de la 
Sorbonne, 2003), p.384; Lacouture, De Gaulle: vol. 3. p.398
3 Newhouse, De Gaulle, p.271; Soutou, Georges-Henri, “De Gaulle’s France and the Soviet Union from Conflict to 
Ddtente ”, in Loth, Europe. Cold War, p. 180
4 Vaisse, La grandeur, p.413
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of the first signs of independence by the satellite states, and the relative failure of .the Franco- 
German treaty.
II. 1963: Incompatible Strategies and Differing Visions of Detente
At the height of the crisis that rocked the West in January 1963, rumours emerged in 
London suggesting that De Gaulle was about to make a major deal with the Soviet Union5. 
However, once the situation quieted down, it soon became apparent that there were no grounds 
for these reports. Whereas France pursued a very ambitious Westpolitik in 1963, its attitude 
towards the Communist world, especially the Soviet Union, was distinctively more cautious and 
low-key. Both sides often claimed that they wanted to improve relations, but they were not ready 
to take serious steps to initiate a rapprochement. In part, this stemmed from the fact that, while 
relations between Paris and Moscow were not hostile, they remained ambivalent and mistrustful.
As he made clear during his meetings with Sergei Vinogradov, Soviet Ambassador in 
Paris, De Gaulle still considered the Soviet Union as a possible threat, and he deplored its actions 
during the Berlin and Cuban crises6. At the same time, French leaders acknowledged that the 
Soviet Union was facing severe problems, leading De Gaulle to perceive it as a declining power. 
As he pointed out to Peyrefitte on 24 January 1963, “it [Russia] understands that its time has 
passed”7. Not only did Moscow have to contend with the growing split with Beijing, which 
according to the General would inevitably culminate one day in open struggle, but it also had to 
deal with internal problems and its failure to assimilate and conquer the populations of the 
Eastern Bloc8. Moreover, France believed that the Soviet Union itself was slowly undergoing 
fundamental changes that might open prospects for peace. As Couve argued, the nationalist
5 MAEF: Amerique, Etats-Unis 1952-1963, Vol.358: Alphand Interview with ABC, 30.01.63
6 MAEF: SG, EM, Vol. 18: De Gaulle-Vinogradov meeting, 29.01.63; MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.375: De Gaulle- 
Vinogradov meeting, 12.07.63
7 Roussel, De Gaulle, p.738
8 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.375: De Gaulle-Queen Juliana meeting, 16.03.63; MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.375: De Gaulle- 
Margerie meeting, 04.06.63
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element in Russia was becoming more predominant at the expense of ideology, and this meant 
that one day Western Europe might no longer face a communist threat9. Yet, considering 
Russia’s huge nuclear arsenal, De Gaulle did not consider these small shifts in attitude as 
sufficient to ensure peace10. Despite these emerging changes within and outside the Soviet 
Union, France remained wary and adopted a wait-and-see approach. In that context, there was a 
sense in which the 22 January treaty with West Germany was made to strengthen Western 
Europe’s resolve and ability to stand up to the Soviet Union. As De Gaulle indicated during the 
Council of Ministers on 13 February, “we did not sign the Franco-German treaty to please the
Soviet Union”11.
\
As for the communist bloc, its attitude towards France was initially shaped by its 
negative reaction to the Franco-German treaty. Vinogradov reported home that the Paris-Bonn 
axis was unequivocally hostile to the Soviet Union12. The Eastern European states were equally 
critical: Czechoslovakia, for instance, claimed that the treaty could have dangerous repercussions 
for international relations in general and Franco-Czech relations in particular13. That said, 
Moscow and its allies were predominantly concerned with West Germany, rather than France. 
As Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko explained to Maurice Dejean, French Ambassador 
in Moscow, the Franco-German treaty was essentially a military pact and a tool in West 
Germany’s policy of revanche14. It worsened Soviet fears that West Germany might one day 
gain access to nuclear weapons, either through the MLF or through cooperation with France, and 
they emphasised that they would consider such move as a grave threat to Soviet interests15.
Moreover, certain voices within the Soviet foreign policy community, such as Daniil 
Mel’nikov of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, were calling for a 
more nuanced assessment of the Franco-German treaty. According to Mel’nikov, the Franco-
9 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.375: Couve-Ikeda meeting, 19.04.63
10 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.375: De Gaulle-Queen Juliana meeting, 16.03.63
11 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.2. p.226
12 Mastny, “Detente”, in Loth, Europe. Cold War, p.217
13 DDF: 1963, Tome I: Lescuyer to Couve, Telegram number 88-91, 14.02.63
14 DDF: 1963, Tome I: Dejean to Couve, Telegram number 655-662,05.02.63
15 MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.18: Vinogradov to De Gaulle, 30.01.63
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German rapprochement was a danger for world peace, but it also contributed to the decline of the 
US in Europe; in other words, Soviet policy towards Western Europe needed to be more flexible, 
and try to play on existing divisions within the Atlantic Alliance16. This applied specifically to 
France: aware of the ever-worsening Franco-American relations, many Soviet scholars were 
paying more attention to France and pointing out that Moscow could gain from De Gaulle’s
17centrifugal pull away from NATO and Washington . These arguments seemingly had some 
influence on the Soviet leaders. In the following months, they began to moderate their criticisms 
of France, and sought instead to benefit from any tensions between France and its Western 
partners. Thus, on 17 May, a day after the Bundestag ratified the Franco-German Treaty and its 
preamble, the Soviet government sent a note to its French counterpart. Beside the usual attacks 
against the Franco-German treaty, the note not-so-subtly referred to past Franco-Soviet 
cooperation against Germany during WWD, and expressed hope that both countries might 
cooperate once again for the sake of European peace18. In July, Khrushchev repeated similar 
arguments to Dejean and added that he wanted to invite De Gaulle to visit Moscow19.
During the autumn 1963, there were further signs suggesting friendlier contacts between 
Paris and Moscow. In October, Khrushchev renewed his invitation to the General, while De 
Gaulle reassured Vinogradov that the moment would come when relations between France and 
the Soviet would improve20. In the same month, the French government sent an invitation to 
Konstantin Rudnev, Soviet State President for scientific and technical coordination, to visit 
Paris, while Valery Giscard d’Estaing, French Minister of Finance, agreed to go to Moscow in 
the winter. However, these moves were not particularly meaningful and it is excessive to claim, 
as Gomart does, that the summer 1963 marked the beginning of a Paris-Moscow
16 Sodaro, Michael, Moscow. Germany and the West from Khrushchev to Gorbachev. (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991),
ft49Newton, Julie, Russia. France and the Idea of Europe. (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p.20
18 MAEF: Europe, URSS 1961-1965, Vol. 1931: Laboulaye to Couve, Telegram number 2613-2636, 17.05.63
19 DDF: 1963, Tome II: Dejean to Couve, Telegrams number 3810-3834 and 3835-3836, 17.07.63
20 Wolton, France sous influence, p.394
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rapprochement21. Taking the example of trade, both sides were undoubtedly in favour of 
expanding commercial links, but not so much for political reasons. France wanted to develop 
economic relations and sell food to the Soviet Union because it was normal trade and good for 
business . As for the Soviets, they were really driven by necessity. Facing serious economic 
problems, especially in the agricultural sector, they needed all the help they could get from the 
West. While they appealed to France, they were also buying wheat from the US and herbicides 
from West Germany23.
Furthermore, differences in grand strategy presented a more fundamental and serious 
obstacle to a rapprochement. As long as the axis with West Germany remained the cornerstone 
of French foreign policy, there was no real possibility for an entente with Russia -  even if Vaisse 
is right to point out that De Gaulle considered Russia as a fall-back ally24. Even in late 1963, 
despite the difficulties in implementing the treaty, De Gaulle had neither given up on 
cooperation with Bonn nor shown an inclination to make a move in Moscow’s direction. As he 
reminded Peyrefitte on 11 December, “we [France] decided to make a policy of entente with the 
Germans to the detriment of our relations with Russia, with Poland, with Czechoslovakia, with 
Yugoslavia”25. Besides, the French government believed that the Soviet Union was only really 
interested in a dialogue with the US26. This was particularly valid, indeed, for Khrushchev. He 
seemed happy to exploit differences between the NATO allies, but he was also essentially an 
‘Atlanticist’: he never lost of sight of American dominance and was not entranced by the 
unlikely prospect that Western Europe would abandon its powerful protector27. Within this 
perspective, France naturally had a limited appeal for the Soviet Union, and this was reinforced 
by Khrushchev’s feelings about De Gaulle. On the one hand, he disliked De Gaulle’s view of 
detente as a means of undoing Soviet ideology and worried about Gaullism as a symbol of the
21 Gomart, Double Detente, p.384
22 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.376: Couve-Rusk meeting, 07.10.63
23 FRUS: 1961-1963, Vol.V: Document 341, 31.07.63; Sodaro, Moscow. Germany, p.51
24 Vaisse, La grandeur, p.566
25 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.2. p.254
26 DDF: 1963, Tome I: Couve to Alphand, Telegram number 3133-3142,09.02.63
27 Sodaro, Moscow, Germany, p.49
75
growing centrifugal forces in the world. On the other hand, he sometimes showed contempt for
98the General and claimed that he reminded him of the emperor without clothes in the old story!
There could be no clearer illustration of how minor a priority were relations with France 
for the Soviet leader than the diplomacy leading up to the Partial Test Ban Treaty [PTBT], which 
he believed could help to solve other international problems29. Nonetheless, despite initial 
optimism in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile crisis, negotiations moved slowly at first and 
stalled around the question of inspections. At the same time, Khrushchev had to contend with 
possible criticism from Communist China. As the Sino-Soviet rift reached a critical stage, he 
decided to make one last effort at conciliating the Chinese by inviting them for talks in Moscow 
in July30. A breakthrough eventually occurred in June-July. Whereas the Sino-Soviet talks ended 
in complete acrimony, US President Kennedy’s speech on 10 June, calling for a new attitude 
towards the Soviets, and Khrushchev’s speech in Berlin on 2 July -  where he expressed Soviet 
readiness “to conclude an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests” and offered to sign a non­
aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact -  helped to break the deadlock 31. On 5 
August, Britain, the US and the Soviet Union finally signed the PTBT, therefore agreeing to end 
all over-ground nuclear tests.
While some states considered the signing of the PTBT as an opportunity to improve East- 
West relations, France took the opposite viewpoint. For a start, it could not accept the PTBT 
because it needed additional tests to finalise the development of its force defrappe, which was, 
as Couve stated, the core pillar of its policy of independence32. Moreover, French uneasiness 
also resulted from its differing conception of detente. According to De Gaulle, peace could only 
be possible if the Soviet Union abandoned its aggressive ideology and loosened its grip on the
28 Newton, Russia. France, p.56; TNA: FO 371/169119: Paris to FO, 19.07.63
29 FRUS: 1961-1963, Vol.V: Document 284, 25.01.63
30 Mastny, “Detente”, in Loth, Europe. Cold War, p.218
31 FRUS: 1961-1963, Vol.V: Document 328, 10.06.63 and Document 335, 02.07.63; Khrushchev first suggested a 
non-aggression pact on 20 February.
32 Peyrefitte, C’etait de Gaulle: vol.2. 21.08.63, p.32
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satellite states33. Nevertheless, for French leaders, the superpower talks were a false detente, an 
illusion because they gave the impression that East-West relations could improve without a real 
change of atmosphere, and a threat because they risked consolidating the Cold War bloc logic34. 
The French foreign policy-making elite worried that the superpowers might acquire the habit of 
deciding the fate of the world without consulting other states . Finally, Paris also took into 
account Bonn’s attitude and how this could work to the advantage of France. The West German 
government had eventually signed the PTBT, but it had been very upset by the “upgrading” of 
East Germany as a signatory to this same treaty; additionally, it criticised the non-aggression 
pact because it risked giving a certain' degree of recognition to Pankow and permanently 
codifying the status quo in Central Europe . De Gaulle quickly seized the opportunity to warn 
Adenauer that both France and West Germany were threatened by the relations between the 
Anglo-Saxon powers and the Soviet Union37.
The contrast between how the French and Soviets approached detente, as well as the 
aftermath of the PTBT, was another obstacle to their rapprochement. While the Soviet Union 
hoped to keep the momentum in their talks with the US, France was determined to prevent the 
bipolar Cold War developing into a bipolar process of detente38. Paris resisted the exclusive 
superpower conversation, and sought to increase its margin of manoeuvre vis-a-vis Washington 
and Moscow. Thus, during his 29 July press conference, De Gaulle very publicly signalled that 
France would not sign the PBTB39. Similarly, French leaders also tried to undermine the US- 
Soviet dialogue by emphasising its inherent dangers to the other NATO members, who were
33 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.375: De Gaulle-Adenauer meeting, 04.07.63
34 Mahan, Kennedy. De Gaulle, p. 147; Couve, Politique etrangere. p. 193
35 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.376: De Gaulle-Chang-Huan meeting, 02.09.63
36 Gray, William Glenn, Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany. 1949-1969. (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), p. 143; Locher, Anna, and Nuenlist, Christian, “What Role for 
NATO? Conflicting Western Perceptions of Detente, 1963-65”, Journal o f Transatlantic Studies, Vol.2/2 (2004), 
p. 189
7 De Gaulle, LNC: IX, De Gaulle to Adenauer, 23.08.63, p.364
38 Rey, Marie-Pierre, La tentation du rapprochement: France et URSS a l’heure de la detente (1964-1974), (Paris: 
Publications de la Sorbonne, 1991), p. 16
39 De Gaulle, DM: IV. p. 123
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already much divided about the question of post-PTBT detente initiatives40. They warned -  again 
in part to appeal to Bonn -  that the talks between the Anglo-Saxon powers and the Soviet Union, 
especially the project of a non-aggression pact, might lead to the neutralisation of West Germany 
and hence be catastrophic for Western Europe41. They took essentially a negative stance, which 
was nicely summed up by Couve during his speech at the December 1963 NATO Ministerial 
meeting. If he welcomed the beginnings of change in the communist world, he added that 
detente could happen only if the Soviets wanted it and if they adopted a less menacing attitude. 
Paris was, in any case, willing to wait as it believed that detente with the East would inevitably 
happen once it became clear that they did not want a war42.
However, France did not only resort to negative measures in its struggle against the 
superpowers, but also tried to benefit from the growing fragmentation of the communist world. 
In view of the timid signs of independence in Eastern Europe, France decided in December to 
raise the status of its delegations in Romania and Hungary to that of embassies43. Additionally, 
there was obviously the case of Communist China. Ever since the end of the Algerian war -  the 
main bone of contention between Paris and Beijing -  and in view of the growing Sino-Soviet 
split, De Gaulle had seriously considered the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with 
the PRC. Such a move, as he explained to Peyrefitte, presented the advantage of annoying the 
Americans and strengthening France’s position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. “We need fall-back 
allies. It has always been the policy of France [...] One day I will make an alliance with China to 
strengthen us against Russia. Well, alliance, we are not there yet. We will first renew
40 See Locher, and Nuenlist, “What Role for NATO?”, pp. 189-193. While France, West Germany, the Netherlands, 
Greece and Turkey opposed the idea of a non-aggression pact, small states such as Belgium, Canada, Norway and 
Denmark were more favourable.
41 See for example MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.376: De GauIIe-Dixon meeting, 17.09.63; TNA: FO 371/172077: Paris to 
FO, Telegram number 217, 10.09.63
42 MAEF: Service des Pactes [Pactes] 1961-1970, Vol.270: Seydoux to Couve, Telegram number 380, 16.12.63; 
Couve, Politique etrangere. p. 196
43 DDF: 1963, Tome II: Bouffanais to Couve, Telegram number 1318-1323, 07.12.63; Schreiber, Thomas, Les 
Actions de la France a l ’Est. ou les Absences de Marianne. (Paris: Harmattan, 2000), p.90
78
relations”44. At the same time, Chinese officials in Beme were repeatedly pointing out that their 
government wanted to establish official relations with France45.
Thus, when China also refused to sign the PTBT, it was another confirmation for De 
Gaulle that both countries were tied by a common opposition to the double US-Soviet 
hegemony, and that China could be an element of equilibrium between both superpowers46. As 
we will see in the next chapter when we study the rapprochement in more details, De Gaulle was 
motivated by other factors as well, but the PTBT incident did contribute to convincing the 
French President that the time was right to make a move towards the Chinese. In late September, 
he secretly asked former President of the Council Edgar Faure, who was about to go to Beijing, 
to explore the possibility of a mutual recognition with the Chinese leaders47. Once Faure had 
successfully reached a provisional understanding with the Chinese regarding the establishment 
of diplomatic relations, Couve then instructed Jacques de Beaumarchais, head of the Quai’s 
Europe department, to finalise the agreement with the Chinese officials in Beme48. The stage 
was set for the major announcement on 27 January 1964.
III. .Tanuarv-October 1964: Evolution in the East
Addressing the French people on 31 December 1963, De Gaulle outlined his hopes for 
future developments behind the iron curtain. “We have to [...] envisage the day when, maybe, in 
Warsaw, in Prague, in Pankow, in Budapest, in Bucharest, in Sofia, in Belgrade, in Tirana, in 
Moscow, the totalitarian communist regime, which still rules captive populations, would 
progressively evolve in a direction compatible with our own transformation”49. This was not, 
however, the signal for a new policy towards the communist states. In early 1964, superpower 
relations were at their closest since the start of the Cold War, and Franco-Soviet cooperation was
44 Peyrefitte, C’etait de Gaulle: vo l.l. 24.01.63 and 13.03.63, p .317,320
45 DDF: 1963, Tome I: Baudet to Couve, Depeche number 940, 26.03.63
46 Jianqing, Zhou, DGESS IV. pp.403-404
47 De Gaulle, LNC: IX. 26.09.63, pp.374-375
48 DDF: 1963, Tome II: Instructions for de Beaumarchais, 11.12.63
49 De Gaulle, DM: IV. p. 155
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not an option as long as Moscow preferred to deal with the US50. Additionally, De Gaulle 
remained wary of the Soviets. He doubted that it was possible to have political negotiations with 
Khrushchev, and turned down Vinogradov’s invitation to visit Moscow51. The French leaders 
were more open to improving practical relations with the Soviets, but they had no intentions to 
go to great lengths to court them. Regarding trade for example, Couve instructed Giscard, before 
his trip to Moscow, that France would not break solidarity with other Western nations and grant 
long-term credits to the Soviets52. Yet, 1964 witnessed several key developments that helped to 
change the French perspective on East-West detente, and narrow the gap with the Eastern bloc.
The first factor was the recognition of Communist China, which France hoped would 
strengthen its position vis-a-vis the superpowers and which, Alphand expected, would not be 
welcomed by the Soviet government53. In practice, the opposite proved to be true. When Dejean 
informed Vasilii Kuznetsov, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, that his government was about to 
establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, the latter congratulated France for its realistic and 
reasonable decision54. According to Wolton, the Soviet reaction can be partly explained by the 
fact that they were not surprised as they had secretively been informed of De Gaulle’s intentions 
since 3 December 1963. It seems that Faure told Vinogradov about the forthcoming decision to 
normalise relations with China, and added that the move needed to be seen in line with Franco- 
US relations and had nothing to do with the Sino-Soviet split. Moscow was naturally pleased 
with Paris’ decision, because it believed that it consolidated the socialist camp and worsened 
Franco-American relations55. At the same time, if the surprise effect failed, the recognition of the 
PRC was more successful in pushing the Soviets to pay more attention to France’s role on the 
international scene56.
50 Mastny, “Detente”, in Loth, Europe. Cold War, p.228
51 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.377: De Gaulle-Pearson meeting, 15.01.64; MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.20: De Gaulle- 
Vinogradov meeting, 03.01.64
52 DDF: 1964, Tome I: Couve to Dejean, Telegram number 676-685, 15.01.64
53 Alphand. L'etonnement. 01.01.64. p.420
54 DDF: 1964, Tome I: Dejean to Couve, Telegram number 312-316,18.01.64
55 Wolton, France sous influence, pp.406-7
56 Puaux, Frangois, DGESS V. p.433
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Indeed, growing Soviet interest was clearly demonstrated soon after when Nikolai 
Podgomy, a senior member of the Presidium, suddenly replaced a lesser figure to head a 
delegation of Soviet parliamentarians for a visit to Paris that had been planned for a long time57. 
Podgomy used the opportunity to have high-level contacts with Couve and Pompidou, and also a 
friendly meeting with De Gaulle. He once again hailed the recognition of China as a realistic and 
positive initiative, underlined past Franco-Soviet cooperation, and referred to the lack of 
conflicts between both countries. De Gaulle, for his part, also expressed relative optimism for 
future Franco-Soviet relations, especially as he was under the impression that the Soviet was
CO
changing in a direction that suited France . Both sides’ attempts to improve relations in other 
fields certainly helped create this better atmosphere for political talks. During his meetings in 
Moscow Giscard discussed the possibility of signing a five year commercial agreement starting 
the following year, while Rudnev expressed his interest in French technology and argued that 
France and the Soviet Union should develop their cultural and scientific exchanges59.
Moreover, Paris and Moscow were brought closer by their stands on events in South- 
East Asia. As we will see in more details in the next chapter, the conflict in the former Indochina 
escalated in 1964, particularly in Vietnam after the Gulf of Tonkin incident. In this period, the 
French also became more openly critical of American policy in Indochina as the US started to 
increase its military involvement in the region, and instead, like the Soviet Union, advocated a 
political solution to the crisis based on the 1954 Geneva accords. The fact that they approached 
the conflict in similar ways obviously did not go unnoticed in Paris and Moscow. The Soviet 
Union repeatedly praised French policy towards South-East Asia, and even expressed hope that 
both countries might unite their efforts to ensure Indochina’s independence60. Equally, during a 
meeting with Vinogradov, De Gaulle claimed that as the Soviet Union did not want to cause
57 TNA: FO 371/177870: Paris to FO, Telegram number 146, 24.02.64
58 MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.20: De Gaulle-Podgomy meeting, 02.03.64
59 See MAEF: Europe, URSS 1961-1965, Vol. 1931: Giscard-Khrushchev meeting, 27.01.64; ANF: 5AG1, Carton 
186, URSS: Pompidou-Rudnev meeting, 10.02.64; DDF: 1964, Tome I: Couve to Moscow, Telegram number 2445- 
2447, 20.02.64
60 See MAEF: Europe, URSS 1961-1965, Vol. 1931: Baudet to Couve, Telegram number 2311-2316, 30.04.64; 
MAEF: Europe, URSS 1961-1965, Vol. 1931: AFP Depeche, 12.09.64
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trouble in South-East Asia, there might be a possible convergence in this domain between 
French and Soviet policy61.
That said, the steps taken by Paris and Moscow towards each other were very tentative, 
and there were still significant obstacles to a rapprochement. For a start, the Soviet leaders still 
expressed their disapproval over French policy towards West Germany, even if they felt that this 
should not prevent an entente on other questions . On the other side, there was a consensus at all 
levels of the French diplomatic establishment that they should respond to the Soviet moves with 
caution. Couve stated that “we were always on known ground” with the Podgomy visit, while 
Pompidou denied that there was any specific development in Franco-Soviet relations, and added 
that France was waiting for the Soviets to approach European issues by peaceful means . As De 
Gaulle summed up nicely, the Soviet “smile campaign” did not change the basic European 
situation, which would remain the same so long as the Soviets tried to impose their will on the 
world64. Similarly, the Quai d’Orsay doubted that there was a genuine change in Soviet policy. A 
note written in early March, at the time of Podgomy’s visit, suggested three complementary 
reasons to explain the Soviets’ motivations for better relations with France: a desire to overcome 
the negative effects of France’s opposition to its European policy by taking advantage of 
tensions between Paris and its main Western allies, a need for Western aid to offset its serious 
economic problems, and an embarrassed reaction to France’s recognition of the PRC65.
Whereas France’s relations with the Soviet Union only improved slowly, its attitude 
towards the satellite states changed significantly. On a basic level, France followed the broader 
trend amongst Western states determined to increase contacts with their neighbours in the East, 
in response to their first signs of independent behaviour. Thus, the US government, as summed 
up by President Johnson in his 23 May 1964 Lexington speech, wanted to “build bridges across
61 MAEF: Europe, URSS 1961-1965, Vol. 1931: De Gaulle-Vinogradov meeting, 18.06.64
62 DDF: 1964, Tome I: Dejean to Couve, Telegram number 637-641, 09.02.64
63 DDF: 1964, Tome I: Couve to Margerie, Telegram with no number, 05.03.64; MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.377: 
Pompidou-Ikeda meeting, 07.04.64
64 Alphand, L'etonnement, 04.05.64, p.429
65 MAEF: Europe, URSS 1961-1965, V ol.1931: Note of Sous-Direction Europe Centrale, 02.03.64
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the Gulf which has divided us from Eastern Europe [...] bridges of increased trade, of ideas, of 
visitors and of humanitarian aid”66. It granted, for example, “most-favoured nation” status to 
Poland and Yugoslavia in March, and signed a limited cultural and trade agreement with 
Romania on 1 June. Similarly, West Germany established a series of trade missions in the East, 
starting with Romania in October 1962, then Poland in March 1963, Hungary in November 
1963, and finally Bulgaria in March 1964. Bonn saw this as an opportunity to increase trade with 
Eastern Europe and try to isolate East Germany within the Warsaw Pact . Paris also 
successfully developed practical relations with the Eastern European states: on 28 February, it 
signed a cultural agreement with Poland, followed by another with Yugoslavia on 19 June . The 
French leaders welcomed these agreements because they felt any future dialogue with the East 
would be meaningless if limited to the Soviet Union69.
However, on a more fundamental level, they believed they were witnessing the 
beginnings of a profound transformation within the Eastern bloc -  in particular when looking at 
Romania. Indeed, Soviet-Romanian tensions had increased markedly since 1962. Not only did 
Bucharest oppose Khrushchev’s plans for further integration of the economies of the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance [Comecon], because they feared this program would impede their 
modernisation plan and relegate them to their traditional role as agricultural supplier for 
advanced economies, but they also took a neutral stand on the Sino-Soviet split70. This more 
independent orientation was again confirmed when the Romanian Communist Party adopted a 
new resolution in April 1964. “It is the sovereign right of all socialist states to decide, to choose 
and change the forms and methods of their social construction. No state has the right to present 
its own interests as the general interest...”71. Moreover, in addition to their growing national 
pride, Romanian officials repeatedly emphasised to their French counterparts that they were
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interested in extending contacts72. This included practical relations, especially trade, but also 
talks at the highest levels. Thus, in early June, Bucharest contacted the French embassy and 
announced that Prime Minister Ion Maurer wanted to visit Paris. This was a particularly 
symbolic event because it would be the first visit of a Romanian Prime Minister to any Western 
capital, and it was further evidence for France that Bucharest was seeking to progressively free 
itself from Soviet dominance73.
The trip eventually took place in late July and Maurer met with De Gaulle. Besides the 
discussions on possible economic, cultural and scientific agreements, the particularly striking 
part of their conversation was Maurer’s analysis of the situation within the Eastern bloc. He 
argued that the communist world was changing, as a consequence of Russia’s own evolution and 
the Sino-Soviet split. This was allowing Romania to strive for more independence, especially in 
the economic sphere, while still remaining part of the socialist bloc. As such, Bucharest wanted 
to improve its relations with the West, including West Germany and the US. Maurer also hinted 
that France held a special status within the West because it was not trying, as he felt the US was, 
to detach the Eastern European states from the socialist camp. When De Gaulle asked Maurer 
why he had gone to Moscow before coming to Paris, the Romanian Prime Minister replied that 
he had done so to dissipate Soviet worries that he wanted to go to France to criticise them. 
Despite some difficulties, Maurer felt he had been eventually been successful in removing Soviet 
mistrust74. The impact of this meeting on French leaders cannot be understated. Despite his 
customary caution, Couve argued that Maurer’s visit to Paris “is a spectacular sign of the 
beginning of new relations between European states of both camps, and opens up some 
interesting perspectives for a thaw of the situation created twenty years ago”75.
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De Gaulle endorsed this view, as Alphand noted two days after the Maurer meeting: “he 
can feel the world is changing, and as a proof of this, the conversations he just had with the 
Romanian representative. The Romanian representative was in Moscow before his visit to 
France. Khrushchev was incapable of imposing his will because he is weakened by internal
K\problems and his conflict with Mao” . Yet, the French President went even further in his 
analysis of Soviet problems. In a personal note written in July, and to whose conclusions he 
referred in his 23 July press conference, the General argued that communism had ultimately 
failed because it could not fulfill three key conditions: the dying away of nations under a 
common ideology, the growth and victory of communism in other industrialised states besides 
Russia, and the establishment of obedient communist regimes in the Third World77. He 
anticipated that Russia’s problems would effectively compel it to take a less threatening stand in 
Europe, which would allow the development of a new equilibrium and security order on the 
continent. This is why De Gaulle instructed Philippe Baudet, his new Ambassador in Moscow, 
that his posture should be to show the Russians that “we are not afraid of them anymore”78.
Although Baudet had reservations about the implication that Russia was no longer 
dangerous, there were signs that the Quai d’Orsay’s perceptions of the Eastern bloc were 
evolving in a way not so different from De Gaulle. As Soutou indicates, the Quai was still split. 
On the one hand, the mainstream conclusion was that Moscow was incapable of resolving the 
problems of the world communist movement, and that the process of differentiation among 
communist parties was irreversible. On the other hand, the specialists on the Soviet Union Jean 
Laloy, the directeur-adjoint des affaires politiques, Jean-Marie Soutou, the director of the 
European department, and Henri Froment-Meurice, head of the Eastern Europe department, were 
more sceptical and doubted that Moscow had lost its full control over Eastern Europe. However,
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in 1963-1964, Laloy was side-tracked, whilst Soutou and Froment-Meurice were moved to other 
departments79.
Aside from the transformations within the Eastern bloc that seemed to offer new 
perspectives for France’s Ostpolitik, shifts in strategies and diplomatic alignments were also 
drawing France and the Eastern states closer together. As detailed in the previous chapter, the 
relative failure of the Franco-German axis, which emerged all too clearly during the 3-4 July 
1964 summit, was a turning point for French foreign policy. That said, the consequences for 
France’s relations with the communist states were not immediately obvious, apart from some 
small progress in practical talks. Soviet representatives visited Paris in June-July to discuss a 
possible new Franco-Soviet trade agreement, while France considered, despite Bonn’s protests, 
breaking Western solidarity and granting longer-term credits to the Soviets. Finally, Gaston 
Palewski, French Minister for Scientific Research, Nuclear and Spatial questions, talked with 
Khrushchev about scientific exchanges and cooperation on French colour television technology, 
i.e. Sequential Couleur Avec Memoire [SECAM]80. The key point, though, was that the 
shortcomings of the Franco-German treaty had led De Gaulle, as he told Peyrefitte a few days 
after the failed July summit, to prepare his diplomatic alternatives: if in the future there was no 
progress with West Germany, France would seek an entente with Eastern Europe81. At the same 
time, superpower contacts lost some momentum in 1964. Despite a series of small steps to ease 
international tension, like the consular convention signed in June, events in Vietnam were 
starting to interfere and adversely impact other spheres of US-Soviet relations. Moreover, 
Johnson somewhat pushed the US-Soviet dialogue to the side as he focussed on the upcoming 
presidential election82.
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The final new factor that prepared the grounds for a rapprochement between France and 
the communist world was tied to Khrushchev. As mentioned before, the Soviet leader never 
considered France as a serious player and he had concluded, as he told Danish Prime Minister 
Jens Krag, that De Gaulle “had little influence in world affairs and knows it” . Instead, in 1964, 
Khrushchev focussed his efforts on trying to improve relations with West Germany. This was 
not so much a result of any change of view on the German question, but more a case that the 
Soviet government hoped to get trade benefits for its ailing economy, and a modus vivendi with 
Bonn in the spirit of Rapallo so as to have a free hand with China84. These reports caused great 
concern amongst East German leaders, who absolutely wanted to be part of any talks on the 
German question. The Soviet leader did make a gesture towards his ally with the signing of the 
Soviet-East German friendship treaty on 12 June, but this was predominantly for Khrushchev a 
way to mark the last word on the Berlin crisis he started in November 1958, and a starting point 
for the normalisation of relations with Bonn85. On 2 September, there seemed to be a 
breakthrough when the West German government formally invited Khrushchev to visit Bonn in 
January 1965. However, this trip was never to be. On 14 October, the Soviet Central Committee 
toppled Khrushchev and replaced him with a collegial leadership dominated by new Secretary 
General of the Communist Party Leonid Brezhnev, the new Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin and 
the new President, Anastas Mikoyan.
IV. October 1964-Februarv 1965: Turning Point
The important developments in the Eastern bloc, combined with Franco-German 
tensions, had helped to narrow the gap between France and the Soviet Union. In the period 
between late 1964 and early 1965, both states would go further and move towards political 
cooperation. According to Couve, the fall of Khrushchev played a crucial role, because it meant
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a return to collegial rule and to more tranquillity in Soviet foreign policy . Furthermore, the
87Quai d’Orsay had always felt that Khrushchev was not interested in France . Yet, the change of 
Soviet leadership only played a small part in bringing Paris and Moscow closer together. The 
profound shift in France’s Westpolitik at that time, and the growing independence of the satellite 
states, were far more significant factors.
The new rulers of the Kremlin -  Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgomy -  were not 
forthcoming when it came to foreign policy. This was partly because they saw domestic 
problems as more urgent, but it was also tied to the controversy between the advocates of hard­
line policies and those who supported a moderate approach. The former wanted to provide more 
aid to Hanoi and to take a tough stand against West Germany, while the latter were keen to work 
towards a negotiated solution in Vietnam and wanted stability in Europe88. This is not to say, as 
Vinogradov claimed, that the change of leadership did not affect Soviet foreign policy89. They 
tried to reverse some of the decisions of their predecessor, starting with their attempt to repair 
relations with China. In regards to Vietnam, Moscow opted for the middle path of sending more 
aid to North Vietnam, whilst at the same time undertaking efforts in order to end the conflict90. 
Moreover, the conservative Soviet leaders decided to side with Poland and East Germany, the 
more orthodox states of the Eastern Bloc, on the German question and ended Khrushchev’s 
attempted rapprochement with Bonn. Beyond that, the Soviets’ European policy was fairly 
subdued and they appeared hesitant about fully exploiting the growing tensions between the US 
and some of its Western European allies91.
This emerged very clearly in Moscow’s attitude towards Paris, which initially seemed to 
flip-flop. On 17 and 20 October, Pravda attacked French positions on Vietnam and Latin 
America, but a mere week later, it devoted a whole article flattering France for its indispensable
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role in solving European problems92. This was reinforced by Gromyko on 27 October, or the 40th 
anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between France and the Soviet Union, 
when he underlined that “concrete possibilities” existed for further improvement in Franco- 
Soviet relations93. The French leaders, for their part, were curious about the changes happening 
in Moscow. Thus on 21 October, De Gaulle encouraged Peyrefitte to visit Moscow so to develop 
cooperation on SECAM, and also because he wanted him to sound out the new Soviet leaders94. 
There was additionally the welcomed development of the new five-year trade agreement signed 
on 30 October. That said, neither the Quai nor De Gaulle believed they were witnessing any 
changes in Soviet policy after Khrushchev’s removal; the Quai, in particular, argued that the 
latest Soviet statements were in line with previous efforts to exploit French tensions with the US 
and West Germany95.
The MLF crisis, however, unlike the change of Soviet leadership, played an important 
role in the Franco-Soviet rapprochement. For a start, both states faced a common threat as they 
were bitterly opposed to West Germany gaining access to nuclear weapons. More importantly, 
the MLF episode led France and the Soviet Union, albeit for different reasons, to consider future 
cooperation as potentially beneficial. Moscow, for its part, became more sensitive to the 
opportunities offered by De Gaulle’s policies to undermine American influence in Europe and 
isolate West Germany96. Soviet officials, starting with Vinogradov on 18 November, 
systematically began to push their French counterparts for more regular consultation on issues 
where they adopted similar views, including South-East Asia, the MLF, or Germany’s borders97. 
In late December 1964, during a meeting with Baudet, Kosygin repeated the appeal for closer 
collaboration. Not only did he suggest giving a contractual form to the growing Franco-Soviet 
entente, but he also emphasised the numerous areas of Franco-Soviet agreement, and highlighted
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the dangers associated with a US-German rapprochement98. In early January 1965, during 
Peyrefitte’s visit to Moscow to discuss potential Franco-Soviet cooperation on SEC AM, Kosygin 
equally made it clear that his government had chosen the latter for political, rather than 
technological reasons99.
In France’s case, the tension over the MLF and the CAP were important insofar as they 
contributed to a serious deterioration of relations with West Germany. De Gaulle, in particular, 
felt very bitter against the Germans and, according to Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri 
Spaak, his mood towards them was reminiscent of that towards the British in January 1963100. 
The General saw the pronounced dispute over the MLF as yet another proof of the shortcomings 
of the Franco-German treaty, and the fact that it would not become the basis of a more 
independent Western Europe in the foreseeable future. This acknowledgement pushed him to 
seek diplomatic alternatives, as he confirmed to Peyrefitte: “automatically we [France] are 
getting closer to the Russians to the extent that the Germans are moving away from us”101. 
Indeed, there is no doubt that resentment towards the West Germans, and the fear of a German- 
American military axis, were pushing the General to consider the traditional alliance with Russia 
to contain Germany. French leaders made little effort to hide this fact, quite the contrary. During 
a speech to VAssemblee Nationale, in which he condemned the MLF, Couve warned that the 
latter would worry the Soviet government, a stand that really pleased Gromyko102.
At the same time, the continuing developments on the other side of the Iron Curtain were 
playing an equally essential role in the Franco-Soviet rapprochement, especially the list of 
Eastern European visitors to Paris which kept getting longer and longer103. The Foreign 
Ministers of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia came in November, while the Hungarian 
representative followed soon after in January 1965. If the discussions mostly dealt with
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commercial and cultural relations, the French officials nonetheless considered these meetings as 
a confirmation that important changes were beginning to take place within the Eastern bloc. 
Couve, for example, was cautious enough to speak of an evolution rather than revolution, and 
dismissed the idea that France should seek to detach the Eastern European states from Russia. 
Yet, he also believed that a general normalisation of relations between all European states was 
possible, and that the satellite states were being attracted to France because of its exceptional 
rayonnement throughout the world104. Similarly, De Gaulle thought that the situation in Europe 
was changing in the right direction and, even if this was not irreversible, it was up to France to 
encourage the Eastern Bloc states to reclaim their national sovereignty and personality. 
Depending on the results of the evolution, German reunification might even become feasible in 
the future105.
Thus, both the MLF crisis and the growing emancipation of the satellite states were 
pushing France towards cooperation with the Eastern bloc, but it was the latter that eventually 
proved the decisive factor in persuading De Gaulle to follow that path. Despite their similar 
views on the issue of German nuclear armament, the French President remained wary of Soviet 
intentions and did not know what value to give to their openings106. On the one hand, he believed 
both countries had a lot in common, and that Russia was taking into account France’s growing 
prestige in the China and the Third World. On the other hand, he feared that the Soviets were 
only interested in France in order to gain an edge over the US, or in other words as a pawn in a 
new Yalta. In the end, however, his conviction that Europe was witnessing dramatic changes, 
especially the crumbling away of both Blocs slowly making the Cold War obsolete, helped the 
General overcome his doubts107. Additionally, the general momentum of French foreign policy 
was in the direction of greater assertiveness and independence. As France was preparing to 
challenge US leadership in monetary and military matters, better relations with the Soviet Union
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were another way to challenge American hegemony and its right to speak for its allies in their 
relations with the other superpower108.
The rest of the foreign policy establishment was more sceptical about the prospects of a 
Franco-Soviet dialogue. The Quai was very mistrustful of the Soviet Union. It doubted that the 
latter saw France as the best interlocutor, and argued repeatedly that the Soviets’ main goal was
i noto exploit divisions within the Atlantic Alliance . Couve, for his part, supported the principle of 
more extensive talks with Moscow, as long as they avoided misunderstandings and did not 
ignore the existing differences on many key subjects, including Europe and the Atlantic 
Alliance. According to a well-placed source, he even had to strengthen a telegram of instructions 
to Baudet, which was originally drafted by the Elysee, so that it conformed more fully to the 
requirements of Western orthodoxy110. De Gaulle was thus undoubtedly the real driving force 
behind seeking better relations with the Soviet Union. Meeting with Vinogradov on 25 January, 
he emphasised that he would be happy to visit Moscow if bilateral relations continued to 
progress. Yet, he did warn his interlocutor that Franco-Soviet collaboration would fail if the 
latter sought to divide France from its allies, or if the Soviets sought to obtain French recognition 
of East Germany111. This was effectively a conditional green light to start exploring the 
possibilities of a Franco-Soviet political cooperation. It was in this context that the General gave 
his all-important press conference of 4 February, or twenty years exactly after the start of the 
Yalta conference.
The press conference was firstly for the General an opportunity to reflect on the recent 
developments in East-West relations, and to outline very clearly his vision of how the division of 
Germany could be overcome in a European framework112. He argued that the German problem 
could not “be solved by the confrontation of the ideologies and the forces of the two camps
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opposed to each other”; it needed to be considered from a different perspective, that is to say
“the entente and conjugated action of the peoples that are and will remain most interested in the
11^fate of Germany, the European nations” . Yet, he was careful to point out that such a solution 
could only occur in the long-term and depended on many conditions. The Eastern Bloc would 
have to evolve so to allow Russia to move away from totalitarianism and let the satellite states 
play a more significant role in Europe. The states of Western Europe would have to extend their 
organisation to cover political and defence matters. West Germany would have to accept that any 
reunification would involve a settlement on its borders and weapons that was accepted by all its 
neighbours. Finally, a solution to the German question was only conceivable once a general 
“detente, entente and cooperation” had developed between all the European states114.
Yet, this press conference was also significant in a more fundamental way, as was 
claimed by a source in the Quai when he argued to American officials that the German section of 
the speech marked a definite turning point in the evolution of French foreign policy115. It was 
effectively a signal of a change in the French strategic priorities: as De Gaulle had temporarily 
given up on his hopes of seeing a more independent Western Europe centred on the Franco- 
German axis, he was now pinning his hopes for a radical transformation of the European system 
on his emerging Ostpolitik.
Y. February 1965-.Tune 1965: First Chapter with the East
Following De Gaulle’s press conference, France pursued in 1965 the process of 
developing a political cooperation with the Eastern Bloc, starting with the Soviet Union. It was 
not always a straightforward process, and during this period, the rapprochement remained often 
more concrete in the scientific and commercial sphere than the political field116. On 23 March 
1965, the Soviet Union officially adopted the French SEC AM technology, and on 12 May, both
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states signed a protocol of cultural exchanges. Six days later, they signed an agreement for 
cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Yet, the international context and the general 
increase in contacts did help to bring both sides closer together.
Indeed, while less dramatic, progress also occurred at the political level in early 1965. 
Paris and Moscow, keen on high-level consultations, quickly agreed that Gromyko would visit 
Paris in April, and Couve would return the visit in the autumn117. Moreover, the appointment in 
March 1965 of Valerian Zorin, as Soviet Ambassador in Paris, reinforced this sense of a new 
phase in Franco-Soviet relations. Whereas Vinogradov had been mainly active in cultural and 
technical matters, it was widely believed that with Zorin, a former deputy Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and expert on European and German policies, the Soviets expected to do business in 
those fields118. The Kremlin leaders believed that improving Franco-Soviet relations did not 
involve big risks, and that they could benefit by simply sending signals in response to De 
Gaulle’s positive speeches, especially his 4 February press conference. It cost Moscow very little 
to thank France by upgrading their embassy in Paris or by sending Gromyko119. As for the 
French, they seemed pleased that a dialogue was possible not only on Vietnam, where they held 
similar views, but also on the crucial question of Germany, despite differences in their 
viewpoints120.
Both the French and Soviet leaders strove to present an optimistic picture of their future 
relations. Zorin mentioned to Pompidou that his government “really wants to improve its 
friendly relations with France, as a great European power itself’. Pompidou replied that as in the 
past, good Franco-Soviet relations could provide a solid base for European peace121. Gromyko’s 
visit in late April only reinforced French optimism, leading De Gaulle to comment, “it is obvious 
the Russians have a strong desire to develop contacts with us”122. The General, after all, was
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convinced that Russia was facing a combination of serious problems, which meant, as he told 
Gromyko, that it no longer appeared as threatening as it once had123. In that context, as Soutou 
explained, despite the fact that the French official position supported reunification, De Gaulle 
was ready to make a concession to the Soviets. If he believed that the partition of Germany was 
“abnormal” and would not last for ever, he was “in no hurry” to overcome it and accepted that 
partition was “an accomplished fact” for the time being. With Gromyko replying that Moscow 
was not against reunification, provided it was agreed by both German states, there was now a 
measure of overlap between the French and Soviet positions124.
However, it is important not to overstate the extent of the Franco-Soviet rapprochement 
by the time of Gromyko’s visit. The latter was more a probing exercise than anything else, a first 
chapter in their dialogue. The French were equally careful not to move too quickly towards the 
Soviets. When Gromyko questioned De Gaulle about the possibilities of a Franco-Soviet treaty, 
his reply was voluntarily ambiguous: he excluded no options in the future, but added that this 
was not an immediate topic . Furthermore, France also made it clear that it wanted actions, not 
just words, to strengthen their bilateral ties. As Pompidou told Zorin, any improvement in 
Franco-Soviet relations depended on solid foundations in all spheres, not just the political field. 
He particularly complained about the low level of Franco-Soviet trade and Soviet delays in fully
i  of*implementing the October 1964 agreement . Similarly, De Gaulle refused to get carried away 
and still remained wary of Moscow. Speaking to Alphand soon after Gromyko’s visit, he 
explained that Russia was “trying to take advantage of our disagreements with the US”, but “for 
the moment it is not really going anywhere”127. Indeed, the Soviets barely hid the fact that they
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were mainly engaging in a dialogue with France to annoy the US, as Ussachev, a Soviet charge 
d’affaires in the Paris Embassy, strongly implied to an American diplomat128.
Additionally, as a US State Department report pointed out, neither France nor the Soviets 
could go very far in their relations without causing unpredictable consequences with their 
allies129. De Gaulle’s 4 February press conference had already caused some uneasiness in the 
West: Washington feared that the General’s “European” approach to the German problem was 
an attempt to exclude the US from any settlement, while Schroeder believed it was not up to the 
French President to discuss the fate of Germany130. Thus, French officials tried early on to 
reassure their Western colleagues that they were not seeking any “reversal of alliances”, and to 
show that they were not fundamentally departing from Western orthodoxy on East-West matters. 
For example, De Gaulle told Bohlen that he saw no real differences in principle between the 
American and French approach to detente, while he explained to Brosio that the purely European 
approach to the German problem would only be appropriate if there were significant changes 
within Russia and the satellite states131. Likewise, France made a gesture towards West Germany 
when it issued on 12 May 1965 a tripartite declaration with Britain and the US, which stressed 
that German unification could only occur via peaceful means and in agreement with the Soviet 
Union, thus reaffirming the responsibility of the four major powers in the German question132.
At the same time, France’s Ostpolitik was pushed forward by the growing contacts with 
the satellite states of Eastern Europe. The latter were particularly important as a counterweight to 
Russian power, and to help maintain a certain equilibrium within Europe. After the increasing 
activities in Franco-Soviet relations in the first few months of 1965, Paris made sure to keep a 
hand in the Eastern European game and balance its rapprochement with Russia133. In June 1965, 
hot on the heels of a commercial agreement with Romania, France signed a scientific and trade
128 NARA: RG59, CFPF, 1964-1966, Box 2180: Bohlen to Rusk, Telegram number 5591, 03.04.65
129 FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XII: Document 46, 24.04.65
130 Bozo, Deux Strategies, p. 135; Seydoux, Francois, Dans L’Intimite Franco-Allemande: Une Mission 
Diplomatique. (Paris: Albatros, 1977), p.45
131 FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XII: Document 47, 04.05.65; LBJL: PP, NSF, CO, Box 171: Finletter to Rusk, Telegram 
number 1247,01.03.65
132 MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.25: Courcel to Couve, Telegram number 1984-1989,12.05.65
133 NARA: RG59, CFPF, 1964-1966, Box 2173: Bohlen to Rusk, Telegram number 7298, 24.06.65
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cooperation agreement with Czechoslovakia, and a new trade and industrial cooperation 
agreement with Poland. Moreover, several French Ministers visited Eastern Europe in the first 
half of 1965, including the Minister for administrative reform Louis Joxe who went to Belgrade 
and Prague, and Giscard who went to Bucharest. That said, the French leaders were realistic and 
understood that any substantial progress in detente in Europe depended on Soviet good will. 
They realised that they should attempt to increase contacts with the Eastern European states, not 
try to detach them from the Soviet sphere of influence134.
Despite that cautious attitude, the French government undoubtedly viewed the evolution 
of the satellite states with great hope. According to a Quai D’Orsay analysis, the Soviet Union 
surely disapproved or was concerned by the rapprochement between Western European and 
Eastern European states, but they felt that Moscow already had its hands full with their own 
economic and external problems, and that prevented it from fully opposing this evolution in 
Europe135. De Gaulle agreed with the analysis of the Quai d’Orsay, and was convinced that the 
satellite states would inevitably and eventually recover their independence. He adamantly 
believed that “Eastern Europe will start moving”, so “it is our role to help and nobody can do it 
better than France”136. Moreover, it was true that on the economic and cultural fronts, France 
offered nothing more really than other Western powers like West Germany, Britain or Italy, and 
often France lagged behind those powers in terms of trading with Eastern Europe. However, the 
Quai d’Orsay officials banked on the fact that France was the only Western European power that 
possessed a certain political credit within the Eastern bloc, and that might allow it to eventually 
become the main interlocutor of the satellite states137.
De Gaulle liked to play states against each other. Better relations with the satellite states 
provided a balance to the rapprochement with Russia, whereas closer ties with the Soviets helped
134 Couve, Politique etrangere, pp. 197-198
135 MAEF: Europe, URSS 1966-1970, Vol.2665: Note of Sous-Direction Europe-Orientale, 20.04.65
136 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.2, 10.02.65, pp.317-318
137 DDF: 1965, Tome I: Account of Joxe’s trip to Prague, 30.06.65
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counter American hegemony138. The latter was particularly relevant in a period when the US was 
stepping up its involvement in the Third World with the interventions in Vietnam and the 
Dominican Republic -  of which more will be said in the next chapter. United by their opposition 
to both of Washington’s moves, France and the Soviet Union were encouraged to consult more 
closely. Peyrefitte’s official statement of 24 February expressed his government’s willingness to 
“consult with the Soviet Union” in seeking “peace in Southeast Asia thanks to an international 
conference”; as for the Dominican Republic incident, French and Soviet representatives enjoyed 
frequent contacts on the matter and shared very similar views139. The international context was, 
in other words, facilitating a Franco-Soviet rapprochement. The war in Vietnam was particularly 
significant because it compromised Moscow’s dialogue with Washington140.
Finally, France’s Eastern policy was also benefiting from the fact that Paris’ Westpolitik 
was leading to serious tension with its allies. The split between France and America only grew in 
the first half of 1965 thanks to their differences over NATO and the international monetary 
system. In parallel, the brewing crisis within the EEC finally erupted on 30 June when France 
decided to boycott the Community institutions. In this context, France’s Western allies, 
especially West Germany, could not help but view De Gaulle’s openings towards Eastern Europe 
with fear and suspicion. In stark contrast, the prospects for France’s Ostpolitik appeared far more 
promising by mid 1965. The rapprochement with both the Soviet Union and the satellite states 
was only at its beginning, and with the Western path at a dead end, the Eastern road appeared to 
offer more opportunities for France to attain Great Power status and promote its national 
independence141.
VI. July 1965-January 1966: Freeze in the West. Opportunities in the East
138 Andrieu, Rene, in De Gaulle. Lacouture and Mehl, p.224
139 NARA: RG59, CFPF, 1964-1966, Box 2186: Bohlen to Rusk, Telegram number 4916, 01.03.65; DDF: 1965, 
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140 Vaisse, La grandeur, p.424
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In the second half of 1965, French strategic priorities shifted even further towards the 
East because of its differences with its Western allies. On a basic level, France’s boycott of the 
EEC institutions and its aloof position within NATO -  as it continued to prepare its withdrawal -  
meant that it was able to focus far more on its relations with the Eastern bloc. More importantly, 
Bonn’s persistent pursuit of the MLF played a key role in bringing Paris and Moscow closer 
together. During the summer, officials from the Quai were not so worried by Bonn’s renewed 
demands for involvement in nuclear matters. They felt, like the head of the European department 
Frangois Puaux, that many of the West German statements on the MLF were being made with an 
eye on the upcoming German general elections scheduled in September142. However, Bonn’s 
stubborn insistence on the MLF after the elections angered French leaders, especially De Gaulle. 
As he warned American Senator Mike Mansfield, West Germany’s nuclear ambitions might 
prevent the possibility of any real peace between Western and Eastern Europe143. It was also yet 
another factor contributing to his complete disillusionment with West Germany by the end of 
1965: “The Germans have taken a dissident position towards our treaty of cooperation and 
friendship. We cannot stop them. Germany follows its way, it is not ours. They look for 
reunification at all costs and without delay; they will not get it as long as the Soviets resist”144. 
When discussing with Soutou his forthcoming trip to Moscow, Couve thus argued that France’s 
best option was to revert to the historic policy of an alliance with Russia, in order to counter the 
resurgence of German nationalism and their apparent desire to participate in nuclear defence
14Smatters .
This was significant because despite general improvement during the first half of 1965, 
the Soviet government had showed signs of frustration with the slow progress in Franco-Soviet 
relations. Iouri Doubinin, Soviet counsellor in the Paris embassy, had complained to Puaux that 
his government was disappointed by the fact France had not “responded” more rapidly to
142 MAEF: Europe, URSS 1961-1965, Vol.1933: Puaux-Doubinin meeting, 15.07.65
143 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.381: De Gaulle-Mansfield meeting, 15.11.65
144 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.2, 13.10.65, p.303
145 LBJL: PP, NSF, CO, Box 172: CIA Intelligence Info Cable, 25.08.65
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Gromyko’s visit “by taking an initiative on the German problem”146. Indeed, the Soviet 
government had to a certain extent misunderstood the implications of De Gaulle’s February 
press conference. When he had claimed that a solution to the German question needed the 
agreement of all Germany’s neighbours, Moscow had wrongly assumed that this included East 
Germany, and was later surprised to hear that France’s position on East Germany had not 
changed147. Yet, Bonn’s renewed campaign for the MLF had caused significant anxiety in 
Moscow and encouraged it to resume efforts to improve ties with Paris. Knowing full well that 
France also opposed the MLF, Soviet officials in Paris lobbied the French government 
intensively during the month of July. They effectively suggested some kind of cooperative effort 
to prevent Bonn from gaining access to nuclear weapons in one form or another.
While French leaders undoubtedly shared Moscow’s opposition to the MLF and were 
keen to give greater attention to the Eastern Bloc, they were equally quite prudent and cautious 
vis-a-vis the Soviet openings148. When Zorin pointed out to De Gaulle that France and the 
Soviet Union had failed to agree on common positions, despite similar views on many 
international problems, De Gaulle adopted a “wait and see attitude”. He agreed that both Paris 
and Moscow shared similar views on crucial problems such as Vietnam and Germany, but those 
were questions that would take a long time to solve. Nonetheless, he still wanted to discuss those 
problems with the Soviet Union, and attached key importance to Couve’s upcoming visit to 
Moscow149. Furthermore, despite the conflicts with its West European allies, France tried not to 
jeopardise even further its relations the latter, especially West Germany. Thus, Puaux reminded 
Doubinin that while France and the Soviets held close views on the MLF, they still belonged to 
different alliances and it would be difficult for Paris to take a common stand with Moscow 
against Bonn150. Finally, the General also adopted a prudent attitude for tactical reasons. He was 
convinced, as he told Alphand, that “our position is unique: Russia is courting us and China
146 NARA: RG59, CFPF, 1964-1966, Box 2173: Bohlen to Rusk, Telegram number 6760,28.05.65
147 MAEF: Europe, URSS 1961-1965, Vol.1933: Lucet-Ussachev meeting, 23.07.65
148 Lacouture, De Gaulle: vol. 3. p.400
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congratulates us for our courage and independence”151. Having the luxury of being on good 
terms with several Great Powers, France did not need to appear desperate to respond the Russian 
advances.
At the same time, the rapprochement with the Soviet Union was gaining in momentum as 
a consequence of France’s ever-increasing contacts with the satellite states. French officials saw 
the visit in September by Polish Prime Minister, Josef Cyrankiewicz, as a particularly important 
step in Eastern Europe’s evolution towards greater independence, starting with the fact that it 
would be the first time a Polish Prime Minister would come to an Atlantic Alliance state since 
World War Two. They also considered it an excellent opportunity for France to improve its 
cultural, commercial and political presence. As for De Gaulle, he was planning to give 
Cyrankiewicz a finer reception than the one for Maurer in 1964, because of his deeper personal 
interest in Poland -  dating from his time in Warsaw in 1920 -  and Poland’s more significant role 
in the overall European picture152. Yet, if the General was confident that the Eastern European 
states would slowly, but inexorably, reclaim their national independence, he understood that any 
improvement in France’s relations with those states could not happen without parallel 
improvement in its relations with Russia. During his talks with Cyrankiewicz, De Gaulle was 
careful to balance his calls for greater contacts between Poland and France with a cautious 
statement that as long as “you [Poland] keep your national personality ... we have no problems 
with your alliance with the Soviet Union”. He further added that France wanted to cooperate 
more with this Russia, which it saw as less threatening, beset with problems, and no longer set 
on dominating Europe153.
As such, De Gaulle was attaching a lot of importance to Couve’s imminent trip to 
Moscow, unlike the Quai officials who were more sceptical about the prospects of Franco-Soviet 
cooperation. A note drafted before Couve’s visit acknowledged the growing Soviet interest in
151 Alphand, L'etonnement. 17.07.65, p.459
152 DDF: 1965, Tome II: Note of Sous-Direction Europe Centrale, 30.08.65; LBJL: PP, NSF, CO, Box 172: Bohlen 
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France, and the more distant relations between the superpowers, but warned that the US and the 
Soviet Union had enough common interests to make it likely that they would engage in a close 
dialogue in the future154. However, despite that warning, Couve’s positive talks with his Russian 
hosts played a central role in fully committing the French government towards its relations with 
Russia and the goal of East-West rapprochement in Europe. The meetings with Brezhnev, 
Gromyko and Kosygin undoubtedly produced no changes in respective viewpoints. 
Nevertheless, the repeated meetings between high-level French and Soviet officials -  after 
Gromyko’s visit in April and Gromyko’s meetings with Couve in Vienna in May and at the 
United Nations [UN] in October -  were strong evidence of the new friendlier atmosphere 
between France and the Soviet Union155. The Kremlin leaders went to great lengths to flatter and 
please Couve during his trip, often complimenting De Gaulle and his policies, and suggested the 
latter should visit the Soviet Union. Brezhnev promised Couve that the General “would be 
warmly welcomed”156. Kosygin also mentioned that De Gaulle’s trip could offer the opportunity 
to “draft a serious document to organise our relations for the coming years”, or in effect 
underlining that Moscow took its relations with Paris seriously. Couve hinted that De Gaulle 
would be interested in the invitation, but he could only reply after the Presidential elections157.
Couve’s trip to Moscow was a very important landmark in Franco-Soviet relations and 
the confirmation of the series of small improvements throughout 1964-65. Furthermore, it helped 
to overcome some of the lingering doubts on both sides. In regards to the Soviets, on the one 
hand the foreign policy community was to still undecided and caught up in the “great debates” 
about peaceful coexistence, which helps explain Brezhnev’s skimpy tribute to Franco-Soviet 
relations as merely “not bad” during the Central Committee plenum in September 1965158. On 
the other hand, certain officials were pushing for closer ties with Paris, like Zorin who was
154 MAEF: Europe, URSS 1961-1965, Vol.1933: Notes of Sous Direction Europe Orientale, 22.10.65
155 Couve, Politique etrangere. p.209
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delighted by the current spirit of Franco-Soviet cooperation159. As the political report for 1965 of 
the Soviet Embassy in Paris argued, “the political orientations of the French government present 
for us undeniable advantages in regards to the general aims of Soviet foreign policy, because, 
first and foremost, this tendency destabilises the Western camp in its current organisation, 
weakens objectively the United States -  our main imperialist enemy -  and compromises West 
Germany's chances for military and political progress”160.
In the same way, it is true that France did not abandon its prudent stance. For example, 
De Gaulle mentioned to British conservative leader Edward Heath that while the Soviets 
appeared more reasonable, the West still needed to remain cautious; similarly, French leaders 
were wary of hasty and adventurous positions, which explains why they were very lukewarm 
towards the Soviet proposal for a European security conference161. Yet, there was also a clear 
optimism because, according to Couve, his trip had shown that Paris could “objectively 
cooperate” with Moscow162. He came back from the Soviet Union extremely pleased and 
impressed with the results of the talks, and as he told Schroeder, he was struck by the changes in 
the Soviet Union since his last visit in 1947, and by the apparent freedom of expression 
prevailing . By the end of 1965, as a source from the Quai d’Orsay confirmed to American 
officials, De Gaulle now considered the East-West rapprochement in Europe as his main 
strategic objective164.
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VII. Conclusion
Between 1963 and 1965, France’s attitude towards the communist bloc underwent a very 
significant evolution. From bitter opponent in early 1963, separated by the Franco-German treaty 
and its different conception of detente, France had moved by late 1965 to the position of 
champion of East-West detente in Europe. The failure of the Franco-German treaty, combined 
with the growing emancipation of the satellite states within the Eastern bloc, proved instrumental 
in this change of situation. After his victory in the second round of the presidential elections on 
19 December, De Gaulle went to the next level and quickly moved to give a new impetus to 
France’s relations with the Soviet Union. During a meeting with Zorin on 12 January 1966, he 
announced that he had accepted Brezhnev and Kosygin’s invitation to visit the Soviet Union in 
June165.
In 1966, the French President was thus preparing to initiate a bolder foreign policy, and 
one that would actively challenge the Cold War order in Europe, thanks to the withdrawal from 
NATO and his trip to Moscow. Yet, he again faced a series of significant challenges. Would 
France be able to stay at the vanguard of East-West detente? Would it be able to compel the 
Eastern European states to adopt more flexible positions on the German question? Finally, would 
French public opinion continue to support the rapprochement with the Soviet Union166? Chapter 
four will consider these questions, but before that, it is necessary to focus on how French policy 
towards the Third World evolved between 1963 and 1965.
165 ANF: 5AG1, Carton 187, URSS: De Gaulle-Zorin meeting, 12.01.66
166 According to IFOP, De Gaulle, p.264, in 1963, 23% had a good opinion of the USSR, 30% neither good nor bad, 
35% had a bad opinion, and 12% had no opinion; for 1964, the figures were 25%, 42%, 25% and 8%; for 1965, 
27%, 40%, 14%, and 19%.
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Chapter III: A “Shining Light** for the World?
I. Introduction
The four years following De Gaulle’s return to power in 1958 marked the end of the 
French colonial empire. Paris swiftly granted independence to its black African colonies in 1960, 
before finally ending the Algerian War with the Evian Accords of March 1962. The latter were a 
very significant turning point, not only because they removed a major burden and enabled France 
to focus on its quest for Great Power status, but they also allowed it to try and make a comeback 
in the Third World. Free from its colonial past and the Algerian quagmire, Paris was keen to start 
a new phase with the Third World states, and present itself as the champion of their 
development. The creation in late 1962 of the Ministry of Cooperation, headed by Raymond 
Triboulet, for France’s relations with its former African colonies seemed to confirm this new 
direction. The new Ministry would be distinct from the Quai d’Orsay, and would provide 
technical aid on the margins of the Quai’s political diplomacy1.
Yet, this policy towards the developing states, based on cooperation rather than colonial 
domination, raises three main questions. First, did Gaullist France follow a coherent policy 
towards the Third World as a whole? Second, what effectively drove this policy of cooperation? 
There is a clear divide on the subject within this literature, as described in the introduction2. 
Finally, how important was the Third World in De Gaulle’s overall grand strategy, and did its 
role evolve significantly between 1963 and 1965? Did the French openings towards the Third 
World, as Vaisse suggests, translate the General’s will to look for a third way and place French 
policy outside the framework of the Cold War struggle3?
1 Triboulet, Raymond, Un Ministre du General. (Paris: Plon, 1985), p. 198
2 See Introduction, footnote 37
3 Vaisse, La grandeur, p.452
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II. The Rhetoric...
Judging by rhetoric alone, there was a coherent and defined French approach towards the 
Third World and its place in the international system. Presenting the maintenance of world peace 
as one of their central foreign policy goals, French leaders consistently denounced the Cold War 
bipolar order because they felt that “a simplistic division of the world into two blocs invariably 
led to opposition and conflict”4. It was thus normal that they wanted to prevent the Third World 
from becoming another East-West battlefield because, as Couve argued in the case of the Middle 
East, superpower involvement in the region undermined its stability5. Paris essentially viewed 
the Cold War as an unstable system and believed that global equilibrium could not solely depend 
on agreements between Moscow and Washington; it needed the participation of the rest of the 
world6.
For De Gaulle, the emergence of a multitude of new independent states was a profound 
change in modem civilisation. Yet, as he reflected to Luis Giannattasio, President of the 
Uruguayan National Council, the Cold War threatened to sterilise this development7. The spread 
of ideological competition throughout the globe presented the clear danger of turning Third 
World states into pawns in the superpower rivalry. In that respect, the policy of neutralisation, 
often advocated by France and especially in South-East Asia as we will see later, represented a 
possible alternative and an attempt at freezing out some areas from the US-Soviet struggle. 
French leaders were convinced that neutralisation was in the interest of the small, lesser- 
developed states caught between the great free nations and communist powers8. Promoting 
neutrality also had the advantage of encouraging Third World independence and the attempts to 
resist subordination to Great Powers. As De Gaulle explained to the Laotian Prime Minister 
Prince Souvanna Phouma, “a state can have friends and receive aid. But, it has to solve its own
4 Couve, Politique etrangere, p.446
5 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.375: Couve-Peres meeting, 15.06.63
6 DDF: 1964, Tome II: De Gaulle-Illia meeting, 04.10.64
7 De Gaulle, DM: IV. 08.10.64, p.297
8 MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.20: Pompidou-Ikeda meeting, 07.04.64
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problems without foreign intervention”9. In other words, this was connected to the central 
Gaullist creed according to which nationalism, rather than the sterile (and self-serving) struggle 
between the US and the Soviet Union, was the real driving force in world affairs10.
Moreover, not only was the emergence of an independent Third World important for 
world equilibrium, but according to De Gaulle in his 31 January 1964 press conference, this was 
the true global challenge as “two billion men are aspiring for progress, well-being and dignity”11. 
It was just not possible, as he told Peyrefitte, to let the universe “be divided into haves and have- 
nots. The whole world is part of a common civilisation”12. The General was keen not to consider 
all international relations, including French policy towards the Third World, through the prism of 
the East-West conflict13. Instead of the Cold War’s divisive ideologies and desires for 
domination, Gaullist rhetoric thus outlined an ambitious alternative model for relations between 
developed and developing states. Speaking at Mexico University, he explained that the 
dominating fact in the world was the unity of the universe and the need for fraternal relations 
between states, which implied richer states had to help those requiring aid to progress14.
If Gaullist rhetoric argued that helping developing states, rather the Cold War rivalry, 
was the fundamental global task for rich nations, what did it have to say about France’s 
contribution to this mission? On a basic level, it referred to historical circumstances to justify 
why France should have an active role in the Third World. In addition to its colonial past, France 
possessed traditional links of friendship with many states throughout the world, and De Gaulle 
often used this argument when urging foreign statesmen for further collaboration15. Furthermore, 
French leaders often pointed to their country’s history as providing it with an authoritative 
standing on extra-European affairs. On the thorny issue of Vietnam, for example, Couve 
regularly told American officials that France had spent more than ninety years in Indochina, in
9 De Gaulle, DM: IV. 12.09.63, p. 133
10 Costigliola, Cold alliance, p. 139
n De Gaulle, DM: IV. p. 170
12 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.2. 11.03.64, p.472
13 Gorce, Paul Marie de la, DGESS VI. pp.73-74
14 De Gaulle, DM: IV. 18.03.64, p. 198
15 MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.19: De Gaulle-King Hussein meeting, 10.09.63
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effect reminding them that it possessed a great knowledge of the region16. Gaullist rhetoric 
effectively presented France -  with its blend of tradition and experience -  as a privileged 
interlocutor for Third World states. After all, this was important because the latter needed to 
have more options available to them besides turning to either Washington or Moscow for aid17.
Yet, besides history and tradition, French leaders argued that their country’s unique
1 ftnature drove it to seek closer cooperation with developing states . As Couve explained in his 
memoirs, the spirit, the soul and the genius of France pushed it towards the universal. It was the 
flag bearer of the fundamental principles of the time, that is to say national independence, peace, 
and cooperation between peoples19. An independent France was a major source of inspiration for 
all states fighting foreign intervention . It was a model for the Third World thanks to its 
assertive stance against the superpowers, and the constant values it stood for. In other words, 
French leaders believed that they country had a special position and role to play in the world, as 
De Gaulle made clear to Peyrefitte: “France’s authority is moral [...] Our country is different 
than others because of its disinterested and universal vocation [...] France has an eternal role. 
That is why it benefits from an immense credit. Because France was a pioneer of American 
independence, of the abolition of slavery, of the rights of people to dispose of their own fate. 
Because it is the champion of nations’ independence against all hegemonies. Everyone realises 
that: France is the light of the world, its genius is to enlighten the universe”21.
This belief in France’s special role led De Gaulle to present it as leading the way when it 
came to helping Third World states, as he did during his 31 January 1964 press conference, when 
he sought to justify the principles of its cooperation policy and emphasise its humane and 
disinterested nature. Reminding his audience that France dedicated more of its income to aid
16 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.376: Couve-Kennedy meeting, 07.10.63
17 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.377: De Gaulle-Erhard meeting 1, 15.02.64
18 See Vaisse, La grandeur, p.453, and Hartley, Gaullism, p.205
19 Couve, Politique dtrangere, pp.431-432
20 De Gaulle, DM: IV. Speech in Lyon, 28.09.63, p. 138
21 Peyrefitte. C'etait de Gaulle: v o l.l. 13.02.63, p.283
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O')than any other state in terms of percentage of total gross national income [GNI] , the General 
added that the material gains they received from helping developing states were very 
insignificant compared to what France spent in terms of aid. In addition, he argued that France’s 
cooperation policy was not a cynical effort, which involved splashing out money in exchange for 
allegiance. Instead, he claimed that beyond financial aid, it was France’s duty to “educate and 
train” the men of the Third World so to enable them one day to follow their own path towards 
progress23. Additionally, this was a duty that applied to all states irrespective of their regimes or 
ideologies, as shown by Paris’ ties with socialist Algeria or its recognition of Communist 
China24.
Considering the latter point, and with its emphasis on cooperation and overcoming the 
Cold War’s divisive logic, Gaullist rhetoric towards the Third World naturally disavowed 
exclusive links. If it continued to give priority to its former colonies, France had grander 
ambitions for its relations with developing states. The rapport Jeanneney, published in January 
1964, was instrumental in determining whether French aid should be limited, and it offered 
strong conclusions that influenced De Gaulle’s thinking: “We should remove all geographical 
limits. Wanting to set up a list of states with which to cooperate would lead to wrongful 
exclusions and inclusions. Cooperation must be directed globally...” . Indeed, between 1963 
and 1967, the share of French aid for states outside the franc zone -  especially in Asia, the
0f\Middle East and Latin America -  doubled .
Gaullist rhetoric thus underlined how France’s history and values created a strong bond 
between itself and the developing states. Yet, it also strove to emphasise France’s commitment to
22 According to Pascallon, Pierre, “Les Aspects Economiques de la Politique Tiers Mondiste du General de Gaulle 
de 1962 a 1969”, in Institut Charles de Gaulle (ed.), De Gaulle et le Tiers Monde. (Paris: A. Pedone, 1984), p. 189, 
throughout the 1960s, France dedicated a higher percentage of its GNI to aid than the average member-state of the 
Development Aid Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]. See annex
2.
23 De Gaulle, DM: IV. p.173; See also Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.2. 16.09.64, p.517
24 Gorce, DGESS VI. p.74
25 Lacouture, De Gaulle: vol.3, p.422; In March 1963, a decree established a commission, presided by former 
Minister Jean-Marcel Jeanneney, that was in charge of making a report on the policy of cooperation with the 
developing countries.
26 Vaisse, La grandeur, p.457
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practical steps to help the cause of Third World progress. Starting with world peace, official 
discourse repeatedly pointed to the government’s active steps towards furthering that noble 
cause. French leaders presented themselves as reasonable statesmen who advised moderation to
97belligerent states, as when they dealt with officials from the Middle Eastern states . They 
tirelessly condemned war as solving nothing and advocated political solutions to conflicts, with 
the repeated calls to convene an international conference for the conflict in Indochina as a prime 
example.
Moreover, Paris also used all opportunities to show its complete respect for Third World 
states by underlining the four core principles underpinning its policy: non intervention in the 
internal affairs of other states; the right of peoples to self-determination; independence of
9o t
nations; and respect for other states . This respectful stand was a way for De Gaulle to highlight 
the distinction between France and the superpowers. As he ceaselessly explained during his trip 
to Latin America in September-October 1964, France -  unlike the US and the Soviet Union -  did 
not want to dominate other states. It only wanted to walk la mano en la mano with Third World 
states on their journey towards progress29. France wanted therefore to appear as a state with pro- 
Third World sensitivities, as genuinely concerned with their development. This was the case, for 
example, with the issue of the global prices of raw materials. France advocated stable and fixed 
prices for those raw materials, so to protect the agricultural countries of the Third World .
Gaullist rhetoric depicted the development of the Third World as the great global 
challenge, as vital for world equilibrium, but threatened by the expansion of the divisive Cold 
War struggle. France, thanks to its colonial experience and universal genius as the champion of 
human rights, human freedom and national self-determination, had a special role to play by
f
guiding the Third World towards greater independence and protecting it from the ambitions of 
the superpowers. Thus, to use Viansson’s oceanic analogy, rather than being a small fish in a big
27 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.378: Pompidou-Eskhol meeting, 28.06.64
28 FNSP: CM Carton 1: Toast for the Mexican President Adolfo Lopez Mateos, 27.03.63
29 De Gaulle, DM: IV. Speech at the Mexican National Palace, 16.03.64, p. 189
30 MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.20: De Gaulle-Mateos meeting, 16.03.64; For more on this, see Pascallon, “Aspects 
Economiques”, in Institut, De Gaulle et le Tiers Monde, p. 175
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sea, France was acting as a big fish in a small sea and, in the name of the small fish, was ready to 
challenge the biggest fish31!
III.... And Reality
Yet, as appealing as Gaullist rhetoric was, it is impossible to ignore the influence of more 
pragmatic and self-interested goals. For a start, there were limits to the collusion between France 
and the Third World, which in part stemmed from the tensions between the ostensible French 
championing of universal nationalism, on the one hand, and on the other hand its pretensions to 
sharing the role of world policeman with the other nuclear powers32.
Indeed, if De Gaulle tried to present France as sympathetic to the cause of developing 
states, his conception of the world remained very aristocratic, and he was far from being a 
partisan of the principle of equality between states . Even when France actively courted the 
Third World states, it was not ready to jeopardise its independence of action just to please them. 
For example, French leaders always categorically refused to discuss relations with Israel during 
their meetings with Arab officials34. Similarly, France also refused any alliances or engagements 
that would limit its diplomatic freedom, such as when De Gaulle turned down Israeli Prime 
Minister David Ben Gurion’s offer for an alliance in 1963, at a time when Paris was renewing 
relations with the Arab world35.
This desire to maintain a certain distance was even more obvious in the dealings with 
former colonies. Indeed, the General felt that since France had granted them independence, it 
was no longer its duty to solve all their problems. Acting in such a way would only get France 
bogged down in the internal affairs of these new states. But, at the same time, the master of the 
Elysee saw these new states as utterly dependent on France, and constantly asking for more
31 Viansson-Ponte, Pierre. Histoire de la Republique Gaullienne: vol.2, (Paris: Fayard, 1971), p.79
32 Zorgbibe, Charles, “De Gaulle et le Tiers Monde: Orientations Generates”, in Institut, De Gaulle et le Tiers 
Monde, p. 165; Cemy, Politics of grandeur, p.204
33 Vaisse, La grandeur, p.454
34 DDF: 1964, Tome II: Lucet to Roux, 07.09.64
35 De Gaulle, LNC: IX. De Gaulle to Ben Gurion, 11.06.63, p.341
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financial aid36. As a consequence, he often had little respect for them: “They say Youlou 
[President of Congo-Brazzaville until August 1963] is independent. But I am paying for him. So 
for me, Youlou is not independent”37.
There was a further divide between France and Third World states when it came to 
economic goals. As an advanced industrial power, France’s interests in maintaining supplies of 
raw materials, including oil, spreading its political influence and gaining access to new markets, 
did not really fit with the more extreme demands of poor states38. Thus, if France was the 
world’s most generous donor in terms of GDP percentage it devoted to Third World aid, it was 
not quite as disinterested as suggested by Gaullist rhetoric. Paris expected concrete benefits -  
especially in the domain of trade -  from its cooperation policy. In the case of Algeria, French 
officials made it clear that the aid was not a gift and depended on significant counterparts, 
including a military base, a location for nuclear tests, a significant amount of oil for domestic 
consumption, a decent market for French exports, and an opportunity to maintain influence . 
Equally, the military agreements signed with the former African colonies included clauses that 
gave France priority in the purchase of strategic raw materials and equipment, while the new 
African states also offered great markets for the French weapons industry40.
Moreover, the nature itself of France’s aid program itself was ambiguous. It certainly did 
involve a “conceptual shift from direct aid for friendly allies to a more ‘infra-structural’ form of 
assistance based on the sending of teachers, technical advisers and so on”41. Of course, Gaullist 
rhetoric emphasised this evolution, claiming that France’s policy sought solely to “train” Third 
World elites and facilitate their states’ development. Yet, as Marcel points out, in some ways 
France’s aid to under-developed states appeared neo-colonial, and simply the historical 
continuation of the assistance to colonies: “It tends to shift from the direct and administrative
36 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.2. 24.01.63 and 06.03.63, pp.462-463
37 Wauthier, Claude, Ouatre Presidents et fAfrique. De Gaulle. Pompidou. Giscard d’Estaing, Mitterrand: Ouarante 
ans de politique africaine, (Paris: Seuil, 1995), p. 170
38 Zorgbibe, “Orientations Generates”, in Institut, De Gaulle et le Tiers Monde, p. 165; Cemy, Politics of grandeur. 
p.204
DDF: 1963, Tome II: Note on French financial aid to Algeria, 13.11.63
40 Zan, Semi-Bi, DGESS VI. p.295
41 Cerny, Politics o f grandeur, p.203
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forms of domination specific to colonialism to more indirect forms control that are more 
appropriate for neo-colonialism. This aid safeguards the monopolies’ control on the resources of 
under-developed states and maintains them in a situation of providers of raw materials and 
clients for industrial goods”42. By sending teachers and advisers to Third World states, De 
Gaulle undoubtedly hoped to channel the latter’s development along a path favourable to French 
interests. He expected that the promise of cultural, technical, commercial and linguistic aid could 
entice the former African colonies to develop according to a French model43. This reasoning also 
extended to other Third World states. In the General’s view, training Latin American engineers 
and elites would lead them to speak French, and naturally to look to France on a human and 
material level. Technical assistance was thus not an end in itself, but could lead to concrete 
economic benefits44.
The fact is that France’s Third World policy was not as humane as the Gaullist rhetoric 
suggested. France sent many advisers and teachers to developing states, but it equally made a 
decent profit by selling weapons to them45. Moral considerations rarely stood in the way of good 
business. Paris did not hesitate to supply arms to both Algeria and Morocco, despite the fact that 
these states fought each other in a border conflict in 1963, while it also provided weapons to 
both Israel and Arab states, such as Lebanon or Jordan. It also engaged in military trade with 
pariah states like Portugal and South Africa, despite UN recommendations. France tried to 
justify its attitude by claiming its attachment to the principle of non-interference in domestic 
affairs, and by repeating the guarantees that South Africa made to not use these weapons for 
internal repression. Yet, the concrete benefits it received in exchange for the weapons sales, be it
42 Quoted by Pascallon, “Aspects Economiques”, in Institut, De Gaulle et le Tiers Monde, p. 194
43 De Gaulle, LNC: DC. Draft before a Minister’s Council, Not Dated 03.63, p.318
44 DDF: 1964, Tome II: Note on De Gaulle comments after his South American trip, 21.10.64
45 Hartley, Gaullism. p.238
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gold and uranium from South Africa, or a satellite station in the Azores from Portugal, were 
surely more persuasive46.
Additionally, French policy towards the Third World was not as coherent and consistent 
in practice as implied by Gaullist rhetoric. This was particularly obvious when comparing how 
Paris dealt with its former African colonies, and how it dealt with states attempting to “free” 
themselves from superpower hegemony, like Vietnam as we will see later47. From 1963 
onwards, Africa was certainly no longer a top priority for De Gaulle as he focussed more on 
global affairs, whereas Couve had never been particularly interested in the continent48; this 
certainly allowed the all-powerful Secretaire General pour les Affaires Africaines et Malgaches, 
Jacques Foccart -  who tended to see Africa as France’s backyard -  to have great influence on 
policy and pursue goals far less magnanimous than those implied by Gaullist rhetoric49. As a 
consequence, the main French goal in the region was effectively to manage its sphere of 
influence, and prevent other Great Powers from intruding. This applied, for example, to the US, 
as De Gaulle actively sought to “refuse any American attempts towards harmonisation [of 
policy], that is to say ‘leadership’ in Africa”50. He felt that cooperation with the US threatened to 
undermine France’s prime position in Africa, and subordinate it to American interests. Equally, 
Quai d’Orsay officials seemed keen to prevent the spread of communism in the continent. For 
example, they maintained officially that France had no problems with a socialist Algeria. In 
private, however, the same officials emphasised the importance of making sure that Algeria did
46 Wauthier, Ouatre Presidents, pp.139-143, 144-145; Between 1961 and 1965, France sold 700M francs worth of 
weapons to South Africa, while Pretoria was a key source of uranium for Paris, see DDF: 1966, Tome I: Note on 
Franco-South African economic relations, 28.04.66 and Note, 09.05.66
47 Kouassi, Edmond Kwam, DGESS VI. p.77
48 Vaisse, La grandeur, p.480, although the French President did continue to regularly receive African leaders; 
Interview with Jean Charbonnel, Paris, 15.09.04
49 It is difficult to separate fact and fiction on Foccart, but amongst those who suggest his great influence see Pean, 
Pierre, L’homme de l’ombre: Elements d’enquete autour de Jacques Foccart. l’homme le plus mvsterieux et le plus 
puissant de la Vfeme Republique, (Paris: Fayard, 1990); Wauthier, Ouatre Presidents: Interview with Michel Habib- 
Deloncle, Paris, 15.12.04
50 De Gaulle, LNC: IX. De Gaulle to Couve, 22.10.63, p.380
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not join the Eastern Bloc. France did not want on its doorstep a hostile power that could 
adversely affect the other North African states51.
In this context, France’s military agreements with certain former African colonies helped 
to protect its sphere of influence. Officially, they were meant to guarantee the internal and 
external security of the former colonies and, according to Pierre Messmer, the French minister 
for armed forces, De Gaulle saw instability and anarchy as “the biggest threat to these new 
states”52. Yet, if Paris eventually withdrew most of its troops from Africa -  from 35,000 in West 
Africa and 12,000 in Equatorial Africa in 1960, to respectively 9,000 and 6,600 respectively in 
1964 -  this was not necessarily incompatible with the goals previously mentioned. Progress in 
transport enabled French troops based in the metropolis to intervene in Africa if and when the 
need arose. Equally, by withdrawing most of its troops, France reduced part of the financial 
burden attached to its military policy, maintained its freedom of action, and countered the 
criticisms made by the Organization of African Unity [OAU] in regards to the presence of 
foreign troops53. France thus had fewer troops in Africa, but it would not hesitate to intervene at 
the expense of other states’ sovereignty if it suited its interests to do so.
The Gabon episode in 1964 is particularly revealing of the goals and the decision-making 
process of France’s African policy. On 17-18 February, Gabon’s army toppled President Leon 
M’Ba, which immediately prompted the French government to act to restore him to power. The 
Quai d’Orsay was not involved in the process, and it was instead Foccart who pushed for the 
intervention, without M’Ba’s request, before informing De Gaulle54. Gabon possessed a lot of 
mineral resources such as oil, manganese and uranium, in itself a powerful incentive to act, and 
on top of that, France wanted to send a signal to its other African partners that it could be trusted
51 DDF: 1963, Tome II: Note on French financial aid to Algeria, 13.11.63
52 Zan, Semi-Bi, DGESS VI. p.295
53 Ibid, pp.295, 299-301
54 TNA: FO 371/177285: Paris to FO, Telegram number 142,20.02.64; Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.2. 26.02.64, 
p.471; Foccart, Jacques, Foccart parle: entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard. (Paris: le Grand livre du mois: Fayard: 
Jeune Afrique, c l 995), p.273
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to guarantee general order and their security55. Foccart and other French officials also often 
claimed that American intrigues were behind the military putsch’s slogans, and they suggested 
that companies, such as US Steel, possessed an interest in exploiting the mineral resources of 
Gabon56. Yet, Pierre-Michel Durand, in recent research, argues strongly that there is no real 
evidence to support the claim of American involvement. The latter essentially played the role of 
a founding myth, a confirmation and a pretext for French authorities for their anti-American 
policy in Africa57. In other words, Paris acted in Gabon of its own accord, to maintain order and 
to protect its influence, rather than because of external competition.
Thus, French Third world policy effectively appeared as an uneasy coexistence -  one 
might even say competition -  between its stated revisionist and generous goals, and its ambitions 
for Great Power status. If the latter consideration generally prevailed, it was also because of 
inherent difficulties that limited the implementation of the aims of Gaullist rhetoric. For a start, 
France’s cooperation policy faced significant opposition, especially in regards to black Africa, 
coming from both the left and right of the political spectrum. On the one hand, Cartierisme from 
the journalist Raymont Cartier’s slogan of financing “la Correze avant le Zambeze”, argued that 
it was preferable to spend aid money on France rather than waste it on Africa; on the other hand, 
the leftist critique of people such as the sociologist Rene Dumont accused the French 
government of showing too much complacency towards the African leaders58. At the same time, 
this policy of cooperation was the subject of a fierce internal struggle over jurisdiction, involving 
the Ministry of Cooperation, the Quai d’Orsay and Foccart’s Secretariat General pour les 
Affaires Africaines et Malgaches. It was a fight from the very beginning, and Couve made clear 
to Triboulet that he had negative feelings about the new Ministry that he was heading59.
55 Pean, L’homme de 1’ombre, pp.304-305
56 Foccart, Foccart parle, p.276; Wauthier, Ouatre Presidents, p. 127
57 Durand, Pierre-Michel, “Les relations Franco-Americaines au Gabon dans les Annees 60 ou la ‘Petite Guerre 
Froide’”, in Melandri, Pierre and Ricard, Serge (ed.), Les Relations Franco-Americaines au XXfeme siecle, (Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 2003), especially pp. 120-124
58 Interview with Jean Charbonnel, Paris, 15.09.04; for more on the divided domestic reactions to De Gaulle’s Third 
World policy, see Decraene, Philippe, “Les Reactions de l’Opinion Publique Frangaise a la Politique Tiers Mondiste 
du General de Gaulle de 1962 a 1969”, in Institut, De Gaulle et le Tiers Monde, pp.367-377
59 FNSP: CM Carton 8: Triboulet to Couve, 03.01.63
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Triboulet believed that the Quai resented the competition from the Ministry of Cooperation, 
while the Quai was very angered by Triboulet’s imperialist attempts to use his special funds, 
more or less behind the backs of the Quai and Foccart, to undermine Guinea’s leader, Sekou 
Toure60. It was only in late 1965 that this struggle was finally settled to the detriment of the 
Ministry of Cooperation.
Furthermore, Gaullist rhetoric was always confronted by financial limitations. For 
example, when Paraguayan President, General Alfredo Stroessner, asked De Gaulle for more 
aid, he replied that France could only do little because it was already dedicating more than 2% of 
its national wealth to cooperation61. To overcome this obstacle, the General often relied on 
symbols as a way of increasing the impact of his policy. In many areas of the Third World, he 
sought to establish a very visible French presence, sometimes instead of a concrete one, in order 
to add further legitimacy to its claim of being a Great Power with a global role . His highly 
theatrical and heroic trips abroad, particularly the tour of South America in 1964 when he visited 
every country of the continent, in effect complemented an aid policy that depended on high 
visibility. Not surprisingly, De Gaulle used an ambitious rhetoric during these spectacular trips 
rhetoric, if only to add effect. In that context, it has to be remembered that symbols could be 
particularly useful, as an American official explained. France had resorted to unpopular actions 
towards developing states, including the intervention in Gabon or the termination of aid to 
Tunisia, to which we could add De Gaulle’s disdainful attitude towards the UN, one of the 
sacred cows of anti-colonialism. Yet, De Gaulle, aware of his enormous popularity in the Third 
World that stemmed from his unquestionable acts of decolonisation and his constant nose- 
thumbing at the superpower hegemonies, relied on this prestige to gloss over some of the 
contradictions of French policy .
60 For more on this internal struggle, see Triboulet, Un Ministre. especially pp.198-261; Information on the moves to 
destabilise Toure comes from interview with Jean Charbonnel, Paris, 15.09.04
61 Roussel, De Gaulle, p.768
62 Cemy, Politics of grandeur, p.203
63 NARA: RG59, CFPF, 1964-1966, Box 2168: Bovey to State, Airgram number 940, 29.10.64
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A visible and active policy reinforced France’s global prestige, and gave weight to 
Gaullist claims that France was sensitive to the concerns of developing states, and pursuing a 
policy that sought cooperation with these states rather than domination. In that sense, relations 
with Algeria played a very symbolic part when it came to substantiating the latter claim. After 
the trauma of the Algerian war, Paris wanted above all to develop new relations with Algiers 
based on equality and friendship, as highlighted by the agreement of 29 July 1965 that set up a 
cooperative partnership for the joint exploitation of Algeria’s oil reserves64. Maintaining good 
Franco-Algerian relations played a vital role for France, because it served to remove the stain of 
its colonial past and raise its prestige in the Third World. Algeria was indeed the “door through 
which we [France] can penetrate the Third World”65. Not surprisingly, it received the lion’s 
share of France’s aid to North Africa, and a substantial share of the total money sent to under­
developed states -  75% of the total aid for North Africa and 22% of the public and private 
credits given to the Third World for the period 1962-196966. Thus, De Gaulle often proved far 
more patient with Algeria than he did with other countries. Despite the repeated problems with 
the Evian accords, there was no public cancellation of aid, as there was for Tunisia in May 1964 
after it breached an agreement on the progressive transfer of French proprieties to the local 
population.
Therefore, considered from the point of view of realities, France’s Third World policy 
appears in a very different light than when described by Gaullist rhetoric. The latter referred to 
France’s universal role as the great champion of human freedom and national independence. It 
presented France’s policy as a coherent, principled and humane mission that attempted to foster 
the development of the poorer states and prevent them from becoming a Cold War battlefield. In 
practice, however, it often followed a more traditional Great Power, and sometimes neo-colonial, 
approach that centred on limiting the costs of its aid, while maximising influence and benefits. 
Additionally, Paris acted differently depending on whether it was dealing with a state within its
64 Couve, Politique etrangere. p.442
65 Vaisse, La grandeur, p.462
66 Riffi, Bouhout El Mellouki, DGESS VI. p. 195
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loose sphere of influence -  especially its former African colonies -  or whether it was dealing 
with a state that needed to be “freed” from superpower hegemony. It could loudly declare its 
support for Vietnam’s independence, as we will see later, while also intervening in Gabon and 
disregarding its sovereignty. Finally, France’s cooperation policy was impeded by domestic 
divisions and financial limitations.
IV. The Third World in France’s Grand Strategy
France’s desire to play the role of world’s policeman, along with its pursuit of economic 
and political benefits, were thus not always compatible with its stated aim of helping the 
developing states and preventing them from becoming pawns of US-Soviet rivalry. Furthermore, 
the policy of cooperation outlined in the Gaullist rhetoric had to compete for time and resources 
with other French foreign policy priorities. If De Gaulle hoped to engage more with the Third 
World after 1962, within a few years it was clear that it would had not become a top priority 
ahead of France’s Westpolitik and Ostpolitik in Europe.
Initially, the more ambitious foreign policy agenda adopted by the General towards the 
West in early 1963, and symbolised by his spectacular veto of Britain’s candidacy to the EEC, 
also impacted to a lesser extent other geographic areas, starting with Latin America. As a State 
Department analysis pointed out, De Gaulle began to pay increasing attention to the region in 
1962, and he sent former Ambassador Jean Chauvel on a fact-finding mission there. It was 
widely believed that Chauvel called for a more active French presence, which could help to 
buttress its claim to world power status, and restore its cultural influence in a region where it had 
been in decline since World War Two67. Additionally, De Gaulle believed that there might be a 
“great card to play” in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, especially considering the 
ambivalent relations between the US and its southern neighbours68. There is no doubt that “nose- 
thumbing” Washington in its own backyard, as part of the wider policy of opposing American
67 NARA: RG59, Records of Policy Planning Council, Box 252: Hughes to Rusk, Research Memo INR-14, 04.04.63
68 Vaisse, La grandeur, pp.503-504
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hegemony, also played a key role in pushing the General to develop relations with the Latin 
American states69.
The March 1963 visit by Mexico’s President, Adolfo Lopez Mateos, which culminated 
with the announcement of a $150 Million credit from France to Mexico for the building of a 
petro-chemical industry, was the first concrete sign of this new French interest in Latin America. 
Yet, taking place so soon after the January 1963 crisis that rocked the Western world, De Gaulle 
made sure Mateos’ visit would not further inflame Franco-American relations. In a toast for his 
counterpart, he underlined France’s desire to cooperate “without changing your [Mexico’s] 
relations with the US”70. In the same way, he reassured Juan Bosch, the President of the 
Dominican Republic that France and America remained friends despite certain temporary 
differences. He was not trying to criticise the US, but he just felt that an exclusive dialogue 
between the latter and the Latin American states was not desirable 71. In private, the General 
showed far less restraint and talked much more candidly about his designs towards the region. 
Acknowledging that Mexico and its neighbours were in state of catastrophic economic 
dependence on the US, he explained to Peyrefitte that “France could enable them to a certain
extent to escape American dominance”, and he later mentioned his plans for a trip to Latin
10America in 1964 . Nevertheless, ambitious rhetoric aside, Paris’ main concern during the first 
half of 1963 was unquestionably its partnership with Bonn, rather than the Third World.
In that context, Indochina hardly featured very high on the list of France’s priorities. As 
was the case for Latin America, French leaders avoided taking a confrontational stance, and 
when meeting their American counterparts, they generally expressed a minimal solidarity with 
their policies towards the region. Thus, De Gaulle reminded American Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk that “if South East Asia turned against the West, we would act in common with you and the
69 See for example Lacouture, De Gaulle: vol.3. p.445; Viansson-Ponte, Republique Gaullienne: vol.2. p.79; 
Newhouse, De Gaulle, p.256
70 De Gaulle, DM: IV. 26.03.63, p.91
71 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.375: De Gaulle-Bosch meeting, 01.02.63
72 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.2, 27.03.63 and 22.04.64, p.508
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allies of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization [SEATO]”73. In reality, however, De Gaulle and 
his colleagues were far from supportive of their ally. Couve complained about France’s 
exclusion from affairs in South Vietnam, while the General described the situation in Indochina 
as rotten, and mentioned to his Ministers that France had “no interest in taking sides ... and even 
less in siding with the US”74; part of De Gaulle’s criticism of the US included a sense of revenge 
for the way it had replaced France in Vietnam, following the humiliating French withdrawal in 
1954 after the battle of Dien Bien Phu75.
This historic connection meant that despite the American presence in Indochina and 
France’s relatively limited influence, De Gaulle continued to consider the region as part of the 
French “sphere”, and so he could not stay indifferent to events there. Additionally, his policy 
towards the former French colony rested on a certain number of well-established principles, 
starting with his belief that the forces of national self-determination unleashed since World War 
Two could not be ignored. He doubted that the conflict in Southeast Asia could be solved by 
military might, and the Algerian war had only strengthened this feeling . Instead, De Gaulle, 
along with Couve, pushed for a political solution through the return to the 1954 Geneva accords 
-  which had sought to establish an independent Vietnam, free from foreign interventions -  and 
they regularly criticised the American and communist failures to live up to these agreements77. 
Despite the ambiguity of the concept, the General considered neutralisation as the best the West 
could hope for. As Logevall argues convincingly, he envisaged a situation whereby the 
Vietnamese would settle their own problems without external interference, leading possibly to 
reunification. Even if he agreed that the most likely outcome of an American withdrawal would 
be a reunified Vietnam under communist control, he saw little to fear from this because he
73 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.375: De Gaulle-Rusk meeting, 08.04.63
74 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.2, 20.02.63, p.474
75 Vaisse, Maurice, “De Gaulle et la guerre du Vietnam: de la difficulte d’etre Cassandre”, in Goscha and Vaisse, 
Guerre du Vietnam, p. 169
76 Sullivan, Marianna, France’s Vietnam policy: A Study in French-American relations. (Westport, Conn: 
Greenwood press, 1978), p.71
77 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.375: De Gaulle-Pelaez meeting, 08.02.63, and Couve-Martin meeting, 21.05.63; Note that 
Geneva Accords gave France a residual role in the region, i.e. that it could officers to train the Laotian National 
Army.
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considered that Vietnam’s traditional animosity towards Beijing would prevent China from 
controlling Indochina78.
The strength of his convictions, combined with the historic connections with the former 
colony, made it likely that De Gaulle would attempt to give France more influence in Indochina; 
significant changes in 1963 gave him the opportunity to try just that. For a start, Roger Lalouette, 
French Ambassador in Saigon, was constantly reporting to Couve that the American presence in 
South Vietnam was causing growing acrimony between the President, Ngo Dinh Diem, and its 
patrons; in May 1963 Diem’s brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, even called for the withdrawal of half of 
the American advisers79. At the same time, French officials were receiving reports from Hanoi 
that the North Vietnamese leaders were feeling increasingly squeezed between Moscow and 
Beijing, and that moderates were pushing for relief from fighting in the South as a means of 
reducing Chinese pressure80.
Moreover, Lalouette, helped by his friend Mieczyslaw Maneli, the Polish representative 
to the International Control Commission [ICC], believed there was a real opportunity for a 
political solution, and had been acting more or less as mediators between Diem and the North 
Vietnamese leadership81. With Hanoi less intransigent than hitherto in its confrontation with 
Saigon, and with a change in the South’s power structure becoming more likely -  the growing 
Buddhist opposition to Diem provided yet more evidence -  there seemed to be a new 
environment emerging that appeared more favourable for French action, especially as both South 
and North Vietnamese officials underlined the role Paris could play in the future evolution of
78 Logevall, Choosing war, p. 13
79 See MAEF: Asie-Oceanie, Sud-Vietnam 1954-1964, Vol.78: Lalouette to Couve, Depeches number 161 and 
number 350, 02.03.63 and 22.05.63; it seems that in April Lalouette had advised Diem that he should ‘gently’ ask 
the Americans to leave, according to Marianna Sullivan interview with Roger Lalouette, Versailles, 19.07.72. I 
would like to thank Prof. Sullivan for lending me her notes.
80 TNA: FO 371/170107: Paris to FO, 12.09.63
81 ANF: 5AG1, Carton 241, Sud-Vietnam: Note du Secretariat General de la Presidence, 20.06.63; DDF: 1963, 
Tome II: Note of Direction des Affaires Politiques Asie-Oceanie, 06.09.63; The extent of Diem’s peace feelers, as 
well as Lalouette’s role and his exact intentions, are still subject to debate, see Maneli, Mieczyslaw, War of the 
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their country82. It is in this context that on 29 August, De Gaulle made his solemn public
83declaration in support of a reunified and independent Vietnam, free from foreign intervention .
This was an important moment for Gaullist policy, and its implications went well beyond 
Vietnam. In the aftermath of the PTBT signed by the Soviet Union and the two Anglo-Saxon 
powers, De Gaulle was keen to underline France’s independence vis-a-vis the superpowers, and 
its ability to have an impact on world affairs. At the same time, the shortcomings of Paris’ 
European policy, and its partnership with Bonn, was leading France to give more emphasis to the 
Third World in its grand strategy; as the General told Peyrefitte, he believed that his declaration 
marked the beginning of France’s great return in Asia84. Furthermore, Paris’ policy towards 
Indochina went hand-in-hand with its rapprochement with Beijing. Even more so than the PTBT 
and the common opposition to the superpowers, De Gaulle’s stand on Vietnam, and his desire to 
play a bigger role in Southeast Asia, convinced him that the time was right to send Faure on a 
negotiating mission to China85.
As France continued to move its pawns in the region, it made more and more sense not to 
ignore the PRC. When Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia unilaterally denounced 
American aid on 20 November 1963, he appealed to Paris for help. The French government 
swiftly obliged and agreed to send Messmer in early January 1964 to discuss future cooperation. 
For De Gaulle, encouraging Cambodia was essential for Indochina’s neutrality and 
independence, but he also believed that contacts with Beijing would help relations with Phnom
q / t
Penh . According to Couve, during the Council of Ministers on 22 January 1964, the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC confirmed a certain number of important
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changes, including the re-emergence of China and the Sino-Soviet split, but the most
07
fundamental one was France’s great comeback in Southeast Asia .
Thus, on a basic level, the establishment of diplomatic relations between France and 
Communist China simply reflected Paris’ increasing involvement in Southeast Asia. However, 
the connection worked both ways. According to Devillers, the PTBT had already created a 
convergence between both countries through their rejection of superpower hegemony, but for the 
General this was not enough. France and the PRC needed to understand each other, and possibly
00
cooperate . The obvious choice for this was Indochina, because De Gaulle believed that the 
recognition of Communist China would yield benefits and provide a great asset for his Vietnam 
diplomacy; although it has to be noted that on this point, the Chinese leaders viewed the situation
very differently, and actually feared that the normalisation of relations with Paris would prove a
80liability in their dealings with Hanoi . Irrespectively, in De Gaulle’s view, China played a 
pivotal and inescapable role in the region. There could be no political reality in Asia, he argued 
in his 31 January 1964 press conference, “regarding Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, or India, 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Burma, Korea or Soviet Russia or Japan which does not include nor 
involve China [...] Therefore, it would be impossible to have a neutralisation agreement for 
Southeast Asia without China”90.
The rapprochement with the PRC was undoubtedly a prerequisite for any active role in 
Asia. However, De Gaulle also expected this move to have a more global impact. As a Quai 
source claimed to a British official, the General had deliberately arranged the timing of the 
recognition of Communist China just before his 31 January 1964 press conference, so to draw 
attention to the announcement of his trips to Mexico and Latin America later that year91. In other 
words, the master of the Elysee palace believed that the establishment of diplomatic relations
87 Ibid, p.491
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with China could act as a stepping stone for a more active French policy towards the Third 
World.
Thus, according to Peyrefitte, the trips to Latin America would be the most important 
event of 196492. This was not solely rhetoric. With his Westpolitik offering limited opportunities 
at that time, De Gaulle naturally pinned his hopes on the Third World path as a means to boost 
France’s prestige as a global power. It needed to make its presence felt in Latin America, and 
frustrating the Americans was an added bonus; as De Gaulle told Raymond Offroy, French 
Ambassador in Mexico, his intention was to “plant a French flag there, on the US doorstep”93. 
Additionally, besides spreading French influence, the General expected that his visits to Latin 
America could help to highlight a general atmosphere defined by less concentration upon the two 
superpowers94. While he was careful to make a distinction between the Soviet tyranny and US as 
a country respectful of freedom, nonetheless the dominant message of his public and private 
speeches centred on the need for the Latin brothers of Western Europe and Latin America to 
cooperate in order to prevent the division of the world between the two giants95. Obviously, De 
Gaulle realised that his rhetoric denouncing the double hegemony of Moscow and Washington 
would appeal to his hosts, and reinforce the image of France as a truly independent power. But, 
the primary interest of these trips was to establish a first contact and to sow seeds for future 
developments, rather than any clear concrete goal. This was what De Gaulle meant when he 
wrote to former Prime Minister, Michel Debre, that he was going to Latin America “without a 
clear diplomatic program, but in some ways instinctively”96.
Furthermore, describing the trip as laying the grounds for future cooperation between 
Western Europe and Latin America presented distinctive advantages for the French leaders, in 
particular as a way of giving impetus to the stalling Paris-Bonn axis. During the February 1964
92 NARA: RG59, CFPF, 1964-1966, Box 2186: Paris to State, Airgram number 1941, 13.02.64
93 Loaeza, Soledad, DGESS VI. p.508
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Franco-German summit, De Gaulle tried to convince West German chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, 
that the French and American policies towards Latin America were compatible. He explained 
that France and West Germany could become an alternative partner for these states, thereby 
reducing the risks of an exclusive US-Soviet competition that could end up with Latin America 
choosing the latter97. Bonn’s help would be also particularly welcome if it agreed to participate 
in a joint aid effort, which would enable the French to respond to critics who suggested its policy
QO
towards Latin America was solely driven by anti-American aims .
In parallel, France continually strove to promote peace in Indochina through 
neutralisation, as De Gaulle outlined in his 23 July 1964 press conference. If a military solution 
could not end the conflict in Southeast Asia, then there was no other choice but peace along the 
lines of the 1954 Geneva Accords. Additionally, the Great Powers would promise not to 
intervene, and instead provide a massive economic and technical aid to the states of the region99. 
This approach was certainly short of details, and publicly the French leaders did not really make 
it clear how exactly neutralisation would come about, especially for the case of Vietnam. 
Privately, however, they believed that Hanoi would refuse neutralisation and that it should first 
be applied to the South, in the hope that a truly Vietnamese government would emerge in 
Saigon100. As Logevall argues, vagueness suited De Gaulle’s purposes. He saw no reason to give 
too many specifics because negotiations required a certain blurring of categories. It also suited 
the General to wait and see how the situation would develop101.
At the same time, Paris also resorted to more concrete, and less ambiguous, actions in 
favour of peace. De Gaulle actively encouraged Lucien Paye, his Ambassador in Beijing, to 
sound out the Chinese leaders and determine whether they would support a peaceful solution for 
Indochina102. France wanted a dialogue with China, but without siding with it either. In their
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meetings with Huang Chen, the Chinese Ambassador in Paris, Couve and De Gaulle both 
pointed out that to all the preconditions and recriminations put forward by China, the US would 
respond with similar accusations and conditions. The most important issue was to try and 
convene an international conference with participants that were keen to reach a settlement for 
Southeast Asia103. To this end, France’s policy focussed on all the states of Indochina, not just 
Vietnam. It went to great lengths to prevent Cambodia from abandoning its neutral and 
independent foreign policy, and in March, it was partly thanks to strong French persuasion that 
Sihanouk did not break with London and Washington, in order to get closer to Hanoi and 
Beijing104. Paris continued to support the idea of an international conference to guarantee 
Cambodia’s independence and territorial integrity, while simultaneously advocating in May 1964 
an international conference for Laos, after the coup in April that had shaken its fragile 
equilibrium. It decided later to host the representatives of the three Laotian factions -  the Pathet 
Lao, the neutralists, and the rightists -  in August-September 1964, in an attempt to restore 1962 
Geneva accords that had effectively established Laos’ neutrality.
However, there were clear limits to France’s bid to give more attention to the Third 
World, which were essentially related to its relations with the other Great Powers. In particular, 
as the situation in Indochina gradually deteriorated, so did the relations between Paris and 
Washington. That said, the real tension existed at the higher levels of government. Quai officials 
were often dismayed by De Gaulle or in disagreement with his Vietnam policies, and they 
suspected that he was working deliberately against US policies105. Additionally, the 
disagreements between Paris and Washington did not come to the forefront immediately, and in 
late 1963, French leaders continued to show restraint when dealing with their American 
counterparts. For example in a talk with President Kennedy, Couve strongly denied the
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accusation that De Gaulle’s August 1963 declaration was trying to add further problems to
America in Indochina106. Similarly, De Gaulle expressed a certain understanding and outward
solidarity with the US when Cambodia unilaterally repealed the latter’s aid107. Behind closed
doors, of course, his assessment of American policy appeared far more damning. After the coup
3
against Diem in November 196/5, he warned Peyrefitte that the US’ involvement would only end 
in catastrophe if they became more engaged in the region108.
As the situation in Vietnam continued to worsen with every passing month in 1964, the 
General abandoned some of his restraint and his attitude towards Indochina hardened109. Matters 
truly came to a head during the SEATO meeting in April 1964, when France alone refused to 
publicly support America’s policy110. For Couve, the US would never achieve a solution via 
military means. Only a political settlement, starting with the neutralisation of South Vietnam, 
would be successful and prevent a serious escalation of the conflict with North Vietnam and 
China. In addition, Couve disagreed with Rusk’s view of China as a fully expansionist power. 
He believed that the US’ dominance in the Pacific, along with China’s internal problems, could 
lead the latter to agree to a political settlement111. De Gaulle made his position very clear to 
Under Secretary of State, George Ball: “I do not believe you can win in this situation [Vietnam]
even though you have more canons, more planes, etc... [...] The more the US becomes involved
in the actual conduct of military operations, the more the Vietnamese will turn against you, as 
will others in Southeast Asia”112.
Furthermore, Paris’ frustrations with Washington’s Indochinese policy were affecting 
other spheres, noticeably Latin America. When De Gaulle visited Mexico in March 1964, he 
seemed far more willing to criticise the American attitude towards Latin America than he had 
when Mateos had visited a year before, and this even in public speeches. Thus, during a toast for
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Mateos, after repeating his usual comment that France did not want to affect Mexico’s relations 
with the US, he described Franco-Mexican cooperation as a force for good “in opposition to 
older axes and pacts seeking domination”, a barely hidden reference to the Monroe doctrine113. 
His rhetoric unquestionably suggested a desire to play more on Latin American frustrations with 
the US, and to encourage them to take some distances with their powerful neighbour in the 
North. Indeed, unlike their March 1963 meeting, the General openly criticised the US in front of 
Mateos. He deplored America’s failure to both recognise certain new changes in the world, such 
as the emergence of a “Third World with its own ambitions and views”, and to accept 
independent policies from its allies114.
During his autumn trip to Latin America, De Gaulle seemed to adopt an even more 
critical language towards the US than the one he used in Mexico. He denounced for the form the 
two superpower hegemonies, but his criticism of the blocs possessed an undeniable strong anti- 
Yankee tone115. He called for the emergence on the world scene of both Latin America and 
Europe, but he also made it clear that they both needed to develop as allies of America, and not 
subordinate entities116. Thus, the General was no longer merely criticising American hegemony 
in Latin America, but he was also taking more active steps to try and undermine it. According to 
US officials in Chile, De Gaulle made the following confession to the former Chilean President, 
Jorge Alessandri, which only adds further evidence to the latter point: “He [De Gaulle] described 
the US as an octopus which had exploited the Latin American countries, was sucking them dry 
of their natural resources, and which controlled their foreign policy. He called on Alessandri to 
free Chile from the US grasp and regain its liberty in both the economic and political spheres”117.
Equally, Franco-American differences played a crucial role at a time when De Gaulle’s 
assessment of the nature of the conflict in Indochina was changing. He increasingly viewed the 
conflict in Southeast Asia through the Great Power lens, noting how the war looked more and
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more like a Sino-American struggle rather than a battle about Vietnam itself118. In such a
context, the tensions with Washington certainly contributed to the French leaders’ perceptions
that the US held more responsibility for the current problems in Indochina. While presenting
Moscow as less virulent and Beijing as generally cautious, De Gaulle stressed that American
illusions concerning military force threatened to cause a universal crisis119. Paris mainly based its
assessment of Chinese intentions on the meetings between its officials and their Chinese
counterparts. The Chinese leaders, such as Foreign Minister Chen Yi, repeatedly proclaimed
their attachment to peace and hoped France could help in that endeavour120. Yet, evidence
suggests that China’s attachment to peace was quite ambivalent. During a trip to Hanoi in July
1964, Prime Minister Zhou En-lai suggested a mix of military and political struggles: in the
military area they would strengthen forces, and on the political front, they would adhere to the
101Geneva accords and seek to exploit Franco-American differences . Nonetheless, France to a
certain extent “bought” into this Chinese rhetoric and perceived China as more defensive-minded
that it actually was. It believed that American interventionism bore the most guilt in the
escalation of the conflict, a belief only strengthened after the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August
1964. Franco-American relations had reached such a level of mistrust, that Couve could describe
the latter incident as a conspiracy inspired by an America keen to stop communist 
122insurgencies .
By late 1964, not only Indochina but also France’s Third World policy seemed to be at a 
turning point. On a first level, it is in this period that French grand strategy underwent an 
important shift, whereby it decided to move closer to the Soviet Union in the East, and start to 
more actively challenge American leadership in the West. The inevitable result of this renewed 
emphasis on Europe was that the Third World took a back seat in De Gaulle’s plans. Moreover,
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the situation in Southeast Asia reinforced that tendency. As 1964 came to an end, the gap 
between Washington and Paris on Indochina had become unbridgeable. Couve now denounced 
American policy in South Vietnam as the equivalent of a colonial occupation123. De Gaulle, for 
his part, had given up on helping Washington in the region: “In the last two years, the US has 
accumulated mistakes. What do you want me to do? They should have been less stupid. I did 
what I could to push them towards a reasonable path. If they do not want to understand, it is too 
bad”124. Since the fighting was becoming more serious, the chances of organising a conference 
on Vietnam appeared less and less feasible125. Finally, the crisis in Southeast Asia impacted on 
France’s attitude towards the developing states in two other crucial ways. Firstly, not only was 
the Third World less important in the overall French strategy, but the crisis in Vietnam made 
sure that it was the only area of any interest for France, to the detriment of other regions. 
Secondly, as Devillers argues, American growing involvement in the war led De Gaulle to 
consider his Asian policy as an extension of his general attitude towards the US126.
Washington’s decision to start a systematic bombing campaign of North Vietnam in 
February 1965, accompanied by a massive dispatch of troops in the following months, caused 
another serious escalation in the Indochinese conflict and a further deterioration in Franco- 
American relations. That said, after the initial bombing of Hanoi on 7 February, France made 
another attempt to promote peace. On 10 February, Peyrefitte officially repeated France’s desire 
to urgently convene an international conference so to settle all the outstanding problems in
i onIndochina . Couve also went to Washington between 18 and 20 of February, in the hope of 
rallying US leaders to the idea of the conference128. Additionally, France made it clear to the
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Soviet government that they would be ready to consult and cooperate, as long as Moscow agreed 
that it was best to convene a conference on Indochina without preconditions129.
Yet, the attempts to organise a conference proved extremely short-lived, once it became 
clear that some protagonists of the conflict lacked the will for a settlement. In particular, France 
increasingly perceived American intransigence as the main obstacle to peace; for Couve, Beijing 
and Hanoi wanted to negotiate, but not the US130. With a conference unlikely to happen, De 
Gaulle felt that the best France could do was take a step back and bide its time: “At one moment, 
we will say ‘That is enough!’ We have already said what we needed to at the right moment. The 
Americans still went to war. And there will be a moment when everyone will have enough of 
this war. Then, we will say so”131. During the Council of Ministers meeting on 14 April, he 
added that if America did not withdraw from Indochina, the war would last for many years and 
inevitably end in shame for them132.
If France took a step back in its peace efforts, it became more vocal in its criticism of the 
US’ war effort. During the NATO Council in May 1965, Couve launched a scathing attack 
against his ally. After claiming that he regretted America’s failure to listen to advice on 
Indochina, Couve denounced its vision of the conflict. According to France, South Vietnam 
faced a civil war, a war of national liberation, and not a manifestation of world communism as 
suggested by America. To Vietnam, Couve contrasted the example of Algeria, underlining how 
France had successfully managed the conflict and maintained acceptable relations with the latter, 
which had not become communist. Finally, Couve ended on a pessimist note, pointing out that it 
was impossible in current conditions to convene an international conference to negotiate 
peace133. America’s intervention in the Dominican Republic in April only further exasperated De 
Gaulle: “The policy the US is leading in Vietnam, in South America and elsewhere is provoking 
the hostility of peoples of Asia and elsewhere. It is the same thing in South America after
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sending troops to the Dominican Republic. We are against those operations, which are 
supposedly part of a crusade against communism, but which in fact seek to defend economic 
interests”134.
For De Gaulle, as Costigliola argues correctly, the Vietnam War showed all that was
wrong with American foreign policy: a naive self-righteousness, a readiness to quash smaller
nations’ independence, a tendency towards military actions that threatened to drag France into
war, and a stubborn persistence in containing “communist” expansion while underestimating the
Sino-Soviet split and Vietnamese nationalism135. Yet, for all the harsh criticism, France
temporarily pushed the issue of the Vietnam War to one side after May 1965, as other policy
spheres became more urgent in that period, especially NATO and the EEC. Moreover, as the war
continued to escalate in the second half of 1965, French pessimism grew accordingly, and De
1 ^6Gaulle could see no possibilities of ending the conflict . During a meeting with Arthur 
Goldberg, Lyndon Johnson’s special envoy, he claimed that most of Indochina would surely 
become communist one day, albeit an Asian form of communism. Hanoi would never accept the 
American presence in the South, so only an American withdrawal could lead to negotiations137. 
In the meantime, as the war escalated, the General believed that France needed to refrain from 
further intervention in the conflict, and develop its relations with all the other protagonists in the
1 o o
region . Thus, Paris pursued a serious dialogue with Moscow and Beijing in this period, while 
it was able to get closer to North Vietnam after Saigon broke off diplomatic relations in June 
1965139. Moreover, Quai officials established during the summer a first contact in Algiers with 
the representatives of the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front140.
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V. Conclusion
Despite its best efforts to take a more active role in the Third World after the end of the 
Algerian War, France could never quite live up to the ambitious aims of the Gaullist rhetoric of 
cooperation with the developing states. For a start, there was always an inherent tension between 
Paris’ sincere desire to help these emerging states, as shown by the amount of aid it dedicated to 
the latter, and its Great Power ambitions. Moreover, with the exception of 1964, the Third World 
never became a central priority for the French leaders. This was largely a result of the 
blossoming Franco-American hostility during this period, in particular over Vietnam, which 
progressively ended up invading all aspects of French policy. By the end of 1965, France’s Third 
World policy appeared as largely an extension of its relations with the other Great Powers, rather 
than as a policy distinct from the Cold War and the East-West conflict.
Thus, the story of the three years between 1963 and 1965 had been one of a twin struggle 
by De Gaulle, with the aim of restoring his country’s Great Power status, and overcoming the 
Cold War bipolar order. If he had given priority to the former goal in that period, he had shown 
an ability to explore different means to achieve it: such as the Franco-German Treaty in the 
West, the spectacular trips in the Third World, and finally detente with the Eastern Bloc. Freshly 
re-elected President for seven years in December 1965, the General could now pursue a more 
ambitious, and revisionist foreign policy, whereby he would actively challenge the international 
system led by the superpowers.
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Part II: The Rise and Fall of the Gaullist Project, 1966-1968
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Chapter IV: 1966, Gaullist Zenith
I. Introduction
In his ritual end of year television address to the French people, General de Gaulle boldly 
announced on 31 December 1965 that: “starting from our rediscovered independence, and not 
wishing to reverse our alliances and friendships [...] it is the year [1966] of ardour. It is the end 
of doubts, hesitations and renunciations”1. Indeed, in the period between 1963 and 1965 -  and by 
extension since his return to power in 1958 — the General had largely concentrated on re­
establishing his country’s confidence, power and prestige. Despite some disappointments, he had 
ended the Algerian War, strengthened the economy, and succeeded in making France count on 
the international scene through a more independent and spectacular diplomacy, leading to 
frequent clashes with the US.
In 1966, however, freshly re-elected President, the master of the Elysee was ready to start 
a new phase of French foreign policy. The aim was no longer to simply show that France 
mattered, but that it could actually help transform the international order. Thus, while keeping 
his cards close to his chest, De Gaulle was planning major initiatives towards NATO and the 
Eastern Bloc. With France a seemingly more confident and powerful player, and with emerging 
East-West detente in Europe, the General believed the timing was right to pursue the twin goals 
of his grand design: asserting his country’s Great Power status, and striving to overcome the 
Cold War order.
II. Disengaging in the West
On 7 March 1966, De Gaulle sent a letter to US President Lyndon Baines Johnson 
announcing that while France would stay in the Atlantic Alliance, it proposed “to recover the
1 De Gaulle, DM: IV. p.445
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entire exercise of its sovereignty on its territory, [...], terminate its participation in the 
‘integrated’ [NATO] commands and no longer to place its forces at NATO’s disposal”2. The 
withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structure ended the process of disengagement 
initiated by De Gaulle after his return to power in 1958. It represented the culmination of his 
quest to restore his country’s independence. As he told Adenauer, soon after sending the letter to 
Johnson, any country that was neither independent, nor in charge of its own fate, eventually 
risked losing its self-confidence3. On the one hand, Paris was certainly trying to redefine its 
relations with the organisation, rather than simply “leave” NATO, in order to claim what it 
considered as its rightful status and influence4. It remained a member of the Atlantic Alliance 
and accepted some degree of collaboration with its allies, which raised the complex problem of 
establishing a new legal, institutional and military framework for this cooperation5.
On the other hand, if the withdrawal from NATO was unsurprising and in line even with 
the French position towards the Atlantic Alliance since its origins -  a consistent criticism of 
integration and the Anglo-Saxon leadership -  the unilateral decision and the forceful method of 
negotiation shocked the other member-states, and caused a major crisis6. From the start, France 
sought to dramatise the situation, and effectively presented its Allies with a fait accompli that left 
little room for compromise. For example, in an aide-memoire sent to its partners in late March, 
the French government announced that from 1 July 1966 onwards, it would no longer affect to
»<A
NATO its troops located Germany, it would withdraw French personnel attached to the Allied 
Integrated Command, and it demanded the evacuation from its territory of all foreign troops and 
organisations by 1 April 19677. Similarly, it informed the Johnson administration that it no 
longer considered the five 1950s Franco-American agreements -  that establishing the 
Chateauroux military base, that covering the Donges-Metz pipe-line, the US Military
2 De Gaulle, LNC: X. pp.261-262
3 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.382: De Gaulle-Adenauer meeting, 10.03.66
4 Bozo, Frederic, La France et l’OTAN: de la guerre froide au nouvel ordre europeen, (Paris: Masson, 1991), p. 104
5 Soutou, “La decision frangaise”, in Harder, Von Truman bis Harmel. p. 185
6 Ibid, pp. 186-187
7 Documentation Frangaise [DF]: La Politique Etrangere de la France [PEF], Textes et Documents 1966-1967: Aide- 
memoire to the NATO Allies, 29.03.66
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Headquarters agreement, the Air Bases agreement (1952), and the System of Communications 
Agreement (1958) -  as valid8.
Through this forceful style, France tried to make it clear to its Allies that they should 
abandon any hopes of questioning, or undermining its decisions. According to a Quai source, the 
government, and De Gaulle especially, stubbornly refused any compromise. The same source, 
during a talk with Bohlen, confirmed that the General was determined to see the American forces 
begin their evacuation from France immediately. If Washington tried to delay their departure, he 
warned, De Gaulle’s reaction could be violent9. Moreover, the master of the Elysee palace 
realised that France possessed a certain amount of leverage over its Allies. As he told Herve 
Alphand, now Secretary General of the Quai d’Orsay, “if our partners prove difficult, we can 
make life complicated for them: we can refuse to provide vital services for the survival of their 
bases, we can deny them authorisations to fly over France”10. On 3 May 1966, he proved true to 
his word, when Paris announced to its allies that any authorisation for military planes to over fly 
France would now be renewed on a month-to-month basis, rather than an annual one. For the 
Quai’s Service des Pactes, this move would emphasise to France’s partners the precarious nature 
of their current situation. Any change in the over flight regime would depend on the evolution of 
the negotiations linked to France’s withdrawal from NATO11.
These uncompromising tactics aimed to convey the following clear message to the 
NATO Allies: they needed France more than France needed them. As De Gaulle pointed out 
during the Council of Ministers meeting on 31 March 1966: “... Our allies will realise that it is 
in their interest to be accommodating, just to be able to benefit from the North-South air 
communications. No plane going from Germany to Italy can do so without flying over our 
territory”12. The General and his officials firmly believed that they were in a position of strength,
8 MAEF: Amerique, Etats-Unis 1964-1970, Vol.576: Beaumarchais to Lucet, Telegram number 1303-1309,
04.06.66
9 LBJL: PP, NSF, CO, Box 177: Bohlen to Rusk, Telegram number 6552,06.04.66
10 Alphand, L'etonnement. 31.03.66, p.476
11 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.339: Note of Service des Pactes, 23.04.66
12 Peyrefitte, Alain, C'&ait de Gaulle: vol.3. (Paris: Editions de Fallois Fayard, 2000), p. 189
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and so felt they could act tough and not be demandeurs when it came to negotiations. They 
adopted this strategy not only when making threats on the over flight regime, but also during 
other discussions. For example, France’s decision to no longer commit its Forces Frangaises 
d ’Allemagne [FFA] to NATO created uncertainty about their future: would they leave West 
Germany, or would they remain under a new status? If they stayed, what would be their mission? 
Schroeder insisted that the October 1954 convention -  which had set the legal ground for the 
presence of foreign troops in West Germany -  was rendered invalid by France’s withdrawal 
from NATO, and that both states would need to agree on a new legal status, whereby France 
recognised the sovereignty of the host state. However, Paris rejected this logic and claimed that 
the ball was in Bonn’s court. In an aide-memoire, it declared its readiness to withdraw its troops 
from West Germany by July 1967, unless the German government made it clear it wanted to 
keep the FFA13.
As Bozo argues, France possessed many advantages during the negotiations. Considering 
its geostrategic situation, a profound break with the rest of NATO would be more 
disadvantageous for its allies than for itself. It also had a clear idea of the type of relations it 
wanted with the organisation, and it sought in priority to reach agreements on cooperation with 
the allied forces in case of war. The Allies, for their part, America especially, wanted to obtain 
the maximum cooperation with France, and that placed them in a position of petitioner. 
Additionally, Washington was unsure about France’s ultimate intentions, which they estimated 
ranged somewhere between a neutral position and support for a “diluted NATO”14. Be it before 
the announcement of its withdrawal from NATO, or during the subsequent negotiations, Paris 
sent mixed signals about its aims and desires. By creating uncertainty and anxiety amongst its 
partners, France hoped not only to bolster the importance of its initiative, but also to keep the 
advantage in the ongoing NATO episode.
13 DF: PEF, 1966-1967: French aide-memoire, 18.05.66
14 Bozo, Deux Strategies, p. 158
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Indeed, puzzling his allies and keeping his cards close to his chest were an integral part of 
De Gaulle’s policy towards NATO, in particular in the period between January and early March 
1966. Quai officials were not well informed of the General’s plans, and were often reduced to 
getting information from foreign statesmen who met the French President15. Thus, they were 
surprised and worried when they heard that during a meeting on 20 January with Manlio Brosio, 
NATO’s Secretary General, De Gaulle had pointed out that France intended to denounce the 
Atlantic Pact of 1949, and effectively withdraw from the Atlantic Alliance altogether16. On 10 
February, however, De Gaulle reassured Bohlen that French policy would only affect the 
organisation, not the Atlantic Pact; before misleading him by claiming that France was in no 
hurry to act17. The General stuck to this line during his 21 February press conference, when he 
stated that while France would end its subordination to NATO before April 1969, it would do so 
progressively and without causing problems to its Allies18.
Did De Gaulle seriously plan to denounce the Atlantic Pact, and why did he change his 
mind between his conversation with Brosio and his comments to Bohlen? A definitive answer to 
the first question might ultimately depend on historians gaining access to De Gaulle’s private 
papers, but interestingly his former collaborators provide very different views. Whereas Alphand 
claimed that De Gaulle decided not to denounce the Atlantic Pact only after Couve and others 
convinced him not to do so, Couve denied that the French President had ever really considered 
the idea of leaving the Atlantic Alliance19. As for the second question, Soutou refers to the fact 
that in mid-January 1966, both les Services de VElysee and the Quai’s Service des Pactes were 
looking for formulas whereby France would undermine its participation in NATO, but not the 
Atlantic Alliance. Soutou adds that the Quai recommended this formula, because France would
15 Bozo, Frederic, “Chronique d’une decision annoncee: Le retrait de l’organisation militaire 1965-1967”, in Vai'sse, 
Maurice, Melandri, Pierre, and Bozo, Frederic (ed.), La France et l’OTAN. 1949-1996. (Bruxelles: Editions 
Complexes, 1996), p.337
16 MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.26: Note for Couve, 21.01.66
17 Bohlen, Charles, Witness to History. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), p.506
18 De Gaulle, Charles, DM: V. (Paris: Plon, 1970), p.19
19 For Alphand’s view, see Alphand, L'etonnement. 28.02.66, p.473; For Couve’s view, see Lacouture, De Gaulle: 
vol.3. p.377; Pierre Messmer, French Minister for armed forces at the time, agreed with Couve, interview, Paris, 
12.06.03
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lose its right to keep its troops stationed in West Germany if it left the Atlantic Alliance20. This 
was the feeling of a source from the French administration, who confirmed to the Americans that 
the Quai had sent a paper to De Gaulle the day after his meeting with Brosio, where they 
repeated the arguments about the troops in West Germany. The source believed that this had 
probably had an effect on the French President21.
Yet, if the German factor played a part, it was not necessarily decisive. While there is no 
clear evidence to back this point, it is more plausible that the General quickly abandoned the idea 
of withdrawing from the Atlantic Alliance because, as we will see later, this would not really 
benefit his other key foreign policy goals. His announcement to Brosio, in that case, was more
9»
likely to be typical example of his strategy of sowing anxieties amongst his allies about his 
intentions; as Paul-Henri Spaak explained in his memoirs, De Gaulle skilfully made people 
expect the worse, and when he settled on a less excessive position, they breathed a sigh of relief 
thinking they had won a lot22. The fact he authorised Brosio to repeat the contents of the 
conversation to the representatives of other NATO states, surely hoping that this would foster 
their anxiety, tends to substantiate Spaak’s argument. Moreover, the cat and mouse game 
continued during the negotiations on the details of the French withdrawal. Paris remained fairly 
vague and mysterious about its ultimate aims. For example, on the FFA, De Gaulle privately 
claimed several times that he wanted the French troops to remain in West Germany, as their 
presence was a consequence of their victory -  a source of prestige -  in World War Two, and had 
nothing to do with NATO23. In his talks with foreign officials, however, the General was ready 
to threaten a withdrawal of the FFA, undoubtedly as a way of putting pressure on Bonn24.
20 Soutou, L’Alliance Incertaine. p.291; For the Quai’s note mentioned by Soutou, see MAEF: Pactes 1961-1970, 
Vol. 261: Note of Service des Pactes, 17.01.66
21 LBJL: PP, NSF, CO, Box 172: Bohlen to Rusk, Telegram number 4867, 11.02.66
22 Spaak, Combats: vol.2. p.391
23 See MAEF: Pactes 1961-1970, Vol.263: Inner Council in Elysee, 02.06.66 and Note by De Gaulle, 04.07.66
24 FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XII: Document 60, 11.06.66
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By the summer 1966, according to a Quai source, French leaders appeared extremely 
confident that they had won their battle with NATO25. Certainly, while the discussions 
concerning the French withdrawal had barely started -  France only selected its negotiating teams 
at the Inner Council on 2 June -  De Gaulle had at least successfully accomplished his aim of 
imposing a redefinition of France’s relations with NATO . In many ways, delaying the 
negotiations had served French interests. It had strengthened the symbolic split between France 
and the organisation, and forced the Allies to accept this new French status. Paris had achieved 
its main goal but the situation was far from being resolved, as De Gaulle told his collaborators 
during the same 2 June meeting: “This NATO business is both simple and complex. Simple, 
because we know what we want and where we are going. Complex, because there are in fact 
several negotiations”27.
Yet, the relevance of the withdrawal from NATO went much further than simply 
redefining France’s relations with the organisation and claiming a new status within the Alliance. 
It was not only a powerful symbol of De Gaulle’s pursuit of Great Power status for his country, 
but it was also to be both the cornerstone and the starting point for the more ambitious foreign 
policy he planned for France. This emerges very clearly when considering the reasons behind the 
timing of the move against NATO, as well as its interactions with other spheres of French policy.
For a start, domestic factors pushed the General to act quickly against NATO. On the one 
hand, freshly re-elected President in December 1965, he possessed a clear mandate from the 
French people. On the other hand, according to Bruno de Leusse, French representative to 
NATO, he probably feared that he might not stay in office for more than a couple of years. 
Considering that the parliamentary elections scheduled in 1967 might leave him with less margin 
of manoeuvre, it was really now or never. De Gaulle also firmly believed that no other French
25 NARA: RG59, Records of Under-Secretary of State George Ball, 1961-1966, Box 21: Rusk to Johnson, 12.06.66
26 Bozo, Deux Strategies, p.163
27 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.3, p. 191
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leader beside him would be capable of carrying out such a policy28. The domestic response to the 
withdrawal was, however, fairly mixed. While the government easily supported its policy in 
front of parliament -  the right defended the move, the socialists condemned it, but the 
communists interestingly did not follow the socialists -  public opinion reacted with more 
uneasiness and in contradictory ways29.
The international context, especially the Vietnam War, provided further impetus for a 
prompt disengagement. Apart from Philippe Devillers, few authors have pointed out that De 
Gaulle sent his letter to Johnson a mere five weeks after the US put an end, on 31 January 1966, 
to the truce on its bombings of North Vietnam30. Couve later confirmed how this influenced De 
Gaulle’s decision, stating “he [De Gaulle] took the resolution just after the renewal of his 
Presidential mandate, and even more firmly as the Vietnam War was becoming bloodier”31. 
Leaving NATO’s integrated military structures at a time when America was seriously escalating 
its involvement in Vietnam was not without its benefits for France. It added more weight to its 
criticism of US leadership, and to the arguments that NATO no longer seemed suitable in a 
changing world, when Asia, rather than Europe, was the main field of Cold War conflict32.
At the same time, the initiative against NATO also interacted to a certain extent with the 
policy vis-a-vis the EEC. Boycotting the Community since 30 June 1965, Paris had agreed in late 
December to restart talks with its five partners. After more acrimonious debates, France finally 
rejoined the EEC after the Luxemburg compromise of 30 January 196633. France did not push 
ahead with the disengagement from NATO for so long as the EEC crisis was in its full-blown 
phase. The General, it has to be remembered, usually shied away from dealing with two crises
28 LBJL: PP, NSF, CO, Box 177: Bohlen to Rusk, Telegram number 6146, 23.03.66; This was a view shared by the 
main American source within the Quai, see LBJL: PP, NSF, CO, Box 177: Bohlen to Rusk, Telegram number 5422,
03.03.66
29 See Bozo, Deux Strategies, p. 155; Vai'sse, La grandeur, p.350; Brunet, Jean-Paul, “Le Retrait de la France de 
l’OTAN: La Scene Interieure”, in Vai’sse, Melandri, and Bozo, France et POTAN. pp.393-394
30 Devillers, “L’Asie”, in Institut, De Gaulle et le Tiers monde, p.314
31 Couve de Murville, Maurice, Le Monde en Face: Entretiens avec Maurice Delarue. (Paris: Plon, 1989), p.40
32 French officials made these points its Allies and to the domestic audience. See French aide-memoire to its Allies 
in FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XII: Document 142, 11.03.66, or DF: PEF, 1966-1967: Pompidou speech to YAssemblee 
Nationale, 13.04.66
33 For more on how the “empty chair” crisis ended see Ludlow, N. Piers, “The Eclipse o f the Extremes. 
Demythologising the Luxembourg Compromise”, in Loth, Crises and Compromises, pp.247-264
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simultaneously. Attacking NATO while the EEC remained deadlocked would give the 
impression that France intended to undermine the whole organisation of the Western world. 
Instead, by first ending the “empty chair” boycott, France could try to appear as an independent 
but loyal ally, solely targeting American leadership within the Atlantic Alliance. To the pleasant 
surprise of French leaders, the NATO crisis hardly disrupted the EEC debates34. While the 
Atlantic organisation was undergoing a severe test, the European Community effectively secured 
its future through the three agreements of 11 May, 14 June, and 27 July. Not only did they 
finalise the CAP’s financial regulation, and set 1 July 1968 as the date when the common 
industrial and agricultural markets would come into operation, but they also devised part of the 
EEC’s stance on the agricultural questions for the Kennedy Round35.
In fact, in many ways, the NATO crisis shielded the EEC. After France announced its 
withdrawal from the Atlantic Organisation, this naturally became the key problem for senior 
officials, and with good consequences for the Community. As Emile Noel, the European 
Commission’s Executive Secretary, pointed out, the French administration took advantage of De 
Gaulle’s preoccupation with NATO to move ahead in Brussels. Similarly, according to Jean 
Dromer, advisor in the Elysee, the absence of the quite anti-French Schroeder from the Belgian 
capital, certainly made Franco-German cooperation easier . Furthermore, both France and the 
Five believed they were ultimately benefiting by moving ahead on EEC issues, which US 
officials named the “double trap” theory. France thought that by sucking the Five into having a 
vested interest in the maintenance of the EEC, this might cause them to be soft on the NATO 
front; the Five, for their part, believed this was a way of trapping France into greater than ever 
enmeshment in the Community37. As Ludlow suggests convincingly, rather than being 
communicating vessels, “the Community and NATO spheres were hence more like separate
34 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.3. 13.04.66, p. 185
35 Ludlow, European Community, p.109; for the details of the 11 May agreement, see DDF: 1966, Tome I: Note of 
Service de Cooperation economique, 12.05.66
36 NARA: RG59, CFPF, 1964-1966, Box 2182: Bohlen to Rusk, Telegram number 7062, 22.04.66
37 NARA: RG59, Bureau of European Affairs [European Affairs], Files of Robert Schaetzel Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Atlantic Affairs [Schaetzel], Box 3: Fessenden to Schaetzel, 25.05.66
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billiard balls, liable at times to touch and affect each other’s advance but otherwise subject to 
independent stimuli and dynamics”38.
Unlike the EEC, however, there was a significant link between the timing of the 
withdrawal from NATO and De Gaulle’s upcoming trip to the Soviet Union in June 1966,
<1Q
despite Couve’s claims to the contrary during the Council of Ministers on 9 March 1966 . De 
Gaulle needed imperatively to push ahead with the disengagement from NATO before going to 
Moscow. As Roussel argues, and this was also President Johnson’s view at the time, this would 
enable De Gaulle to have les mains libres in his talks with the Soviet leaders, or in effect 
strengthen France’s position40. If the initiative against NATO came after the trip to the Soviet 
Union, this might have led some of France’s Allies and De Gaulle’s domestic opponents to claim 
that his policy had been the result of a deal with the Kremlin41. Moreover, besides bolstering 
France’s Great Power status during the Moscow trip, De Gaulle wanted to use the withdrawal 
from NATO as a diplomatic tool in his dealings with the states of the Eastern Bloc. In effect, he 
hoped that it would become the motor for new East-West relations in Europe42. Thus, rather than 
seeming disruptive, De Gaulle wanted his policy towards the Atlantic organisation to appear as 
the latest stage in his pursuit of East-West detente, which ultimately aimed to overcome the Cold 
War order in Europe.
III. Extending a hand to the East
By withdrawing from NATO, De Gaulle hoped to strengthen his country’s claim to Great 
Power status before the talks with the Soviet leadership. Yet, the connection between his goal of 
East-West detente in Europe, and disengagement from the Atlantic Alliance, went deeper than 
the mere tactical level. Paris argued that the new international context, marked by a growing
38 Ludlow, European Community, p.l 14
39 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.3. p. 186
40 Roussel, De Gaulle, p.796; LBJL: Telephone Conversations, White House Series 6603.03, Citation 9841: Johnson 
to Reuther, 07.03.66
41 See for example Newhouse, De Gaulle, p.285; or NARA: RG59, CFPF, 1964-1966, Box 2179: Bohlen to Rusk, 
Telegram number 5542,07.03.66
42 Bozo, Deux Strategies, p. 163
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thaw between states of both blocs in Europe, effectively justified its stand in the Western
military Alliance. As Couve emphasised during an interview, the departure from the Atlantic
organisation was largely the consequence of the changes in East-West relations:
.. .within each camp, the Western and the Communist camps, things have changed and 
[...] the various members of both camps have rebuilt their economies and reclaimed 
their personalities. All this means that the situation is very different today [than it was 
in 1945]. It is under this angle that we have to consider the recent decision taken by 
France towards NATO43.
De Gaulle confirmed this viewpoint when he stated, during the Council of Ministers on 31
March 1966, “it is natural for us to loosen in times of detente a [military] system established for
periods of tension”44.
That said, the disengagement from NATO was not solely a result of the new East-West 
relations in Europe. As Francois Puaux, head of the European department of the Quai, argued in 
a circular note, France’s policy needed to be understood in a wider political context than the 
workings of the Atlantic Alliance, because it was effectively in line with the ideas expressed by 
De Gaulle in his press conference of 4 February 1965, when he outlined the long-term 
perspectives for overcoming the Cold War order in Europe. Puaux stated that ending military 
integration was a precondition for the East-West rapprochement pursued by France in Europe, 
because it prevented European states from reclaiming their independence. Moreover, in response 
to the criticism that France’s policy towards NATO played into Moscow’s hands, Puaux 
concluded that if French moves proved contagious within the Western bloc, they were equally 
likely to do so in the Eastern bloc. Romania, which relied on French policy to resist the Soviet 
integration efforts through the Warsaw pact, was a particularly good example of this45.
Indeed, French leaders did not hesitate to use the withdrawal from NATO as a bargaining 
card when dealing with their Eastern bloc counterparts. This strategy featured very prominently 
during the French diplomatic offensive aimed at the satellite states during the spring-summer 
1966. Between April and July 1966, Couve visited successively Bucharest, Sofia, Warsaw,
43 DF: PEF, 1966-1967: Interview with O.R.T.F., 23.04.66
44 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.3. p. 190
45 MAEF: Pactes 1961-1970, Vol.261: Draft Circular, Not dated 03.66
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Prague and Budapest. Whenever he talked with Communist officials, he reiterated the argument 
that France’s policy towards the Atlantic Alliance could serve the cause of ddtente in Europe. 
For example, he told Ion Maurer, Romanian Prime Minister, “we [France] took a certain decision 
towards NATO, which will constitute another step on the path towards the normalisation of 
political conditions in Europe”46. Moreover, Couve shared these thoughts not only with the 
independent-minded Romanians, but also with the more orthodox Bulgarians and Poles: “That is 
why we left NATO. This policy is part of our plans for the whole of Europe, which aims to have 
Western European and Eastern European states living in normal conditions ...”47. France’s 
withdrawal from NATO, and its policy towards the Eastern Bloc, were therefore not separate 
policies but two sides of the same coin, both aiming to end the division of Europe and restore full 
sovereignty and independence to all its states.
The diplomatic offensive of the spring and summer 1966, if novel in its scale, was in line 
with Paris’ attempts since 1964 to develop contacts and cooperation with all the satellite states, 
which it considered as a vital component of its East-West policy. Couve used his visits to Eastern 
Europe to finalise further agreements of cooperation, such as the new cultural and scientific 
agreements of cooperation that he signed in Poland with his counterpart Adam Rapacki48. 
Moreover, by dealing with all Eastern bloc states, the French Foreign Minister was increasing 
French prestige in the region, and reminding his hosts that detente involved contacts and 
openings between all states, not just between the US and the Soviet Union49.
That said, France was not hoping to lure the satellite states away from their powerful 
Soviet protector. In the long-run, the General expected that they would come to show more 
independence vis-a-vis Moscow, and as he told Zenon Kliszko, Vice-Marshall of the Polish Diet: 
“An ideology does not prevent a state from being a state, with its own ambitions and policies”50. 
Equally, De Gaulle accepted the strong ties linking the Communist states with their Soviet
46 MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.27: Couve-Maurer meeting, 27.04.66
47 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.383: Couve-Gomulka meeting, 20.05.66
48 Schreiber, Les Actions, pp. 102-103
49 Couve, Politique etrangere, p.227
50 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.383: De Gaulle-Kliszko meeting, 13.05.66
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patron. As Burin des Roziers points out, the French President opposed blocs, but he viewed 
spheres of influence in a more nuanced way, even accepting them to a certain extent when they 
resulted from historical roots or affinities51. In that context, as Couve explained, De Gaulle went 
to the Soviet Union for his first trip behind the Iron Curtain, because France wanted to show that 
it “started with the essential, and also not give the Russians the impression it was trying to detach
c<n
them from their satellites” . Paris realised that no serious thaw in East-West relations could 
occur without Moscow’s agreement. Nonetheless, De Gaulle’s trip to the Soviet Union 
represented the crowning moment for France’s Ostpolitik53. It stood as a defining moment in the 
General’s drive to foster an East-West rapprochement in Europe.
However, the prospect of the French President going to Moscow caused serious 
apprehension in the West, at a time when the complex negotiations that followed the French
g i ^
withdrawal from NATO were still ongoing . It seemed to be dark omen, further evidence that 
France was breaking away from the Western bloc. De Gaulle, though, was careful to maintain a 
certain equilibrium in his policy and to not cross certain boundaries. Before his trip to Moscow, 
French leaders went to great lengths to reassure their Allies and public opinion in regards to the 
aims of his visit55. In a speech to the parliament, Pompidou explained that the General’s trip to 
the Soviet Union was not the start of a reversal of alliances, and was certainly not a threat to the 
European and American allies56.
Moreover, French representatives also sought to downplay the possible impact of the trip. 
During a dinner with his West German, British and American counterparts, Couve emphasised 
that the General’s upcoming visit to Moscow was a normal development of French policy, and 
that nothing dramatic would emerge from it57. Certainly, De Gaulle and his collaborators were
51 Burin des Roziers, Etienne, “Le non-alignement”, in Barnavi, Elie and Friedlander, Saul (ed.), La politique 
etrangere du General de Gaulle. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1985), p.72
52 See Schreiber, Les Actions, p. 101
53 Couve, Politique etrangere, p.222
54 See Wenger, Andreas, “Crisis and Opportunity: NATO’s Transformation and the Multilateralization of Detente, 
1966-1968”, Journal o f Cold War Studies, Vol.6/1 (2004), p.31; Vaisse, La grandeur, p.390
55 Vaisse, La grandeur, p.425
56 DF: PEF, 1966-1967: Pompidou speech to VAssemblee Nationale, 13.04.66
57 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.383: Couve-Schroeder-Rusk-Stewart meeting, 06.06.66
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still to a certain extent wary of Soviet intentions, and they set out limits to the cooperation with 
Moscow. When Zorin again suggested a possible Franco-Soviet treaty, the General shied away 
from a categorical answer58. He was not naive and did not plan any early far-reaching agreement 
with Moscow, as he told Adenauer: “the Russians are very polite, which is line with their policy. 
I am not refusing their politeness, but I will not make any fundamental agreements with them. 
Maybe we will improve scientific and cultural relations. Surely, we will speak about Germany as 
we have done in the past”59. Rather than a threat to Bonn, De Gaulle wanted to convey the 
impression that his trip to Moscow could actually help the cause of German reunification.
Indeed, it was vital for the General to not only reassure his Allies, but also give the 
impression that he was acting in their interests. Speaking to Alain Peyrefitte, now Minister for 
Scientific Research, Nuclear and Space Questions, he suggested that “it is not at the moment 
when the two blocs are cracking up that I am going to think of leaving one bloc for the other [...] 
I will speak for Western Europe”60. De Gaulle perceived France as Western Europe’s leading 
spokesman when it came to improving relations with the Eastern Bloc, and so he defended 
Western ideas. He had no desire, for example, to recognise East Germany. France, in other 
words, tried to keep one hand firmly tied to its Western Allies and extend the other one to the 
states of the Eastern Bloc. Moreover, the visit to Moscow and the talks with Soviet leaders 
would offer the General an ideal platform to probe and test the Soviet intentions. He wanted “to 
see where the Soviets are going, and what they can agree on; or at least where they are going and 
what they can not agree on”61.
The trip was a perfect example of what Jean Charbonnel, French junior Minister for 
Cooperation with Francophone Africa in 1966-1967, describes as une diplomatie du temoignage. 
De Gaulle went to the Soviet Union to tell their leaders that France was present and ready to talk,
58 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.382: De Gaulle-Zorin meeting, 29.04.66; For another example of De Gaulle’s suspicions, in 
this case in the field of scientific cooperation, see Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.3. 22.03.66, p. 129
59 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.382: De Gaulle-Adenauer meeting, 10.03.66; Similarly, De Gaulle told Erhard that 
“Germany has nothing to fear” from his trip to Moscow (see De Gaulle, LNC: X. p.306)
60 Lefort, Bernard, Souvenirs et secrets des annees gaulliennes, 1958-1969, (Paris: A. Michel, 1999), p. 149
61 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.3. Council of Ministers 15.06.66, p. 195
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despite differences in regimes62. He was ready to discuss any subject or regions with his Soviet
(\Xcounterparts, as clearly shown during the discussions with Zorin to prepare the visit . But, it 
would be a mistake to assume that the General had a clear idea of how the talks would develop. 
He told the Danish Prime Minister, Otto Krag, that he did not know what to expect from his talks 
in Moscow, but that the Soviet leaders had repeatedly invited him and he wanted to repay the 
visit made by Khrushchev in I96064. The French President neither believed nor wanted German 
reunification to happen quickly. He realised that the Soviet Union pursued detente for their own 
interests, but he also felt that the Soviet Union appeared less bellicose than in the past, and 
seemed interested in reaching some sort of general detente with the West65.
Yet, the fact that De Gaulle sought to downplay the importance of the trip, and was not 
sure what to expect from the talks, did not mean that he had no clear and ambitious long-term 
plans -quite the opposite. As Soutou explains, the General envisaged in the future a sort of pan- 
European security system, where American troops would eventually leave the continent. In 
return, the Soviet Union would abandon East Germany, allowing German reunification and a real 
detente in Europe, which would also restore the independence of the satellite states. The two 
main pillars of the system would of course be France and the Soviet Union, as nuclear powers, 
but security would be guaranteed by an interlocking set of checks and balances. Paris and 
Moscow would contain Bonn, while a closer union between the states of Western Europe would 
contain Soviet power. The US would play its traditional role of underwriter and ultimate arbiter 
of the European order. This was, in other words, a modernised version of the Concert of Nations 
of the 19th Century66. In this context, withdrawing from NATO just before going to Moscow 
made complete sense. As Pierre Maillard, former diplomatic adviser to De Gaulle, confirmed to
62 Interview with Jean Charbonnel, Paris, 15.09.04
63 See for example MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.26: De Gaulle-Zorin meeting, 18.03.66; or MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.382: De 
Gaulle-Zorin meeting, 29.04.66
64 MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.27: De Gaulle-Krag meeting, 18.04.66
65 FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XII: Document 60, 11.06.66
66 Soutou, “La decision fran§aise”, in Harder, Von Truman bis Harmel. pp. 194-196; the reference to the US as the 
underwriter of Europe featured in the briefing for De Gaulle’s trip to Moscow, according to a Quai source, see 
NARA: RG59, Records of the Ambassador Charles Bohlen [Bohlen], Box 33: Grandville-Funkhouse meeting,
09.07.66
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Zorin in March 1966, the French President wanted to have something to offer the Soviets, in
fnorder to ask in return for their support for his views on German reunification .
The General was thus convinced that his trip could be vital for his long-term goal of 
transforming the European order. The Soviet Union, rather than West Germany, had become
/TO
France’s main partner . As Couve said in an interview for Soviet radio on 4 June 1966, Franco- 
Soviet cooperation on European matters could act as a role model for their respective allies, and 
encourage them to follow the path leading to peace on the continent69. He reinforced that 
message during his speech at the NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels in early June 1966. 
While calling for detente without illusions, he attacked the principle according to which the East- 
West rapprochement should be the competence of the Atlantic Alliance or the Warsaw Pact, or 
that is to say solely the responsibility of the two superpowers70. Detente needed to take place 
within a European framework.
In 1966, the prospects of Franco-Soviet cooperation were certainly helped by Moscow’s 
conscious effort to seek better relations with Western Europe -  except West Germany -  and 
exploit US vulnerability on Vietnam71. In previous years, as mentioned in chapter two, Soviet 
leaders had been greatly divided over the desirability of peaceful coexistence with the West72. 
Conservative figures, including Politburo members Aleksandr Shelepin and Mikhail Suslov, 
were uneasy about peaceful coexistence and they believed that centrifugal forces in the West 
were bound to intensify independently of Soviet actions. They called for increased military 
spending because they still considered NATO as a threat, and they feared that peaceful 
coexistence would undermine the cohesion inside the socialist alliance. The so-called 
‘instrumental Europeanists’ disagreed with this conservative analysis, and instead argued that it
67 Narinsky, “Le retrait”, in Vaisse, De Gaulle, p. 166
68 For a good example of De Gaulle’s pessimistic assessment of West Germany, see De Gaulle, LNC: X . Expose 
during the Council of Foreign Affairs on West Germany, pp.246-249; De Gaulle mentioned that “there is no 
problem between us and them now [...] but there is a growing difficulty to agree”. He also added that “West 
Germany is not following the path of reunification [...] and it would be better if West Germany followed our path”.
69 NARA: RG59, CFPF, 1964-1966, Box 2180: Bohlen to Rusk, Airgram number 2425, 24.06.66
70 MAEF: Pactes 1961-1970, Vol.272: Crouy-Chanel to Couve, Telegram number 568-576,08.06.66
71 Wolfe, Soviet Power, p.281
72 See chapter 2, footnote 88
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was the combination of Soviet overtures and the decrease in international tension that had
fostered the rise of centrifugal trends. They saw serious benefits in De Gaulle’s campaign to
reduce, and perhaps eliminate, the American presence in Europe. Finally, a third group, the
Americanists including Gromyko, supported peaceful coexistence but were less hostile to the
US. They viewed West Germany as the main threat, and felt that if Western Europe was allowed
to become a third, independent force, this could undermine the bipolar strategic order and make
international relations more dangerous and unpredictable .
These debates eventually came to a head in March 1966 at the Twenty-Third Party
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and were solved eventually by a
compromise. Brezhnev’s speech emphasised vigilance, with only a secondary emphasis on
peaceful coexistence. He stressed Soviet-European cooperation as a counterweight to the
American and West German menace, whereas Gromyko put more emphasis on German
“revanchism” and sang an Americanist tune. France was singled out as the centrepiece of this
combined strategy. Brezhnev highlighted Soviet-French ties as the most important element of the
European counterweight, and ordered a “further improvement of these relations”74. For the
Kremlin leaders, Paris’ policy corresponded to the Soviet interests because it sought to weaken
the links between Bonn and Washington, and some even hoped that Paris might denounce the
Atlantic Pact in April 1969, when it would be up for renewal twenty years after its creation75.
Thus, both Paris and Moscow wanted De Gaulle’s trip to be a success, even if they
d *
remained partly cautious. On the other hand, the General went out of his way to praise Russia 
and the possibilities for a new cooperation with France. As Durandin points out, De Gaulle 
repeatedly emphasised the point that both Russia and France possessed a past -  implicitly 
opposing both of them to the rootless America - and that history dictated an important role for 
Russia in Europe76. This claim that the Soviet Union needed to take part in the peace process in
73 For more on the debates see Newton, Russia. France, pp.58-73
74 See ibid, pp.73-75
75 Narinsky, “Le retrait”, in Va'isse, De Gaulle, pp. 165-167
76 Durandin, France contre l ’Amerique. pp.98-99
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Europe undoubtedly pleased the Kremlin leaders77. The actual conversations also highlighted
many areas of agreement between both leaders, ranging from Vietnam to a shared opposition to
any speedy German reunification. The General also took a step in the Soviet direction when he
showed a certain support for the project of a European security conference, even if he suggested
that this was not an immediate prospect. On the other hand, during the first talk with Brezhnev,
Kosygin and Podgomy, De Gaulle clearly underlined their differences. He made it clear that he
would not depart from Western orthodoxy and recognise East Germany. He also highlighted
France’s independence, pointing out that he accepted Soviet power as a balance against
American hegemony, in the same way that he viewed American power as a guarantee against
Soviet hegemony. De Gaulle’s key aim, though, was to probe Soviet intentions. It is no
coincidence that with his first question, he asked his hosts whether they perceived the situation in
Europe as definitive, or whether they accepted the possibility of change, in particular over the
German question78. The General wanted to know whether the Soviet Union would accept to go
along with his vision of a new European system, which was why he constantly talked about
taking the German question out of the US-Soviet rivalry.
On returning to France, De Gaulle was thus pleased with the results of his trip, as he
explained during the Council of Ministers of 2 July 1966:
The [Soviet] regime survives but is transforming itself. It is becoming less ideological 
and more technocratic. The meetings went well. The differences of opinion on the 
German question are clear, but were pointed out without insistence [...] They consider 
that the dialogue with Western Europe must go through France. They want to keep up 
these contacts. Our policy, which consists in breaking up the Cold War, is coherent 
with their feelings and interests79.
Certainly, the masters of the Kremlin remained fairly inflexible on the German question, but they
had not ruled out reunification in the future. Additionally, both states signed various agreements
of cooperation, including a common declaration on their relations, established economic
commissions, decided to set up a “hot-line” between both capitals, and agreed on the principle of
77 Bieloussova, Zinaida, DGESS IV. p.394
78 MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.27: De Gaulle-Brezhnev-Kosygin-Podgomy meeting, 21.06.66
79 Peyrefitte, C’etait de Gaulle: vol.3. p. 197
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regular consultations80. The “hot-line”, in particular, pleased De Gaulle and appealed to France’s 
global ambitions as a Great Power81. After all, the only other existing “hot-line” was the one set 
up in 1963 between Moscow and Washington. Moreover, the General appreciated the welcome 
he received throughout the Soviet Union, and the opportunity to directly address the Russian 
people, thanks to his travels and speech on Soviet television. De Gaulle wanted his policy of 
detente to appeal to the peoples of the Eastern bloc, not just its leaders . In the summer of 1966, 
as Soviet relations with Bonn and Washington remained lukewarm, Paris could thus make a 
legitimate claim to the role of mediator in East-West relations .
IV. A Platform in Cambodia
During the first half of 1966, two fundamental and inter-related goals dominated French 
foreign policy. On the one hand, by leaving NATO and going to Moscow, De Gaulle was 
spectacularly demonstrating France’s independence and its claim to Great Power status. On the 
other hand, he hoped both actions could help his overarching goal of overcoming the Cold War 
order in Europe. In that period, the twin objectives of national independence and revision of the 
international order also impacted France’s policy towards the Vietnam War. The Third World 
was no longer a priority for Paris, but the conflict in Vietnam was an exception as a centre of 
international tension and Great Power rivalry.
France’s attitude towards Vietnam did not change significantly in 1966, and remained at 
odds with that of the Johnson administration. Fundamentally, French leaders disagreed with their 
American counterparts about the nature of the conflict. Instead of seeing the war as the result of 
a North Vietnamese communist aggression, sponsored by Communist China, against the South, 
they argued that South Vietnam was undergoing a civil war, where the local population fought
80 For the declaration, see DF: PEF, 1966-1967: Franco-Soviet Common Declaration, 30.06.66
81 Andrieu, in De Gaulle. Lacouture and Mehl, p.221
82 Schreiber, Les Actions, p. 102; interestingly, French public opinion developed a more favourable view towards the 
Soviet Union, see IFOP, De Gaulle, p.264, whereas in 1964 25% had a good opinion of the Soviet Union, 42% had a 
neither good or bad opinion, 25% had a bad opinion, and 8% had no opinion, by 1966 the numbers had changed 
respectively to 35%, 31%, 13% and 21%.
83 Rey, La tentation. p.48
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OA
against a government imposed from the outside . Similarly, French officials generally differed 
with their American colleagues when it came to assessing the intentions of the main belligerents, 
giving more emphasis to national rather than ideological considerations. For example, Couve 
often referred to differences between the PRC and North Vietnam, especially the fact that Hanoi 
was more receptive than Beijing to the idea of negotiations, and felt the latter would not be able 
to stop Hanoi should it choose to press forward with peace talks85.
Moreover, if Paris continued to consider a settlement in Indochina as unlikely, it 
nonetheless consistently reaffirmed what it considered as the vital guiding principles for any 
peaceful end to the conflict. De Gaulle, for example, clearly outlined those principles during his 
21 February press conference. There was no military solution to the war in Indochina, and 
consequently peace could only be the result of a political solution between all parties involved, 
and a return to the 1954 and 1962 Geneva conferences. In the international sphere, peace would 
be guaranteed by an entente between the Great Powers -  Britain, US, Soviet Union, China and 
France; locally, it required an end to all foreign interventions in Vietnam, and then neutrality for
qz:
the country as a whole . The fighting in Indochina posed not only a threat to the independence 
of the states in the region -  in line with De Gaulle’s views about the detrimental effect of the 
Cold War on the Third World -  but it risked escalating into a very serious confrontation between 
the US and Communist China. This is why the General warned Johnson that peace talks could 
only start once the US government decided to withdraw its troops from Vietnam, and end 
intervention in the affairs of that country87.
This firm and unambiguous stand strengthened France’s status in the world. The Eastern 
Bloc states always applauded France for its criticism of American policy in Southeast Asia, and 
Couve certainly played on that convergence of views during his extended tour of the satellite
84 See for example MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.27: Couve-Maurer meeting, 27.04.66
85 See for example MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.384: Couve-Schroeder meeting, 21.07.66
86 De Gaulle, DM: V . p.23
87 See for example, De Gaulle, LNC: X, De Gaulle to Johnson, 05.02.66, p.250
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states between April and July 196688. French views on Indochina also appealed to others besides 
the communist states. Leaders and officials from the Third World often complimented France on 
its position on the conflict, and equally condemned American policies89. In many ways, French 
officials were trying to act as a sort of “bridge” between the West, and both the communist and 
Third World states. It extended a hand to the latter by largely sharing their assessment of the 
situation in Southeast Asia, but not necessarily fully agreeing with their often harsh anti- 
American tone. For example, Couve tried to moderate the criticism of the US delivered by the 
Chinese Ambassador to Paris, Huang Chen, and he doubted that Washington had any plans to 
wage war against the PRC90.
France took this “bridging” role seriously, as De Gaulle explained to Alphand in early 
January 1966: “The war will continue and get worse. We must not intervene, but instead 
establish and develop our relations with all the actors”91. This was true, of course, with the Great 
Powers, and De Gaulle made it clear to Huang Chen that Chinese Prime Minister, Zhou En-lai, 
would be welcome in France92. Additionally, French officials also maintained contacts with both 
South and North Vietnamese officials. Etienne Manac’h, head of the Asie-Oceanie department of 
the Quai, regularly met and kept friendly relations with the South Vietnamese General Consul in 
Paris, Nguyen Huu Tan93. At the same time, Paris continued to get closer to Hanoi. On 24 
January 1966, Ho Chi Minh sent a letter to all socialist states, but also non-aligned, neutrals and 
Western states. Significantly, France was the only state of the Atlantic Alliance to reply through 
De Gaulle’s letter, and this helped open up a new chapter in the relations between both
88 See for example MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.27: Couve-Ceaucescu meeting, 28.04.66; MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.383: 
Couve-Rapacki meeting, 19.05.66; or MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.384: Couve-Kallai meeting, 29.07.66
89 See for example MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.26: De Gaulle-Gandhi meeting, 25.03.66; MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.382: 
Malraux-Fawzi meeting, 26.03.66; or see MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.27: Report of Sainteny mission in Southeast Asia,
13.07.66, which mentions that North Vietnamese Prime Minister, Pham Van Dong, expressed his respect for De 
Gaulle’s statements on the Vietnam conflict.
90 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.383: Couve-Huang Chen meeting, 12.05.66
91 Alphand, L'etonnement, p.468
92 ANF: 5AG1, Carton 226, Chine Populaire: Burin-Chen meeting, 26.05.66
93 See NARA: RG59, CFPF, 1964-1966, Box 2188: US Embassy to State, Airgram number 1845, 19.03.66
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countries94. On 13 May, Couve hosted for the first time Mai Van Bo, the commercial delegate of 
North Vietnam in France, and on 2 August, this same commercial representation was 
transformed into a general delegation, thus finally fulfilling Hanoi’s desire to have equality of 
status for their representation in Paris95. Moreover, France engaged in secret diplomacy with 
non-state actors, especially the South Vietnamese NLF. Manac’h even agreed to the opening of 
an NLF “press bureau” in Paris, knowing very well that it would act as a cover for political 
action96.
Thus, if French views about the Vietnam War remained consistent in 1966, the wider 
developments of its foreign policy did play a growing influence on its attitude towards the 
Southeast Asian conflict. The disengagement from NATO and the trip to Moscow had already 
undermined Franco-American relations, and the escalating US involvement in Indochina only 
caused more friction. After Washington put an end to the tmce and re-started its bombing 
campaign of North Vietnam in late January 1966, the French government issued a communique 
on 2 February condemning this course of action, and emphasising that “this renewed bombing
Q7
[...] compromises even more the cause of peace” . Moreover, France partly justified its 
withdrawal from NATO by stating its refusal to become involved in a war against its will -  in 
other words, an implicit accusation that American unilateral policies in the Far East could lead to 
a wider war98. It was in that context that the General began planning a trip to Asia. On 24 
February, he summoned Jean Sainteny, a former Minister and General Delegate to Hanoi, and 
asked him to go to North Vietnam on a fact finding mission. Sainteny would eventually go 
during the summer99.
94 De Quirielle, Frangois, A Hanoi sous les Bombes Americaines: Journal d’un diplomate Frangais. 1966-1969. 
(Paris: Tallandier, 1992), p.71; For De Gaulle’s letter, see De Gaulle, LNC: X. De Gaulle to Ho Chi Minh, 08.02.66,
P-251
DDF: 1966, Tome I: Note number 149 of Direction Asie-Oceanie, 14.05.66; De Quirielle, A Hanoi', p. 189
96 See MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.27: Note on Manac’h-Huynh Van Tam meetings, 06-07.06.66; or MAEF: SG, EM, 
Vol.28: Manac’h-Nguyen Van Hieu meeting, 28.08.66
97 Quoted by Devillers, “L’Asie”, in Institut, De Gaulle et le Tiers monde. p.313
98 FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XIII: Document 136, 07.03.66
99 Dulong, Claude, La Derniere Pagode. (Paris: B. Grasset, 1989), p. 138
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As Manac’h explained to a British colleague, De Gaulle had essentially prepared his trip 
to Asia in secret and Quai officials had been kept in the dark about the plan. It was only in June, 
just before the trip to Moscow, that they had received a telegram drafted by the Elysee, and 
intended for Phnom Penh, which asked Sihanouk if he would like to welcome De Gaulle in the 
autumn100. As the General shifted his focus back to Indochina, in the aftermath of his visit to the 
Soviet Union, the situation on the ground appeared even more dangerous. The first American 
bombings of Hanoi had just taken place, at the same time as Sainteny’s secret mission in 
Southeast Asia101. Not surprisingly, his reports painted a grim picture, suggesting that 
Communist China seemed ready to launch a massive intervention in Vietnam, and that all the 
elements were in place for a “new Korean war”102. Additionally, Ho Chi Minh made it very clear 
to Sainteny that Hanoi would never surrender to America, which must have impressed De Gaulle 
and further convinced him that the US needed to seek peace through negotiations103.
In the summer 1966, French leaders were undoubtedly worried about the developments in 
Indochina, and especially about their potential repercussions for the rest of the world. Couve 
complained to Schroeder that the “general situation in the world will depend on those 
developments [in Indochina]”, while De Gaulle warned that, as a result of the Southeast Asian 
war, the threat of universal catastrophe was growing104. Moreover, the General was particularly 
worried because he feared the impact of the Vietnamese conflict on the emerging detente with 
the Communist states105. Certainly, on the one hand, America’s increasing involvement in 
Southeast Asia meant that it would focus less on Europe, therefore offering France more leeway 
in the affairs of the continent. On the other hand, there was always a threat that a sharp escalation 
of the conflict in Indochina could cause a serious rise in US-Soviet tension, making the process 
of rapprochement with the Eastern bloc even more difficult. As Sullivan correctly points out, the
100 TNA: FO 371/185915: Paris to FO, 29.06.66
101 Devillers, “L’Asie”, in Institut, De Gaulle et le Tiers monde. p.315
102 ANF: 5AG1, Carton 226, Chine Populaire: Sainteny note, 07.07.66
103 Sullivan, France’s Vietnam policy, p.101; Dulong, Demiere Pagode, p.159
104 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.384: Couve-Schroeder meeting, 21.07.66; De Gaulle, Charles, DM: V, Reply to Toast 
given by Haile Selassie, 27.08.66, p.69
05 See for example MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.27: De Gaulle-Church meeting, 04.05.66
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General’s strategy relied on a correct mix of US-Soviet cooperation and conflict; because too 
much of either restricted French action106.
Thus, if French criticism of American policy in Vietnam became more outspoken in this 
period, this was the result of a deep sense of frustration with the latter. De Gaulle and his 
collaborators sincerely believed that the US government held nearly all the cards in its hands, as 
it alone could end the war once it finally decided to withdraw its troops107. Only America could 
end a pointless war that acted as an obstacle to French President’s pursuit of East-West detente 
in Europe. In those circumstances dominated by frustration, anxiety, and escalation, De Gaulle 
had no intention of going to Cambodia in early September to participate actively in the 
settlement of the Vietnamese conflict108. Rather, as he told US Ambassador to Ethiopia, Edward 
Korry, just before his stopover in Phnom Penh, while he liked and admired the Americans, he 
needed to speak his mind and they would later thank him for it109.
It has to be noted, however, that there was no consensus within the French administration 
when it came to the Vietnam War. The more Atlantic minded in the Quai often complained about 
their colleagues who hoped for a humiliating American surrender110. Even at the top level, De 
Gaulle appeared far more uncompromising than Couve when it came to assessing American 
policy111. According to Manac’h, in a letter he wrote to new Ambassador in Washington Charles 
Lucet, Couve was not favourable either to the Sainteny mission, which echoed his own 
pessimism: “Showing that a channel remains open between Paris and Hanoi, that is something, 
but we have not much to convey ... Unless the General has decided to finally leave the domain
106 Sullivan, France’s Vietnam policy, p.92
107 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.384: Couve-David meeting, 26.07.66
108 MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.28: De Gaulle-Lucet meeting, 25.07.66
109 FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XII: Document 65, 27.08.66
110 LBJL: PP, CF, Box 8: Kissinger-Grandville meeting, 23.01.66; Henri Froment-Meurice, a Quai official at the 
time, confirmed this point in an interview, when he stated that the idea of America succeeding where France had 
failed was certainly not very popular. Paris, 24.04.03
111 Compare De Gaulle and Couve’s meetings in mid-May with Huang Chen. Whereas Couve highlighted the more 
limited American aims, De Gaulle underlined the similarity of views between France and China, and pointed to the 
“growing moral and diplomatic isolation of the US”. See MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.383: Couve-Chen meeting, 12.05.66 
and De Gaulle-Chen meeting, 16.05.66
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119of ritual declarations on Southeast Asia and make concrete proposals” . Yet, as was the case for
the other key foreign policy decisions of 1966, De Gaulle clearly took command of strategy
towards Indochina. The Phnom Penh speech on 1 September, written by De Gaulle during the
plane trip to Djibouti, reflected, according to Couve, the General’s deepest feelings about the
11^Vietnam War, and his intention to publicly speak about the subject . It was without a doubt his 
most complete and dramatic statement on the subject of Indochina114.
Delivered to a crowd of near 100,000 people, the speech was a solemn and scathing one­
sided criticism of the American involvement in Vietnam, which the General described as a 
growing threat for the world. According to him, if it was “unlikely that the American war 
machine would be destroyed, there was no chance, at the same time, that the peoples of Asia 
would submit to the law of a foreigner from the other side of the Pacific, regardless of his 
intentions or the power of his weapons”. There could be no military solution to the conflict, and 
the opening of negotiations depended on the eventual withdrawal of American forces115. The 
speech not only caused uproar at the time, but it also certainly created controversy in the 
literature, in particular in regards to the General’s aims. While Roussel describes it as a violent 
denunciation of American presence in Vietnam and part of a wider global strategy to make 
France’s voice heard in the world, Lefort presents the picture of an anxious De Gaulle, keen to 
show his American friends the errors of their ways116. Lacouture, for his part, points out that 
Prince Sihanouk had offered De Gaulle a great platform to speak to the Third World. This last 
point was confirmed by De Gaulle’s comments to his aide de camp, Jean d’Escrienne, when he
117mentioned that France had drawn great benefits in the Third World thanks to his address .
Yet, Phnom Penh can only be truly understood when seen in the context of De Gaulle’s 
wider strategy. By speaking in Cambodia, the French President certainly possessed a great stage
112 Journoud, “Quai d’Orsay”, in Goscha and Vai'sse. Guerre du Vietnam, p.393
113 Couve, Monde en face, p.40
114 Sa’adah, Anne, “Idees Simples and Idees Fixes: De Gaulle, the United States, and Vietnam”, in Wahl and 
Paxton, De Gaulle and the US. p.307
115 For the Phnom Penh speech, see De Gaulle, DM:V, pp.74-78
116 Roussel, De Gaulle, pp.801-805 ; Lefort, Souvenirs et secrets, p.155
117 Lacouture, De Gaulle: vol. 3. p.436; D ’Escrienne, Jean, Le General m’a dit: 1966-1970. (Paris : Plon, 1973), p.85
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to defend his ideas on neutrality in the Third World, and contrast them with the detrimental 
impact of Cold War interventions in neighbouring Vietnam. As he told Peyrefitte, “we had to tell 
the world that there will only be peace in Indochina if the two superpowers do not transform it 
into a field of their rivalry”118. Moreover, the speech was also a way of emphasising France’s 
radiance and moral authority, and the reference to the Algerian war enabled De Gaulle to 
underline his credentials as a commentator of the Vietnam War119. In his view, France had ended 
the conflict in Algeria without losing its power and prestige, and had subsequently managed to 
establish a precedent for cooperation with developing states.
Finally, the timing of the speech was closely tied to the larger developments of French 
foreign policy. Following his spectacular moves towards NATO and the Soviet bloc, De Gaulle 
believed that the moment had come for France, as a Great and independent power, to take a firm 
and solemn stand, and denounce an American policy that was increasingly dangerous for the 
world. As Paris increasingly focussed on fostering East-West detente and overcoming the Cold 
War order in Europe, it perceived the Vietnam War as a vital obstacle. It is also for this reason 
that the General essentially singled out America, because he believed Washington held all the 
cards in its hands to end a conflict that impeded his central goals.
V. Staving the Course
In the aftermath of the Phnom Penh speech, De Gaulle shied away from major initiatives 
and concentrated on consolidating the gains from his previous initiatives. This included 
finalising France’s status within the Alliance and the modalities of its withdrawal from NATO, a 
subject which Paris had somewhat ignored until June 1966. In large part, this resulted from the 
cat-and-mouse game played by France with its Allies, and its belief that it possessed many 
advantages in the negotiations. For a start, De Gaulle knew exactly what he wanted from those 
talks. As he argued during an Inner Council meeting on 2 June, France should not be
118 Peyrefitte, C’etait de Gaulle: vol.3. 12.09.66, p. 147
119 Sullivan, France’s Vietnam policy, p.91
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automatically committed if a war broke out that involved its NATO allies120. The General 
ultimately aimed to protect France’s independence of decision. This principle was to guide 
officials in the three core negotiations surrounding the disengagement from NATO: the status of 
the FFA, the possible cooperation between the FFA and NATO troops, and the future use, if any, 
granted to Americans for the facilities located in France.
For all these issues, France adopted a firm, but not entirely inflexible, stand and refused 
to appear as a demandeur. The French President refused the presence on French soil of American 
stocks or troops. He rejected any agreement guaranteeing an automatic French intervention in 
case of a European war. That said, he accepted that the French and NATO Chiefs of Staff could 
discuss possible cooperation scenarios, which would include providing facilities to American 
troops, in case of a war in which France also took part121. Moreover, De Gaulle wanted to keep 
the FFA in West Germany, but he was not ready to interpret the agreement of 23 October 1954 -  
which gave a legal basis to the presence of foreign troops -  in such a way that it subordinated 
their maintenance to the desires of the Bonn government122.
All parties, Paris included, appeared ready to make some compromises in order to limit 
the NATO crisis started by the French withdrawal. By autumn 1966, limited success in the 
various negotiations had helped to establish a de facto “14+1” Atlantic Alliance, whereby France 
remained a full member, but stayed away from most of the common military decisions123. This 
was helped by the slight improvement in Franco-German relations following the EEC agreement 
of May and De Gaulle’s trip to Moscow, where he had advocated German reunification, and the 
progress over the status of the FFA. During a meeting with De Gaulle in July, Erhard solemnly 
declared his desire to keep the French troops124. Bonn, as we will see later, was certainly looking 
for a way out of the deadlock, once it became worried by the threat of Britain and the US
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reducing the number of their troops in West Germany125. Thus, after the July meeting between 
De Gaulle and Erhard, it was left to the Directeurs Politiques, Jacques de Beaumarchais and 
Hermann Meyer-Lindenberg, to hammer out the details of a new agreement for the FFA. On 21 
December 1966, the dispute formally came to an end after Couve exchanged letters with Willy 
Brandt, the new West German Foreign Minister.
Furthermore, the discussions around possible cooperation between the FFA and the 
NATO troops remained for long deadlocked over the issue of adding a political basis to any 
accord. Despite initially agreeing to this idea during the Brussels NATO Ministerial Meeting in 
June, France changed its mind soon after and insisted that any agreement should remain strictly
10 f \limited to the military sphere . De Gaulle was probably no stranger to this change of policy. In 
his view, the “missions [of French forces] were to be decided by the French government only, 
and the French and NATO chiefs of staff could only discuss possible links or common actions in 
case of war127. Yet, under the influence of Brosio, France’s Allies eventually agreed on 26 
October to go ahead with talks between France and NATO’s military chiefs of staff -  
respectively led by General Charles Ailleret and General Lyman Lemnitzer -  without any 
directives or pre-established positions128. Finally, even in the absence of a definite agreement, 
France had made it clear that the US could gain access in wartime to some facilities located on 
its territory, provided it joined the war129.
Consequently, by the end of 1966, Paris was confident that it had successfully re-defined 
its relations with NATO. Couve triumphantly stated “all is being progressively put in place for 
the establishment, on new bases, of France’s military relations with her allies and the restoration 
of our full sovereignty”130. Moreover, De Gaulle was equally confident that France’s policy 
towards NATO would act as a role model for other states in the future. As he pointed out during
125 Vai'sse, La grandeur, p.393 ; In addition, Erhard also wanted to appease the CDU’s Gaullists after the electoral 
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the Council of Ministers of 19 October, “it is clear that by leaving NATO, we are anticipating a 
deep change in the Atlantic Alliance, which was organised for the Cold War and thus called to 
change”131.
This perceived significant evolution -  the ending of the Cold War in Europe -  
encouraged France, during the second half of 1966, to pursue even more vigourously its policy 
of East-West detente. Following De Gaulle’s visit to the Soviet Union, there was a certain 
feeling amongst French leaders that the trip had produced important results. Couve emphasised 
to the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, that while the Soviets did not offer any new policy 
towards Germany and European security, he had been impressed by their frame of mind which 
was in many ways similar to the French one: a desire to create an atmosphere of peace132. Even 
certain Quai officials and noticeably Puaux, who were generally more wary of the Soviets than 
De Gaulle or Couve, saw some grounds for optimism. They felt that De Gaulle’s trip had 
highlighted certain nuances in Russian policy which, while not suggesting fundamental changes 
in attitude, had hinted at least to moves in France’s direction. The common Franco-Soviet 
declaration at the end of the visit was based on the French text, the Soviets accepted French 
formulas and the priority given to detente, and they seemingly no longer saw the US as their sole 
Western interlocutor133. They could also gain satisfaction from the declaration on European 
security produced by the Warsaw Pact meeting in Bucharest in early July. The document 
included some clearly Gaullist passages, with its underlying tone of “Europe for the Europeans”, 
and its call for the abolition of the military organisations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact134.
Driven by this optimistic outlook, the pursuit of East-West detente was becoming even 
more important in French strategic thinking. As De Gaulle confided to Peyrefitte on 22 
September: “I do not want my trip to the Soviet Union to have been in vain. There has to be 
some follow up. Franco-Soviet cooperation is a grand affair. It has to succeed [...] In all
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domains, it needs to develop. Through this, we will have more exchanges and we will be able to 
overcome the politics of blocs”135. De Gaulle wanted to keep the momentum from his Soviet trip 
going. The next day, during a meeting with Zorin, he asked about his invitation to Brezhnev, 
Kosygin and Podgomy -  which had been accepted in principle -  and pointed out that he hoped 
their visit could happen as quickly as possible, ideally before the end of 1966136. Besides 
Kosygin’s visit, finally planned for the first week of December, Franco-Soviet relations also 
received a boost when Peyrefitte went to the Soviet Union in October, soon followed a month 
later by the new Minister of Finances, Michel Debre. Moreover, France continued to pay 
attention to the Eastern Europe states when it welcomed the Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov in 
mid-October.
Relations with the Kremlin leaders remained, obviously, the priority for France in the 
latter part of 1966. For Kosygin’s visit, the Elysee actually changed the protocol to highlight this 
point, as De Gaulle welcomed his visitor at the airport despite the fact he was not a head of 
state137. More importantly the General went to great lengths to court the Soviet Prime Minister, 
in order to enlist his country’s cooperation for the grand goal of East-West detente. He first 
argued that the Vietnam War, by increasingly drawing America away from Europe and 
undermining its prestige there, was creating a new situation. There now existed a real possibility 
for the Soviets and France “to organise a more European policy, which would be well perceived 
by many Western European states, and maybe even West Germany”138. That could only happen, 
however, if Paris and Moscow offered other perspectives to Bonn, besides subordination to 
Washington. De Gaulle, in effect, was asking Kosygin to make a gesture to Bonn, to show the 
latter that the division of Germany was not a permanent feature of Europe139. Finally, in what 
was probably the most fascinating moment of the De Gaulle-Kosygin meetings, the French 
President confided to Kosygin that he needed Soviet support for domestic reasons. A successful
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policy of cooperation with the Soviets in Europe could cut the grass under the feet of those in 
France who wanted closer ties with the US140. He counted on Moscow to act as a counterweight 
to Washington, and thus protect France’s policy of independence.
At the end of 1966, France appeared very confident about the perspectives for East-West 
detente in Europe. Certainly, it needed Soviet support in order to satisfy the hopes raised in West 
Germany141; yet, since Kosygin had not categorically rejected possibility of detente with West 
Germany, and with the new government in Bonn -  as we will be mentioned later -  sending out 
signals that it wanted to improve relations with the Eastern Bloc, De Gaulle could foresee the 
emergence of some kind of Moscow-Paris-Bonn relationship, which would be essential for his 
vision of a new European order, with Paris as a mediator. This emerged clearly during a meeting 
between Brandt and the General, when the French President encouraged his German guest to 
follow the path of detente, adding that France could help Bonn’s position in Moscow and Eastern 
Europe142. Moreover, the French were also triumphant as they witnessed their Allies focussing 
on “detente, entente and cooperation” during the NATO Ministerial Meeting of Paris in mid- 
December143. With their partners seemingly converting to De Gaulle’s theses on detente, the 
French saw further signs confirming that the march towards an East-West rapprochement in 
Europe was an irreversible one.
That said, the shadow of the Vietnam War continued to hang over East-West links and 
increasingly, French officials argued that it was the central obstacle to the policy of detente144. 
While not providing any significant new elements to its policy towards Indochina in the 
aftermath of De Gaulle’s Phnom Penh speech, Paris stepped up its criticism of American actions 
in the region. During his meetings with Rusk on 3-4 October, Couve moralised towards his 
counterpart and ridiculed the idea that a guerrilla fighter could stop fighting before
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negotiating145. But, yet again, it was the General who launched the harshest attacks against his 
ally. In his customary end of year address to the French people, the French President again tied 
the question of detente to the Vietnam War by contrasting Europe’s path of peace with the 
conflict in Asia. He denounced “an unjust war, as it results from a US intervention” and a 
“despicable war, as it leads a major nation to destroy a far smaller one”146.
Despite Vietnam, De Gaulle was in a triumphant mood and no statement better 
emphasised that than his press conference on 28 October 1966. In a real hymn to France’s 
independence, he denounced all those who wanted to subordinate his country to Moscow, 
Washington, or any supranational myth. Instead, France had withdrawn from NATO and all 
signs were pointing “to the re-emergence of our country as a great power”147. Moreover, the 
General argued that France’s rise as a Great Power served not just its own interests, but also the 
greater interests of mankind. By once again attacking American policy in Vietnam, and by 
extension the superpowers’ right to impose their will on the peoples of the world, and by 
defending his country’s right to break the superpowers’ monopoly on nuclear weapons, France 
was in fact contributing to the creation of a more multi-polar world that would eventually replace 
the Cold War’s bipolar system148.
Led by a sort of euphoria, De Gaulle seemed adamant that the Cold War was increasingly 
a feature of the past, claiming that “between these peoples [in the East] and ours [in the West], 
the Cold War appears obsolete in a time when a growing and friendly cooperation is being 
organised”149. The policy of East-West detente had become such a priority for the General that it 
overshadowed any other aspects of European project. As he clearly stated, nothing useful could 
be achieved in Europe, including a political union between the members of the EEC, as long as 
both East and West did not solve their differences150. Additionally, De Gaulle was in a strong
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position domestically. The economy was still growing rapidly, and public opinion largely 
supported his foreign policy initiatives151.
VI. Challenges Ahead
Yet, if by all accounts this had been a successful year for Gaullist diplomacy, it would be
misleading to ignore some of the challenges and criticisms that had been building up in parallel.
This was true for his policy of detente with the Eastern bloc, which was the subject of many
sceptical assessments within diplomatic circles, in particular from opponents of the General. For
example, American Under-Secretary of State, George Ball, dismissed his designs, arguing that
the “Soviets see De Gaulle’s power pretensions as a joke” and adding that they only wanted to
exploit him for his divisive potential in the West152. Indeed, according to an unverifiable rumour,
the KGB leaders greatly celebrated France’s withdrawal from NATO, pretending this was in
1large parts the result of their influence . At the same time, there was more reliable evidence 
suggesting a certain Soviet uneasiness in regards to France’s disengagement from the Atlantic 
organisation. Officially, Gromyko, and other officials, congratulated France for its initiative, 
praising it as a new affirmation of political independence154. In private, however, the Soviets, 
along with some of its allies, worried that Bonn would gain more authority within the Atlantic 
Alliance, and Moscow also feared that Paris’ example could undermine the cohesion of the 
Warsaw Pact155.
The Soviets, and certain satellites, undoubtedly worried about the impact of De Gaulle’s 
diplomacy within their own bloc. As Puaux told American officials, “the Romanian Ambassador 
[in Paris] Victor Dimitriu informed me that De Gaulle’s effort to ‘unfreeze’ the Cold War and to 
force reconsideration of the NATO organisation were having a beneficial effect in Romania, but
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constituted an embarrassment to the Soviets”156. Romania certainly relied on the French model, 
but in many ways it was an exception within the Communist bloc. Other states, and Poland in 
particular as confirmed by its Ambassador in Paris, Jan Druto, tended to instinctively adopt a 
cautious approach when it came to undermining the status quo157. In the words of Wladislaw 
Gomulka, Secretary General of the Polish Communist Party, if Poland was happy in theory to 
destroy the military pacts in Europe, this was not a realistic policy158.
The Kremlin leaders, and their partners in the satellite states, appeared reluctant to follow 
the General completely on the path to European detente. For Jacques Andreani, of the Quai’s 
Soviet desk, the Soviet regime was “incapable at this stage of embarking on foreign policy 
ventures which would upset the careful balance it maintains in Eastern Europe and which would 
stimulate disequilibrium in the Soviet Union itself’159. Moreover, the limits of Soviet attitude 
extended to more practical aspects of Franco-Soviet cooperation, especially trade. During an 
inner council on 17 October 1966, Pompidou expressed the following concerns: “We have to 
develop our trade with the Eastern bloc. But what worries me is that we are taking unilateral 
decisions. In fact it should be a trade off. We are being drawn in. We are giving twice”160. The 
new Ambassador in Moscow, Olivier Wormser, agreed with Pompidou in his assessment of 
Debre’s visit to Moscow in November. According to him, the Soviets claimed that Franco-Soviet 
cooperation was privileged, but in reality they were looking out for other economic partners as 
well disposed as France. He believed that Moscow tended to view cooperation exclusively in 
terms of benefits, and it would demand intensive work to make the cooperation more 
balanced161.
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Some French officials, though, went even further and questioned whether the Soviet
Union’s own nature could ever allow it to engage in meaningful cooperation with France over
European affairs. This idea was highlighted very clearly by Philippe Baudet, Wormser’s
predecessor in Moscow, in his last report before leaving the Soviet capital. In his view, the
Kremlin’s hosts continued to see the policy of the status quo as the wisest, and continued to
present the German problem in the same terms. Any agreement between French and Soviet
policy was only temporary. As he powerfully stated:
I leave the Soviet Union with the deep conviction that there is no longer, if ever there 
was, and there will never be again common measure between the European states and 
the Soviet Union. Disproportion exists everywhere: in dimensions, in population, in 
climate, in military power [...] The Soviet Union is not really a state: it is a 
subcontinent, whose vital interests are in Asia and Europe, and for that reason it cannot 
be part of either an Asian or European system .
Baudet, in effect, rejected the idea that Moscow could ever accept the role De Gaulle wanted it to
play in his modernised Concert of Nations.
The fundamental developments in the international system in late 1966 gave credence to 
Baudet’s view. Despite the situation in Vietnam, Soviet leaders were still ready to deal with the 
US on a certain number of questions. This included cultural exchanges, the outer space treaty 
signed in December, and of course the talks for a Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT]. In the autumn, 
Rusk and Gromyko achieved some sort of breakthrough over arms control and nuclear non­
proliferation, and the American Secretary of State was able to present a treaty proposal to his
1 /r-3
NATO allies in December . Additionally, the upheaval in the PRC, linked to the Cultural 
Revolution, and the growing Sino-Soviet tension, served to draw Moscow and Washington 
closer together As Gromyko pointed out in his confidential report to the Politburo on 13 January 
1967, good relations with the US could act as a bulwark against the “adventurous schemes” of
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China164. The US and the Soviet Union, as Gordon Chang argues, “were still trying to arrange
some sort of Pax Superpowerica”165.
The challenges to the Gaullist designs also extended to its Westpolitik. France’s
withdrawal from NATO had posed a serious threat to the organisation, especially when it
combined with other problems besetting the Atlantic Alliance. Thus, in the summer 1966, a
serious crisis erupted over the issue of offset payments for the British and American troops in
West Germany166. Erhard, facing an economic recession and budget troubles, claimed he could
not increase military spending to offset the costs of the British troops, while London, in the midst
of a sterling crisis, argued that it would withdraw its troops unless it received full offset. The
situation escalated when Erhard informed Washington in September that West Germany would
not be able to fulfill its offset agreements with the US either, contributing two months later to the
fall of his government . To complicate matters further, US Senator Mike Mansfield introduced
a resolution on 31 August stating that “a substantial reduction of US forces permanently
stationed in Europe can be made without adversely affecting either our resolve or ability to meet
our commitment under the North Atlantic Treaty ...”. The American President realised that a
British troop withdrawal from West Germany would increase domestic pressure in the US for a
168similar move, and that he had to react to prevent the unravelling of the Atlantic Alliance .
Indeed, the various crises shook the member-states of NATO into action. Johnson, 
despite divisions within his government, refused to start a “war” with De Gaulle169. He told Ball 
that he did not want to get into a “pissing match” with De Gaulle, which “would serve to build 
De Gaulle and France up” 17°. A public dispute would accomplish little, especially since 
according to Francis Bator, Johnson’s adviser on European affairs: “... the central point about
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the NATO crisis is that De Gaulle has no real cards. If we play our hand skillfully, we can 
manage to carry on with NATO without him. In many ways, he is like a lightweight jujitsu artist. 
All his leverage comes from our over-exertion”171. Johnson and his collaborators understood that 
they could not contest the General’s decisions or force him to change his mind. Geographical 
realities meant that any threat to deprive France of American protection was either not credible 
or plain silly. It would be similar to “threatening to abandon Kentucky in the face of a land attack 
by Canada. It is hard to do unless one is prepared to throw in Ohio”172.
Rather than engage in a futile struggle with De Gaulle, NATO, as suggested by British 
Minister of Defence, Denis Healey, could now focus on moving ahead with projects that France 
had previously blocked173. In other words, Paris’ disengagement from the Atlantic organisation 
provided an opportunity to improve not only the mechanisms of the Atlantic Alliance, but also 
its cohesion by encouraging a multilateral response to the French threat174. Consequently, 
following its efforts in the autumn 1965, the US government sought to consolidate Secretary of 
Defence Robert McNamara’s proposals for the Alliance’s nuclear strategy. It made, throughout 
1966, a serious information effort about operational nuclear issues, leading to the creation of two 
groups in December: the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee [NDAC], open to all interested 
allies, and a restricted body, the Nuclear Planning Group [NPG], limited to seven members. This 
was a very important success for the US because it meant it finally consolidated a nuclear 
consensus with its allies, after years of debate on a question that was at the heart of transatlantic 
problems175. In the same way, in order to deal with the offset crisis, Johnson decided to favour 
trilateral negotiations between West Germany, the US and Britain176. By late 1966, the fourteen 
had not only survived De Gaulle’s institutional test and successfully sorted out a new France-
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NATO relationship, but they had managed to make the Atlantic organisation more rational and 
efficient177.
Furthermore, they also started to address the second challenge posed by the French 
initiative, that is to say the continued relevance of NATO in a period of lessened tension in 
Europe. Johnson and his advisers realised that Paris’s actions created an opportunity revitalise 
the Alliance by stressing its role in East-West detente178. In that respect, the US found valuable 
allies in the smaller states of the Alliance, in particular Belgium. France’s disengagement from 
NATO had created a certain climate of uncertainty and anxiety, and many smaller states feared 
for the future of the Alliance if Bonn was to follow Paris in its policies of independence. What 
would happen in 1969, when the North Atlantic Treaty was up for review and states were free to 
exercise the withdrawal clause? Under the impulse of its Foreign Minister, Pierre Harmel, and 
building on ideas put forward in 1964 by the Canadian Prime Minister, Lester Pearson, Belgium 
pushed for an exercise on the future role of the Alliance179. Harmel had three clear aims with this 
study: help maintain all the members in the Alliance; define a collective political mission for the 
Alliance, and in particular towards ending the East-West division in Europe; and finally, use this 
renewed emphasis on detente to convince France to remain a member in the Alliance after 
1 9 6 9 180 On 16 December 1966, the North Atlantic Council formally authorised the Harmel 
exercise. The communique pointed out that the Council had “decided to undertake a large 
analysis of the changes that have taken place in the international sphere since the signing of the 
North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, in view of determining their influence on the Atlantic Alliance 
and to define the tasks to be accomplished in order to reinforce the Atlantic Alliance as an 
element of lasting peace”181.
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The Belgian initiative suited to large extent American aims. On a tactical level, it 
possessed the not insignificant advantage of coming from a European initiative182. More 
importantly, Washington not only wanted to further involve NATO in the process of East-West 
detente, but also viewed this as an opportunity to restore its leadership on this vital question. On 
the recommendation of his advisers, Johnson decided to outline his European policy during a 
speech, on 7 October 1966, to the National Conference of Editorial Writers in New York. The 
American President called for progress on three fronts: modernising NATO and strengthening 
the Atlantic Alliance; furthering the integration of the Western European Community; and 
accelerating progress in East-West relations. In regards to the latter point, he called for the 
immediate mending of the European division and added that it had to be “healed with the 
consent of the East European states and with the consent of the Soviet Union”183. As a result, the 
picture of East-West detente in Europe looked increasingly complex and fluid, as both NATO 
and the US sought a more significant role. This development undoubtedly threatened Paris’s 
attempt to develop a privileged dialogue with Moscow.
In parallel to Atlantic affairs, the Johnson administration adopted a more active stand 
towards the monetary debates. Following the agreement at the annual IMF meeting in September 
1965 to study ways to improve the international monetary system, the US pushed hard for the 
creation of a new reserve asset that could either substitute or supplement gold, whereas the 
French argued that such planning was not needed. This was a particularly important 
development. Whereas the US had previously been on the defensive when France called for a 
reform of the international monetary system, Washington now championed change while Paris 
tried to defend the status quo184. Despite warnings from his adviser that too rigid an attitude 
might lead to French isolation in future debates, on 25 February De Gaulle chose to give his 
officials very restrictive instructions. They were essentially asked to follow a negative strategy,
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whereby they would try to keep negotiations open and hope to convince the G10 to collectively 
refuse unreasonable decisions185.
Yet, this approach hardly proved successful. At the G10 July meeting in The Hague, the 
other EEC states moved closer to accepting the principle of the creation of a new reserve asset, 
and accepted that the IMF be involved in the debates about the latter . To make matters worse, 
France’s Common Market partners had also seemingly accepted the fact that the removal of the 
American balance of payments deficit should not be a precondition to any reform of the 
international monetary system. Considering Paris’ isolated position, Debre decided in late 1966 
to adopt a new strategy that would focus on enlisting the support of the other states of the 
European Community187.
Achieving and maintaining this unity of the Six on monetary matters would be no easy 
feat for France, especially with other negotiations threatening to undermine the Community’s 
cohesion. The end of the EEC crisis had finally enabled some progress on the Kennedy Round, 
and the start of serious talks on the agricultural part of the GATT negotiations. But, there was 
still a large gap between all the parties, especially but not exclusively on agriculture, and there 
was no guarantee of success before the American Presidential mandate expired on 30 June 
1 9 6 7 188 ]y[ore significantly, the return of the British question to EEC affairs posed an all- 
together more complex challenge for France. On 10 November, British Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson announced to the House of Commons that “I intend to engage in a series of discussions 
with each of the Heads of Government of the Six, for the purpose of establishing whether it 
appears likely that essential British and Commonwealth interests could be safeguarded if Britain
185 ANF: 5AG1, Carton 28, Affaires Economiques Conseils Restreints: Dromer to De Gaulle 31.01.66, and Note by 
De Gaulle, 25.02.66. De Gaulle believed gold was the only valid international currency and he dismissed as futile 
the plans to create new currency reserves. Moreover, he felt that France’s “isolation” was meaningless as long as its 
balance o f payments was in good shape, see De Gaulle, LNC: X , Personal Note, 31.01.66, p.245
186 For Hague decisions, see DF: PEF, 1966-1967: Communique after the Hague G10 meeting, 26.07.66; MAEF: 
Direction Economique, Cooperation Economique 1967-1974, Vol.884: Brunet Circular Telegram number 213,
01.08.66. The IMF’s involvement was a blow because France considered it as a tool of US domination and the 
dollar hegemony, see Haberer, Jean-Yves, DGESS III, p. 156.
187 Debre, Memoires IV. pp. 164-167
188 See Preeg, Traders and Diplomats, pp.139-141; Evans, Kennedy Round, pp.238-239; Zeiler, American trade. 
p.225
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were to accept the Treaty of Rome and join EEC”, before concluding that “we mean
1 RObusiness” . Part of Wilson’s long-term strategy focussed on making it difficult for De Gaulle to 
veto Britain, as he had done in 1963, by showing its sincerity and willingness to enter the 
Community190.
VII. Conclusion
Throughout 1966, France was present on all diplomatic fronts. Besides withdrawing from 
NATO and recovering its full sovereignty, Paris had taken steps towards fostering an East-West 
rapprochement in Europe and building a solid cooperation with the Kremlin leaders. 
Additionally, from his platform in Cambodia, De Gaulle had powerfully denounced American 
actions in Indochina, thereby strengthening his prestige in the Third World. The French President 
was in a triumphant mood, convinced that while the march towards detente and overcoming the 
Cold War order in Europe would be long and difficult, it was nonetheless irreversible. He felt he 
could look to the future with optimism, noting that “guaranteed in its institutions, free in its 
foreign policy, experiencing economic growth and with a strong currency, France is walking 
towards a future of progress, independence, and peace”191.
Yet, fundamental developments in the international sphere were presenting new 
challenges to the Gaullist designs. Not only would France have to deal with increasing 
competition on the East-West detente scene, but it faced the prospect of difficult negotiations in 
its Westpolitik, be it in the monetary, trade or EEC sphere. The fate of all these questions would 
depend to a large extent on the attitude adopted by the new Grand Coalition government in 
Bonn, under chancellor Georg Kiesinger. Erhard’s successor made it immediately clear that he 
wanted to improve relations with the Soviet Union and its satellite states, and that he perceived
189 Wilson, Harold, The Labour Government. 1964-1970: A Personal Record. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1971), p.299; for more on the British decision to probe the Six, see Parr, Britain's policy, especially pp.70-95
190 Parr, Britain’s policy, pp. 101
191 De Gaulle, LNC: XI. Draft for a manifesto on general policy, Not dated late 1966, p.50
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Franco-German cooperation as vital in that matter192. What was less clear, however, was whether 
Kiesinger intended to show real independence from Washington, and follow in Paris’ footsteps.
192 MAEF: Europe, Allemagne 1961-1970, V ol.1608: Seydoux to Couve, Telegram number 7063-7069, 13.12.66
Chapter V: Illusion of Independence Part 1, January-June 1967
I. Introduction
1966 had been by all accounts the year of diplomatic achievements and diplomatic 
flamboyance for France. After the withdrawal from the integrated military structures of NATO, 
De Gaulle’s trip to the Soviet Union and his solemn condemnation of American policy in 
Vietnam during the speech in Phnom Penh, Paris believed it had reclaimed its Great Power status 
and ended the year on a euphoric note.
However, in 1967, the French president and his government faced a very different set of 
challenges. In addition to the parliamentary elections in March, could Paris gain satisfaction in 
all the complex negotiations -  including the Kennedy Round, the reform of the international 
monetary system and the British application to join the EEC -  affecting the Western world? 
Could it convince its Common Market partners to follow its path and show more independence 
vis-a-vis the powerful ally on the other side of the Atlantic? Could France convince Moscow and 
the Eastern bloc to be more flexible towards Bonn’s new Ostpolitikl
Behind all these difficulties lay the question of whether France could convert its new 
found status into concrete influence over its partners and allies, and this despite having used two 
of its best diplomatic trump cards the previous year -  the withdrawal from NATO and the trip to 
the Soviet Union. France was driven by the desire to be recognised as a major player on the 
international scene, but it was still unclear to what extent it would be listened to by other states.
II. New Challenges in the West
By 1967, the Atlantic Alliance had effectively settled the institutional crisis caused by 
France’s withdrawal from NATO, and devised a working compromise. Whereas military 
questions would be handled by the Fourteen in the Defence Planning Committee [DPC], France
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would join its allies in the North Atlantic Council [NAC] to study matters of general 
significance1. Moreover, the Fourteen, under American impetus, stuck to their policy of neither 
appeasing nor attacking France. Rusk was particularly adamant that while they should encourage 
Paris’ participation in any NATO consultation or studies, they should equally be prepared to deal 
with French obstruction2. This attitude helped to solve some of the remaining problems between 
France and NATO. The essential Ailleret-Lemnitzer negotiations on the future role of French 
troops in the common defence were still stalling by mid-1967, but at least an arrangement had 
been reached in March between the US and France regarding the use of pipe-lines in peacetime3.
At the same time, France’s disengagement offered an opportunity to inject some needed 
energy and sense of purpose into the Alliance. Under the auspices of the DPC, NATO finally 
adopted flexible response as its strategy on 9 May 1967, after more than four years of American 
lobbying4. This was an important political success for the US because it meant “a decisive step 
towards ending the strategic disagreements within the Atlantic Alliance”, and reinforced both 
NATO’s cohesion and American leadership5. Additionally, the Harmel exercise -  where 
Belgium and the US took the lead -  progressively emerged as a useful tool to underline NATO’s 
continuing political relevance in East-West affairs and to guarantee a political recommitment to 
the Alliance6. On 17 March, the exercise took an important step forward when the NATO states 
agreed that it should include four sub-groups, studying the following topics: East-West relations; 
Intra-Alliance relations; General questions of Defence Policy; and Developments in regions 
outside the NATO treaty area7.
France, for its part, paid little attention to the Atlantic organisation in early 1967. 
Convinced that he had fulfilled his aim of restoring France’s independence, De Gaulle happily
1 Haftendom, NATO, p.59
2 FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XIII: Document 245,06.04.67
3 Bozo, Deux Strategies, pp. 188-189; Ailleret and Lemnitzer easily agreed on military questions, but talks were at a 
standstill for political reasons; see chapter 4, footnotes 8 and 129 for the pipe-lines.
4 Kaplan, Lawrence, “The US and NATO in the Johnson Years”, in Divine, Robert (ed.), The Johnson Years, 
volume three, p. 134
5 Bozo, Deux Strategies, p. 182
6 FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XIII: Document 236, 11.02.67
7 Haftendom, Helga, “The Adaptation of the NATO Alliance to a Period of Detente: The 1967 Harmel Report”, in 
Loth, Crises and Compromises, pp.292-293
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oversaw the departure of the last foreign troops in March. He did not worry either about the 
adoption of flexible response, because in his mind it simply confirmed the developments of the 
previous years. The US, thanks to its dominant position within NATO, had already modified de 
facto their nuclear strategy, and thus the one of the Atlantic Alliance8. French officials were no 
more concerned about the Harmel exercise, claiming that they wanted to receive additional 
information before taking a position9. To a certain extent, Paris was deceived by the tactics of the 
Belgian government. Brussels voluntarily avoided introducing politically sensitive questions in 
the first stages of the study, so as to “avoid frightening off any hesitant governments”, and to 
give the “French as small a target as possible until the exercise is well under way”10.
Instead of NATO, France’s Westpolitik seemed essentially focussed on the predominant 
international negotiations of the time, that is to say the Kennedy Round, the reform of the 
international monetary system, and the possible British application to join the EEC. According to 
Jean Dromer, an advisor in the Elysee, in a long note written to De Gaulle, all these questions 
were closely tied to one another because they presented France with the same essential 
challenge: “Will France convince its [EEC] partners, by persuasion, initiatives or veto, that 
Europe is ready to claim and achieve its independence, i.e. that it must free itself from the US 
and Anglo-Saxon supremacy?”. Considering the strong American pressures, Dromer insisted that 
France needed to stop “this generally defensive attitude whereby we fight on our own, with the 
neutrality of our partners of the Common Market”, and instead “try and animate them so they 
veer in our direction”11. He was effectively suggesting that France needed a more flexible 
Western policy, in which it would make more efforts to rally its European partners, and not 
solely rely on independent action against the American hegemony.
This applied especially to monetary strategy. France had consistently opposed the Bretton 
Woods system because it conferred excessive privileges to the reserve currencies -  sterling and
8 Bozo, Deux Strategies, p. 183
9MAEF: Pactes 1961-1970, Vol.276: Alphand-Rostow meeting, 14.02.67
10 FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XIII: Document 236,11.02.67
11 ANF: 5AG1, Carton 29, Affaires Economiques Conseils Restreints: Note by Dromer, 07.01.67
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the dollar -  and it enabled the US to continue financing its balance of payments deficit, through 
the accumulation of dollars by foreign central banks, without having to resort to the same 
discipline that other states were held to12. By 1967, however, as we saw in chapter four, Paris 
had found itself isolated as most of the G10 states supported the creation of a new international 
currency, without removing the privileges of the reserve currencies. In a context where the Six 
were split on these issues, Minister of Finance Michel Debre believed that France should try to 
attract its EEC partners around a common proposal, or at minimum try to associate them to an 
effort to delay unwelcome reforms13. Debre’s concerns convinced De Gaulle to a certain extent, 
and accordingly he provided less rigid instructions for the monetary negotiations. While still 
critical of the Bretton Woods system, France accepted the possibility of a more extensive resort 
to the IMF’s credit facilities and the creation of Special Drawing Rights [SDR], as long as the 
IMF rules were revised to give more influence to the European states, and the credits granted 
were repaid within a predetermined time-frame14.
This new strategy yielded good results, especially during the meeting of EEC financial 
ministers in Munich on 17-18 April. Believing they deserved more influence in international 
monetary institutions, the Six agreed “to seek a common position in the present discussions on 
the reform of the international monetary system and to maintain a close cooperation in the 
future” in order “to safeguard their legitimate interests”15. The Six had seemingly reached a 
compromise agreement to defend the following points: the aim of the negotiations was to create 
“drawing rights” within the IMF, rather than a new reserve asset; the SDR would only be created 
if a lack of international liquidities was collectively acknowledged; IMF voting rules had to be
12 FNSP: Fonds Michel Debre Ministre des Finances [4DE] Carton 72: Conference in VEcole Polytechnique,
24.05.67
13 Prate, Les Batailles, p.222; Schenk, Catherine, “Sterling, International Monetary Reform and Britain’s 
Applications to join the European Economic Community in the 1960s”, Contemporary European History, Vol. 11/3 
(2002), p.363. France and Belgium wanted to delay reforms and concentrate on forcing the US to correct its deficit, 
and the Dutch and Italians were ready to go ahead with proposals for a new reserve unit. West Germans were 
undecided, Luxemburg did not express a view; MAEF: Direction Economique, Cooperation Economique 1967- 
1974, Vol.886: Note on Debre-French Ambassadors to the EEC states meeting, 09.01.67
14 ANF: 5AG1, Carton 29, Affaires Economiques Conseils Restreints: Draft instructions for French delegates in 
international monetary meetings, 22.02.67
15 LBJL: Papers of Francis Bator [Bator], SF, Box 10: EEC Official Communique, 18.04.67
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changed to give the Six a veto on key decisions16. The French considered this an important 
success, and Debre insisted to officials involved in the joint IMF-G10 meetings that they needed 
to defend the Munich accords. In particular, he wanted them to focus on maintaining and 
strengthening the cohesion between the states of the European Community17.
Munich certainly offered the EEC an opportunity to flex its collective muscles in the 
international monetary sphere, but it had not erased all divisions between the Six. Whereas 
France could assert that what was to be created was another form of international credit, many of 
its European partners were still seeking an asset, or a form of international currency that was 
“gold-like”18. These differences quickly came to the fore in the months following the Munich 
conference. Paris’ partners remained firm on a certain number of points, including giving the 
EEC veto power and more influence in the IMF, but significantly they were moving closer to 
accepting the creation of a new monetary instrument that could complement, and eventually 
replace, gold and the reserve currencies in the running of the international monetary system. 
Dromer complained that France’s relatively defensive strategy was being “gnawed away” by the 
work of the IMF’s experts on the rules for the use of SDR19. To make matters worse, the other 
crucial negotiations going on in parallel risked further jeopardising the unity of the Six.
At the start of 1967, six months before the expiration of the US Congressional mandate, 
there were still plenty of unresolved issues in the Kennedy Round, with two disputes in 
particular threatening to breakdown the entire talks. Firstly, the Americans wanted access to the 
European grain market. Secondly, in the chemical sector, the EEC wanted the US to abolish the 
so-called American Selling Price [ASP], a system of tariffs on four classes of imports. 
Washington refused to do so without concessions. Yet, despite these obstacles, all parties were 
determined to reach an agreement, and to make some compromises in order to achieve some sort
16 Prate, Les Batailles, p.224
17 FNSP: 4DE Carton 6: Instructions for French delegation in Washington, 21.04.67
18 Solomon, Monetary System, pp. 138-139
19 ANF: 5AG1, Carton 32, Affaires Economiques: Dromer to De Gaulle, 21.06.67
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of package settlement20. Lyndon Johnson remained committed to free trade, and believed that “if 
we could demonstrate our ability to move ahead in an economic partnership, especially with 
members of the Common Market, we could greatly improve the chances for a healthy NATO 
and for an increased international monetary cooperation”21. French officials also ultimately
99supported an accord, as long as it was on the basis of strict reciprocity . Eventually, after a 
series of marathon sessions in Geneva, the negotiators reached a deal on 15 May. The Kennedy 
Round brought balanced and reciprocal rewards in the industrial sector, with tariff reductions 
averaging 36-39% against the original aim of 50%, but few advantages for exporters in the 
agricultural field23.
As Ludlow points out, the Kennedy Round helped French interests in two ways. Paris 
realised that a successful outcome in Geneva would benefit its economy, whereas a breakdown, 
especially if blamed on French rigidity, could have disastrous economic and political 
consequences. At the same time the GATT talks also strengthened rather than undermined 
solidarity between the Six24. French leaders sought to capitalise on this latter fact, by consistently 
contrasting the reasonable European proposals with the supposed blackmail and negative 
pressure employed by their American interlocutors25. This was especially apparent during De 
Gaulle’s press conference of 16 May: “I will only say that it seems to me that a certain 
impression of the Six’s solidarity vis-a-vis the outside world has been felt recently. In the 
economic domain this is maybe partly linked to the fact that, in the great tariff battle of Geneva, 
and even though we achieved an agreement based on reciprocal compensations, the more 
‘Atlantic’ states, that is to say the US, Britain, and the Scandinavians, showed that their interests
9 f\were very different than those of the Community” .
20 For the tense 1967 negotiations, see Zeiler, American trade, pp.232-236; Preeg, Traders and Diplomats, pp. 159- 
192; Evans, Kennedy Round, pp.265-273
21 Johnson, Vantage Point, p.312
22 ANF: 5AG1, Carton 29, Affaires Economiques Conseils Restreints: Note by Dromer, 07.01.67
23 Zeiler, American trade, p.237, 239
24 Ludlow, European Community, p. 128
25 See for example MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.30: Couve-Brandt meeting, 28.04.67
26 De Gaulle. DM: V. p. 168
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However, if the Kennedy Round was an important landmark for the EEC, as the first 
GATT negotiation conducted collectively by the Community, its positive impact was under 
threat of being undone once Harold Wilson, British Prime Minister, started his probing tour of 
the Six’ capitals in January-March. He wanted to “establish Britain’s sincerity in approaching the 
European Community” and “emphasised the political case in favour of British accession and 
enlargement, challenging the French view of the Community”. At the same time, he hoped “his 
exposition of an enlarged Europe’s ‘strength and independence’” would “appeal to de Gaulle”27. 
Wilson’s strategy, though, did not really convince the General. While the President welcomed 
his interlocutor’s emphasis on independence, he firmly argued that British membership would 
completely alter the nature of the European Community, if only because of the agricultural 
question and the weakness of the pound28. The latter issue was very significant. Because of 
Article 108 of the Rome Treaty, which committed members to help a partner experiencing a 
balance-of-payments crisis, there was a fear that the Six would have to support the sterling 
exchange rate if Britain joined Europe29. For Debre, it was simply inconceivable to let Britain 
join the Common Market under the current international monetary system . Additionally, 
French leaders and officials generally opposed the principle of enlargement, and shared a certain 
wariness towards what they perceived as the Labour government’s sudden conversion to the 
cause of the EEC. Within the Quai’s Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financieres, which 
played an important role in the management of European affairs, there was a very strong feeling 
that accepting Britain in the Community would lead to the dissolution of the EEC, and to the 
creation of a large zone of free trade instead31.
If the immediate reactions of the French government to Wilson’s visit were certainly 
unfavourable, De Gaulle also realised he needed to choose a strategy that could avoid a repeat of
27 Parr, Britain's policy, pp. 111-113
28 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.386: De Gaulle-Wilson meeting, 24.01.67
29 Schenk, “Sterling, International Monetary Reform”, p.348; Bossuat, Gerard, “De Gaulle et la seconde candidature 
britannique aux Communautes europeennes 1966-1969”, in Loth, Crises and Compromises, p.517
30 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.3, 01.02.67, p.267
31 Couve, Politique ^trangere. p.418; Badel, Laurence, “Le Quai d’Orsay, la Grande-Bretagne et Pdlargissement de 
la Communaute (1963-1969)”, in Catala, Michel (ed.), Cinquante Ans apres la declaration Schuman: Histoire de la 
Construction Europeenne, (Nantes: Ouest Editions, 2001), pp.241, 247-250
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the first British application to the EEC. As he said during the Council of Ministers on 1 
February, “the key is not to be drawn into ever lasting talks, like in 1962. But also to make clear 
that there is no easy solution, that the pure and simple entry is not so pure and simple”32. By 
preventing the opening of negotiations with London, Paris would not have to resort to a political 
veto like in January 1963. This approach, according to French ambassador in Moscow, Olivier 
Wormser, might still cause a crisis, but at least a far less serious one than if they followed the 
same procedure as in 1961-196333. This was a vital consideration, at a time when France was 
seeking to maintain the unity of the Six on other matters, especially the monetary talks. De 
Gaulle even tried to deter the British from filing an early application. Thus, during a meeting 
with Patrick Reilly, British Ambassador in Paris, he argued that the economic situation was not 
favourable for any dramatic initiative, and that there would still be the problem of how to fit 
Britain in the European Community in light of its ties to the US34.
London, however -  along with Copenhagen, Dublin and Oslo later on -  ignored De 
Gaulle’s advice and officially announced its application to join the EEC on 2 May. The reactions 
amongst French leaders showed a certain consensus. Most of the Ministers still opposed British 
membership, and underlined the insurmountable problems tied to agriculture and the pound 
sterling. They also insisted that the government needed to pay extra attention to the presentation 
of its policy, if only to deal with a public opinion favourable to Britain. The General, for his part, 
believed that there was no rush to take a dramatic decision, and he remained confident that the 
ball would be in France’s court at the appropriate time35. His press conference on 16 May 
essentially reflected these views. While De Gaulle avoided the spectacular style of January 1963 
so as not to infuriate the other members of the EEC, he nonetheless sought to nip negotiations 
with London in the bud by emphasising the problematic nature of a British membership -  what 
observers came to call the ‘velvet veto’. The result was a fairly defensive posture whereby the
32 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.3, p.267
33 FNSP: CM Carton 8: Wormser to Couve, 14.04.67
34 TNA: Foreign and Commonwealth Office [FCO] 33/62: Paris to FO, Telegram number 255,20.03.67
35 See Peyrefitte, C'dtait de Gaulle: vol.3, 03-10.05.67, pp.268-272;
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French President described the Common Market as a sort of miracle, which would not be able to 
withstand a British entry. Instead of membership, he suggested an association between Britain
'y/:
and the European Community .
The speech hardly had the desired effect. The British, unlike in 1963, were determined to 
continue in the face of De Gaulle’s obstruction, and based their strategy on the long-term hope 
that the application could outlast him37. At the same time, the French President could not easily 
convince the other EEC states -  a reality which emerged clearly during the Rome meeting of the 
Six Heads of State. Originally meant to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Rome Treaty, the 
meeting quickly shifted to the question of enlargement. On the one hand, the Benelux states led 
the way in arguing that Article 237 of the Rome Treaty legally obliged the EEC to start talks 
with the new applicants. France, on the other hand, wanted the Six to first discuss together the 
question of enlargement before opening negotiations with the new candidates38. The debates in 
June quickly became quite acrimonious, but despite sharp differences, the European Community 
Council agreed on 26 June to request the Commission’s opinion on enlargement. Couve 
“specifically vetoed the Belgian proposal to invite a British spokesman, but he was unable to 
block the ‘compromise’ suggestion that Britain be heard at the 4-5 July meeting of the West 
European Union [WEU] in The Hague”39.
France faced the difficult challenge of maintaining the unity of the Six on monetary 
matters, while preventing Britain from joining the EEC. At the same time, in parallel to these 
negotiations, 1967 witnessed a new round of the bitter struggle between Paris and Washington 
for Bonn’s favours. The new West German government, established in December 1966 and led 
by Chancellor Georg Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Willy Brandt, immediately sought to repair 
relations with France. The summit meeting on 13-14 January proved a great success40. French 
leaders obviously welcomed this change of policy, even if Couve struck a cautious note by
36 For the press conference, see De Gaulle, DM: V. pp. 156-174
37 Parr, Britain's policy, pp. 155, 160
38 FNSP: CM Carton 9: Conference of Six Heads of State, 30.05.67
39 LBJL: PP, NSF, SF, Box 48: CIA Memo, 01.08.67
40 For the memorandums of conversation [memcons] of the summit, see MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.29
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pointing out that “time will tell if the Germans can better resist the Anglo-Saxon pressures”. De 
Gaulle, though, sounded more optimistic: “They [Germans] are getting closer to us. We have to 
use that to our advantage in framework of the Six, especially for monetary questions”41. 
Regarding the British application to the EEC, Kiesinger certainly gave no signs of wanting to 
start a conflict with France over the issue, while Franco-German cooperation in monetary affairs 
proved its worth when both states tried to forge a common EEC position during the Munich 
meeting42. This does not mean, however, that Paris and Bonn had ironed out all differences. 
German officials still believed they were limits to Franco-German cooperation, and they were 
not keen to start a conflict against the “supremacy” of the dollar43.
At the same time, Bonn wanted more independence from Washington and not to act, in 
the words of Brandt, “like a girl who constantly has to be reassured by her boyfriend that he still 
loves her”44. Waiting until late January to agree to restart the trilateral negotiations, Kiesinger 
made an unprecedented public critique of American foreign policy over the NPT, announcing 
that American and German interests were not always identical, and that the time of 
unquestioning acceptance of US leadership was over45. The German chancellor’s apparent 
deference to Paris, his criticism of the US, and the Munich compromise worried the American 
administration, leading Johnson to have his doubts about whether the German policy of 
friendship towards US was really unchanged46. Yet, as Zimmermann argues, both sides realised 
it was in their interests to avoid a major crisis. In a memo to Johnson on 23 February, Deputy 
national security advisor Francis Bator pointed out that there was no chance of getting a 100% 
military offset deal with the Germans, but that instead the US could try to guarantee some 
financial compensation, such as a promise not to use their dollars to buy gold. Despite some
41 Peyrefitte. C'etait de Gaulle: vol.3. 18.01.67, p.194
42 Bohmer, Katharina, “’We too mean business’: Germany and the Second British Application”, in Daddow, Oliver 
(ed.), Harold Wilson and European Integration: Britain’s Second Application to join the EEC. (London: Cass, 2002), 
pp.215-2L7; Solomon, Monetary System, p. 137
43 Zimmermann, Money and Security, p.223; Wilkens, Andreas, “L’Europe en suspens. Willy Brandt et l’orientation 
de la politique europeenne de l’Allemagne federate 1966-1969”, in Loth, Crises and Compromises, p.327
44 FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XIII: Document 235, 08.02.67
45 Bark, Dennis and Gress, David, A History of West Germany, vol.2. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p.99
46 Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson, p. 152
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hesitations, Bonn understood that there was no way around the Americans. On 30 March, 
Bundesbank President Karl Blessing sent a letter that contained a non-conversion pledge to the 
US treasury, which was according to Bator “by far the most important part of the US-German 
deal”47.
The Franco-American struggle over West Germany reached a high point during 
Adenauer’s funeral in late April. After briefly speaking to Johnson, De Gaulle met the German 
chancellor and urged him again to resist Anglo-Saxon pressures. For the General, Paris and Bonn 
needed to have a common attitude vis-a-vis Washington and to stay together in all negotiations, 
especially in the monetary sphere48. Equally, realising their importance in the outcome on 
monetary affairs, the NPT and the Kennedy Round, the Americans tried to push the Germans to 
split with the French and follow their line. Bator was convinced that this could be attained as 
long as Johnson could develop friendly relation with Kiesinger and make some compromises 
over the trilateral negotiations49. To a certain extent, Johnson succeeded and turned the tables on 
Kiesinger, underlining the fact that he faced significant problems at home and thus needed 
Kiesinger’s cooperation, and on 28 April, Britain, West Germany and the US finally signed the 
trilateral agreement50.
Germany’s position between France and the US remained uneasy in May-June as 
attention shifted to monetary affairs. The French repeatedly reminded their German colleagues of 
the importance and difficulty of maintaining a common EEC position on monetary problems51. 
At the same time, in a meeting with German finance minister Kurt Schiller, secretary of Treasury 
Henry Fowler denounced France’s unconstructive attitude towards the international monetary 
system, while Bator advised Schiller not to worry too much about accommodating the French. 
Schiller, though, reminded his guests that Bonn wanted to act as the honest broker between
47 Zimmermann, Money and Security, pp.220-227; Kunz, Diane, Butter and Guns: America’s Cold War Economic 
Diplomacy. (New York: Free Press, 1997), p. 173-174
48 ANF: 5AG1, Carton 163, Allemagne RFA: De Gaulle-Kiesinger meeting, 25.04.67
49 See LBJL: PP, NSF, SF, Box 48: Bator to Johnson, 21.04.67; LBJL: Bator, SF, Box 22: Bator to Rostow,
24.04.67
50 Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson, p. 164; for trilateral negotiations, see Zimmermann, Money and Security, pp.212-232
51 MAEF: Direction Economique, Papiers Jean-Pierre Brunet [Brunet] 1966-1974, Vol.53: Brunet-Neef meeting,
21.06.67
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Washington and Paris52. By mid-1967, the jury was still out as the fate of the Harmel exercise, 
the British application to the EEC and the international monetary system were still undecided. 
Moreover, while relations had improved between Bonn and Washington, Kiesinger and Brandt 
were determined to pursue the cooperation with Paris.
III. The Paris-Bonn-Moscow Dynamic
France realised that not only would West Germany have a significant role to play in the 
ongoing Western negotiations, but this was also true for the future of detente in Europe. In that 
regards, the January 1967 Franco-German summit had confirmed the noticeable improvement in 
relations between the two governments, especially in the field of East-West relations. Kiesinger 
renounced the Hallstein doctrine and the MLF, and also accepted De Gaulle’s analysis that 
German reunification could only happen through a rapprochement with the Eastern Bloc. Bonn 
was now ready to establish diplomatic relations with all satellite states, except East Germany . 
Moreover, Brandt and Kiesinger repeatedly asked France to champion their Ostpolitik, in 
particular by vouching for them during talks with Eastern Bloc leaders54. Apart from the question 
of the Oder-Neisse border, the January meetings had largely convinced De Gaulle that “they 
[Germans] are going through key changes. They realise that detente is the most promising path 
for them. They are getting closer to us”55. He further hoped that if France supported Bonn’s 
Ostpolitik, this could help to guarantee German solidarity in Western matters, including 
monetary questions and the British application to the EEC.
Therefore, Paris went out of its way to cooperate with Bonn and defend the Federal 
Republic’s Eastern policy. On a lower level, Brandt and Couve agreed that their respective 
directeurs politiques should continue to consult and look for possibilities of common action, and 
they encouraged their directeurs economiques to promote common industrial projects in Eastern
52 FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.VIII: Document 129, 19.06.67
53 MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.29: De Gaulle-Kiesinger meeting 1, 13.01.67
54 See for example MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.29: Couve-Brandt meeting, 13.01.67
55 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.3. 18.01.67, p. 194
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Europe56. Through their regular meetings, the directeurs politiques updated each other about 
their governments’ latest initiatives, and discussed their analyses of developments on the other 
side of the Iron Curtain . At the top level, France mostly helped West Germany by lobbying 
important Eastern Bloc statesmen, such as Zorin or Adam Rapacki, the Polish foreign minister. 
De Gaulle and Couve, for example, defended Bonn’s new attitude on detente, the Hallstein 
doctrine and the MLF as small steps, but still steps in the right direction. Moreover, they 
emphasised that Germany had taken these initiatives of its own accord, and it was important for 
the Eastern Bloc to encourage these endeavours in order not to push them back into the arms of 
the US. This is not say that French leaders ignored altogether the differences between their view 
of detente and the German one, especially regarding the Oder-Neisse border. They 
acknowledged this fact, but generally tried to underline Bonn’s intentions to follow in Paris’ 
footsteps58.
In the longer-term perspective, De Gaulle realised that Germany’s policy towards the 
East, combined with its closer alignment on France, could open up great possibilities for detente 
in Europe. As various authors point out, relations between Bonn, Paris and Moscow were central 
to his goal of overcoming the Cold War order in Europe. If West Germany and the Soviet Union 
could start a rapprochement -  as France had done with both previously -  and change their 
reciprocal perceptions of threat, the military blocs in Europe would lose their raison d ’etre, and 
there would be no need for an American security guarantee in Western Europe59. De Gaulle’s 
grand design therefore depended to a certain extent on Bonn and Moscow’s ability to improve 
their relations, which he supposedly made clear to Kiesinger when he stated that “the moment 
we both go to Moscow will be le grand jour”60. That said, if he accepted that the three countries 
had a vital role to play in transforming the European order, he was not trying to establish a sort
56 MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.29: Couve-Brandt meeting 2, 13.01.67
57 See for example MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.387: Beaumarchais-Meyer Lindenberg meeting, 17.02.67; MAEF: 
Direction Economique, Brunet 1966-1974, Vol.54: Beaumarchais-Meyer Lindenberg meeting, 22.03.67
58 For the memcons, see MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.29: Couve-Zorin meeting, 19.01.67 and De Gaulle-Zorin meeting, 
23.01.67; MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.386: Couve-Rapacki meeting, 26.01.67 and De Gaulle-Rapacki meeting, 27.01.67
59 On this idea of a triangular relationship see Kolodziej, French international policy, pp.350-351; Newhouse, De 
Gaulle, p.295; Ledwidge, Bernard, DGESS V, p.505; Bloch, Rene, Ibid, p.513
60 See Maillard, Probleme Allemand. p.231
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of triangular partnership either. For a start, as Couve cautiously noted, Paris could only do so 
much to mediate and improve German-Soviet relations61. More importantly, he did not intend to 
give Germany, even once reunified, equal responsibility: it would remain in a subordinate role as 
only France and Russia would act as pillars in the General’s modernised Concert of Nations,
f\)which depended on a complex set of checks and balances, and multiple bilateralism .
Yet, De Gaulle’s vision for the future of Europe faced clear obstacles, starting with West 
Germany. Certainly, the latter agreed with the French President that they needed to make more 
efforts to improve relations with the Eastern bloc, especially Moscow. Keen to create a climate 
in which the status quo could be changed peacefully, Brandt argued that “realities can be 
influenced for the better only if they are taken into account” . West Germany accepted the 
Soviet Union’s central role in any future German reunification, as suggested by Kiesinger’s June 
14 speech to the Bundestag: “We all know that overcoming the division of our people can indeed 
only be achieved by an arrangement with Moscow”64. Thus, Bonn took a series of steps to 
improve relations with the communist superpower, such as a proposed renunciation of force 
agreement. At the same time, it sent officials on missions to Bucharest, Prague and Budapest in 
view of establishing diplomatic relations65.
Additionally, Bonn focussed on the intra-German sphere. Despite refusing to recognise 
East Germany and referring to it as “East Zone”, Kiesinger announced a series of proposals to 
improve communications with Pankow. This included positive and practical steps, such as 
improving travel possibilities, allowing the joining together of families, and expanding trade66. 
French leaders undoubtedly welcomed these initiatives, but it was not at all clear that Germany 
would accept the subordinate role expected by De Gaulle. Indeed, for Brandt, the core of Bonn’s 
new Ostpolitik was that it would now take greater control over its own fate, rather than rely on
61 See for example FNSP: CM Carton 2: Interview with French radio, 07.01.67
62 For the Concert o f Nations, see chapter 4, footnote 66; the expression multiple bilateralism was coined by 
Georges-Henri Soutou
63 Brandt, Willy, People and Politics: The Years 1960-1975. (London: Collins, 1978), pp.168-169
64 Garton Ash, Timothy, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent. (New York: Random House, 
c l 993), p.54
65 MAEF: Direction Economique, Brunet 1966-1974, Vol.54: Beaumarchais-Meyer Lindenberg meeting, 10.01.67
66 Bark and Gress, West Germany, vol.2, p. 101
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others to speak on its behalf, and become more adult67. Even if it followed France’s detente 
policy with great interest and attention, Bonn only expected limited gains from its cooperation 
with Paris. As Egon Bahr, Brandt’s influential advisor on Ostpolitik, argued in January 1967, the 
possibilities of common actions towards Eastern Europe should not be overstated. It was at the
r o
bilateral level that Germany could take “decisive steps” towards the Eastern Bloc .
Furthermore, the attempts to start a rapprochement between West Germany and the 
Eastern bloc were proving particularly difficult. At first, the Soviet leaders did not appear 
completely hostile to the new German government. They believed that they could possibly 
benefit from Bonn’s Ostpolitik, and weaken its alliance with Washington69. However, it did not 
take long for Moscow, along with the more intransigent members of the Warsaw Pact, to shift to 
a more critical stance. Attacking the new German policy as a tactical rather than concrete 
change, Moscow and Warsaw criticised Bonn’s attitude on nuclear weapons, borders and its
70failure to recognise East Germany . Soviet policy stiffened even further after West Germany 
and Romania officially agreed to exchange ambassadors on 31 January, and because of East 
German pressure in Moscow to prevent Hungary and Czechoslovakia from following 
Bucharest’s example. Without doubt, the masters of the Kremlin felt deep-rooted anxiety about 
the controllability of a sweeping European detente, its potential to stimulate divisive forces 
within the Eastern bloc, and about West German influence in Eastern Europe. They chose to side 
with East Germany, moving away from their maximal goal of isolating Bonn and lowering 
American influence, and reverting to their minimal aim of consolidating control over Eastern 
Europe71.
Indeed, the hardening reaction of the Eastern Bloc was also greatly influenced by East 
Germany, and its leader Walter Ulbricht. As Garton Ash explains, “Ulbricht quickly moved to 
counter the new West German offensive [...] Against the “Hallstein doctrine” of Bonn, Pankow
67 Brandt, People and Politics, pp. 168-169
68 Wilkens, “L’Europe en suspens”, in Loth, Crises and Compromises, p.331
69 Griffith, Ostpolitik. p. 141
70 See footnote 58
71 Newton, Russia. France, p.79; Griffith, Ostpolitik. pp. 142-144; Wolfe, Soviet Power, p.316
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placed what journalists would label the “Ulbricht doctrine”, according to which no other Eastern 
bloc states should move faster than East Germany in setting up diplomatic relations with West 
Germany72. His success was all too clearly confirmed when the communist parties of East and 
West Europe, except Romania, met in April in Karlovy Vary, and heaped abuse upon Bonn’s 
policies73. This was not enough to convince Kiesinger to give up on Ostpolitik, but he was 
adamant that his policy could not be considered a success in view of the obstruction from the 
East74. Equally, Quai officials regarded the results of Germany’s policy as very limited, 
considering how the talks with the satellite states, except Romania, were at a dead end75.
Despite those bleak developments, French leaders remained fairly optimistic about the 
prospects of detente in Europe. After the spectacular trips of 1966, De Gaulle did not forecast 
any major developments in East-West relations. He was pleased with the progress made by the 
West German government, although he hoped that it would eventually give up its illusions on 
borders, and make some sort of move, short of recognition, towards East Germany76. As he told 
Zorin, he never expected the Soviets and others to immediately embrace Bonn’s Ostpolitik11. 
This fitted with the belief that the East-West rapprochement in Europe, and the resulting German 
reunification, would take a long time, but the key was to see a movement in the “right direction, 
even if the road is long”78. The French simply felt that they had entered an irreversible phase of 
detente, and as Couve pointed out during the NATO Ministerial meeting in Luxemburg, the 
question was no longer to justify detente but to practice it79.
For the General and his collaborators, it was normal to see France adopt a more relaxed 
approach after the dramatic and frantic pace of its own Ostpolitik in the previous year. They saw 
no reasons to worry when relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were developing
72 Garton, In Europe’s Name, pp.55-56
73 Brandt, People and Politics, p. 172
74 MAEF: Europe, Allemagne 1961-1970, Vol.1608: Seydoux to Couve, Telegram number 3955-3965, 30.06.67
75 MAEF: Europe, Allemagne 1961-1970, Vol.1545: Note of Direction Europe Centrale, 14.06.67
76 TNA: FCO 33/62: Paris to FO, Telegram number 255, 20.03.67
77 MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.29: De Gaulle-Zorin meeting, 23.01.67
78 DF: PEF 1966-1967: Couve interview with Le Figaro, 30.01.67
79 MAEF: Pactes 1961-1970, Vol.272: Paris to Couve, Telegram number 8, 14.06.67
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normally in all spheres80. De Gaulle’s visit to the Soviet Union, and the subsequent Franco- 
Soviet common declaration of 30 June 1966 had created a framework for cooperation, which 
included the establishment of various trade commissions. The mixed Franco-Soviet commission 
first met in Paris between 26 and 31 January. As Rey claims, the years 1967-1968 were meant to 
be a learning process for the bilateral structures set up the previous year81. Yet, the realities of 
Franco-Soviet cooperation -  and for that matter with other Eastern Bloc states -  hardly matched
O'}
up to expectations, especially in the field of trade . According to Jacques Andreani, Quai 
d’Orsay official on the Soviet desk, trade with the Soviet Union only accounted for 1% of 
France’s total foreign trade, and it was unlikely to increase quickly as the Russians had so little 
to sell83. As for the satellite states, Andreani argued that if France maintained good political 
relations with them, it would be “necessary for its economic role to match its political status if it 
were to really play an influential role. But this would be hard to achieve”84. In the case of Poland 
for example, despite improvements in 1966, France was only the fourth largest Western exporter, 
far behind Britain and West Germany85.
More importantly, there were various suggestions of a “cooling off’ of Franco-Soviet
relations in this period. Wolton claims that Moscow lost interest in France once it left NATO,
while Lefort claims that it was giving up on its rapprochement with Paris because of the latter’s
refusal to align itself on Soviet policy towards West Germany . At the same time, Brezhnev
gave a very damning assessment of De Gaulle during a conversation with Ulbricht and
Wladislaw Gomulka, Secretary General of the Polish Communist Party, in April 1967:
Take for example De Gaulle. Did we not manage, without any risk, to create a breach 
in imperialist capitalism? De Gaulle is our enemy and we know it. The PCF [Parti 
Communiste Frangais], narrow in its conceptions, tried to get us against De Gaulle.
And what did we obtain however? A weakening of the position of the US in Europe.
80 MAEF: SG,EM, Vol.30: Couve-Brandt meeting, 27.04.67
81 Rey, La tentation. p.53
82 Vai'sse, La grandeur, p.433
83 NARA: RG59, CFPF, 1967-1969, Box 2089: McBride to Rusk, Airgram number 1255,09.02.67
84 NARA: RG59, CFPF, 1967-1969, Box 2089: Bohlen to Rusk, Airgram number 1436, 10.03.67
85 MAEF: Europe, Pologne 1966-1970, Vol.2499: Note of MAEF, 26.05.67. Only 2,4% of Polish imports came 
from France, against 6,4% for Britain and 2,7% for West Germany. Additionally, 1,6% of Polish exports went to 
France, against 6,4% to Britain and 5,4% to West Germany.
86 Wolton, France sous influence, p.443 ; Lefort, Souvenirs et secrets, p. 164
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And it is not over. De Gaulle is a sly fox. He wants hegemony for France in Europe, 
and that is directed against us. But there, we have to act with flexibility. In any case,
De Gaulle’s European conceptions have no chance of succeeding because there are in 
Western Europe some strong countries that would never admit it. But the assessment, 
comrades, is it not favourable?87
Bohlen also agreed with the rumours concerning the troubles in Franco-Soviet relations. Aside
from the differences over the question of a European security conference, the NPT, and the
natural strains caused by Paris’ attempt to facilitate a rapprochement between Bonn and
Moscow, he rightfully reminded Rusk that “the Franco-Soviet affair was a hurry up business
from the outset, and the concrete results have always panted along far behind the grandiose
publicity”88.
Thus, France’s Eastern strategy was facing significant obstacles, but it is important not to 
overstate them. Certainly, the rapprochement between West Germany and the Eastern bloc 
would be a slow and difficult affair. Moreover, the Brezhnev quote, as Soutou argues, made it 
clear that the Soviet leaders were not ready to make the Franco-Soviet couple their main axis in 
Europe89. While they were ready to show more assertiveness and confidence in their relations 
with France, Moscow’s policy towards Western Europe was still “actively reactive”, constrained 
by the fear of a resurgent Germany, and the risk of seeing an American withdrawal from Europe 
or NATO’s collapse. In other words, the Kremlin leaders could not “truly embark on a Europe 
first policy that would treat Europe as a primary and ultimate focus, rather than a derivative of 
the superpower relationship”90. However, this is not to say that France had lost all its leverage in 
Europe, or that it was completely ignored by Moscow. Conscious of its pioneering role in 
European detente, Paris was actually planning to go back on the offensive in the second half of 
1967. Pompidou made sure to announce very publicly De Gaulle’s trips to Poland in early June 
and to Romania in the autumn, and his own trip to the Soviet Union in July91.
87 Weit, Erwin, Dans 1’Ombre de Gomulka. (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1971), p. 188
88 NARA: RG59, CFPF, 1967-1969, Box 2090: Bohlen to Rusk, Airgram number 1650, 19.04.67
89 Soutou, Georges-Henri, La Guerre de cinquante ans: le conflit Est-Ouest 1943-1990, (Paris: Fayard, 2001), p.472
90 Newton, Russia. France, pp.77-78
91 DF: PEF, 1966-1967: Pompidou speech to YAssemblee Nationale, 18.04.67. Because of the Six Day war, the trip 
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IV. Six Days that shook the World
While France was facing difficult challenges in both its Westpolitik and Ostpolitik, the 
Third World provided little relief. For once, though, the problem was not so much related to 
Vietnam. In regards to the conflict in Indochina, De Gaulle shied away from any major 
initiatives, and simply maintained the very critical stance towards America that he had outlined 
during his Phnom Penh speech in September 1966. He continued to denounce what he 
considered as a terrible conflict, and stuck to his claim according to which the ongoing war in 
Indochina was undermining the emerging detente in the world92. To further mark its disapproval 
of American actions, the French government also decided not to bother sending an observer to 
the SEATO council meeting in Washington93.
Moreover, the General stubbornly refused to take part in any mediation effort in this 
period. For example, when US ambassador at large Averell Harriman asked Jean Sainteny, a 
former French general delegate to North Vietnam, to act as an intermediary with Hanoi, De 
Gaulle reacted negatively. He made it clear to Sainteny that he should “not become, in any way, 
a messenger for the US”94. Why did he adopt this obstructive attitude, when he repeatedly 
claimed that ending the Vietnam War would benefit detente? Without full access to the De 
Gaulle private papers it is difficult to be categorical, but there are several possible explanations. 
Essentially, as Couve stated, France believed that a negotiated solution would only happen when 
the belligerents agreed on its objectives95. As long as this was not the case, the General probably 
believed that he could have his cake and eat it too. He certainly genuinely perceived Washington 
as responsible for the conflict in Indochina. Yet, without a foreseeable end in sight, he could, as 
Jean-Daniel Jurgensen, the Quai’s head of the US department, explained to Bohlen, continually
92 De Gaulle, DM: V, Toast for Sihanouk, 21.02.67, p.147; MAEF: Asie-Oceanie, Conflit Vietnam 1955-1975, 
Vol. 163: De Gaulle speech to diplomatic corps, 01.01.67
93 MAEF: Asie-Oceanie, Conflit Vietnam 1955-1975, Vol.163: Manac’h to Lucet, Telegrams number 706-707,
21.03.67
94 Vai'sse, “De Gaulle”, in Goscha and Vai'sse, Guerre du Vietnam, p. 176
95 FSNP: CM Carton 2: Interview with French radio, 07.01.67
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hammer in a view which appealed to 80% of the French electorate. This position was obviously 
useful in view of the upcoming parliamentary elections, and also struck a responsive chord in the 
Third World96. Moreover, De Gaulle also felt that the US was morally losing a lot of ground in 
Europe because of Vietnam, and this provided a golden opportunity for France to push for a 
more independent Europe along the Paris-Bonn-Moscow line.
Thus, while the shadow of the Vietnam still loomed heavily during the first half of 1967, 
it was actually the Middle East that ended up taking centre stage on the international scene. 
Before then, the region had hardly been a key priority for France. Since the end of the Algerian 
war, De Gaulle had pursued a logic of double normalisation in his Middle Eastern policy. On the 
one hand, he had loosened ties with Israel since the heyday under the Fourth Republic, and 
rejected Ben Gurion’s offer of an alliance in 1963. On the other hand, Paris had successfully 
renewed relations with the Arab states, which had been broken after the Suez crisis. The latter 
goal had been achieved without jeopardising relations with Israel97. As Abba Eban, Israeli 
foreign minister at the time, notes in his memoirs, their Embassy in Paris continued to paint a 
favourable picture of French policy, despite the rumours suggesting that Paris’ attitude towards 
Tel Aviv was cooling98. On the eve of the crisis that culminated in the Six Day War, France 
essentially sought to keep a balanced approach towards the region99.
France’s Middle Eastern policy was largely neutral and uncontroversial until mid-1967, 
but this drastically changed because of the conflict that erupted in the region. Not only did it 
cause a spectacular break between Paris and Tel Aviv, but it also dealt a blow to France’s 
aspirations to Great Power status. Moreover, the General’s decisions before and during the Six 
Day War created a very sharp split in the literature, one shaped by the memoirs of participants, 
and not helped by a relative lack of access, on this subject, to the French archives. There is a 
distinct lack of consensus when it comes to assessing De Gaulle’s aims and his reading of the
96 LBJL: PP, NSF, CO, Box 173: Bohlen to Rusk, Telegram number 10209,10.01.67
97 Cohen, Sarny, “De Gaulle et Israel: Le sens d’une rupture”, in Bamavi and Friedlander, Politique etrangere. 
pp. 193-195
Eban, Abba, Personal Witness: Israel Through My Eves, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1993), p.339
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situation. For example, Bohlen believed that France’s policy was driven by cold blooded 
reasons. In particular, it realised that the Anglo-Saxons countries had lost their standing in the 
Arab states, which provided an opportunity for France to move in. Roussel and Gad, for their 
part, suggest that the Middle East crisis provided another chance to show independence vis-a-vis 
the US. Finally, Couve justified Paris’ rabid defence of peace as tied to the conviction that a war 
in the region would be vain, and could only lead to further catastrophes100.
Additionally, the confusion of French policy in the initial stages of the crisis complicates 
any analysis. Certainly, De Gaulle was aware and worried by the rising tension in the region. In a 
meeting with an Egyptian official on 9 May, he made it clear that Paris wanted to avoid a 
conflict101. This did not mean, though, that French officials were particularly prepared for the 
troubles ahead, as confirmed by Herve Alphand. During a visit to the Middle East between 6 and 
16 May, he met with various Syrian and Egyptian leaders, and despite his hosts’ warning that a 
war was imminent, he assumed that this was an exaggeration102. However, the crisis in the 
Middle East soon escalated when Nasser obtained on 18 May the withdrawal of the UN troops 
stationed on the Egyptian-Israeli border. Four days later, he closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli 
ships.
The French government was initially slow to react publicly to these new developments, 
so much so that the Israeli government, worried by France’s lack of public support and its failure 
to respond to several messages, decided on 23 May to send Eban to Paris for consultations103. At 
the same time, in the absence of clear directives from the highest levels, officials remained 
cautious and could only provide limited, sometimes even contradictory, insights about French 
policy when talking with foreign diplomats. Thus, on 15 May Charles Lucet, the ambassador in 
Washington, mentioned to American officials that the tripartite declaration remained the basis of
'i  ' ' ' "
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France’s attitude towards the Middle East. Yet, a week later, during a meeting with Bohlen, 
Alphand confirmed that he had no objections to informal consultations between France, Britain 
and the US, but he questioned the value of appealing to the tripartite declaration. He felt that 
official talks between the three Western powers without Russia “would give it the appearance of 
the ‘cold war’”104. The same Alphand, in a conversation with a British official, also confirmed 
that Paris was opposed to an early meeting of the UN’s Security Council to discuss the tension in 
the Middle East, and that the Ambassador in Moscow had been instructed to sound out the 
Soviets’ intentions105.
It was only during the Council of Ministers of 24 May that the French government 
seriously discussed its attitude towards the emerging crisis. De Gaulle imposed his view that the 
closure of the Straits did not constitute a casus belli, described war in the region as an absurdity, 
and claimed that it was up to the four Great Powers -  France, the US, Britain and the Soviet 
Union -  to cooperate and facilitate a settlement. He further added that the situation had changed 
since 1957, when France had made a declaration favourable to freedom of navigation in the Gulf 
of Aqaba, and had defended Israel’s right to defend itself106. For the General, France in 1967 was 
now a Great Power with global responsibilities. He adopted, as Lacouture explains, a very 
dogmatic position in support of peace, which appeared as the only way to maintain the
1 (Y7equilibrium he had developed in the previous years towards the Middle East . In his rush to see 
France act and be considered as a Great Power, De Gaulle -  in line with his stance on the 
Vietnam War -  wanted France to play the role of the moral defender of peace in the world, 
thereby distinguishing itself from the other three Great Powers, which were more closely aligned 
to the regional actors. This was an approach dominated by global considerations, at the expense 
of local circumstances.
104 See FRUS: 1964-1968, VoLXIX: Document 3, 15.05.67, and Document 47, 23.05.67; The Tripartite declaration 
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The French President held the same line with all the potential belligerents. He told the 
Egyptian ambassador in Paris, Abdel El-Naggar, that a war would be terrible for Egypt, and that 
he wanted talks between the four Great Powers so to prevent them from taking sides108. He 
equally strongly warned Eban that Israel should not go to war, or at any rate not be the first one 
to shoot. He warned that “today there are no Western solutions. The more Israel looks 
exclusively to the West, the less the Soviets will be ready to cooperate. It is essential that the 
four powers should concert their policies”109. Why was De Gaulle so obsessed with four power 
consultation? This stemmed from various reasons, but fundamentally it was tied to his 
aristocratic conception of the international system. As he explained during the Council of 
Ministers on 2 June, “those problems [in the Middle East] cannot be solved internally. They must 
be solved internationally, which implies an agreement between the four [Great Powers]”110. By 
calling for such a meeting, France was only defending its status and its right to take part in the 
settlement of the crisis111. Moreover, the French were convinced that the crisis was of global and 
not local importance, and that the superpowers were hiding behind the belligerents112.
Paris’ hopes for high level talks, however, proved illusory after Moscow turned down the 
offer, and instead proposed that both countries continue their bilateral consultation, which was a 
disappointment for the French President, but better than nothing113. Was it, though, a body blow 
to De Gaulle’s prestige, as suggested by Arthur Goldberg, American ambassador to the UN114? 
This is a slightly overstated assessment. Couve, as he told Bohlen, recognised that Soviet 
behaviour was far from clear and that their aim was probably to reduce Western influence in the
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Middle East, but at least they had expressed a desire to keep individual contact with the Western 
powers. For the American Ambassador, “Couve's general attitude showed [...] that they still are 
hopeful that the Soviets will change their negative attitude and be willing to join in some form of 
negotiations115”. In the meantime, as the crisis continued to escalate and war became more and 
more imminent, France chose to maintain its balanced stance. Thus on 2 June, the government 
solemnly stated its neutrality, expressed its condemnation of whichever state fired the first shot, 
and called again on the Great Powers to settle the crisis116.
The outbreak of war on 5 June temporarily improved the perspectives of high-level 
cooperation. True, French leaders were partly frustrated by the exclusive superpower dialogue in 
the UN, which aimed to agree on a cease-fire resolution, but at least Kosygin and De Gaulle 
maintained a regular contact during the war via the hot line between the Elysee and the 
Kremlin117. Moreover, the reasonable attitude of the superpowers reassured and comforted the 
General in his belief that neither of them wanted the crisis to go too far118. With the threat of a 
major escalation out of the way, the French president saw a chance to push again for a Great 
Power agreement. During the Council of Ministers on 7 June, he argued that the Russians were 
surely embarrassed by their initial refusal of high level talks, and that it was up to France to 
remain “the champion of consultation between the four”119.
After the war ended on 10 June, France believed that it could now attempt to play a 
useful role in the search for peace, thanks to its wise and moderate attitude120. On 14 June, 
France abstained on a Soviet Security Council resolution denouncing Israel as the aggressor, but 
accepted Moscow’s proposal to convene a UN General Assembly121. However, this optimism 
proved short-lived as the positions hardened on all sides, and Paris struggled to keep an influence 
on the course of events. With the communist bloc, except Romania, breaking relations with
115 FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XIX: Document 133,02.06.67
116 DF: PEF, 1966-1967: Official Declaration of Council of Ministers, 02.06.67
117 Vaisse, Maurice, “Les crises de Cuba et du Proche-Orient dans les relations franco-sovietiques”, in Vaisse, De 
Gaulle, p. 161; For the Kosygin-De Gaulle messages, see MAEF : SG, EM, Vol.30
118 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.387: De Gaulle-Nixon meeting, 08.06.67
1,9 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.3. p.278
120 Alphand, L’etonnement, 11.06.67, p.490
121 Vaisse, “Les crises”, in Vaisse, De Gaulle, p.157
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Israel, and the US temporarily cut off from the Arab world, Couve feared the re-emergence of
1 /)9the Cold War in the Middle East . In this atmosphere of growing danger, Gaulle invited 
Kosygin to stop over in Paris for a meeting, before heading to the UN, but the talks were hardly 
very productive. If Kosygin pushed De Gaulle to abandon his neutral stance, the latter remained 
non-committal and instead warned his guest of the dangers of escalation, emphasising the 
potentially disastrous consequences for the superpower rivalry that was, in his view, at the core 
of the conflict123. For the General, the wars in Vietnam and the Middle East, combined with the 
Chinese exploding their first hydrogen bomb on 17 June, were creating a very dangerous 
international context, in which none of the Great Powers were truly in control124. Thus, on 21 
June, in a communique after the Council of Ministers, De Gaulle solemnly denounced Israel for 
starting the conflict in the Middle East, and blamed the spread of war on the American 
intervention in Vietnam, emphasising that only an American withdrawal from Indochina could 
bring a peaceful solution to the current global situation125.
Why did he make this announcement, which really infuriated the Americans? Was it 
because he genuinely feared the prospect of World War Three, and the risk of a confrontation
10 f\between the US and the Soviet Union ? If that was partly his motivation, another factor played 
a key role. De Gaulle wanted to avoid a confrontation between the superpowers, but he equally 
wanted to prevent the polar opposite scenario of the Americans and the Soviets negotiating 
without France. In his memoirs, Harold Wilson noted that during their meeting on 19 June the 
General was very depressed. He supposed that this was linked to the fact that Kosygin had 
virtually bypassed him, and to the rumours of a possible bilateral meeting between the Soviet 
Premier and Lyndon Johnson. As Wolton argues, De Gaulle was probably also trying to 
embarrass the Americans with his declaration, and prevent a superpower rapprochement when
122 FSNP: CM Carton 2: Speech to YAssemblee Nationale, 15.06.67
123 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.387: De Gaulle-Kosygin meeting, 16.06.67
124 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.387: De Gaulle-Wilson meeting, 19.06.67
125 De Gaulle, LNC: XI. Communique at the end of the Council of Ministers, 21.06.67, pp. 119-120
126 Lefort, Souvenirs et secrets, p.193; Charbonnel, Jean, L’ Aventure de la Fidelite. (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1976), 
p.141
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Kosygin and Johnson finally met at Glassboro on 23 June127. This remains to be proven, but it is
interesting to note the shift in French policy away from a strict neutral stance in the aftermath of
the Glassboro summit. Paris acknowledged that the crisis in the Middle East had confirmed the
relative weakness of the Soviet Union in relation to the US on the international scene. Thus,
France sided with the Communist resolution, which called for a strict Israeli withdrawal from the
1 0 8occupied territories, and pressured the Francophone African states to do the same . With its 
relations with Israel already jeopardised, the French President undoubtedly believed that he 
could counter-balance superpower cooperation by siding with the Soviet Union. At the same 
time, he could make sure that the West maintained some influence in the Arab world, and 
prevent an exclusive dialogue between the latter and Moscow129.
The Six Days war shook the world and seriously impacted on the whole of French 
foreign policy. On a basic level, Paris abandoned its balanced position towards the Middle East 
by moving closer to the Arab states, and further away from Israel. Israel felt abandoned and 
cheated by France, but staunch Gaullists have defended the French president’s record by arguing 
he knew all along that Israel would win the war130. Without access to his private papers, though, 
it is hard to give a conclusive answer. More significantly, and on the back of the not so good 
results in the legislative elections of March -  where the Gaullists barely held on to their majority 
in the Assemblee Nationale -  the war in the Middle East undermined the General’s popularity. 
For a start, large sections of the Quai d’Orsay disagreed with his policies and found it hard to 
accept France siding with the Soviet and Arab theses. Furthermore, as Vaisse explains, the 
attitude of the government during the conflict provoked a moral crisis amongst French people -  
more sympathetic to Israel - and marked the beginning of the slow yet significant erosion of De
127 Wilson, Labour Government, p .402,406; Wolton, France sous influence, p.450
128 Vaisse, “Les crises”, in Vaisse, De Gaulle, pp. 159-160
129 Couve, Politique etrangere, p.473
130 D ’Escrienne, Le General, pp.145-146; Gorce, Paul Marie de la, “La politique arabe du General de Gaulle”, in 
Bamavi and Friedlander, Politique etrangfere. p. 188, after visiting the military authorities of Israel and Egypt, Paul 
Marie de la Gorce had no doubt Israel would win any conflict, and he was told that De Gaulle shared this view.
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Gaulle’s popularity131. He certainly realised that a majority of French people supported Israel, as 
he told Wilson, but he did not seem unduly concerned, and justified himself by saying that “you 
do not pursue a policy by following public opinion. Public opinion always ends up following the 
policy, as long as it is good”132.
De Gaulle’s stance on the war did not help relations with allies, starting with West 
Germany. According to the memoirs of Francois Seydoux, French ambassador in Bonn at the 
time, the West Germans were very critical: they “accused [De Gaulle] of having anti-American 
and anti-Israeli feelings. He was also accused of ignoring Germany, seeing it as not worthy 
enough to be associated to global responsibilities”133. Moreover, the conflict also affected 
dynamics within NATO, and strengthened the organisation to the detriment of France. As argued 
by Harlan Cleveland, US ambassador at NATO, after the June Ministerial meeting in 
Luxemburg, “the whole spectrum has discemibly moved over toward pessimism about Soviet 
motivations, so that those Ministers [of the member states of NATO] who spoke of detente in [a] 
hopeful manner, felt constrained to balance their comments with [an] emphasis on maintaining 
the NATO deterrent as well”134.
Last, but certainly not least, the war affected France’s global status. To a certain extent, 
the Kremlin leaders “manipulated” France’s policy of independence for their own comfort in the 
Middle East. It is also possible that the situation in the Middle East, as Wilson told Johnson on 
23 June, forced the General “to accept reality, the lack of influence of France in international 
affairs”135. Undoubtedly, the Glassboro meeting symbolically underlined the continuing 
predominance of the superpowers in international affairs, and certainly strengthened the hands of 
the ‘Americanists’ in the Kremlin who believed Moscow needed to deal in priority with
131 Lefort, Souvenirs et secrets, pp.196-197; Vaisse, La grandeur, pp.353-354, on 13 June, 57% of people were 
happy with De Gaulle’s policies and 12% were unhappy; by 16 July, numbers had dropped to 48% happy and 19% 
unhappy.
,32 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.387: De Gaulle-Wilson meeting, 19.06.67; Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.3. 15.06.67,
p.280
133 Seydoux, Mission Diplomatique, p.96; Vaisse, Maurice, “De Gaulle et Willy Brandt: deux non-conformistes au 
pouvoir”, in Moller, Horst, and Vaisse, Maurice (ed.), Willy Brandt und Frankreich. (Munchen: R. Oldenbourg, 
2005), p.108
134 FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XIB: Document 258, 17.06.67
135 Soutou, Guerre de cinquante ans. p.472; quoted by Roussel, De Gaulle, p.829
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Washington. Moreover, the mix of cooperation, rejection and competition for the favours of the
Arab world only highlighted the ambiguities of the Franco-Soviet cooperation in the Middle 
1East . Yet, it is important not to overstate the impact of the Six Day War. After all, according 
to a CIA analysis and vindicated by Kosygin’s two stops in Paris, “De Gaulle appears to have 
been successful in his efforts to induce Moscow to give consideration to Paris and to prevent
1 '17‘superpowers’ from negotiating without France” . As De Gaulle pointed out about the results 
of Glassboro, “he [Kosygin] and Johnson agreed on nothing”138.
V. Conclusion
By mid-1967, France’s situation was noticeably different than in late 1966, and the 
difficulties of converting status into influence had become painfully clear. In its Westpolitik, and 
despite its best efforts, the question of the British application had created acrimony between 
Paris and its Common Market partners, and tainted the French efforts to maintain solidarity 
between the Six over monetary affairs.
In the field of East-West detente, the picture had become far more complex. The Paris- 
Bonn-Moscow dynamic was facing problems, which were for the moment mostly limited to the 
relations between West Germany and the Eastern bloc. At the same time, the US and the Soviet 
Union were increasingly aware of their need to cooperate, be it over nuclear matters or to deal 
with major international crises, as shown in Glassboro. Finally, the Middle East war had 
painfully confirmed how hard it would be for France to have its voice heard on the international 
scene, and had even undermined De Gaulle’s domestic position.
That said, it would be misleading to suggest that the decline of Gaullist foreign policy 
was already inevitable by the end of the first half of 1967. The fate of both France’s detente
136 Rey, La tentation. p.57
137 LBJL: PP, NSF, Files of the Special Committee of the National Security Council, Box 3: CIA memorandum on 
Middle East, 29.06.67
138 Peyrefitte, C'&ait de Gaulle: vol.3.05.07.67, p.282
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policy in Europe and the negotiations within the Western world were still in the balance. But, it 
is equally fair to say that France appeared in a weaker position and locked in a defensive stance, 
precisely at a time when those key questions were approaching their pinnacle.
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Chapter VI: Illusion of Independence Part 2, Julv-December 1967
I. Introduction
After the euphoria of 1966, the first half of 1967 proved to be a sobering period for 
France, and one in which the difficulties of having a real influence on international affairs had 
become all too apparent. This was true for the Middle East crisis, when France had attempted to 
organise Great Power cooperation, and for its attempts to foster an East-West detente in Europe 
via the Paris-Bonn-Moscow triangle. In addition, the re-emergence of the British question in the 
EEC and the growing domestic opposition to De Gaulle -  as shown by the results of the March 
parliamentary elections and the reaction to the criticism of Israel -  undermined Paris’ position as 
it sought to unite the Six for a series of crucial negotiations within the Western world.
Clearly, France faced tough challenges at the start of the summer 1967. However, its 
situation was by no means desperate. For a start De Gaulle’s trip to Poland, the first visit of a 
Western leader to a satellite state of the Eastern Bloc, offered the French president a great 
opportunity to give renewed impetus to the East-West rapprochement in Europe, and through 
that the possibility to maintain a certain leverage over Bonn. With Germany on board, France 
could still find a way to fulfil its goals in the international monetary negotiations, as long of 
course as it found a way to deal with the British question that was not too divisive.
II. .Tulv-August: A breathing space?
The drop in world tension during the summer 1967, after the heights of the Six Day War 
and the ensuing diplomatic battle at the UN, produced no fundamental change in France’s 
policies towards the Middle East. France continued to refuse to recognise Israel’s territorial 
gains, but also realised from the stalemate in the UN that a negotiated solution to the conflict 
remained unlikely in the short-term. Similarly, De Gaulle stuck to his view according to which
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Egypt’s decision to close the Straits of Tiran had been regrettable, but Israel was still more to 
blame because it had started the war1. The only slight change in the General’s position during 
this period was a growing anger with Israel for not listening to his warnings, and suspicion - not 
to say a conviction - that the latter had in fact been patiently waiting for an opportunity to expand 
its territory2.
It was precisely the condemnation of Israel, which had created internal and external 
opposition to the policies of the French government, but Paris hardly drew lessons from this. 
True, during the Franco-German summit in Bonn, French leaders attempted to clarify their 
policy to their West German allies. De Gaulle explained to Kiesinger that France had 
disapproved of Israel’s actions because it was against war, and not because it wanted to please 
the Soviets. He added that Moscow had condemned Israel for its own reasons3. But, in regard to 
domestic opposition, the General refused to let public opinion dictate his foreign policy choices, 
as he made clear soon after in Montreal.
His provocative call of “Vive le Quebec libre!” on 24 July caused uproar in Canada and 
many parts of the world, even pushing US Ambassador at Paris, Charles Bohlen, to question the 
French President’s sanity4! Yet, far from being senile, De Gaulle had had clear aims with this 
spectacular gesture, as he confided to an aide de camp. He wanted to show that France could “act 
without asking other countries’ opinion, act on its own, independently, according to its own 
conscience”5. In other words, De Gaulle wanted to convince French citizens that an ambitious 
foreign policy, as demonstrated by his recent controversial actions, was the correct path for their 
country. In another justification during a television speech on 10 August, he pointed out that 
France’s energetic action in the service of world peace - according to him widely approved in the
1 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.388: De Gaulle-Hussein meeting, 04.07.67
2 Vaisse, La grandeur, p.640; See also FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XII: Document 74, 12.07.67 for an explanation of De 
Gaulle’s suspicions.
3 MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.31: De Gaulle-Kiesinger meeting, 12.07.67
4 FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XII: Document 76, 27.07.67
5 D ’Escrienne, Le General, p. 107
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world - required an independent stance and could not be affected by “foreign allegiances and the 
episodic impact of public opinion”6.
However, there were undeniable signs that people were not buying this argument. 
According to polls, a majority disapproved of De Gaulle’s positions on Quebec, meaning that for 
the first time, public opinion had expressed serious hostility to two of De Gaulle’s major foreign 
policy initiatives7. As Alphand recognised on 12 August, the President’s popularity was clearly 
being affected by these events8. This widespread questioning of the General’s judgement, 
combined with wider domestic weaknesses when the French government faced Parliamentary 
difficulty, a budget in deficit and the economy in trouble, hardly placed France in an ideal 
position to counter Britain’s renewed push to become a member of the EEC9.
British Foreign Secretary George Brown’s confident speech to the Western European 
Union [WEU] on 4 July, where he explained why his country wanted to join the EEC, was 
symptomatic of a stronger British candidacy. Compared to the first application of 1961-1963, the 
second effort appeared far less hesitant and conditional, and “was approved by the House of 
Commons by a sweeping 488:62 majority, with all three of the main English parties voting for 
EEC membership”10. Moreover in 1967, according to Ludlow, and unlike the first candidacy five 
years earlier, “not only were the Community’s policies that much more solidly established, but 
Britain seemed also to have accepted that the onus of adaptation lay with the applicant and not 
with the existing member states”11. This undermined France’s key argument that enlargement 
would destroy the Community. With the Five responding warmly to Brown’s speech, Paris faced 
an uphill struggle to prevent London from joining the Community without a divisive veto.
6 De Gaulle, DM:V. p.200
7 IFOP, De Gaulle, p.281, in a survey on 4-8 August 1967, 18% approved of De Gaulle’s position on the Quebec 
problem, 45% disapproved, and 37% had no opinion. See also annex 4; Vaisse, La grandeur, p.354; Many Ministers, 
including Pompidou and Couve, also disagreed with the General’s actions, see Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.3, 
pp.338-339, 349
8 Alphand, L’etonnement. p.493
9 Parr, Britain’s policy, p. 163
10 Ludlow, European Community, p. 139
11 Ibid, p. 140
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This was obvious during the EEC Council of Ministers meeting in Brussels on 10-11 July 
when the Six debated enlargement. French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville 
presented an inspired case against enlargement, trying to impress on his interlocutors the wide 
range of obstacles rather than focussing on a single specific reason. He highlighted first the 
consequences for the Community itself, as the addition of new members would create an 
organisation more akin to a wide Atlantic grouping, increasingly unmanageable, and would 
impede the developing detente with the Eastern bloc. To add strength to his argument, he also 
designated the specific problems of the British candidacy, that is to say the weakness of the 
sterling and the deficit of its balance of payments, as well as the incompatibility of British 
agricultural practices with the CAP12. Despite Couve’s great debating skills, it was clear from the 
vigourous refutations of his five counterparts that few of his points had really struck home; both 
sides wanted to prevail, but this July meeting was nevertheless largely devoid of outright 
confrontation; with the memory of the “empty chair” crisis of 1965-1966 still fresh in everyone’s 
mind13. The only conclusion of this meeting was the decision to request by September a report 
from the Commission on the consequences of enlargement for the Community.
This request temporarily pushed the British question to the sidelines, as both sides hoped 
that positions might soften in the autumn by the time of the Commission’s report14. On the 
surface, it also helped to temporarily soothe relations between France and the rest of the Western 
world, combining with certain seemingly positive developments within NATO. Indeed, August 
finally witnessed the signing of the Ailleret-Lemnitzer agreement, which regulated the future 
role of French troops in NATO’s common defence, and France shifted to an annual authorisation 
of overflight of its territory for its fourteen allies, rather than the month-to-month regime 
imposed in May 1966. This timid thaw principally benefited the summer negotiation over the 
international monetary system. It allowed the talks to take place in a more serene environment, 
less affected by linkages with other problems within the Western world, and enabled Paris to
12 FNSP: CM Carton 2: Speech to the European Communities, 10-11.07.67
13 Ludlow, European Community, p. 141
14 Idem
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focus on maintaining the unity of the Six over monetary affairs without having to worry about 
the divisive British factor.
France reaped instant gains from this calmer atmosphere, first at the meeting of the Six 
Financial Ministers in Brussels on 4 July, and more importantly at the G10 meeting in London 
on 17-18 July. In his analysis of the latter meeting, French Minister of Finance Michel Debre 
painted an optimistic picture to De Gaulle. Isolated the previous year at the G10 meeting of The 
Hague, Debre was convinced that France had this time held the Six to a common stance. He 
added that thanks to their cohesion, the Six had virtually obtained a veto over the future use of 
the Special Drawing Rights [SDR], as well as the guarantee that the latter would be subject to a 
real reconstitution, thus giving those drawing rights the characteristics of an international credit, 
rather than those of a new international currency as desired by the United States15.
Debre appeared optimistic, but not to the point that he ignored certain nuances between 
France and its Common Market allies. If all the EEC states wanted a greater say in the decision­
making over the SDR, France seemed more adamant than its partners that this new asset should 
be credit-like, and not money-like16. This difference of opinion hardly deterred Debre from 
pushing ahead, quite the opposite. He realised that any agreement over the international 
monetary system would represent some sort of compromise, but this was fine as long as he 
perceived it as beneficial to France and strengthening the Six’s position within the IMF at the 
expense of the Anglo-Saxon powers17. In addition, as Morse argues, an agreement was facilitated 
by two other factors: four years of debate and the reduction of available liquidity had convinced 
the French that the predicted disasters in the international monetary system were more imminent 
than they had thought, while the conflict between the US and France was partly eased thanks to 
great mediators18. The second G10 meeting in London on 26 August thus ended with an
15 FNSP: 4DE Carton 6: Telegram Debre to De Gaulle, 19.07.67; reconstitution referred to the fact that the drawing 
rights ought to carry a repayment obligation.
16 FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.VIII: Document 136, 02.08.67
17 ANF: 5AG1, Carton 29, Affaires Economiques Conseils Restreints: Note by Secretariat General de la 
Presidence, 23.08.67
18 Morse, Foreign Policy, p.241
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agreement on an outline of a plan that would be presented the following month at the annual IMF 
meeting in Rio. The plan spoke of the creation of a new facility, subject to reconstitution, which 
would require for its implementation an 85% majority of votes within the IMF - in effect giving 
the Six a collective veto as they represented 17% of the votes19.
Yet, it would be misleading to overstate the importance of this agreement and the general 
summer thaw. The London compromise remained very ambiguous and, as Solomon argued, 
hardly justified Debre’s claim that it was “a success for the French thesis” and that “the question 
of creating new money was discarded” 20. Instead, during the debate over the nature of the SDR, 
Otmar Emminger, of the German Bundesbank, accurately defined the facility as a zebra: “one 
could regard it as a black animal with white stripe or as a white animal with black stripes”21. 
More importantly, the vigourous behind-the-scenes rivalry between Paris and Washington for 
Bonn’s loyalty did not stop during the summer lull.
That West Germany would play a decisive role in the various Western negotiations of the 
time was painfully clear during Kiesinger’s summer meetings with De Gaulle and US president 
Lyndon Johnson, and both presidents used similar techniques to swing Kiesinger to their cause. 
Johnson mentioned his confidence in De Gaulle, but added he could not understand why the 
French president sometimes used such a sharp language, while he personally refrained from 
negative statements about the General. De Gaulle, for his part, justified his sharp language 
towards the US as a way of opposing the pro-Atlanticist segments of public opinion. He pointed 
out that France had no aversion to the US, but felt the latter was enormous and could not stop 
being dominant22. Moreover, both Paris and Washington specifically pressured Bonn on the 
question of the international monetary system. US Secretary of the Treasury Henry Fowler 
complained about French obstructionism in the negotiations, praised his own country’s 
compromises, and invited Kiesinger to follow the American lead rather than stick with France.
19 For the text of the agreement, see DF: PEF 1966-1967: Communique after the London G10 meeting, 26.08.67
20 Solomon, Monetary System, p. 142
21 Idem
22 See FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XIII: Document 263, 15.08.67; MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.31: De Gaulle-Kiesinger 
meeting, 13.07.67
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De Gaulle, similarly, emphasised the need for the Six to act in common in the negotiations for 
the international monetary system if they wanted to defend their independence towards the US23.
The West German leaders, always uneasy about having to choose between Paris and 
Washington, were also divided on certain questions, especially on how to successfully push 
Britain’s candidacy to the EEC. If Kiesinger wanted to avoid confrontation with De Gaulle and 
refused to act like a “bulldozer”, Brandt was blunter and warned his American counterpart Rusk 
that a French veto could have serious consequences for Franco-German relations24. The issue of 
the rivalry was therefore still uncertain at this point, but both Paris and Washington had, or felt 
they had, means to influence their ally. The US could always rely on the fact that they 
guaranteed West Germany’s security. On the other hand, and if we are to believe American 
sources, Couve after the Franco-German summit of July “had made it ‘brutally clear’ that 
Germany now had to choose between either forcing the British application for admission [to the 
EEC] or aligning themselves to De Gaulle’s policy of detente”25.
This last, however, produced mixed results during the summer, including the relations 
with the Soviet Union where very little came out of Pompidou’s visit to Moscow between 4 and 
8 July. It is true that on the Vietnam War, the final communique marked the first occasion when
96both countries joined together to call for an end to foreign intervention and bombing . It actually 
coincided with the regularisation of relations between Paris and Hanoi, with Francis de 
Quirielle being accredited as the general French representative in Hanoi rather than an interim 
representative27. But on other topics, the harmony was less obvious, especially on the Middle 
East conflict. Brezhnev praised French policy, but did not hide his disappointment with its 
failure to convince many African states to vote for the same resolutions during the UN debates28. 
Finally on the all-important question of Europe, Kosygin, besides the usual tribute to France’s
23 See FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XV: Document 227, 15.08.67; MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.31: De Gaulle-Kiesinger 
meeting, 13.07.67
24 Compare FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XIII: Document 263, 15.08.67 and FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XV: Document 227, 
15.08.67;
25 LBJL: PP, NSF, SF, Box 48: CIA Memo, 01.08.67
26 NARA: RG59, CFPF, 1967-1969, Box 2102: Stoessel to Rusk, 14.07.67
27 De Quirielle, A Hanoi, p. 195
28 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.388: Pompidou-Brezhnev meeting, 08.07.67
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positive role in East-West relations, appeared very pessimistic as to the chances of progress for 
detente on the continent, and expressed strong mistrust towards Bonn’s Ostpolitik29. In a talk 
with Kiesinger a few days later, Pompidou could only regret the Soviet government’s inability to 
appreciate West Germany’s new overtures30.
In contrast to the lukewarm Franco-Soviet relations, Bonn’s Ostpolitik was going through 
a period of renewed hope. After a couple of months of stalling, the summer brought concrete 
results. As Brandt confided to Rusk, his trip to Romania had been a success, and he was equally 
optimistic about the exchange of trade missions recently negotiated between the Czechs and 
Germans by his personal representative Egon Bahr31. Paris fully welcomed Bonn’s latest 
openings to Eastern Europe. Beside the belief that Bonn was following in France’s footsteps, De 
Gaulle felt that Bonn’s moves towards detente in Europe “can help give a reality to the Europe of 
the Six. It discovers itself through its relations with Eastern Europe”32. Moreover, those changes 
could not have happened at a better time, as De Gaulle prepared for his extremely important trip 
to Poland - originally planned for June but postponed to early September because of the Six Day 
War.
As significant as this trip was, France realised, however, its success would ultimately 
depend on West Germany’s ability to normalise its relations with the states of the Eastern Bloc. 
France needed some flexibility from its ally, and De Gaulle did not hesitate to encourage 
Kiesinger to change his stance on the Oder-Neisse border, because of the massive effect on 
Poland that would ensue . Similarly, Bonn counted on the support of Paris in its quest to break 
the ice with Moscow and the satellite states. In the weeks preceding De Gaulle’s visit, West 
German officials repeatedly lobbied the French government. Manfred Klaiber, West German 
Ambassador to Paris, asked the French president if he could mention the problem of Germany’s
29 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.388: Pompidou-Kosygin meeting 1, 04.07.67
30 MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.31: Pompidou-Kiesinger meeting, 12.07.67
31 FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XV: Document 225, 15.08.67
32 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.3. 09.08.67, p.263
33 MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.31: De Gaulle-Kiesinger meeting, 12.07.67
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post-war borders “in a way that was not too ‘demonstrative’”34. Limburg, a charge d ’affaires in 
the West German Embassy in Paris, reiterated the point in a meeting with Jacques de 
Beaumarchais, the Directeur Politique of the Quai d’Orsay. He also indicated that his 
government would be grateful if France could not only defend Bonn’s Ostpolitik in front of the 
Poles, but also emphasise that West Germany sincerely wanted to improve relations with 
Warsaw35.
Here lay both the crucial challenge and opportunity for France. On the positive side, the 
French government believed it possessed - with this visit to Poland - a trump card in its relations 
with Bonn, one with which it could possibly pressure its ally for cooperation in other political 
fields. On the other hand, the General only possessed a limited margin of action during his trip to 
Poland, as he sought to please all parties. In exchange for his support on the question of the post­
war borders, he hoped that the Polish Communist leaders would show more flexibility on the 
German question and greater independence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Naturally, for fear of 
antagonising Bonn, De Gaulle did not intend to become too close to the Poles, and so he 
categorically rejected Polish proposals to sign a Franco-Polish treaty ; nor could he afford to 
push Warsaw too far on the path of independence, for fear of angering Moscow.
III. September-October: Times of Tension
As pointed out by Couve, going to Poland was part of the plan “to disengage Europe 
from the bloc system and to accentuate the opening of Eastern Europe, while still recognising the 
post-war borders”37. Besides promoting French prestige and strengthening Franco-Polish 
relations, the trip mostly sought to provide additional impetus to the rapprochement between 
Western and Eastern Europe.
34 MAEF: Europe, Pologne 1966-1970, Vol.2500: Seydoux to Couve, Telegram number 4890-4893,05.09.67
35 MAEF: Europe, Pologne 1966-1970, Vol.2500: Note of De Beaumarchais, 18.08.67
36 ANF: 5AG1, Carton 182, Pologne: Note by Tricot, 23.08.67. Jan Druto, Polish Ambassador at Paris, first 
broached the subject of a treaty on 11.08.67 during a conversation with Bernard Tricot, the Secretaire General de 
V Ely see [see MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.31]
37 Peyrefitte, C’etait De Gaulle: vol.3, 06.09.67, p.293
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Despite giving a warm reception to the General, Polish leaders, especially Secretary 
General of the Communist Party Wladislaw Gomulka, proved incredibly stubborn and inflexible 
on both European issues and Germany. If De Gaulle stated that security in Europe could only 
exist through detente and entente between states rather than through the futile opposition 
between two blocs, Gomulka firmly and publicly rejected this vision, presenting the alliance with 
the Soviet Union as the “cornerstone of Polish foreign policy”38. Similarly in private talks, De 
Gaulle made his plea in favour of German reunification, calling the current situation abnormal 
and warning that European states would remain the pawns of superpower rivalries as long as 
they did not act in common. But, Gomulka proved again uncompromising and unresponsive. He 
pointed out that the Polish policy towards Germany was not only more dogmatic than the Soviet 
policy but also the only good policy. He added that France should not expect concessions from 
Poland on that subject39.
Privately, the French president felt somewhat frustrated with the limited results of his 
visit. During the first Council of Ministers after his return, he poured scorn on a Polish 
government that “barely remembers Poland is in Europe”40. Nonetheless, this did not prevent De 
Gaulle and his aides from considering the trip as a breakthrough. Taking the long-term view, 
they undoubtedly believed that France had connected with the Polish people, providing 
momentum for their struggle to liberalise their regime and gain more independence from 
Moscow41. As De Gaulle confided to Alain Peyrefitte, his then Minister for Education: “I know 
those regimes [in Eastern Europe] are totalitarian. But I am sowing grains which maybe, with 
others, will blossom in twenty or thirty years. I will not see them blossom. You might. The 
young Poles of today will rattle the Soviet rule. It is written on the walls”42. Thus, despite a 
certain setback in Poland, De Gaulle refused to give up on a policy to which he was greatly
38 DF: PEF, 1966-1967: De Gaulle and Gomulka’s speeches to the Polish Diet, 11.09.67
39 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.388: De Gaulle-Gomulka meeting, 11.09.67
40 Peyrefitte, C’etait De Gaulle: vol.3. 13.09.67, p.298
41 Salgo, Laszlo, DGESS V. p.478
42 Peyrefitte, C’etait De Gaulle: vo l.l, 09.09.67, p.47
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attached43. For him, nothing could stop the inexorable march towards East-West detente in 
Europe.
That said, not all observers shared his optimism. Le Monde argued that while the trip had 
produced some interesting results, it had also underlined the limits of Gaullist policy. The 
Eastern Europe states applauded French policy when it weakened Western solidarity, but their 
leaders quickly ran away when asked to follow France’s footsteps44. This damning assessment 
would turn out to be all too accurate, and many authors have singled out the trip to Poland as a 
turning point in De Gaulle’s attempts to foster East-West detente in Europe45.
In the same way, there is no consensus when assessing to what extent De Gaulle’s own 
actions in Poland were responsible for provoking the backlash against French policy. For Vaisse, 
De Gaulle’s speech to the Polish Diet was perhaps less blatant than the famous speeches in 
Quebec or Phnom Penh, but it was equally clear in its calls for Poland to adopt France’s 
independent model; for Rey, this call for “revolt” undoubtedly worried the Soviet leaders46. 
Thierry Wolton, though, offers a very different interpretation on the trip, describing it as an 
embarrassment for De Gaulle and his supporters. After the speeches of Phnom Penh and the 
Quebec scandal, “it was hard to find equivalents in the speeches in Poland which would credit 
the idea that De Gaulle maintained a good equilibrium between his policy towards the East and 
his policy towards the West”. Roussel agrees, pointing out that De Gaulle showed at best a very 
moderate attitude towards the socialist world and lacked conviction when criticising the policy of 
blocs in the Polish Diet47.
Yet, if both views are to a certain extent correct, they also ignore the central point. De 
Gaulle’s calls for greater Polish independence from Moscow certainly remained fairly lacklustre 
and cryptic. On one occasion, for example, he invited Poland to “look a bit further, a bit bigger” 
and pointed out that “obstacles that seem insurmountable today, you [Poland] will overcome
43 Rey, La tentation. p.61
44 MAEF: Europe, Pologne 1966-1970, Vol.2500: Le Monde article, 13.09.67
45 See Lacouture, De Gaulle: vol.3, p.541; or Durandin, France contre l'Amerique. p. 101
46 Vaisse, La grandeur, p.439; Rey, La tentation. p.61
47 Wolton, France sous influence, p.439; Roussel, De Gaulle, pp.843-844
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without doubt. You know what I am referring too”48. But, the master of the Elysee could neither 
afford nor did he want to cause the same shock as with the speeches in Phnom Penh and Quebec. 
De Gaulle went to Poland with the idea of furthering the cause of East-West detente in Europe. 
In order to do so, he needed to keep Poland, West Germany and the Soviet Union happy and on 
board, a feat only possible through nuance and a tight balancing act. The real problem for 
France, however, was that for all its clear strategy, it lacked persuasive tactics. If De Gaulle gave 
the Poles satisfaction on the question of post-war borders and shied away from major criticism of 
the Soviet Union, he only met in exchange with serious Polish inflexibility on the German 
question and thus had little to show for Bonn. After the trip to Poland, the challenge for France 
was both simple and daunting: what could France do to keep the momentum of detente going 
once the Eastern Bloc started to adopt a more rigid attitude?
Sadly for the General, the situation hardly improved in the following months, as France’s 
policy of East-West detente in Europe faced ever growing difficulties. It was certainly not the 
case that the policy lost all its impetus straightaway. The process of consultation and mutual 
visits with the countries of the Eastern Bloc continued unabated for the rest of 1967. To mention 
a few examples, the Czech President Josef Lenart visited Paris in October 1967, and French 
Chief of Staff General Charles Ailleret visited Moscow the same month. Nevertheless, these 
regular contacts could not hide the fact that relations between France and the Eastern Bloc states 
were being played out in a far more tense and mistrustful atmosphere.
Both the growing rigidity and Soviet attempts to restore discipline within the Eastern 
Bloc played a central role in impeding France’s policy. As some of the satellite states showed 
less flexibility, so the tone towards France became less lenient. In an article on 13 September 
Prace, the organ of the Czech syndicates, praised De Gaulle’s visit to Poland, but also sent an 
explicit advice to the French President:
48 MAEF: Europe, Pologne 1966-1970, Vol.2500: De Gaulle speech in Westerplatte, 10.09.67; Note that the Polish 
Embassy in Paris complained about this speech, describing it as improper, according to Jarzabek, Wanda, 
“Rozmowa Charlesa de Gaulle’a z Wladyslawem Gomulka w czasie wizyty generala w Polsce we wrzesnu 1967 r” 
(“The four eyes conversation between Charles de Gaulle and Wladislaw Gomulka during the General’s visit to 
Poland, September 1967”), Dzieje Najnowsze (The Journal), Vol.32/4 (2000), p.152;
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The noble words of De Gaulle did not fool the sharp observer when it came to the 
little diplomatic subtleties by which he tried to tell his interlocutors about the need to 
express stronger national feelings. De Gaulle would obviously welcome what in the 
West they describe - in the relations between socialist states - as the ‘policy of 
independence’ towards the Soviet Union. It is also why there are some differences of 
opinions between France and Poland on the German problem49.
Like Gomulka, the journal wanted to reaffirm the solidarity between the socialist states and the 
Soviet Union, and warn De Gaulle that they welcomed French policy only inasmuch as it did not 
attempt to threaten this link.
Moreover, France’s detente policy further faltered as Franco-Soviet relations suffered 
from Moscow’s hardening stance on European affairs and its mistrust of French intentions. 
Officially, the Soviets welcomed De Gaulle’s trip to Poland, and Zorin was quick to point out to 
De Gaulle that “Moscow considers your trip to Poland as a major contribution to the developing 
normalisation of European relations”50. Privately, they held a different view. The Soviet leaders 
were content with the Franco-Polish rapprochement, but were unhappy with the grandiose 
reception given to the General because they feared it could reinforce anticommunist movements 
in Poland. Despite Gomulka’s inflexibility, they were also worried by French attempts to 
underline Poland’s national differences vis-a-vis the Soviet Union51.
The Soviets were mistrustful, especially of West Germany, and far more interested in the 
status quo52. As such, during talks with their French counterparts, Soviet officials -  as well as 
other Eastern European statesmen -  mainly focused on the question of a European security 
conference and a possible Franco-Soviet pact. Any such conference would naturally confirm the 
status quo in Europe, and as a bonus the Soviets could exploit the conference in order to 
jeopardise Western solidarity. Zorin not so subtly suggested to De Gaulle that April 1969, in 
other words the date of the revision of the North Atlantic Treaty, could constitute a favourable 
period to consider the question of European security in a different manner than through military
49 MAEF: Europe, Pologne 1966-1970, Vol.2500: Note of Sous Direction Europe Orientate, 18.10.67
50 MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.32: Zorin-De Gaulle meeting, 04.10.67
51 Vassilieva, Natalia, “L’URSS et le developpement des relations de la France avec les pays d’Europe de l’Est 
(Pologne et Roumanie)”, in Vaisse, De Gaulle, pp.207-208
52 Couve, Politique etrangere. p.281
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blocs53. Similarly, the insistence with which Zorin pushed for a Franco-Soviet pact worried 
Alphand, leading him to think that Moscow was seeking nothing else apart from detaching 
France further from its Allies in the Western world54. At the same time, the Soviets remained 
deaf to the French calls for greater flexibility on the issue of East-West detente in Europe. De 
Gaulle pleaded with Zorin for Moscow to try and improve its relations with Bonn, as it would 
have a vital impact in advancing the cause of detente, but such calls seemed to have little 
effect55.
If the French government was not oblivious to the difficulties encountered by its policy 
of detente in late 1967, it did not appear unduly worried by the situation. Couve, for one, 
complained to Brandt about the rigidity of Soviet policy, and the general immobilism in both 
East-West affairs and within NATO. But, he added that immobilism was an easier position to 
adopt, at least in the short term56.West German officials shared this outlook but not French 
optimism. After the minor successes of the summer, Ostpolitik appeared once again at a 
standstill in the face of the rigidity and inflexibility of some of the states of the Eastern Bloc, 
especially Poland and East Germany. During the meeting of West German representatives in 
Eastern Europe in Bonn on 4-5 December 1967, they agreed that except with Yugoslavia, West 
German diplomacy could expect no key development with the satellite states in 1968 . This 
assessment did not escape Alphand who complained that: “Everything is at a dead end: West 
Germany is not accepting either the post-war borders or the existence of East Germany, the 
Soviets prefer the status quo, and Brandt still persists with the search for detente with Eastern 
Europe58.
Such dejection was not without consequences for Franco-German relations. De Gaulle’s 
declarations in Poland on the irreversible nature of the post-war borders had already created
53 MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.32: Zorin-De Gaulle meeting, 04.10.67
54 MAEF: Europe, URSS 1966-1970, Vol.2666: Alphand-Zorin meeting, 20.09.67
55 See MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.32: De Gaulle-Zorin meeting, 04.10.67
56 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.389: Couve-Brandt meeting, 17.10.67
57 MAEF: Europe, Allemagne 1961-1970, V ol.1545: Seydoux to Couve, Telegram number 6543-6547, 09.12.67
58 Alphand, L'etonnement, 22.10.67, p.494
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controversy in the West German press, and contributed to the relative loss of popularity of the 
French president in Germany59. Furthermore, the problems also spread to Ostpolitik as a whole. 
With the latter’s lack of progress, it was an easy step for many within Germany to question the 
usefulness of the Paris-Bonn link, considering how France’s aid had not enabled the German 
government to achieve its aims, and then call for more support for British entry into the EEC60.
Yet, it is easy to overstate this point. While favourable in principle to Britain joining the 
EEC, Kiesinger made it clear that he opposed the idea of forcing France on the issue of Britain. 
Stability in the Federal Republic’s European and Atlantic bonds, as Ludlow mentioned, was a 
precondition for any new Ostpolitik61. The real danger was that with the stalling process of East- 
West detente, France risked losing its perceived trump card over Bonn, and so find itself in even 
less of a position to guarantee the latter’s cooperation in other political domains, especially 
Western affairs. This was particularly problematic in a period when the crucial Western 
negotiations were fast approaching their climax.
The summer respite within the Western world came to a crashing end in September. This 
was evidently the case for NATO, rocked by increasing speculation as to whether France would 
continue its membership of the North Atlantic Treaty after 196962. Paris’ intentions were unclear, 
but there was no doubt about its animosity towards NATO. De Gaulle was already furious that 
he had not been consulted over the decision to restore an annual authorisation for over flights . 
But, Paris’ hostility increasingly centred on the Harmel exercise.
Prior to the autumn of 1967, France had paid little attention to the Harmel discussions, 
and even late in July, officials noted the limited progress of the four sub-groups composing the 
report, as well as their very provisional conclusions64. However, this changed from September 
onwards as the exercise reached its critical phase, and French dissatisfaction threatened to turn
59 Seydoux, Mission Diplomatique, p. 101
60 MAEF: Europe, Allemagne 1961-1970, Vol.1608: Note of Sous-Direction Europe Centrale, 22.11.67
61 Ludlow, European Community, p. 143
62 NARA: RG59, CFPF, 1967-1969, Box 2102: Leddy to Rusk, 11.09.67
63 De Gaulle, LNC: XI. De Gaulle to Pompidou, 15.09.67, p. 134. According to Jean de la Grandville, then Director 
of the Quai d ’Orsay’s Service des Pactes, the French note of 31 August to the NATO embassies had not been 
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64 MAEF: Pactes 1961-1970, Vol.276: Note 348 o f French delegation to North Atlantic Council, 20.07.67
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into all-out opposition65. By early October, the French government had finally received all four 
reports drafted by the sub-groups, and woken up to the challenge of the Harmel exercise. Two of 
the reports in particular -  from the second sub group on inter-allied relations headed by Paul- 
Henri Spaak and the fourth one on NATO’s relations with the outside world headed by Professor 
Patijn -  appeared as real pleas against French policy, and therefore totally unacceptable from 
Paris’ point of view66.
The friction in NATO coincided with the erosion of the fragile consensus over the 
international monetary system. True, there was still enough good will to produce a general 
agreement at the IMF’s annual meeting in Rio: the Fund’s Executive Directors were asked to 
submit a report by 31 March 1968 that proposed amendments for the activation of the SDR and 
new rules for the running of the IMF67. Even Debre initially expressed satisfaction with the 
agreement, even if accompanied with several caveats. He warned his colleagues that the SDR 
could only be activated on certain preconditions, such as the reserve currency states eliminating 
their balance of payments deficits, and if the creation of the drawing rights took place in parallel 
with a reform of the IMF rules that gave the Six more weight68. But the Rio accord was vague 
and did not mark the end of negotiations over the international monetary system.
The SDR could not become effective as long as there remained basic differences between 
France and others. As Solomon explains, “some of the semantic compromises in the [Rio] 
outline had to be unmasked if the new language was to be clear and operational”69. Furthermore, 
Debre’s optimism was slowly giving way to rising suspicion. Only a few days after the London 
meeting in late August, he was already writing to his American counterpart Fowler, complaining 
that some of his recent declarations went against the agreed compromise70. His doubts only 
worsened after the Rio meeting. Initially pleased with the results of Rio, Debre quickly changed
65 Bozo, Frederic, “Detente versus Alliance: France, the United States and the politics of the Harmel Report, 1964- 
1968”, Contemporary European History, Vol.7/3 (1998), p.352
66 MAEF: Pactes 1961-1970, Vol.276: Note du Service des Pactes, 05.10.67
67 For the agreement see DF: PEF, 1966-1967: Resolutions adopted in Rio, 29.09.67
68 FNSP: 4DE Carton 73: Speech at the IMF Rio meeting, 26.09.67
69 Solomon, Monetary System, p. 143
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his mind when his collaborators mentioned the ambiguity of the agreement and the Anglo- 
Saxons’ desire to break the unity of Common Market Ministers71. In particular, there was great 
disappointment with Italian Finance Minister Emilio Colombo, who had tended to break with 
fellow Europeans and dismiss the link between the study on SDR and the one on the IMF’s 
reform72.
The question of Six unity became even more urgent when the British question resurfaced 
through the Commission’s Opinion of 29 September. As Parr explains, the Commission’s 
Opinion largely supported the principle of enlargement and recommended the opening of 
negotiations, but it still raised doubts about the strength of the sterling . It seemed as if France 
had managed to “make explicit links between the balance of payments and the reserve role of 
sterling, so drawing a clear political picture of a country whose extra-European obligations 
would render a European role difficult”. Moreover, the Opinion had also “pointed out that 
Britain’s extra-European interests would make it difficult for the UK to side with the Six in IMF 
talks”74. But, those arguments on sterling notwithstanding, the general tone of the Opinion truly
i
emphasised how much the debate on enlargement had changed since 1961-63. If the 
Commission had been lukewarm towards the first British application and sympathetic to the 
French efforts to defend the Community, it had by 1967 completely changed its position and was 
now prepared “to use its avis as a means of putting further pressure on the French to allow talks 
with the British, Danes, Irish and Norwegians to begin”75.
The uncomfortable reality was that in October 1967 France was battling simultaneously 
on three fronts, and on questions of some importance for the future of the Western world. This 
situation appeared in some ways similar to the one in late 1962, at the time of the first British 
application and Kennedy’s “Great Partnership” proposal. There were, however, crucial 
differences in respect to France. If De Gaulle’s domestic position had been strengthened in late
71 Debre, Memoires IV. p. 172
72 FNSP: 4DE Carton 6: Debre to Burin des Roziers, 02.10.67
73 Parr, Britain's policy, p. 164
74 Ibid, p. 165
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1962 by victories in the referendum and legislative election, five years later he faced a 
significant public opposition to his policies.
Furthermore, France was also in a weaker position in the respective negotiations. 
Towards NATO, France realised that the Harmel exercise offered an opportunity for the US to 
both strengthen the unity of the Atlantic Alliance and to lead the process of detente, thereby 
undermining the French impact in the East-West dimension. Yet, because it took De Gaulle’s 
ideas on detente, France would find itself in clear contradiction with its own policies should it
7 ( \distance itself from the conclusions of the analysis . Similarly, under strong Anglo-Saxon 
pressure in monetary affairs, Paris’ Five partners in the Common Market were slowly accepting 
the idea that the SDR could become the outline of a real international currency detached from
77gold, as opposed to a system of international credit . As for the British question, Paris had rarely 
been isolated in the 1961-1963 talks and its arguments had often appeared as perfectly legitimate 
attempts to defend the Community. In the 1967 negotiations, however, it found itself far more 
isolated than it had ever been before January 1963, and the veneer of respectability seemed to be
7 0
almost missing from its case against enlargement .
Finally, France had to confront the challenge of interdependence. If its goals in the 
various negotiations were quite clear, what tactic could it adopt to fulfill its objectives on all 
fronts, and still avoid some inherent contradictions? Indeed, France wanted to maintain the unity 
of the Six to push through a reform of the international monetary system, while also opposing the 
Harmel exercise and blocking British entry into the EEC, two goals inimical to the interests of its 
Common Market partners. Any success in their Westpolitik would require a remarkable juggling 
act from De Gaulle and his government.
In October, France still chose to avoid an all-out confrontation on the Harmel exercise, 
surely with an idea of maintaining cohesion between the six member states of the EEC. Instead,
76 Bozo, Deux Strategies, p. 174
77 Prate, Les Batailles, p.225
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it quickly adopted the carrot and stick approach so as to limit the impact of the exercise. On the 
one hand, during a meeting with Secretary General of NATO Manlio Brosio, De Gaulle sent a 
clear warning to his Allies. While reaffirming France’s loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance and its 
likely adherence to the Treaty after 1969, he stated that any attempts to “transform the Atlantic 
Alliance” or to turn the Atlantic Alliance into a political organisation designed “to control and 
direct East-West relations” - an oblique reference to the Harmel exercise - might force France to
7Qact otherwise . At the same time, France tried to coordinate its policy with West Germany and 
convince them that the Harmel exercise should not be too ambitious. Couve insisted to Brandt 
that it was a purely academic report, and as such should not attempt to define a common foreign 
policy for all NATO states80.
The best tactic to block the British candidacy appeared far less obvious. As Parr explains, 
De Gaulle at this point preferred not to resort to a veto and on 5 October, he made the very 
unusual move of summoning Patrick Reilly, British Ambassador at Paris, for a private meeting. 
He “urged Reilly to convince the British to drop the whole venture [candidacy to the EEC], 
arguing that the negotiations could not work and so there was no point in embarking upon 
them”81. This uncertainty was even more in evidence during the fascinating top-level meeting 
that took place a few days later, involving only De Gaulle, Debre, Pompidou, Couve and French 
Permanent Representative to the EEC Jean-Marc Boegner. All participants agreed on the need to 
prevent Britain’s membership and to avoid the opening of negotiations, but they could not agree 
on a definite tactic82. However, external circumstances were to come to the rescue.
Back in September, Debre had suggested closer ties between the policies towards the 
negotiations on the international monetary system and the ones towards Britain’s candidacy. He 
believed that in view of the weakness of the sterling, Britain could not possibly ask for full 
membership to the EEC, and that the safeguard of its currency depended on a reform of both the
79 LBJL: PP, NSF, AF, Box 36: Cleveland to Rusk, Telegram number 5,15.10.67
80 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.389: Couve-Brandt meeting, 17.10.67
81 Parr, Britain's policy, p. 167
82 ANF: 5AG1, Carton 29, Affaires Economiques Conseils Restreints: Conseil sur les Affaires Economiques et 
Financieres, 16.10.67
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IMF and the current international monetary practices83. Similarly, De Gaulle believed that the 
sterling balances were a millstone around Britain’s neck, and that the would-be EEC member 
state would not be able to distinguish between its international and national balance of payments. 
Once inside the EEC, this meant that they would surely resort to Article 108 of the Rome Treaty. 
Additionally, the General felt that the Americans were able to exert pressure on Britain because 
of the weakness of sterling, meaning it was yet again a Trojan horse84. Thus, with the help of the 
Commission’s Opinion and the autumn speculation over sterling, criticism of the British 
currency became the motto of French diplomacy85.
This shift became very evident at the EEC Council of Ministers of 23-24 October. 
Compared to the impressive number of obstacles he listed at the July Council, Couve this time 
primarily focussed on Britain’s economic problems, arguing that London needed to “completely 
transform its monetary situation and monetary system” and “turn the pound into a national 
currency” . Besides the fact this argument sought to “kill two birds with one stone”, by vetoing 
British membership and calling for London to end sterling’s role as a reserve currency, it 
presented an additional advantage as Couve explained during the French Council of Ministers of 
25 October. France had presented the problem as a debate over whether Britain was in a state or 
not to join the Common Market. This placed the onus on Britain to prove itself, rather than leave 
the whole weight of the decision on France87. Yet, Couve’s optimism was not shared by all. For 
Alphand, the next crisis would occur when the other Common Market partners realised that 
France saw as “pointless the opening of any negotiations with Britain”88.
IV. November-December: Denouement
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Publicly and privately, France continued to portray enlargement as dangerous for the 
Community and repeated their two preconditions before any opening of talks with Britain: the 
Six would have to agree on the problems presented by London’s membership, while Britain 
would need to put its economy back in order, implying an equilibrium in its balance of payments 
and a solution to its monetary difficulties89. Couve continued to link the British membership with 
the monetary negotiations as he repeated the passage of the Commission’s Opinion that stated “it 
is hard to imagine how, after a British entry, this currency [sterling] could continue to play a 
different role than the currencies of the other EEC states within the international monetary 
system”90.
Despite all those efforts, Paris’ case really failed to convince its Common Market 
partners as the Five largely resisted the French preconditions. They agreed that the reserve role 
of sterling could cause problems, but they did not believe that this should deter negotiations91. 
But more importantly, the British question had another very obvious impact on France as it 
undermined the other goals of its Western policy. In particular, London’s second application 
seemed to distract French attention away from NATO, as the Harmel exercise approached its
92final stages .
While the French government had settled on a relatively defensive tactic so as to limit its 
scope, other states -  especially the US and Belgium -  were equally very active behind-the-scenes 
and they sought to give a real value to the exercise on the future of the Alliance. Rusk, and his 
Belgian counterpart Pierre Harmel, realised that French obstruction created a dilemma: a report 
adjusted to French sensibilities could end up empty in content, while one which was too honest 
one could give De Gaulle a pretext for withdrawal from the Alliance93. Nonetheless, they rapidly 
settled on a two-fold strategy to overcome this quandary. On the one hand, they would quietly
89 MAEF: Direction Economique, Papiers Jean-Pierre Brunet 1966-1974, Vol.53: Brunet-Lahr meeting, 02.11.67
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spread the word to other allies about their determination to see the exercise through, so as to 
build up the unity of the Fourteen in the face of French objections. On the other hand, they 
would also try to keep the French authorities on board by sounding them out quietly, and in a 
way that did not engage their prestige94.
This strategy ultimately fulfilled its aim by isolating the French during the November 
meetings of the Special Group on the Future of the Alliance. Roger Seydoux, French Permanent 
Representative to NATO, vigourously defended his country’s views in the first meeting on 7-8 
November, denying that the organisation could act as an agent of detente and initially opposing 
the proposed procedural format for the report that would mark the end of the Harmel exercise95. 
Confronted with a determined and united group of fourteen states he had, however, little choice 
in the end but agree to their favoured procedural approach: Brosio was instructed to draft a report 
that would be submitted at a second meeting scheduled on 22-23 November96.
Seydoux was equally unsuccessful on the content of the report. Having managed to reject 
the previous seven drafts, he tried to remove from the eighth one all formulations that were 
incompatible with Gaullist views, especially in regards to harmonisation of policies between 
NATO states. Yet, his efforts were far from successful in the face of a hardened opposition from 
the Fourteen, even if they did their best not to completely alienate France97. As the American 
Permanent Representative Harlan Cleveland summed up: “the broad consensus on key issues 
which began to take form in [the] subgroup sessions has begun to be converted into Alliance 
doctrine” and, “confronted by this momentum, France appears to have made [the] decision that it 
prefers the embarrassment of compromises to the risk of rejection”98.
The determination and unity shown by the Fourteen, combined with public opinion, thus 
significantly reduced France’s margin of action. It also convinced Paris that it should avoid a
94 FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XIII: Document 268,04.10.67
95 MAEF: Pactes 1961-1970, Vol.277: Seydoux to Couve, Telegrams number 459-462,08.11.67
96 FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XIII: Document 275,09.11.67
97 MAEF: Pactes 1961-1970, Vol.277: Seydoux to Couve, Telegrams number 673-675, 24.11.67; Note Pierre 
Harmel also tried to appease the French directly, taking into account some of their comments, as he pointed out 
during an interview, Brussels, 02.04.04;
98 FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XIII: Document 277, 23.11.67
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complete break with its NATO allies, at a time when it risked acute isolation from its Five 
Common Market partners over the possibility of a new veto of the British candidacy to the 
EEC99. That said, the compromise on the Harmel report represented more of a tactical choice 
than an actual capitulation. Realising it could not gain full satisfaction on both fronts, France 
gave priority to the EEC over NATO. Apart from the fact the EEC offered a more promising 
ground for its goals, Paris believed that by accepting the Harmel report, it could avoid further 
antagonising its Five partners as it sought to block London’s application to the European 
Community. Far from bowing down, the French government wanted to go on the offensive, and 
it was not long before it found an opening: on 18 November, Britain finally devalued the pound.
Without doubt, De Gaulle had always intended to prevent British membership into the 
European Community, but the devaluation of sterling provided a convenient excuse -  much like 
the Nassau agreement in December 1962 -  to deliver a swift veto. During his press conference 
on 27 November, the General stressed the incompatibility between the Common Market and the 
British economy, agriculture and restrictions on free movement of capital. He particularly 
emphasised the gap between the Common Market and “the state of the pound sterling as 
highlighted, once again, by its devaluation [...]; with the state of the pound sterling also which, 
combined with its role as an international currency and the enormous external debts weighing on 
it, would not enable it right now to be part of the solid, connected, confident society where the 
franc, the mark, the lira, the florin and the Belgian franc are united”; at best De Gaulle would 
only offer association because accepting Britain into the EEC would lead to “the breaking up of 
a community which, was built and works according to rules that can not accept such a 
monumental exception”100.
The devaluation of sterling also allowed the French authorities to challenge the 
international monetary system. In a matter of days, the speculators who had brought down one
99 IFOP, De Gaulle, p.79, in a survey on 25 September-2 October, only 12% were in favour of leaving the Atlantic 
Alliance, 54% wanted France to stay in the Alliance, and 34% had no opinion. Bozo, “Detente versus Alliance”, 
pp.354-355
100 De Gaulle, DM:V. p.243
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reserve currency began to turn their attention to the other one, the dollar. In the week between 20 
and 27 November, the gold pool -  the arrangement among eight countries, including US, to sell 
or buy gold in free market in order to keep it close to the official price of $35 -  lost an 
unprecedented $641M101. Those questions became even more pronounced when it became public 
knowledge that France had secretly withdrawn from the gold pool102. While France had in fact 
left in June, Paul Fabra, a financial journalist from Le Monde with close ties to the Gaullist 
government, chose the week after the devaluation to announce that Paris had dropped out from 
the pool103. Furthermore, during his press conference, the French president launched another 
scathing attack on the dollar, condemning the fact that the US balance of payments deficit 
favoured American investments abroad, and seemed to welcome the current difficulties of the 
reserve currencies: “it is possible that the current storm, for which France is not responsible, and 
which swept away the exchange rate of the pound and is now threatening the dollar’s rate, will 
lead in the end to the restoration of an international monetary system based on immutability, 
impartiality, and universality, which are the characteristics of gold”104.
The veto against Britain and the denunciation of the international monetary system were 
the most significant elements, but certainly not the only important parts of De Gaulle’s very 
provocative press conference. The French president wanted to use the opportunity to settle some 
domestic scores. Besides explaining his attitude in Montreal, the General decided to address 
again the conflict in the Middle East. It has to be said that French policy had already shown signs 
of hardening in the autumn, and became more obviously sympathetic to the Arab states -  as 
testified by the various visits of Saudi and Kuwaiti princes in this period105; De Gaulle, though, 
went a step further in his press conference. Referring to the Jewish people as a “peuple d ’elite,
101 See Roy, Raj, “The Battle for Bretton Woods: America, Britain and the International Financial Crisis o f October 
1967-March 1968”, Cold War History, 2/2 (2002), p.47; Kunz, “American Economic Consequences”, in Fink, 
Gassert, and Junker, 1968, p.95
102 Solomon, Monetary System, p. 114
103 Gavin, Gold, Dollars, and Power, p. 171; TNA: PREM 13/1856: Paris to FO, Telegram number 1161, 21.11.67
104 De Gaulle, DM:V, p.231
105 Roussel, De Gaulle, p.845
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sur de lui-meme et dominateur”, he regretted the fact that since 1956 Israel had transformed 
itself into a belligerent country, determined at all costs to expand its territory106.
Thus, like his press conference of 14 January 1963, the French President had hoped to 
turn the November 1967 speech into another spectacular knock out blow, and it did not fail to 
produce strong reactions. For example Rusk mentioned to Charles Lucet, French Ambassador in 
Washington, the great emotion that arose in American public opinion because of De Gaulle’s 
declarations on Israel, Quebec and the dollar, and confessed “never had US-French relations, 
according to him, reached such a cold and hostile point”107. Yet, Paris pursued this offensive line 
in the aftermath of the press conference. In monetary matters, if we are to believe a CIA report of 
March 1968, France sought to further fan the speculative flames by leaking unsettling financial 
news to the press and by encouraging other countries, especially China, Algeria and other 
Communist states, to convert their dollars into gold108. The situation was so tense that President 
Johnson went as far as to complain to Senator Mike Mansfield about “the desire of the French 
and Soviets ‘and all of our enemies’ to get US gold and bring the dollar down”109.
At the same time, General Ailleret caused major uproar with an article in the December 
1967 issue of Revue de Defense Nationale. Nicely timed with the Harmel report and adoption of 
flexible response by NATO, Ailleret’s article stated that the French force defrappe must not be 
“oriented in a direction, against an a priori enemy, but must be capable of intervening 
everywhere, or be tous azimuts”\ a strategic doctrine that the US and others interpreted as a 
possible declaration of French military neutrality110. French Minister for armed forces Pierre 
Messmer, confessing that he had authorised the publication of the article -  or in effect 
confirming De Gaulle’s hand in this -  argued to American officials that the main purpose of 
Ailleret’s piece was to convince French public opinion about the value of an independent nuclear
106 De Gaulle, DM:V. pp.232-233
107 MAEF: Amerique, Etats-Unis 1964-1970, Vol.577: Lucet to Couve, Telegrams number 6405-6408, 07.12.67
108 LBJL: PP, NSF, CO, Box 174: CIA Intelligence Memorandum, 20.03.68
109 See footnote 6 of FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.Vni: Document 158, 15.12.67
110 Bozo, Deux Strategies, pp. 183-184
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capability111. But it is hard to disagree with Bozo’s assessment that the tous azimuts doctrine 
mostly sought to highlight French difference within the Atlantic Alliance, and to transpose to the 
strategic field the refusal of the bloc logic112. Finally, and certainly not the least important, 
France successfully ended the British application to join the European Community during the 
EEC Council of Ministers on 18-19 December. If the Five and the Commission had wanted to 
start negotiations with the candidates, France imposed its will because any decision on
113enlargement required unanimity .
Like in January 1963, France took bold measures to proclaim its independence and Great 
Power status, and prevented Britain from joining the Common Market. That is, however, as far 
as the parallel goes between those two periods. The diplomatic offensive of November- 
December 1967 was, more than anything else, a sign of weakness and it largely failed. During 
the French Council of Ministers on 20 December, Couve might have gloated about the fact that 
the EEC meeting had ended in disagreement rather than the crisis wanted by Britain114. But, the 
reality is that the Five refused to let the question of enlargement die down as it had in 1963. The 
decision to keep the candidacies on the agenda “reflected the fact that peace was unlikely fully to 
return to the EEC until la question anglaise had been answered in a fashion acceptable to the 
applicants, to the Five and to the French”115.
Moreover, the tension with the Five undermined French goals in other domains, 
especially the monetary negotiations. Of course, the future of the international monetary system 
was still very uncertain in late 1967. After the collapse of sterling, the market began to stabilise, 
but it was still uneasy and the support for the gold pool was deteriorating, as the European 
members of the group made it clear that they would end their cooperation unless the US took
111 NARA: RG59, CFPF, 1967-1969, Box 1542: Wallner to Rusk, Telegram number 7724,11.12.67
112 Bozo, Deux Strategies, p. 183
113 For the result of the meeting see DF: PEF, 1966-1967: Communique at end of EEC Council of Ministers, 
19.12.67
114 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.3, p.274
115 Ludlow, European Community, p. 145
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drastic measures to reduce its balance of payments deficit116. Yet, Paris had hardly benefited 
from the weaknesses of the reserve currencies, quite the opposite. By mid-December -  according 
to the CIA report previously mentioned -  “the French government had become concerned about 
the deepening [monetary] crisis and subsequently had generally refrained from unsettling 
actions”117. Moreover, its capacity to seriously damage the dollar was limited, considering that it 
no longer possessed a large dollar surplus in reserve118. Finally, while agreeing with Paris on 
core points, the Five moved closer and closer to the US interpretation of the London agreement 
of August, sometimes using as a pretext the anti-American presentation of some of France’s 
ideas119.
To make things worse, internal and external events combined to weaken France’s 
position even more. Domestically, the General’s press conference of 27 November, in particular 
the words on Israel, shocked French public opinion and did little to increase support for the
10Cipresident’s policy . In regards to international developments, Couve continued to publicly 
express little concern with the Harmel report and the stalling East-West detente in Europe121. 
Yet, there were undeniable signs that France was losing its margin of action and becoming 
increasingly trapped between both blocs. As Vai'sse and Bozo argue convincingly, the adoption 
of the Harmel report in December 1967, with its twin emphasis on defence and detente, 
represented a great victory for the US and its leadership. By “Atlanticising” detente, NATO said 
yes to detente and no to the dissolution of blocs, which was one of the central aims of De 
Gaulle’s policy122. The Harmel report effectively gave NATO a new impetus to take a more 
active role in the East-West rapprochement; it was hard to disagree with President Johnson’s
116 Gavin, Gold. Dollars, and Power, pp. 172-173; Kunz, “American Economic Consequences”, in Fink, Gassert, and 
Junker, 1968. p.96
117 LBJL: PP, NSF, CO, Box 174: CIA Intelligence Memorandum, 20.03.68
1.8 TNA: FCO 33/44: Washington to FO, Telegram number 3891,08.12.67
1.9 See ANF: 5AG1, Carton 33, Affaires Economiques: Note for Pompidou, 14.12.67; or Debre, Memoires IV. p.172
120 Vai'sse, La grandeur, p.640; according to Vai'sse again, on p.349, average approval for De Gaulle’s foreign policy 
dropped three points in the second semester of 1967, from 52.60% to 49.50%.
121 DF: PEF, 1966-1967: Couve Interview with French Television, 14.12.67
122 Bozo, Deux Strategies, pp.176-177; Vai'sse, La grandeur, p.395
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19^assessment according to which NATO had successfully defeated the French challenge . Thus, 
France found itself surrounded by a NATO keen to act as an agent of detente and an Eastern bloc 
less willing to open up to the Western world. This morose context was not helped by the fact that 
some Soviet officials believed NATO saw the Harmel report as a licence to try to spark the 
“‘weakening’ and disintegration of the socialist community ...”124.
V. Conclusion
Back in January 1967 Jean Dromer, one of De Gaulle’s influential economic advisors in 
the Ely see, had written an all-important note about the strategy France should adopt in the major 
negotiations of the Western world in the period ahead, that is to say the Kennedy Round, the 
British application to the EEC and the reform of the international monetary system. He 
essentially advocated that France should try to unite the Six along common positions in 
monetary affairs, thereby allowing Europe to show its independence vis-a-vis the Anglo-Saxons, 
and he warned that Paris should not let itself be cornered and forced into a political veto over the 
British question125. By the end of the year, it was hard to deny that France had largely failed to 
achieve its objectives, as well as over NATO and East-West detente in Europe. Why did 1967 
end up being such a disappointment for France after the highs of 1966?
Essentially, the French government had come up against the challenge of 
interdependence and failed to devise a suitable answer. Politically, it could not find a balance 
between its desire to pursue independent goals -  such as vetoing Britain and maintaining sole 
leadership in the EEC -  and its ambitions to unite Western Europe vis-a-vis the US. Equally, 
Paris lacked the influence to push the East-West rapprochement further once the Eastern Bloc 
became more wary. In the economic field, the French authorities realised that they could not
123 MAEF: Amerique, Etats-Unis 1964-1970, Vol.577: Leprette to Couve, Telegram number 6703-6708, 20.12.67
124 Newton, Russia. France, p. 80
125 ANF: 5AG1, Carton 29, Affaires Economiques Conseils Restraints: Note by Dromer, 07.01.67
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unsettle the international monetary system without affecting their own economy. Finally, even if 
it was not completely buried, De Gaulle’s grand design had been dealt a serious blow by the 
external developments in 1967. If in 1966 the General had hoped that a weakened NATO and a 
more welcoming Eastern Bloc -  after France’s withdrawal from the integrated military section of 
the organisation and his trip to Moscow -  would help to overcome the Cold War in Europe, a 
year later a strengthened Atlantic Alliance and a wary Warsaw Pact showed no signs of 
withering away.
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Chapter VII: The Fall, January-August 1968
I. Introduction
On 15 March 1968, journalist Pierre Viansson-Ponte wrote in Le Monde: “What 
characterises currently our public life is boredom. French people are bored. They are not 
involved in the great convulsions that are shaking the world ... None of this affects us”1. Of 
course, the students and workers of France were soon to prove him very wrong, but many would 
have shared this view. At the start of the year, France still appeared as a haven of stability and 
prosperity. The economy was growing regularly, despite a slight slowdown in the previous year 
caused by the West German recession, and De Gaulle remained popular, in spite of some 
unwelcome outbursts on Quebec and Israel. No one could really anticipate the dramatic events of 
May 1968.
Instead, the real problem for France was how to turn around the situation in regards to its 
foreign policy. 1967, as seen in the previous chapter, had ended with a series of serious setbacks 
for the French authorities: not only were they incapable of preventing NATO from finding a 
renewed source of purpose, through the Harmel report which called for a twin emphasis on 
deterrence and detente, but the question of enlargement within the EEC had refused to disappear, 
even after the veto of Britain’s application. Moreover, even with the devaluation of the sterling 
in November and the ensuing gold run, France had not yet convinced its European partners that 
they should follow its proposals to reform the international monetary system. The challenge for 
this New Year was in fact both simple and difficult: could France prove more able to overcome 
the challenge of interdependence than it had been in the previous year?
1 Viansson-Ponte, Republique Gaullienne: vol.2, p.388
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n. A Changing International Environment
1968 was a year of great change and turmoil throughout the world, starting with the 
Vietnam War. North Vietnam’s startling and spectacular Tet offensive, launched in late January, 
ultimately failed in its military objectives, but its political repercussions went far beyond the 
Indochinese peninsula. Besides crystallising domestic opposition to the conflict in the US, 
Hanoi’s determination to continue fighting convinced American president Lyndon Johnson that 
his country could not win the war, despite the presence of more than a half million soldiers. On 
31 March, during a televised speech, Johnson stunned the world when he announced not only a 
massive reduction in the bombing of North Vietnam and his desire to seek peace via negotiations 
with Hanoi, but also his decision not to stand as a candidate in the forthcoming presidential 
elections.
If De Gaulle welcomed Johnson’s speech as “an act of reason and political courage”, 
France had also been waiting for such an opportunity to mediate, a fact officials were making 
clear both privately and publicly2. On 28 February, the French government expressed its support 
for UN Secretary General U Thant’s position, and claimed that the US should assume North 
Vietnam would deal in “good faith” if they halted their bombing3. At the same time, Quai 
officials were informing their American counterparts of North Vietnam’s interest “in having 
Paris act as ‘witness’ to what it does in connection with the search for a negotiated solution”, and 
Hanoi’s desire -  as North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong told the French general 
representative in Hanoi, Francois de Quirielle -  to see France “becoming more active”4.
Additionally behind the scenes, and even before the Tet offensive according to Joumoud, 
De Gaulle was using all the resources of informal diplomacy to make sure that Paris was an 
acceptable choice as a venue for peace talks for both South and North Vietnam5. Once Hanoi 
accepted Johnson’s peace offers, France’s efforts became more public. On 18 April, Couve
2 De Gaulle, LNC: XI. Note for the Council o f Ministers, 03.04.68, p.210
3 Sullivan, France’s Vietnam policy, p. 108
4 NARA: Files of Ambassador at Large Averell Harriman, 1967-1968, Box 2: Dean to Harriman, 09.02.68
5 Joumoud, Pierre, “La France, les Etats-Unis et la Guerre du Vietnam: L’Annee 1968”, in Melandri and Ricard, 
Relations Franco-Americaines. pp. 186-189
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declared officially that his government would have no objection to Paris acting as a location for 
the negotiations, and by early May all participants had agreed on the French capital. For De 
Gaulle, this was a personal and symbolic victory, a sign that his views on the war were accepted 
throughout the world, and a way to strengthen French influence in South-East Asia6. It was also 
“a triumph of his policy of independence and neutrality” as “Paris had become a ‘neutral 
territory’”7.
The real relevance of the Paris peace talks, however, did not lie in the success of French 
diplomacy, but instead in its consequences for global politics. Despite largely stalling in 1968, 
the Paris negotiations nevertheless facilitated limited progress in superpower relations. Indeed, 
soon after his 31 March speech, Johnson began his “campaign for a symbolically impressive 
summit, centred on questions of arms control, but encompassing other key areas of policy”8. 
Throughout 1967, Johnson had repeatedly tried to convince the Soviet leaders to start Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]. Undeterred by initial failures, the US President refused to give 
up and was eventually rewarded for his efforts. In a letter dated 21 June 1968, Kosygin wrote 
that he hoped it would be possible “more concretely to exchange views”9. Quite likely, the 
timing of this breakthrough was linked not only to the start of peace talks in Paris, but also the 
fact that the Soviet Union was interested in a breathing spell because of the problems within the 
communist world -  which will be mentioned in more detail below10.
On the back of the signing of the NPT on 1 July, the American push for SALT gathered 
momentum. US Secretary of State Dean Rusk informed the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, 
Anatoly Dobrynin, on 2 July that Johnson wanted a meeting with Kosygin, and on 25 July, 
Dobrynin handed Rusk a message from Kosygin “proposing that nuclear arms talks could start 
within a month or six weeks”; better still, in mid-August, Johnson finally received the long-
6 Ibid, p. 189
7 Sullivan, France’s Vietnam policy, p. 109
8 Dumbrell, President Johnson, p.53
9 Johnson, Vantage Point, pp.480-485
10 Wolfe, Soviet Power, p.270
238
awaited invitation to visit Moscow in October11. For Schwartz, these were signs that by summer 
1968, the atmosphere of East-West relations seemed to be changing in profound ways12. This 
could easily appear as an overstated interpretation, especially considering the events in the 
following months. Eventually, the summit failed to materialise, “Moscow did not believe it could 
achieve any meaningful agreements with the outgoing president”, and probably preferred to 
“strengthen those political forces in the US opposed to arms spending”13. But, the modest 
changes introduced by Johnson did have a long-term importance, and helped to provide the 
foundations for Richard Nixon’s foreign policy, a means of reducing the costs of containment by 
easing Cold War tensions14.
These developments in superpower relations and over Vietnam had important 
implications for De Gaulle’s own grand design. In the previous few years, American troubles in 
Indochina had created an opportunity for France to establish a privileged dialogue with the 
Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. With this rapprochement, the General hoped to achieve his 
vision of a European detente, whereby the continent would eventually overcome its division into 
two antagonistic military blocs. At the same time, he hoped that, in exchange for the departure of 
American troops from Europe, the Soviets would both accept the reunification of Germany and 
loosen its control over the Eastern European states. Thus, this goal appeared in jeopardy once 
Moscow increasingly looked to Washington, rather than Europe, as its main interlocutor. France 
was facing serious competition on the detente stage.
Added to that, France faced an equally strong challenge from NATO. Overcoming 
France’s withdrawal had instilled a new sense of confidence within the organisation, and many 
agreed with the Secretary General, Manlio Brosio, that De Gaulle would not withdraw his 
country from the Alliance in 1969 when he would have the opportunity to do so15. Buoyed by the
11 Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 182-183
12 Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson, p.210
13 Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 182; Dumbrell, President Johnson, p.82
14 Herring, George, ‘Tet and the Crisis o f Hegemony”, in Fink, Gassert, and Junker, 1968, p.53
15 FRUS: 1964-1968, VoLXIH: Document 291, 22.02.68
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strengthened cohesion and renewed sense of purpose provided by the Harmel report, NATO 
went about seeking a more active role in East-West relations.
In March, Brosio gave the NATO council a series of questions to be studied by the 
permanent representatives, and three of those -  East-West relations, the situation in the 
Mediterranean, and a balanced reduction of forces -  were investigated in depth16. Most member 
states seemed determined in fact to move away from the usual vague and sterile debates, and 
actually give a concrete follow up to the program of future tasks of the Atlantic Alliance as set 
out in the Harmel report17. This was not without its rewards for the Alliance: at the Ministerial 
meeting in Reykjavik in late June, the member states “issued a ‘signal’ to the USSR to encourage 
it to prepare for future discussions on the possibility of mutual force reductions in Europe”18. To 
sum up, Paris had to contend not only with an emerging superpower rapprochement, but also 
with a NATO keen to promote a model of bloc-to-bloc detente that was incompatible with its 
own East-West designs.
III. Dead end in the East...
If strong competition from the US and NATO was not enough, France’s leverage in East- 
West relations was further reduced by the continuing rigidity of Soviet policy. Moscow remained 
inflexible and made few efforts to improve the situation in Europe, especially on the all- 
important question of its relations with Bonn. Showing no more signs of compromise in early 
1968 than during the previous year, the Kremlin leaders submitted an official note condemning 
West Germany’s infringements in West Berlin, and again insisted on a long list of changes in 
Bonn’s policies before it could accept signing any renunciation of force agreement with the
16 MAEF: Pactes 1961-1970, Vol.277: Note du Service des Pactes, 20.06.68
17 See the example of Belgium in MAEF: Pactes 1961-1970, Vol.277: Note du Service des Pactes, 04.05.68
18 FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XIII: Document 316, 28.06.68
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latter19. The uncomfortable reality was that in 1967-1968, Moscow was just not ready to do 
business with any government in Bonn20.
This, of course, directly affected West Germany and its Ostpolitik. Apart from 
successfully establishing diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia on 31 January 1968, thanks in 
part to French help, Bonn could only expect modest results from its policy21. It also affected De 
Gaulle’s own plans as he continually tried to convince both West Germany and the Soviet Union 
to adopt more forthcoming positions towards European detente. During the Franco-German 
summit in mid-February, and despite the fact he foresaw little possibility for progress in the East, 
the General urged Kiesinger to improve relations with the satellite states, especially Poland22. At 
the same time, he also literally pleaded with Zorin in the hope that his country would make a 
gesture towards West Germany23. This was, however, to no avail, as Zorin stuck to well-known 
Soviet positions and ignored the call for help. The Kremlin leaders believed that the General was 
following his policies for his own reasons, and saw no motive to pay a political price to him on 
Germany at a time when the Grand Coalition government in West Germany was too divided to 
adopt a more flexible policy towards Eastern Europe.24 The prospects for a serious triangular 
partnership between Paris, Bonn and Moscow -  which De Gaulle deemed vital in his design to 
overcome the Cold War in Europe -  seemed pretty bleak indeed in 1968.
To make matters worse, France’s bilateral relations with the Soviet Union also suffered 
from Moscow’s intransigence. French officials’ frustrations with Soviet behaviour had already 
been building up for a long time, leading Jacques Andreani, a deputy director in the Quai in 
charge of the Soviet and East European desk, to complain to an American embassy officer: 
“since then [Kosygin’s trip to Paris in December 1966], things had changed and ‘for some time
19 For more details on Soviet criticisms of West German actions in Berlin and the preconditions for any agreement 
see MAEF: Europe, URSS 1966-1970, Vol.2666: Note of Sous-Direction Europe Orientate, 05.02.68
20 Garton, In Europe’s Name, p.56
21 MAEF: Europe, Allemagne 1961-1970, Vol.1609: Brandt to Couve, 05.02.68. Before both states established 
diplomatic relations, the French embassy defended West Germany’s interests in Yugoslavia.
22 McGhee, George, At the Creation of a New Germany: From Adenauer to Brandt, An Ambassador’s Account. 
(New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1989), p.247
23 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.391: De Gaulle-Zorin meeting, 20.02.68
24 TNA: FCO 28/187: FO to Paris, 19.04.68; TNA: FCO 33/119: Paris to FO, 11.04.68
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now we [France] and Russia have been playing hide and seek with each other’. He [Andreani] 
said Soviets kept saying ‘it is time we took a new step forward’, but they were extremely vague 
about what the step would be”25. The fact that Moscow increasingly seemed interested solely in 
discussing measures that would perpetuate the status quo in Europe, in particular the project of a 
pan-European security conference, did nothing to improve the situation.
The Soviet Union perceived the European security conference as a means to obtain 
recognition of the political and territorial status quo, which had emerged after World War II, 
with the division of Germany as its cornerstone. This was hardly a novel proposal, but the 
Soviets started to push it far more actively in 1968, surely taking into account the fact that 1969 
was approaching, which was to mark the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the North 
Atlantic Treaty and the moment at which NATO members would be free to reconsider their 
membership of the Atlantic Alliance . For example, Gromyko, during a meeting with the French 
Ambassador in Moscow, Oliver Wormser, seemed very impatient and particularly determined to 
fix a place for the start of preparatory talks for the conference. While not quite pressuring his 
French interlocutor, Gromyko nonetheless tried to force his hand when he made it clear that he 
wanted “to put an end to the position that consists in saying that the conference has to be well 
prepared”27.
The French, on the other hand, had no objections to discussing this topic with the Soviets,
but could not imagine this conference occurring in the near future because of the many existing
28unresolved questions, including agreement on its agenda or the exact participants . These 
differences of perception emerged very clearly during the two specific meetings -  between 
Couve and Zorin on 23 April, and the talk between the Quai’s Directeur Politique, Jacques de 
Beaumarchais, with members of the Soviet embassy in Paris, Iouri Doubinin and Oberemko, on 
8 May -  held on the subject of the conference. While the Soviets wanted to quickly push ahead
25 NARA: RG59, CFPF, 1967-1969, Box 2104: Wallner to State, Airgram number 1751,22.03.68
26 MAEF: Europe, Organismes Intemationaux et Grandes Questions Internationales 1966-1970, Vol.2034: Note of 
Sous-Direction Europe-Orientale, 03.05.68
27 MAEF: Europe, URSS 1966-1970, Vol.2666: Wormser to Couve, Telegrams number 1243-1246,03.04.68
28 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.391: Frank-Beaumarchais meeting, 13.03.68
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with preparatory work, the French believed instead that the conference should take place later on 
in the detente process, especially after relations between East and West Germany had improved 
significantly29. The question of the European security conference might not seem vital in the 
bigger picture of Franco-Soviet relations, but it symbolised the essential gap between the goals 
of each of the two countries as far as East-West detente was concerned. If the French continued 
to hope for a rapprochement between the two parts of Germany, the Soviets now openly and 
unambiguously defended detente as a means to protect the status quo in Europe.
Indeed, this quest for the status quo went hand-in-hand with the Soviet leaders’ growing 
focus on strengthening the Warsaw Pact, as confirmed by the theme developed by the 
commentaries of various Soviet newspapers: “France should not expect anything in return from 
the socialist states for having withdrawn from NATO, as it was a unilateral decision and in line 
with French national interest”30. The obsession with bloc solidarity was naturally strengthened 
by the fact the masters of the Kremlin felt a “deep-rooted anxiety about the controllability of a 
sweeping European detente”31; and the events in Czechoslovakia in early 1968 only worsened 
those fears, pushing the Soviets to pay more and more attention to intra-bloc rather than inter- 
bloc developments.
If dogmatic Stalinism had survived for a long time in Czechoslovakia, pressures for 
change finally pushed through in the 1960s and led to a less centralised economy. Antonin 
Novotny, the hard-liner leader of the Czech communist party, opposed these changes and 
attempted a coup in December 1967 to roll back the reforms, but failed when the Soviets refused 
to support him. On 5 January 1968, Alexander Dubcek replaced Novotny as Secretary General of 
the Czech Communist Party, and quickly introduced what he called “socialism with a human 
face”: an attempt to revitalise the country’s polity and economy, which would gain public
29 See MAEF: Europe, URSS 1966-1970, Vol.2666: Couve-Zorin meeting, 23.04.68; and MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.34: 
Note of Direction des Affaires Politiques, 08.05.68
30 MAEF: Europe, Organismes Intemationaux et Grandes Questions Internationales 1966-1970, Vol.2034: Note of 
Sous-Direction Europe-Orientale, 03.05.68
31 Newton, Russia. France, p.79
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support and still remain within the perimeters of the post-1956 Soviet permissibility . If 
Moscow had at first remained very patient with this tolerable effort for self-renewal, as well as 
the vast public debate authorised by Dubcek after he suspended censorship, by late April it had 
started to express its first major reservations33.
In Paris, the reaction to changes in Prague alternated between optimism and anxiety. If 
De Gaulle welcomed Dubcek’s election as “a victory for the supporters of liberalisation”, he also 
worried about the chain impact of these events elsewhere in Eastern Europe34. French officials 
realised what was at stake in Czechoslovakia. A victory for the more liberal socialists could lead 
to far-reaching changes in the rest of the Eastern Bloc35. But at the same time, there was an 
acknowledgement that there was little France could do to influence events, and Couve made it 
clear that nothing should be done to encourage dissension in Eastern Europe36. The ball was thus 
not in the French court, and all they could do was wait. The signs from Moscow were not so 
promising however. During a trip to the Soviet Union in late April, French Minister for armed 
forces, Pierre Messmer, heard the following ominous confession from Soviet Minister of 
Defence Marshal Andrei Gretchko: “We will not tolerate for long this Czech policy helped by 
the German revanchards. We will soon take the right dispositions to end this”37.
The French government kept a close eye on Prague, but this did not mean it adopted a 
completely passive attitude towards relations with the other satellite states. Jeno Fock, the 
President of the Hungarian Council of Ministers, visited Paris in late March, and there was of 
course the small matter of De Gaulle’s trip to Romania in mid-May. Despite his slightly 
disappointing experience in Poland in the autumn 1967, the General was too attached to his 
detente policy to miss out on the opportunity to go Bucharest; and as Charbonnel pointed out, he 
hoped the occasion could serve to give a “new momentum to the struggle of the peoples of
32 To read more about the background and the beginnings of the Prague Spring, see Kramer, Mark, “The 
Czechoslovak Crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine”, in Fink, Gassert, and Junker, 1968: Rothschild and Wingfield, 
Return to Diversity, pp. 166-170
33 Ibid, p. 170
34 Lefort, Souvenirs et secrets, p.231
35 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.391: Frank-Beaumarchais meeting, 13.03.68
36 MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.33: Couve-Stewart meeting, 26.04.68
37 Messmer, Pierre, Apres Tant De Batailles: Memoires, (Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1992), p.299
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Eastern Europe for the liberalisation of their regimes and for greater independence vis-a-vis the 
Soviet Union”38. In any case, the trip proved to be a popular triumph, and the French President 
used all opportunities, both privately and publicly, to hammer in his familiar message about 
detente. To the Great Romanian National Parliament on 15 May, he argued forcefully that 
Romania and France should cooperate amidst the vast movement to overcome the Cold War 
order, and end the sterile division of Europe, through detente, entente and cooperation. During 
his private conversations with Romanian President Nicola Ceaucescu, he warned his host that 
Moscow should not be allowed to develop a full grip on Eastern Europe, because this could lead 
to a parallel increase in US influence in the Western bloc. It was up to the satellite states to play 
a greater role for the sake of the continent’s equilibrium39.
But once again, and even when preaching to the independent minded Romanians, the 
General could not quite escape the constraints imposed by a less favourable international 
environment. Even before his departure, the Romanian Ambassador in Paris emphasised to the 
French President the need not to say anything that would exacerbate Romanian relations with the 
Soviet Union40. De Gaulle replied he would be prudent, and this became apparent in his 
speeches. According to Wolton, “in his speech to the Romanian parliament [he] denounced the 
division of Europe into two blocs. But he censured it after Ceaucescu asked him to do so. He 
removed the reference to hegemonies in the sentence ‘to end the system of two blocs based 
around 2 hegemonies’. The Romanian President clearly did not want to embarrass the Soviets”41. 
Indeed, caution pervaded the whole trip. As explained in an analysis by the American State 
Department, Soviet concern over Romanian politics restrained both De Gaulle and Ceaucescu 
from pressing nationalist themes too far. Instead, the two leaders often “pointedly balanced 
homages to the Soviets (“a pillar of the continent”) against the primary emphasis on bilateral 
friendship and foreign policy ‘parallelism’”. Additionally, the current strains in Soviet-Czech
38 See Rey, La tentation. p.61; and Lefort, Souvenirs et secrets, p.248
39 See De Gaulle, DM: V. Speech to the Great National Assemby of Romania, pp.281-282; and MAEF: SG, EM, 
Vol.34: De Gaulle-Ceaucescu meeting, 14.05.68
40 TNA: FCO 33/46: Paris to FO, 30.05.68
41 Wolton, France sous influence, p.445
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relations, prompting the arrival in Prague on 17 May of Kosygin and a Soviet military 
delegation, no doubt further inhibited De Gaulle and especially Ceaucescu42.
By May 1968, it was hard to avoid the conclusion that France’s policy of detente was 
stuttering and had reached something of a dead end. Caught between NATO and the US, both of 
which were determined to play a more active detente role, and a rigid Soviet Union worried 
about the unrest in Czechoslovakia, France appeared increasingly powerless to influence the 
course of events in East-West relations. Even more worrying, France faced similar problem in its 
Westpolitik.
IV .... And in the West
Indeed, the two previous chapters had described France’s failure to overcome the 
challenge of interdependence during 1967 and the setbacks it suffered, especially during the 
second half, in its policy towards the Western world. NATO, through the Harmel report, had 
strengthened its political cohesion and successfully dealt with the difficulties posed by France’s 
withdrawal. In the EEC, though it had eventually managed to veto the British candidacy, Paris 
had not convinced its five allies that its case against enlargement was reasonable. As for the 
international monetary system, its fate was still uncertain after the serious speculation in the gold 
market that had followed the devaluation of sterling. France’s prospects of persuading its 
partners to reform the monetary system along the lines it wanted, however, were not promising. 
In 1968, France proved no more able to deal with the problem of interdependence than it had 
been in the previous year.
On New Year’s Day, the US government announced a programme -  including measures 
such as stringent capital and overseas lending controls -  designed to correct its balance of 
payments deficit and end financial instability. Europeans in general favoured these provisions 
and the foreign exchange markets at first responded enthusiastically to the American program,
42 NARA: RG59, CFPF, 1967-1969, Box 2091: Hughes to Rusk, Intelligence Note number 377, 21.05.68
246
leading to a drastic reduction of gold pool losses in January43. The French, for their part, reacted 
more ambivalently. Alain Prate, an economic adviser of De Gaulle, argued that not only did the 
American programme validate the French criticism of the frailty of an international monetary 
system based on the American balance of payments deficit, but it also offered a great opportunity 
for the Six states of the EEC. If united, they could impose a new system, independent of the 
fluctuations of American policy, which would guarantee European expansion and allow the EEC 
a greater influence within the IMF. Prate, though, acknowledged this would be difficult. The fear 
of the economic consequences that could follow a dislocation of the international monetary 
system, were pushing Paris’ partners towards unconditionally supporting the dollar44.
This assessment was symptomatic of a wider pessimism about France’s economy and 
status, which French Minister of Finances Michel Debre expressed all too clearly in a letter 
written to De Gaulle. Arguing that the expected growth rate of 5% for 1968 would just about 
cover national demands and individual aspirations, and that the drive towards industrial 
competitiveness was creating incompatibilities with a policy of full employment, Debre warned» 
the General that France could expect a difficult year in 1968. He further added that America’s 
New Year’s Day programme -  which in his view let the Europeans bear the burden of American 
fiscal irresponsibility -  would hurt European expansion unless the Six coordinated their 
economic and monetary policy. Like Prate, however, and based on his own experience of the two 
previous years, Debre doubted that this would be feasible45. As he told Kosygin a few days later, 
if several states supported France’s position in theory, in practice it was isolated in the struggle 
to reform the international monetary system46.
Despite this feeling of pessimism, French authorities persisted in their attempts to define 
a common European stand; and as De Gaulle pointed out on 4 January, this primarily meant
43 Gavin, Gold. Dollars, and Power, p. 178
44 ANF: 5AG1, Carton 34, Affaires Economiques: Note by Prate, 03.01.68
45 FNSP: 4DE Carton 7: Debre to De Gaulle, 06.01.68
46 ANF: 5AG1, Carton 188, URSS: Debre-Kosygin meeting, 11.01.68. Debre actually implicitly suggested that a 
Soviet participation in the IMF could act as a counter-weight to American dominance within the organisation!
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ensuring Franco-German solidarity47. Back in 1967, Franco-German entente had been 
instrumental in establishing a common position in monetary affairs for the Six along the 
following lines: Special Drawing Rights [SDR] were international credit facilities, rather than 
new currency reserves, and their creation depended on several conditions, including a parallel 
reform of the IMF that was to give more influence to the Six, and a restored equilibrium in the 
American balance of payments. Continuous support from West Germany, according to the 
Quai’s Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financieres, would be decisive not only for the 
negotiations relative to the reform of the IMF, but also for the EEC’s cohesion48.
Restoring Franco-German entente appeared especially urgent considering the disturbing 
signs coming out of Bonn. Under pressure from the US because of its important dollar surplus, 
West Germany was moving closer to the American position on international monetary questions. 
Debre’s counterpart, Karl Schiller, spoke in New Delhi in favour of an accelerated activation of 
the SDR, while the German authorities were now ready to accept the latter as new international 
reserves -  not international credit -  and to simply subordinate their introduction to an 
improvement in the American balance of payments deficit, rather than its complete removal49. 
Conscious of the danger, Debre appealed directly to Schiller, reminding him of the many 
sacrifices France had made previously at London and Rio in summer 1967, and suggested a 
detailed discussion of the monetary question during their meeting at the Franco-German 
summit50. During the meeting, Debre again warned Schiller that a premature use of the SDR 
would be dangerous for the future of the West’s economy, and he organised closer cooperation 
between French and German experts before the important meeting in Rome of the Six Ministers 
of Finance, which was to take place later in the month51.
47 Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: vol.3, p.284
48 MAEF: Direction Economique, Cooperation Economique 1967-1974, Vol.884: Note of Direction des Affaires 
Economiques et Financieres, 31.01.68
49 ANF: 5AG1, Carton 34, Affaires Economiques: Note by Prate, 08.02.68
50 ANF: 5AG1, Carton 48, Affaires Economiques: Debre to Schiller, 09.02.68
51 ANF: 5AG1, Carton 164, Allemagne RFA: Debre-Schiller meeting, 15.02.68
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Yet, several developments combined to seriously undermine this attempt at establishing a 
common Franco-German position, and by extension a common EEC position. For a start, the 
“Brandt affair”, which erupted on 4 February, hardly helped: a German press agency reported 
that West Germany’s Foreign Minister, Willy Brandt, had publicly claimed that the Franco- 
German friendship was strong enough to overcome the rigid and anti-European conceptions of a 
head of state “thirsty for power”52. Despite the many complaints and denials, this incident left 
scars at the highest levels and De Gaulle certainly gave the impression that he would not forget 
easily53. Alphand went as far as to claim that this episode marked the end of the “honeymoon” 
period with the Kiesinger government54. But more importantly, the entente suffered from the fact 
that “the dispute between France and its partners over whether or not Britain and its fellow 
applicants should be allowed to join the EEC did not fade away and become an unthreatening 
background controversy. Instead, an intense but ill-tempered debate about enlargement went on 
amongst the Six for the whole of 1968 and the first half of 1969”55.
Indeed, the British question in this period dominated not only the EEC debates, but also 
Franco-German relations. Bonn pushed Paris to be more flexible and offer London a perspective 
of entry into the EEC, if only to end the disarray amongst other members of the Community56. If 
at first the French authorities preferred to delay and procrastinate in the hope that this issue 
would just disappear, it seems pretty clear that tactical considerations pushed them to slightly 
change their tune. Any hope of a Franco-German entente on monetary affairs might be helped by 
a gesture to Bonn on the British question. After prolonged discussions, the summit of 15-16 
February ended in a common Franco-German communique. Both countries declared that they 
supported enlargement in principle, especially of Britain, and suggested commercial
52 Seydoux, Mission Diplomatique, p.105; see also Vaisse, “De Gaulle et Brandt”, in Moller, and Vaisse, Brandt und 
Frankreich. p. 110
53 MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.33: De Gaulle-Luebke meeting, 05.02.68. Certainly, De Gaulle was not prepared to forgive 
Willy Brandt easily. In this meeting, the General went on to say Brandt was a socialist, and that in his mind, no 
socialist could ever be a statesman!
54Alphand, L'etonnement d'etre. 11.02.68, p.500
55 Ludlow, European Community, p. 146
56 MAEF: Direction Economique, Papiers Jean-Pierre Brunet 1967-1974, Vol.53: Brunet-Lahr meeting, 16.01.68
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S7arrangements with candidate states for the period before enlargement actually became feasible . 
According to Kiesinger, and undoubtedly as another gesture to the Germans, De Gaulle even 
apologised during the summit for the categorical language he customarily used towards the US,
co
explaining it as being due to domestic reasons and to get support from the French Communists .
Yet, the prospects of communique soothing relations within the EEC disappeared very 
quickly during debates in late February and early March. The other member states were not 
convinced by the Franco-German plan, and French behaviour hardly helped either. As Ludlow 
argues, Couve’s general lack of enthusiasm to conclude a deal with applicants made it very 
doubtful that France would be ready to go beyond a minimalist ‘arrangement’59. This 
unwillingness to try and seriously end the EEC stalemate did not help France’s goals in the 
monetary sphere, at a time when it faced many difficult challenges.
During the Rome meeting of the Six Ministers of Finance on 26-27 February, except for 
the common desire to see a reform of the IMF that would give the EEC more influence, France 
failed to achieve a united stand amongst the Six, and worried about its partners’ abilities to resist 
growing Anglo-Saxon pressures. Additionally, Paris had to contend with the fact that the IMF 
services, after the mandate given to them in Rio back in September 1967, had presented in 
January a draft proposal for the activation of SDR. Compared to the agreement of the previous 
autumn, the project contained important differences, which tended to transform the SDR into a 
new currency and undermine the reform of the IMF. Seriously concerned by these distortions to 
the Rio compromise, France called for a G10 meeting in Stockholm in late March to debate the 
proposal -  hoping to bypass the IMF where the Anglo-Saxon influence was stronger -  and 
requested an opt out clause in case it did not want to take part in the creation of SDR60. Debre 
realised that the French government was in a tight spot, and seemed increasingly pessimistic as 
to the development of the monetary negotiations. He viewed the IMF project as completely
57 For the summit conversations, see MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.391 and MAEF: SG, EM, Vol.33; For the communique, 
see for example NARA: RG59, CFPF, 1967-1969, Box 2099: Wallner to Rusk, Telegram number 10469, 16.02.68
58 FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XIE: Document 292, 23.02.68
59 Ludlow, European Community, p. 150
60 ANF: 5AG1, Carton 34, Affaires Economiques: Note by Prate, 27.02.68
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unacceptable, but hoped that an independent stance, such as the threat of not signing any future 
agreement, would still offer France a chance to sway its European partners61.
Events in the following weeks, however, radically altered the nature of the struggle over 
the future of the international monetary system. After a calm period in January and February, 
speculative purchases picked up substantially in early March. Financial circles were worried 
about the long-term future of the existing gold price, and disturbed by the failure of the US to 
win the Vietnam War as shown by the recent Tet offensive. When Senator Jacob Javits’ called in
69late February for a suspension of the gold pool, speculation assumed a torrential quality . The
massive losses, which climaxed at almost $400 million on 14 March, caused the immediate
closure of the London gold market, and led the US government to convene an emergency
6^meeting in Washington with the Central Bank governors of the gold pool members . 
Confirming the French criticisms, the Bretton Woods system was once again in serious trouble. 
Yet, it was ironically the US government that proved better able to exploit this new crisis to their 
advantage, and “forge new and more flexible arrangements for the development of the 
international monetary system”64.
The American authorities realised they needed dramatic action to end this state of panic, 
but they also understood that the pressures of the monetary crisis could facilitate international 
agreements and a quick transition to SDR65. During the meeting with the central bank governors 
on 16-17 March, the US officials could rely on a major trump card: the possibility of suspending 
the convertibility of dollars into gold. The European governors, for their part, did not have clear 
aims and were mostly keen to end the general crisis atmosphere66. In these conditions, the talks 
unsurprisingly proved a success for the American government. All the governors present 
accepted the US suggestion to implement the proposal made in November 1967 by Guido Carli,
61 See FNSP: 4DE Carton 7: Debre to Barre, 29.02.68 and Debre to Couve, 03.03.68
62 Roy, “Battle for Bretton Woods”, p.51
63 Solomon, Monetary System, pp. 117-118
64 Roy, “Battle for Bretton Woods”, p.56; Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson, p.200
65 LBJL: Bator, SF, Box 10: Eugene Rostow report, 13.03.68
66 Solomon, Monetary System, p. 120
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the governor of the Italian Central Bank: the creation of a “a two-tiered gold market in which the 
US would only supply central banks with gold at $35 an ounce, while on the private market gold 
would be allowed to float freely”67. In addition, the gold pool was dissolved.
Given Washington’s strong pressure, and the limited choice between this two-tiered 
market and unilateral American action, the European central bankers had little choice but to 
cooperate. As Gavin points out, “a dollar float would have hurt their exports and helped US 
imports, and they would have had to run down their own gold supply to maintain the exchange 
rate of dollar”68. Thus, while the US reaffirmed the dollar as a standard thanks to effective crisis 
decision-making, France in contrast found itself isolated from the process because it was no 
longer a member of the gold pool since June 1967, and effectively alone in its unwillingness to 
cooperate69.
Indeed, Paris adopted a far less pro-active and determined approach in this period than 
Washington. Publicly, French officials appeared confident: In an interview, Debre was adamant 
that the current troubles could favour a monetary emancipation of Europe, while De Gaulle’s 
solemn declaration at the end of the Council of Ministers once again vigourously denounced the 
abuses of the current international monetary system, and called for a new mechanism based on 
gold70. Privately, though, they expressed a very different state of mind. For a start, Debre did not 
really trust France’s European partners. As he told De Gaulle, “unity of Europe risks occurring 
only if we abandon our freedom. Given the attitude of our partners and, to say the word, 
subordination, we cannot accept this hypothesis. Our freedom is vital”71.
Moreover, France’s ability to successfully block any US-led reforms of the international 
monetary system was curtailed by various factors. Unlike in 1965, it was now limited by the
79small size of its dollar holdings, and the disappearance of its balance of payments surplus . At
67 Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson, p.202
68 Gavin, Gold. Dollars, and Power, pp. 182-184
69 Morse, Foreign Policy, p.243
70 See FNSP: 4DE Carton 28: Le Monde article, 17.03.68 and DF: PEF 1968-1969: De Gaulle declaration, 20.03.68
71 FNSP: 4DE Carton 7: Debre to De Gaulle, 18.03.68
72 LBJL: PP, NSF, CO, Box 174: CIA Intelligence Memo, 20.03.68
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the same time, the existence of significant divisions within the government over the best course 
to follow hardly helped either. In particular, if Debre received tacit support from De Gaulle, 
Pompidou wanted France to be closer to the US monetary theses73. Finally, and most seriously, 
France also faced a very difficult dilemma: if Paris refused the American proposals, it would 
maintain its freedom of action, but it would not be able to oppose the creation of a large dollar 
zone. If it agreed to uphold European unity, it would have to pay an expensive price, in the shape 
of severe deterioration to the international monetary system and world inflation. De Gaulle’s 
decision was not to accept the failure of talks, but to try and “push negotiations [at Stockholm] to 
their limit”74.
This was to no avail, as the G10 meeting in Stockholm on 29-30 March ended in failure 
for France. As his European colleagues seemed keener to debate the activation of SDR as a new 
currency, rather than in-depth reforms of the international monetary system, Debre had little 
choice but to condemn the SDR and announce that his country would not sign the communique 
at the end of the meeting75. In contrast, the US government was thrilled with this historic 
agreement, which reaffirmed the SDR plan, the $35 price for gold, and the continuation of 
cooperation to maintain the stability of the international monetary system76. The decisions in 
March 1968 proved only a temporary reprieve for the terminal case of Bretton Woods, which 
Richard Nixon would effectively put out of its misery three years later77. Nonetheless, the price 
of rejecting them was too high for America’s European allies, who feared the consequences if 
the Bretton Woods system broke down, and understood that the US remained the only country 
capable of holding it together78. There was always the risk that failing to cooperate with US 
financial policies might trigger an US departure or emasculation of its commitment to NATO, 
which combined with economic factors. In the case of West Germany, for example, its
73 See Peyrefitte, C’etait De Gaulle: vol.3. 20.03.68, pp.285-287 and Debre, Memoires IV. p. 174
74 Prate, Les Batailles. p.226
75 See ANF: 5AG1, Carton 35, Affaires Economiques: Note by Prate, 29.03.68 and FNSP: 4DE Vol.74 : Final Debre 
speech at the G10 Stockholm meeting, 30.03.68
76 LBJL: PP, White House Central Files, CO, Box 30: Memo for Johnson, 30.03.68
77 Gavin, Gold. Dollars, and Power, p. 185
78 Kunz, “American Economic Consequences”, in Fink, Gassert, and Junker, 1968. pp. 104-105
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dependence on world trade -  especially with the US -  made it more likely to follow modem 
solutions like the SDR, rather than De Gaulle’s conservative ideas on gold79.
Stockholm was clearly a painful blow for France, leading Debre to bitterly complain that 
“I was abandoned by our European partners” and that “the subordination to the US was total and
QA
humiliating” . Despite this setback, the French Minister continued to believe that the debate was
01
not over, and he actually called for another meeting to discuss the monetary system . This, as 
we will see in the next few pages, rapidly proved an illusion. Stockholm was to be in fact the 
“last fling of the French attempt to destroy the confidence in the dollar”82.
V. From Paris to Pra2ue
As May 1968 started, prospects for French foreign policy were not particularly 
promising. A changing and less favourable international environment, coupled with the 
challenge of interdependence in both France’s Westpolitik and Ostpolitik, had translated into a 
loss of influence in external matters. Additionally, the economy was going through a relative 
slowdown. If the growth rate was still close to 5% per annum, France had in the previous year 
been affected by the West German crisis, leading the unemployment figure to jump to 226,000
oq
by January 1968 . But, these were worrying rather than dramatic signs, and France was -  and 
appeared abroad as -  stable and blessed with a strong currency. On 6 May, an article of The 
Times could still claim “France has never seemed so successful, so un-sheeplike, so prosperous -  
so different from the way she ought to be”84. The dramatic events of the following weeks would, 
however, completely shatter this view.
Growing unrest within the student world in Paris -  in part due to the inability of the 
university system to cope with the explosion of the number of enrolments in higher education
79 Kunz, “American Economic Consequences”, in Fink, Gassert, and Junker, 1968. p. 108; TNA: PREM 13/2091: 
Bonn to FO, Telegram 480, 21.03.68
80 Peyrefitte, C’etait De Gaulle: vol.3, 03.04.68, p.287
81 DF: PEF, 1968-1969: Debre interview with ORTF, 01.04.68
82 Schwartz, Lvndon Johnson, p.204
83 Lacouture, Jean, De Gaulle: vol. 3. (Paris: Le Seuil, 1986), p.666
84 Brogan, Patrick, “France: stable, prosperous, and infuriating”, The Times, 06.05.68, p.9
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since the start of the decade -  seriously escalated in spring 196885. Repeated riots, the forced 
closure of La Sorbonne, and the setting up of barricades in the Latin Quarter finally led the 
police to intervene in high-handed fashion on the night of 10-11 May. This was a turning point. 
The “night of the barricades” and the images of police brutality crystallised public opinion in 
favour of the student movement, and against the state. On 13 May, trade unions entered the 
dispute and called for a general strike, which culminated in ten million people refusing to show 
up for work. France was suddenly in a state of paralysis, and verging dangerously towards 
complete chaos86.
If foreign policy clearly did not cause the events of May 1968, there was not either a 
strict separation between the domestic and external spheres. For a start, as explained in the 
previous chapter, public opinion had strongly opposed De Gaulle’s positions on Quebec and 
against Israel, and this contributed to the erosion of the consensus around his person. Moreover, 
the thesis according to which the unrest and strikes were in part the consequences of the French 
President giving priority to international aims, in front of internal ones, is not implausible87. As 
Patricia Dillon argues: “De Gaulle’s efforts to constitute enormous reserves for the reform of the 
International Monetary System led to major tensions. Austerity measures were needed to 
maintain the external surplus, at a time where workers were keen on redistribution, rather than
OQ
austerity” . There was, in other words, a widening gap between the General’s aspirations for 
grandeur and those of his people, and this was particularly evident in the sharp drop, between 
1965 and 1968, of the proportion of those who felt independence was possible for France: from
85 For statistics on this explosion of the number of students, see the. table in Suri, Jeremi, Power and Protest: Global 
Revolution and the Rise of Detente. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003), p.269
86 There is o f course a large and varied literature, including many memoirs, on the origins and events of May 1968, 
but the following can be of interest. For a chronicle of the events see Dansette, Adrien, Mai 68. (Paris: Plon, 1971); 
For a more analytical approach, Dreyfus-Armand, Genevieve (ed.), Les Annees 1968: Le temps de la contestation. 
(Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 2000) and Capdevielle Jacques and Mouriaux, Rene, Mai 68: 1’entre-deux de la 
moderniteT: histoire de trente ans, (Paris: Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1988); For a 
more international perspective of the protest movements, see Caute, David, Sixty-eight: the year o f the barricades. 
(London: Hamilton, 1988) and the excellent Suri, Power and Protest.
87 IFOP, De Gaulle, pp.256-258, in August 1967, 22% thought that foreign policy was France’s most important 
problem. This number dropped to 15% in May 1968, and 9% in September 1968.
88 Dillon, Patricia, DGESS III, p. 137
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46% to 34% in the political level, 41% to 26% in the economic sphere, and from 31% to 28% for 
the military89.
If De Gaulle’s priority to international designs played a part in the disruption that shook 
France, the impact of May 1968 on all levels of French foreign policy was far more significant. 
In a very basic way, les evenements and the need to restore stability afterwards forced the French 
government to turn inwards, effectively leaving foreign policy at a near standstill. De Gaulle’s 
trip to Romania in the middle of the crisis was as such harshly interpreted by public opinion as a 
sign of lack of interest in events at home90. It was only in the aftermath of the elections of 23-30 
June, and the formation of a new government headed by Couve on 10 July, that France returned 
to the international scene.
Furthermore, the social disruptions rattled government unity, especially by breaking up 
the all-important De Gaulle-Pompidou tandem. True, there had been tensions between them 
before, and De Gaulle had actually planned to replace Pompidou with Couve after the March 
1967 legislative elections. May 1968, however, left a scar between both leaders that would never 
really heal. The fundamental problem was that both men analysed the predicament very 
differently. Where De Gaulle saw a crisis of civilisation and a desire for increased participation 
amongst the people, Pompidou was convinced that France was devoid of fundamental problems, 
but victim of a certain boredom and taste for destruction91. Unsurprisingly, they also diverged in 
terms of their preferred solution: Pompidou thought new elections would be more appropriate, as 
opposed to the drastic referendum advocated by De Gaulle.
From that point on, the split between Prime Minister and President only widened and was 
translated into growing mistrust on both sides, even after the disorder had died down. Pompidou 
felt cheated by the way the General kept him in the dark about his secret trip to Baden-Baden on
89IFOP, De Gaulle, p.282
90 Alphand, L'etonnement. 19.05.68, p.503
91 This divergence emerges clearly in the Council o f Ministers of 23 May, see Peyrefitte, C’&ait De Gaulle: vol.3. 
pp.533-540
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29 May, and by the manner in which Couve came to replace him . De Gaulle, for his part, 
increasingly held his Prime Minister responsible for the May troubles. He believed that 
Pompidou’s appeasement policies towards both students and workers -  agreeing to re-open the 
Sorbonne on 11 May after the “night of the barricades”, and signing the Grenelle Accords on 27 
May, which raised minimum wages by 25% in one go -  had helped to spread the disruptions and
93dealt a senous blow to France’s economy .
Last, and certainly not the least, May 68 shook the very foundations of Gaullist foreign 
policy. Obviously, it had a brutal effect on the economy and finances, while the massive loss of 
monetary reserves left the franc in a position of grave weakness. The Grenelle Accords 
significantly raised wages, while the Banque de France was forced to sell gold, and to rely on its 
drawing rights at the IMF94. The crisis also undermined another key pillar. As the new US 
Ambassador to Paris, Sargent Shriver, explained, many of De Gaulle’s diplomatic successes 
were the result not so much of France’s intrinsic power, “but of his unique personal authority and 
audacity, coupled with [the] image of French prosperity and stability”95. Amidst the chaos in the 
streets of Paris, the General was for the first time utterly powerless to control the situation, and 
even his rhetorical powers, normally so trustworthy in times of need, seemed to abandon him; his 
crucial speech on 24 May, calling for a referendum, failed to calm the situation and actually led 
to further violence96. The troubles demystified De Gaulle, destroyed his certain aura of 
infallibility, and raised questions about his ability to always be in control and rise to difficult 
challenges. Throughout May, he appeared more as an out of touch old man, instead of the usual 
towering and imposing figure that people were used to.
Of course, the French President eventually survived the unrest, thanks in part to another 
dramatic coup de theatre. His sudden and unexpected departure from Paris on 29 May, in fact to
92 Pompidou, Georges, Pour retablir une verite. (Paris: Flammarion, 1982), especially pp .l88-204
93 Peyrefitte, C’etait De Gaulle: vol.3, 14.06.68, p.578
94 See FNSP: 4DE Carton 7: Debre to Foccart, 28.05.68; Pompidou, Pour retablir une verite. p. 196; Vaisse, La 
grandeur, p.406
95 FRUS: 1964-1968, Vol.XII: Document 79, 28.05.68
96 De Gaulle could only recognise the failure of his speech, saying “J’ai mis a cote de la plaque”, see Peyrefitte, 
C’etait De Gaulle: vol.3, 24.05.68, p.543
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visit General Massu in Baden-Baden, created a real wave of panic. The next day, taking 
advantage of his renewed position of strength, De Gaulle announced in a radio speech that he 
would not stand down, denounced the forces of totalitarian communism, and called for new 
legislative elections97. The end of the unrest and the strong results of the Gaullist party -  nearly 
300 seats out of a total of 485 -  in the elections of 23-30 June were great successes, but they 
were in many ways misleading. The damage had already been done, be it to France’s image and 
status abroad, to De Gaulle’s leadership, and his own self-confidence. The terrible days of May 
had taken their toll on the General, and he could never quite forgive himself for what he 
considered as crucial errors in judgement: abandoning leadership to Pompidou on 11 May, using 
the wrong tone for his speech on 24 May, and accepting on Pompidou’s request to call on 30
QO
May for new elections instead of a referendum . Even the turnaround of 29-30 May left a bitter 
taste in De Gaulle’s mouth. Confiding to Debre, he was convinced that “ 1Z5 [French people] ont 
eu peur du vide”99.
Thus, the Gaullist regime had not crumbled, but at what cost for its ambitious foreign 
policy? The domestic disruptions, coupled with the previous difficulties in its Westpolitik and 
Ostpolitik, had effectively left the General’s grand design in pieces. In previous years, the French 
position on monetary matters, the British entry to the EEC, or even the Kennedy Round, had 
effectively been grounded in the fact that it ran an economically tight ship, and could thus afford 
to be critical of those who did not. Following les evenements, however, France suddenly found 
itself with the budget deficits and the weakened currencies for which it had criticised the Anglo- 
Saxon countries. As Pompidou summed up eloquently: “The France of General de Gaulle was 
brought back to its real dimensions ... No more war against the dollar. No more lessons given to 
the mighty of this world. No more leadership of Western Europe”100. Moreover, As Couve 
pointed out to Debre, his successor at the Quai d’Orsay, “the stature of the General is no longer
97 For the speech, see De Gaulle, DM:V, pp.292-293
98 Guichard, Olivier, Mon General. (Paris: B. Grasset, 1980), p.432
99 Debre, Memoires IV. p.217
100 Pompidou, Pour retablir une verite. p. 196
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what it was, and all the reports of our Ambassadors declare that our partners will not easily 
forget our internal difficulties”101.
That is not to say that France was incapable of having a foreign policy in the aftermath of 
May 1968. The official declaration of 31 July after the Council of Ministers, defending Biafra’s 
right to self-determination in the Nigerian civil war, showed De Gaulle was still able to provoke 
and surprise people102. Yet, it was hard to escape the fact that all the avenues for an ambitious 
action on the international scene were truly blocked for the French government: The EEC was 
still in a stalemate because of the question of enlargement; within NATO, France could do little 
more than criticise the Reykjavik ‘signal’ on mutual force reductions, and argue that it 
contributed to perpetuating the policy of blocs103. Finally, relations with Washington had reached 
some sort of uncomfortable freeze. Paris could no longer condemn American policy in Vietnam 
since the latter had started peace talks, and it was in no position to challenge the dollar 
hegemony104. The only possible field of action was the East-West rapprochement, but even that 
was fraught with problems.
For a start, despite Debre’s best attempts to convince people otherwise, there was a clear 
tension between claiming to fight totalitarian communism domestically, and pushing for 
cooperation with the Eastern bloc externally105. Furthermore, the future of France’s policy of 
detente depended to a large extent on how events unfolded in Czechoslovakia, and once again 
the situation was far from promising. The Soviet leaders became very alarmed after Czech 
intellectuals issued on 27 June the “2,000 words” statement, which indicted twenty years of 
Communist party dictatorship and demanded accelerated reforms. Despite the pressures in July 
from all his Warsaw Pact partners -  with the exception of Romania -  to re-impose censorship
101 Debre, Memoires IV. p.229
102 DF: PEF, 1968-1969: Declaration at end of Council of Ministers, 31.07.68. For more on French policy towards 
Biafra, see Foccart, Jacques, Le General en Mai: Journal de l’Elvsee. Tome II 1968-1969. (Paris: Fayard, 1998) or 
Wauthier, Ouatre Presidents.
103 MAEF: Pactes 1961-1970, Vol.272 bis: Seydoux to Debre, Telegram number 1025-1033,05.07.68
104 NARA: RG59, CFPF, 1967-1969, Box 2102: Shriver to Rusk, Telegram number 18471, 24.07.68; TNA: FCO 
33/45: Paris to FO, Telegram number 719, 12.07.68
105 DF: PEF, 1968-1969: Debre Interview with Paris-Presse-LTntransigeant, 10-11.07.68
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and curb the intellectuals, Dubcek refused to give in106. In these conditions, and before 
proceeding with East-West normalisation, the Kremlin believed it had no choice “but to 
demonstrate to the world its incontrovertible resolve to maintain the neo-Stalinist regimes in 
Eastern Europe”107. During the night of 20-21 August, Warsaw Pact troops entered 
Czechoslovakia and put an end to the Prague spring.
10RThis invasion was not just, as Debre claimed, a serious “incident de parcours” . While 
President Lyndon Johnson said goodbye to his summit in Moscow, De Gaulle said goodbye to 
his grand design to overcome the Cold War order. As Alphand summed up a few days later in his 
diary: “It is maybe indeed the end of a grand effort to reunite two worlds beyond ideology ... So 
the General’s disappointment must be very profound, after the unrest of May and June, and the 
blows to the country’s economy and finance, as well as to his morale”109.
VI. Conclusion
General de Gaulle remained President for another eight months, only resigning on 28 
April 1969, after 53% of the electorate had disavowed by referendum his proposal for a reform 
of the Senate and of the regions. However, his ambitious foreign policy agenda, or his quest to 
gain Great Power status for France and to overcome the Cold War order, had become a clear 
pipe dream by the time the Soviet troops entered Prague. The events in Paris and Prague 
painfully confirmed to the General, and to the rest of the world, the internal and external limits of 
his grand design.
May 68 not only shook France and its image abroad as prosperous and stable, but also De 
Gaulle’s own prestige. He could no longer count on his unique aura to pursue a dramatic foreign
106 See especially Kramer, “Czechoslovak Crisis”, in Fink, Gassert, and Junker, 1968. pp. 133-151; Rothschild and 
Wingfield, Return to Diversity, p. 171
107 Newton, Russia, France, p.80
108 Debrd, Memoires IV, p.259
109 Alphand, L'etonnement, 25.08.68, p.513
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policy, nor did France have the available means either110. Following the unrest, domestic 
problems became the priority, including the weakening franc. The currency became involved in a 
major speculative crisis, which nearly resulted in devaluation in November, as France’s total 
reserves dropped from $6.9 billion in April to just under $4 billion in November111. At the same 
time, Moscow’s policy was becoming more cautious, and increasingly interested in a dialogue 
with Washington.
Certainly, De Gaulle’s foreign policy was in trouble well before August 1968. The
119rapprochement with the Eastern bloc had only produced limited results . France was isolated in 
the international monetary field. That said, even taking into account those difficulties, May 1968 
and the crushing of the Prague spring were nonetheless particularly significant. They 
dramatically confirmed that the French people were simply not ready to make the needed 
sacrifices for De Gaulle’s ambitious foreign policy agenda, while Kremlin leaders would not 
accept a loosening of their control over the states of Eastern Europe.
110 TNA: FCO 33/45: Paris to FO, Telegram number 719, 12.07.68
111 Solomon, Monetary System, pp. 151-155
112 Vaisse, La grandeur, p.443
261
Conclusion
On 9 September 1968, less than three weeks after the Soviet tanks had rolled into Prague, 
French President General Charles de Gaulle gave one of his regular press conferences. It was 
not, however, to be one of those memorable or shocking speeches, like that of January 1963 or 
even February 1965, to which the world had become accustomed. Instead, the whole 
performance was far more austere and reflective, as De Gaulle seemed to contemplate his legacy 
and achievements. Since 1958, he claimed, France had worked ceaselessly to end the division of 
Europe into two blocs. In that period, it had finalised reconciliation with West Germany, 
progressively withdrawn from NATO which subordinated Europe to the US, taken part in the 
EEC and prevented it from being absorbed into a larger Atlantic Community, and renewed 
relations with Eastern Europe. The events in Czechoslovakia were, thus, particularly worthy of 
condemnation because they were absurd in the context of detente, and simply the expression of 
Soviet hegemony in the Eastern Europe. Yet, the General ended on a slightly more positive note. 
In his view, the Czech attempt to obtain a beginning of liberation, and to refuse enslavement, 
confirmed that the French policy of detente was correct and in line with European realities. 
Unless a world conflict came to upset events, he concluded that the evolution towards a 
rapprochement between both sides of Europe was inevitable1.
De Gaulle resigned a few months later, after the electorate rejected by referendum his 
proposals to reform the Senate and the regions. He left with the frustration of not having been 
able to see through to completion all his grand initiatives. Once out of office, he remained out of 
the public eye, and mostly focussed on writing his memoirs, which were supposed to cover his 
time as President between 1958 and 1969. By the time of his death in November 1970, he had 
only managed to complete the first of the three planned volumes, dealing with the 1958 to 1962 
period, leaving a series of questions unanswered. In particular, there was still the all-important
1 De Gaulle, DM: V. pp.333-335
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issue of understanding what had been the ultimate intentions of French foreign policy between 
1963 and 1968. To what extent was Paris, as the General implied in his September 1968 press 
conference, actually aiming to overcome the Cold War order? Alternatively, to what extent was 
French policy simply rhetoric, that is to say a skilful manipulation of bold stated goals to serve 
more narrow nationalist or domestic causes?
This dissertation has tried to argue that De Gaulle did possess a grand design which, 
despite its flaws and contradictions, was largely coherent and centred on two objectives. The first 
one revolved around recovering France’s independence, especially in the field of defence, and 
striving to recapture its lost Great Power status. The pursuit of grandeur, of an ambitious 
diplomatic agenda, was both a means and an end. For the General, misquoting Hamlet, to be 
great meant being able to sustain a great quarrel2. Only by striving for a higher goal, and being 
ready to make the necessary sacrifices, could France avoid decline, and overcome its traditional 
divisions. At the same time, grandeur also implied the determination to be an actor, not an 
object, a player, and not a stake3. De Gaulle was convinced that France needed to occupy the 
world stage, because its rightful status was to be a great power at the forefront of international 
affairs.
Of course, he remained enough of a realist to acknowledge that France could not really 
compete with the superpowers, especially in the military sphere. Yet, he also believed that it 
could compensate for some of its limitations through a creative and spectacular diplomacy. By 
relying on secrecy, surprise and a great sense of timing, such as with the recognition of 
Communist China or the withdrawal from NATO, the General could give more impact to his 
foreign policy initiatives. He could prove that France still mattered. Moreover, De Gaulle’s 
desire to reclaim his country’s Great Power status equally stemmed from his profound conviction 
that it was not only France’s duty, but also in its nature, to serve the interests of mankind. As he 
told Peyrefitte, “France’s authority is moral [...] Our country is different than others because of
2 Quoted by Jackson, De Gaulle, p. 138
3 D ’Escrienne, Le General, pp.218-219; Vaisse, La grandeur, pp.682-683
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its disinterested and universal vocation [...] France has an eternal role. That is why it benefits 
from an immense credit. Because France was a pioneer of American independence, of the 
abolition of slavery, of the rights of people to dispose of their own fate. Because it is the 
champion of nations’ independence against all hegemonies. Everyone realises that: France is the 
light of the world, its genius is to enlighten the universe”4.
Thus, De Gaulle’s second objective revolved around transforming the international order 
and helping to overcome the status quo inherited from the Cold War, especially in Europe. He 
always believed that a multipolar world would be more stable than a system centred on the 
rivalry between the superpowers. When he came back to power in 1958, he already possessed, as 
Soutou argues, a long-term blueprint to reshape European security. This was not a rigid guide for 
policy, nor an agenda that the General could or wanted to pursue consistently. For example, 
between 1958 and 1962 or the period of tension over Berlin, he supported a firm stance against 
the Soviet Union, despite the fact that his design involved a rapprochement with Moscow in the 
long-term5. Similarly, after 1963, he adopted a relatively defensive attitude towards the plan of a 
Western European political cooperation, once he realised it was unlikely to happen in the short­
term. He focussed instead on opposing any attempts to establish a wider Atlantic Community -  
noticeably by twice vetoing British applications to join the EEC, or by undermining the MLF -  
that in his view could jeopardise any future chances of developing a Western European union.
Nonetheless, De Gaulle always kept in mind his overarching aim, which meant that the 
various strands of his European policy were often closely connected. The most obvious example 
was, of course, the way in which Paris used the withdrawal from NATO to further the cause of 
East-West detente. In the same way, the challenge against the dollar was also tied to the growing 
criticism of American hegemony in other fields. In the long-run, as described in chapter four, the 
General envisaged a sort of pan-European security system, where American troops would 
eventually leave the continent. In return, the Soviet Union would abandon East Germany,
4 Peyrefitte, Cetait de Gaulle: vol.l. 13.02.63, p.283
5 Soutou, “De Gaulle’s France”, in Loth, Europe. Cold War, p. 173
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allowing German reunification and a real detente in Europe, along with independence for the 
satellite states. The two main pillars of the system would be France and the Soviet Union, as 
nuclear powers, but security would be guaranteed by an interlocking set of checks and balances. 
Paris and Moscow would contain Bonn, while a closer union between the states of Western 
Europe would contain Soviet power. The US would play its traditional role of underwriter and 
ultimate arbiter of the European order. This was a modernised version of the Concert of Nations 
of the 19th Century6.
The French President’s grand design was essentially Euro-centric. It is true that Gaullist 
rhetoric called for a new model of relations between developed and developing states, and that 
Paris was against the idea of seeing the Third World become a new Cold War battlefield. Yet, it 
is also true that in practice, France’s attitude towards the non-European world was at least as 
driven, if not more, by traditional Great Power interests and the need to spread influence, as was 
shown in chapter three. Additionally, with the exception of Vietnam, the importance of the Third 
World in De Gaulle’s grand strategy declined steadily after 1964. Even in the case of Indochina, 
his policy increasingly became affected by his general outlook towards the US, once Washington 
stepped up its involvement in the war7.
The two main aims of the General’s foreign policy, restoring French independence and 
overcoming the Cold War order, were not only very ambitious but also appeared as somehow 
incompatible. How could he simultaneously pursue a policy that vigourously defended French 
sovereignty, and pretend that it equally served the larger interests of the world? This 
contradiction was, however, more artificial than real. On the one hand, the pursuit of these twin 
objectives simply reflected De Gaulle’s own political philosophy that stood at the confluence 
between two traditions, one liberal and revolutionary, the other realist and Machiavellian8. On 
the other hand, these two goals were inscribed in very different time frames. Restoring France’s
6 Soutou, “La decision frangaise”, in Harder, Von Truman bis Harmel, pp. 194-196;
7 Devillers, “L’Asie”, in Institut, De Gaulle et le Tiers Monde, p.310
8 Charbonnel, L’Aventure, p. 128
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status was an immediate necessity, whereas transforming the international status quo would be a 
long-term development.
Moreover, the General never thought that France could single-handedly overcome the 
Cold War order. Rather, he was driven by the unshakeable conviction that the world was 
undergoing a significant and irreversible evolution, which was, for example, very clear in his 
attitude towards the process of East-West detente. As he explained to New York Governor 
Nelson Rockefeller, he essentially believed that the Cold War was an abnormal state of affairs, 
an aberration that would eventually give way to a more multipolar system. “It has never 
happened in modem times that one or two nations hold all the power. The US and the Soviet 
Union have all the means of power. All my life, I saw the power of Britain, France, Germany, 
Russia, Italy, and Japan before. It created equilibrium. Today, all has changed. Yet, France 
cannot accept that all the power in the world is shared between two countries. Deep down, all 
countries agree with us”9. France could thus recapture its Great Power status if it embraced the 
profound changes in the international system. That was how De Gaulle effectively attempted to 
reconcile the two central pillars of his grand design.
However, the General’s vision for France and for the world never came to be. His 
country failed to establish itself as a global power, and while the Cold War order evolved and 
eventually came to an end, it did so in different ways to those he had anticipated. Why was he 
ultimately unsuccessful? This can be explained by a variety of reasons. Firstly, De Gaulle faced a 
series of structural obstacles. On the one hand, France was simply not strong enough to play the 
role that its President wanted. The economy performed well throughout the 1960s, but it 
nonetheless remained the Achilles heel of the General’s popularity. Between 1964 and 1969, 
when people were asked specifically about economic issues, the discontented always 
outnumbered the satisfied10. Public opinion generally supported the goals of French foreign 
policy, but this could not prevent the widening gap between the President and his citizens, which
9 MAEF: CM, CD, Vol.376: De Gaulle-Rockefeller meeting, 03.10.63
10 Jackson, De Gaulle, pp. 118-119
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was clearly highlighted by the events of May 1968. If De Gaulle aspired to grandeur and spoke 
of the need for sacrifices, the rest of the population wanted more liberty and a better 
redistribution of wealth.
On the other hand, the Cold War structure proved resilient and not so prone to 
fundamental change. The growing diffusiveness of the international order, combined with the 
desire of smaller states to gain more autonomy, was undoubtedly favouring the emergence of a 
more multipolar world -  especially in the economic sphere -  but not to the point of really 
undermining the predominance of the superpowers. Rather than threaten the equilibrium, the 
various crises of the 1960s, such as the Six Day War, actually strengthened and underlined the 
latent bipolarity of the international system11. They convinced Moscow and Washington that 
they needed to cooperate more, if only to guarantee a certain predictability in East-West 
relations. At the same time, the difficulties of finding a workable alternative were often very 
apparent, as for example in the case of the international monetary system. As David Calleo 
argues, the American analysis was wrong but predominant, while the French one was correct but 
impractical. A gold standard, like any other plural but integrated system, ultimately relied on 
there being enough power dispersed throughout the system to force even the biggest state to obey 
the rules. This condition never prevailed12.
Furthermore, De Gaulle’s grand design also suffered from a series of flaws and 
contradictions13. As pointed out by many authors, he underestimated the role of ideology, in 
particular when it came to the communist bloc14. His plan for a new European security order 
effectively depended on the Soviet Union giving up its global ambitions, and accepting to play a 
more traditional balancing role on the continent. Yet, the Kremlin leaders were not prepared to 
follow that path. More generally, the General’s blueprint for overcoming of the Cold War order 
was in many ways too complex. It could only succeed, as Hoffmann points out, through an
11 Hoffmann, Essais, p.371; Vaisse, La grandeur, p.676
12 Calleo, “Golden Rule”, in Wahl and Paxton, De Gaulle and the US. pp.253-254
13 See for example Vaisse, La grandeur, p.679 for a detailed listing of these contradictions
14 Lacouture, De Gaulle: vol. 3. p.556
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extraordinary concordance of events and changes, whereby all states would realise that it was in 
their interest to follow the Gaullist vision15.
This is where the French President’s diplomatic style posed a major problem. Apart from 
his tendency to over-estimate his country’s power and genius, he was convinced that it could 
become a role-model for others. While his bold initiatives did win some praise, especially in the 
Third World, this did not necessarily translate into influence. More often than not, his unilateral 
and spectacular method of action irritated and offended partners. As Bnino Kreisky, Austrian 
Foreign Minister, summed up in February 1963, “A great country must have three 
characteristics. It must have a healthy economy: that is your [France’s] case. It must have a clear 
policy: you are one of the rare ones in that situation. It must be appreciated by others: this 
condition is not fulfilled; the Anglo-Saxon countries hate you; how do you want to pursue a great 
foreign policy, in today’s world, if the Anglo-Saxon countries hate you?” 16
Paris’ allies played a very significant role when it came to thwarting the General’s plans. 
As the years went by, they simply became more adept at dealing with the Gaullist challenge. 
This was very obvious in 1967-1968, when a series of crucial negotiations for the future of the 
Western world -  the second British application to join the EEC, the Harmel exercise for NATO, 
and the debates over the international monetary system -  reached their conclusion. Facing a 
united and determined opposition, France was often isolated and unable to have a significant 
impact on debates. Thus, it accepted the Harmel report even though it felt uneasy with some of 
its conclusions. Had it rejected it, Paris would have found itself in contradiction with its 
commitment to East-West detente.
Similarly, taking advantage of the monetary crisis in March 1968, the US managed to 
impose a series of changes that safeguarded the dollar as the central pillar of the global monetary 
system, and only partially reformed the Bretton Woods arrangement. Again, France faced a 
choice between two evils. It could have cooperated with its European partners, but this would
15 Hoffmann, Essais. p.375
16 Quoted in Vaisse, La grandeur, p.680
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have entailed accepting a flawed system. Instead, it preferred to maintain its freedom of action, 
in the hope that developments would turn in its favour and that other states would eventually 
accept the need to establish a new monetary mechanism. As for the EEC, while Paris 
successfully vetoed London’s application to join the Common Market, this was at best a pyrrhic
victory. The Five refused to let the British question die down, undermining in the process any
\
chances that the European countries would be able to agree on a united position in other spheres. 
This was, in a nutshell, the challenge of interdependence that France was never able to 
overcome. How could it expect the other European Community states to follow its line on 
monetary matters, if it pursued goals towards NATO and the EEC that were inimical to their 
interests?
De Gaulle failed to achieve all the aims set out in his grand design, but it would be 
misleading to judge his impact by this sole yardstick. While his actions during his lifetime often 
proved divisive and controversial, there is far more consensus when it comes to assessing his 
legacy. The General successfully ended the violent and divisive Algerian War, and he crucially 
helped to restore a sense of pride to France after the difficult years of the Fourth Republic. He 
left behind a country that was in a much stronger position domestically, and with a more 
confident and assertive attitude externally. France was not quite the global power that De Gaulle 
wanted, but it voice was now listened to throughout the world. It is another tribute to his 
importance that his presidential successors, both on the right and the left of the political 
spectrum, generally remained loyal to the central tenets of his foreign policy, even if they did not 
quite replicate his distinctive style. The Gaullist myth has continually grown in the three decades 
after his death, and he is now a figure of almost universal admiration17. His election as the 
greatest Frenchman of all time in a recent poll can be seen as a further proof of this.
Moreover, De Gaulle had a very significant influence on the Western world, albeit for 
ambivalent reasons. Undoubtedly, during the 1960s, he seemed to dedicate a lot of his time
17 Jackson, De Gaulle, p. 143
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towards obstructing or wrecking initiatives. For example, he twice vetoed Britain’s application to 
join the EEC, launched a campaign to undermine the MLF, and effectively gave up on the idea 
of European political cooperation. Similarly, his most famous and spectacular move, the 
withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structure, was in part a negative reaction to his 
inability to reform the Atlantic Alliance. However, the French President could also have a claim 
as a protector of Western unity. This may sound surprising in view of the previous arguments, 
but it is less so when considering the actual impact of the General rather than his intentions. As 
Ludlow argues, the way in which he conducted policy and criticised the US unintentionally 
helped to minimise the European challenge to American leadership. It therefore becomes 
possible to portray the would-be challenger of the Atlantic status quo as someone who actually 
made a generalised crisis within the Atlantic Alliance less likely than it would otherwise have 
been18. Additionally the Western world was that much stronger for having dealt with the test 
posed by De Gaulle. He often alienated allies by his methods, but he also highlighted a series of 
important questions -  in the economic, military and political spheres -  that threatened to 
undermine the fabric of transatlantic relations.
Finally, the General left a lasting impression on the history of the Cold War. Although 
the conflict did not end in the way he had imagined, he nonetheless played an important role 
because of the fact that he outlined an alternative to the bipolar order. Through his trips to the 
Soviet Union, Poland and Romania, he helped the cause of the rapprochement between the two 
divided blocs in Europe, and imposed the principle that East-West detente should precede the 
reunification of Germany. De Gaulle’s bold and pioneering policies inspired subsequent 
statesmen, even if they did not necessarily share the same objectives. This was the case, for 
example, for the Ostpolitik of West German chancellor Willy Brandt, or for US President 
Richard Nixon’s attempts to normalise relations with Communist China. Furthermore, he acted 
as a symbolic role-model for the rest of the world by his nose-thumbing at the superpowers. As
18 Ludlow, N. Piers, “The Protector of Atlantic Unity: De Gaulle’s unintentional boost to the Atlantic Alliance”, 
unpublished paper presented to the LSE-Columbia workshop on transatlantic relations, April 2004
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Gaddis argues, both China and France were in part able to do that because of the disappearance 
of fear. By the 1960s, they had become sufficiently strong within the framework of their 
respective alliances that they no longer suffered from the insecurities that had led them to seek 
alliances in the first place19. De Gaulle did therefore contribute to an important transformation in 
the nature of the Cold War and even, to an extent, hasten its demise. It did not end in exactly the 
manner in which he had predicted. Yet, in the aftermath of 1989 his vision of a world without 
blocs and of a Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals suddenly looked much less 
Quixotic than it had done two decades before.
19 Gaddis, The Cold War, p. 143
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Annex 2
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French Public Opinion and De G aulle’s Foreign Policy, 1966
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